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To see things and their real significance one needs the correct distance. Too close, and one is struck only by the 
details, one does not see the forest for the trees. Too far away, and one may have a good view on the whole, but 
one misses the particulars and their impact on the direct surroundings; that impact has often more to do with 
details than with the general structure. 
... we need an evaluation of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials now that almost twenty five years have passed. We 
need an evaluation, because they stand in history as a fact. On the facts of the past, starting from history, we 
have to build the future. 
At the time, participating in the Tokyo trial as one of the judges, the words of Macbeth alarmed me: 
... that we but teach 
Bloody instructions, which being taught, return 
To plague the inventor: (Macbeth, Act I, Scene VII) 
Are the 'bloody instructions', as formulated in the charters and executed in the judgments to plague us? Or to 
guide us? Will they be an asset, or a liability in the shaping of the future? Reappraisal of what happened in the 
postwar trials may contribute to the answers on that question. 
(Judge Bert V.A. Roling, The Nuremberg and the Tokyo Trials in Retrospect', Bassiouni and Nanda, A Treatise 
on International Criminal Law, Vol. 1, pp. 590-591, Charles C. Thomas, Illinois, U.S.A., 1973). 
CHAPTER 1 	INTRODUCTION 
Ever since the signing of the agreement in London on 8 August 1945 by representatives of the British, French, 
American and Russian Governments ('London agreement'), followed by the presentation to the International 
Military Tribunal sitting at Berlin on 18 October 1945 of the indictment against twenty four of the most 
prominent German military and political leaders, and the proceedings at Nuremherg which culminated in the 
judgement delivered on 30 September and 1 October 1946, there has been widespread and persistent controversy 
among lawyers, academics, scholars, historians and others, who have found 'Nuremberg Law" a fascinating 
research subject. The principal issue was, and remains, whether or not the trials conducted pursuant to the 
Charter annexed to the London Agreement had a sound jurisdictional basis. 
For the most part the views publicly expressed by writers on the issue have been firm and diametrically opposed. 
The orthodox moralist and pragmatic view 
Shortly after the sittings of the Tribunal began, Lord Wright, Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission from January 1945 until its dissolution in March 1948, wrote:- 
The Agreement [that is, the London Agreement includes as falling within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal persons who committed the following crimes: (a) crimes against peace, which means in 
effect planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression; (b) war crimes, by which 
term is meant mainly violation of the laws and customs of war; (c) crimes against humanity, in 
particular murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against 
any civilian population. 
The Tribunal so established is described in the Agreement as an International Military Tribunal. Such 
an International Tribunal is intended to act under International Law. It is clearly to be a judicial 
tribunal constituted to apply and enforce the appropriate rules of International Law. I understand the 
Agreement to import that the three classes of persons which it specifies are war criminals, that the 
acts mentioned in classes (a), (b), and (c) are crimes for which there is properly individual 
responsibility; that they are not crimes because of the agreement of the four Governments 
but that the Governments have scheduled them as coming under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 
because they are already crimes by existing law. On any other assumption the Court would not be a 
Court of law but a manifestation of power. The principles which are declared in the Agreement are not 
laid down as an arbitrary direction to the Court but are intended to define and do, in my opinion, 
accurately define what is the existing International Law on these matters. 2 
The four prosecutors, in opening addresses and speeches at the close of the cases against the individual defendants 
and the indicted organisations, argued strongly that the indictment merely reflected existing recognised principles 
of international law.3 
In its judgment, the Tribunal was unequivocally assertive. It said: 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement and Charter, and the crimes coming 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, for which there shall be individual responsibility, are set out in 
Article 6. The law of the Charter is decisive, and binding upon the Tribunal. 
The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to 
which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to 
legislate for the occupied territories has been recognised by the civilised world. The Charter is not an 
arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, as 
will be shown, it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; and to that 
extent is itself a contribution to international law. 
2 
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it was to administer, and made regulations 
for the proper conduct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of them might 
have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts 
to administer law. With regard to the constitution of the court, all that the defendants are entitled to 
ask is to receive a fair trial on the facts and law. 
The Charter makes the planning or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties a crime; and it is therefore not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what 
extent aggressive war was a crime before the execution of the London Agreement. But in view of the 
great importance of the questions of law involved, the Tribunal has heard full argument from the 
Prosecution and the Defence, and will express its view on the matter. 4 [As discussed in Chapters 11 
and 18, the sentence last cited was obiter]. 
It will be necessary to analyse the details of the indictment. It not only made provision for the 
trial of war crimes in the accepted sense of violations of the laws and customs of war (Count 
3), crimes stricto sensu, but also for the prosecution of those alleged to have been responsible 
for 'the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which 
involved the commission of, Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes against 
Humanity, as defined in the Charter of this Tribunal' (Count 1). Further, Count 2 of the 
indictment defined 'crime against peace' as participation 'in the planning, preparation, initiation 
and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, 
agreements and assurances'. Finally, Count 4 alleged 'crimes against humanity', as defined in 
the Charter. A noteworthy feature of the indictment in a jurisprudential sense was the provision 
for the Tribunal to declare certain organisations 'criminal'. The consequence of such a 
declaration was starkly thus stated in Article 10 of the Charter: 
In cases where a group or organisation is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the 
competent national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring 
individuals to trial for membership therein before national, military or occupation 
courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organisation is 
considered proved and shall not be questioned. 
Were new penal laws created by the victors? 
The argument that the provisions of the Charter were contrary to accepted principles of 
international law was succinctly expressed in a motion adopted by all defence counsel at 
Nuremberg on 19 November 1945. 5 The Tribunal rejected the motion on 21 November 1945. 
The basis of its decision was that, insofar as the motion was a plea to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, it was in conflict with Article 3 of the Charter. Defence counsel advanced three main 
arguments: 
(a) The relevant law was 'a new penal law ... enacted only after the crime'; as such it infringed 
the ex post facto principle. 
(b) 'Other principles of a penal character contained in the Charter are in contradiction with the 
maxim "Nulla Poena Sine Lege". 
(c) 'The judges have been appointed exclusively by States which were the one party in this 
war. This one party to the proceeding is all in one: creator of the statute of the Tribunal and 
of the rules of law, prosecutor and judge.' 
It is proposed in this thesis to examine the validity of the divergent views which can be distiled from the mass of 
literature relating to 'Nuremberg Law'. 6 However, such an examination will only be preliminary to what, in the 
author's view, is a more purposeful objective: that is, the evaluation of 'Nuremherg Law' from the viewpoint of a 
trial lawyer rather than against a background of academic polemics. It is by using the forensic methods of a trial 
3 
lawyer that attention may be most meaningfully focussed on what should be the primary task of a criminal 
advocate, whether for the prosecution or the defence. That task is the minute examination and analysis of the 
basic trial documents: in the case of Nuremberg, the London Agreement, the Charter of the Tribunal and the 
indictment. 
It will be submitted that much of the literature, whether it expresses concurring or dissenting views with respect 
to the validity of 'Nuremberg Law', places too much emphasis on the judgment of the Tribunal and not enough 
on the three basic documents. The London Agreement and Charter were a code which prescribed provisions 
designed to ensure, so far as it was practicable to do so, a fair trial, before the world, of German major war 
criminals, following the virtually undisputed acts of atrocity and inhumanity of a dimension never previously 
experienced. The International Military Tribunal went beyond the constituent documents and propounded a 
number of obiter propositions. Thereby the Tribunal itself sparked much of the controversy which the trial 
engendered. 
A further object of the study is to demonstrate that many of the critics of 'Nuremberg Law' ignored the facts that 
the German Reich had surrendered unconditionally to the major Allied Powers and that, in reaching agreement on 
the terms of the London Agreement and Charter, they were exercising sovereign legislative authority, analogous 
to that of the Parliament of the state of Israel when it enacted the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) 
Law of 1950. 
The study also includes, in as much detail as is practicable, an assessment of the procedural and evidential 
fairness of the Nuremberg trial. The object of such an evaluation is to demonstrate, from the perspective of a 
trial lawyer, that in such an emotive criminal trial as that at Nuremberg, courtroom 'atmosphere' and rulings on 
questions of evidence and procedure were more fundamental in ensuring a fair trial than dogmatic assertions 
concerning legal principles, such as the ex post facto doctrine and the maxim of nullum crimen nulla poena sine 
leae. The basic fact will always remain that the London Agreement and Charter were paramount and binding. 
The chapters of the dissertation have been arranged, in chronological order, commencing with a very brief sketch 
in Chapter 2 of the development of the laws and customs of war in four eras, up to the period between the 
declaration of war on 3 September 1939 and the complete disintegration and surrender of the Third Reich on 8 
May 1945. 
In Chapter 5 the view is expressed that the activities of the United Nations War Crimes Commission were not as 
significant as Lord Wright asserted and that the Nuremberg trial would have proceeded substantially as it did even 
if the Commission had never existed. 
Although the content of Chapter 6 is historical rather than legal, it is considered essential to appreciate the 
political and bureaucratic attitudes which ultimately found expression in the London Agreement and Charter; the 
more so because such attitudes are illuminated by documents which have only comparatively recently been 
declassified and made available for public scrutiny. It is demonstrated in Chapter 6 that American policies 
dominated the discussions which culminated in the London Agreement and Charter and found expression in the 
indictment, which was permeated by the peculiarly Anglo-American concept of criminal conspiracy. 
Chapters 7. 8 and 9 are essentially analyses, by a trial lawyer, of the basic documents, particularly the indictment 
(Chapter 8), the scope and content of which dictated to a large degree the admissibility of evidence and made an 
unduly lone trial inevitable. 
In Chapter 12, a fundamental basis of the defence - the existence of superior orders - is examined as a separate 
issue. The conclusion is reached that the specific provision in the London Charter whereby that defence was not 
available, except in relation to the mitigation of punishment, was legally proper (Article 8). 
The purpose of the discussion in Chapter 13 of the 'Subsequent Proceedings'. as they were commonly designated, 
before American Tribunals at Nuremberg is to provide the background for demonstrating the different conclusions 
by some of the Tribunals, compared with the International Military Tribunal, on a number of the fundamental 
legal issues, in particular the charging of the crime of conspiracy together with charges of substantive offences 
which were the subject of the alleged conspiracy. 
Chapter 14 traces the developments in Australia which preceded the establishment of the International Military 
Tribunal for the Far East ('Tokyo Tribunal'). The discussion in that chapter is directed at establishing that, 
4 
contrary to many views which have been expressed, including that of the Tokyo Tribunal itself, there were basic 
differences in the manner in which the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were established and in the provisions of 
the respective charters. 
It is in Chapter 18 that the author crystalises his conclusions on the Nuremberg process in a discussion of the 
most important issues. The basis for such a discussion is laid in preceeding chapters. The thesis stated in that 
chapter is that the Nuremberg principal trial process was justified on legal grounds, and was also an expression 
of world conscience and overwhelming norms of morality. Above all, the process was generally fair and just. 
None of those sentenced to death at Nuremberg could have expected any more lenient treatment. Their realisation 
of their fate was attested by the fact that three of those who did not face trial at Nuremberg—Hitler, Goebbels and 
Ley—chose the alternative of suicide. 
The view is also expressed in Chapter 18 that many of those who have dissented from the validity of 'Nuremberg 
Law' failed to appreciate the reality of the situation and did not take into account the status of Germany after 8 
May 1945. Nor did some of the critics acknowledge that international law is not a sterile or vacuous 
jurisprudence, but is capable of finding expression, in novel circumstances, with the same virility as has marked 
the evolution of the common law. 
The 'trial lawyer' approach was adopted for the thesis because the author felt unable to align his views and 
conclusions with the doctrinaire assertions of many writers on both sides of the debate. The claim of Lord Wright 
that Nuremberg Law' was simply an application of existing international law is misleading. The arguments of 
many of the most vocal critics that principles such as ex post facto and nullum crimen sine lege vitiated the 
whole Nuremberg process are not tenable. The correct view, in the author's opinion, is that the principles 
incorporated in the London Agreement and Charter, although not in actual existence on any universal or even 
generally accepted basis in international law, were nevertheless nascent at the time of the surrender of the Third 
Reich. Further, such nascent norms were justifiably transformed into binding rules as a consequence of the forces 
unleashed by Germany, as a matter of national policy, to a point at which international order and world peace 
were exposed to destruction and all human values were abandoned. 
5 
NOTES 
1. See Professor Geoffrey Best, 'Nuremberg and After: the continuing history of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity', The Stenton Lecture 1983, University of Reading 1984, pp. 3-4: 
... I am using Nuremberg as a portmanteau or umbrella word to cover all the trials and tribunals 
established to deal with alleged war crimes and so on after the second world war. Nuremberg is a 
perfectly good short title for them since it was in its purposes the grandest, in its long-term 
consequences the weightiest, and although not quite the first, at once accepted as authorising all 
the others. 
2. (1946) 62 L.Q.R., p. 41. 
3. For example, Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. 11, Mr. Justice Jackson, U.S.A., pp. 142-152; loc. cit., vol. 
III, Sir Hartley Shawcross, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, pp. 94-109; loc. cit., vol. VII, General 
Rudenko, U.S.S.R., pp. 147-154; loc. cit., vol. V, M. de Menthon, the French Republic, pp. 388-391. 
4. I.M.T. Judgment. p. 38. 
5. For the verbatim text of the motion, see Appendix I, Chapter17. 
6. In an introductory chapter to Military Tribunals and International Crimes, Greenwood Press, 1971 
(originally published in 1954), Dr. J.A. Appleman, of the Illinois Bar, U.S.A., gave a vivid quantitative 
description of the masses of documents and materials considered at Nuremberg. 
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CHAPTER 2 	OUTLINES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS AND 
CUSTOMS OF WAR IN FOUR ERAS 
INTRODUCTION 
It is proposed in this chapter to survey, in brief outline, the development of the laws and customs of war in four 
eras: 
(a) Prior to the First World War, 
(b) The period immediately following. the First World War; 
(c) Between the two World Wars up to 3 September 1939; and 
(d) During. the Second World War and immediately thereafter. 
The purpose of such a survey is to establish the extent to which principles of international law, as they were 
purportedly embodied in the London Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945 and in the Nuremberg indictment 
existed at the time the indictment was formally presented to the Tribunal. 1 
The survey involves primarily the attitudes of states and what may broadly be termed 'semi-government' or 
'semi-official' agencies. However, action taken, and proposals made, by what are described as 'specialist bodies' 
also have been included, because they reflect the thinking of prominent jurists, scholars and international 
lawyers. 
THE PERIOD PRIOR TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
Although some writers have sought to identify 'precedents for the trial of German major war criminals at 
Nuremberg in isolated trials of individuals, dating from wars involving ancient Greece, through the Napoleonic 
era and up to the end of the 19th cenrury2, there does not appear to be any basis for such a view. The times were 
different, the circumstances were dissimilar, questions of hegemony were involved and, in most of the cases, the 
crimes alleged were simply cases of murder.3 
Professor Woetzel observed4 
... it must be concluded that it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a parallel between the trials in 
ancient Greece and the I.M.T. in view of the difference in time and circumstances. In any case, modern 
international law has no direct roots in antiquity, and any connection between these two epochs would 
be extremely vague and tenuous, as far as the law of nations is concerned. 
Nevertheless, there are isolated reported examples in the 18th and 19th centuries in which individuals were 
charged and convicted for offences punishable because they infrineed 'the law of nations'. 5 
The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 ushered in a period of new international concentration on 
principles considered appropriate in relation to war crimes. In the judgment of the International Military 
Tribunal (I.M.T.) it was stated6 : 
That violations of these provisions constituted crimes for which the guilty individuals were punishable 
is too well settled to admit of argument. 
The concept of the 'laws of war' is described in History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the 
Development of the Laws of War in the following terms: 
7 
Laws of war are the rules of international law with which belli2erants have customarily, or by special 
conventions, agreed to comply in case of war. They involve certain mutual legal obligations and duties 
respecting warfare. The origin of the laws of war can be traced back to practices of belligerents which 
evolved during the latter part of the Middle Ages. 
That description and the supporting examples of general treaties concluded between the majority of states 
prior to the Hague Convention of 1907, are referable only to war crimes in the strict sense, and do not 
illuminate the controversial elements of the Nuremberg indictment: conspiracy, crimes against peace and crimes 
against humanity. 7 
THE PERIOD IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
The Paris Peace Conference (1919) 
Within less than three months after the Armistice it was decided at plenary session of the Preliminary 
Peace Conference on 25 January 1919 to establish a Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors 
of the War and on the Enforcement of Penalties. The Commission comprised two members named by each of 
the five major Powers and five members elected from among the Powers with special interests. It was required 
to report on, inter alia, the constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of breaches of the 
laws and customs of war committed by enemy armed forces. 8 
The most important pronouncements of the Commission with respect to (a) acts which provoked the 
world war and accompanied its inception, and (b) violations of the laws and customs of war and the laws of 
humanity included:9 
... the Commission is of opinion that, having regard to the multiplicity of crimes committed by those 
Powers which a short time before had on two occasions at The Hague protested their reverence for right 
and their respect for the principles of humanity, the public conscience insists upon a sanction which 
will put clearly in the light that it is not permitted , cynically to profess a disdain for the most sacred 
laws and the most formal undertakings. 
The premeditation of a war of aggression, dissimulated under a peaceful pretence, then suddenly declared 
under false pretexts, is conduct which the public conscience reproves and which history will condemn, 
but by reason of the purely optional character of the institutions at The Hague for the maintenance of 
peace (International Commission of Inquiry, Mediation and Arbitration) a war of aggression may not be 
considered as an act directly contrary to positive law, or one which can be successfully brought before a 
tribunal such as the commission is authorised to consider under its terms of reference. 
... We therefore do not advise that the acts which provoked the war should be charged against their 
authors and made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal. 
On the special head of the breaches of the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium, the gravity of these 
outrages upon the principles of the law of nations and upon international good faith is such that they 
should be made the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference. 
On the whole case, including both the acts which brought about the war and those which accompanied 
its inception, particularly the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, it would be right 
for the Peace Conference, in a matter so unprecedented, to adopt special measures, and even to create a 
special [emphasis added] organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors of such acts. 
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With regard to 'violations of the Laws and Customs of War and of the Laws of Humanity', the Commission 
stated: 
Every belligerent has, according to international law, the power and authority to try the individuals 
alleged to be guilty of the crimes of which an enumeration has been given in Chapter II on Violations 
of the Laws and Customs of War, if such persons have been taken prisoners or have otherwise fallen 
into its power. Each belligerent has, or has power to set up, pursuant to its own legislation, an 
appropriate tribunal, military or civil, for the trial of such cases. These courts would be able to try the 
incriminated persons according to their own procedures, and much complication and consequent delay 
would be avoided which would arise if all such cases were to be brought before a single tribunal. 
The Commission enumerated four categories of charges for 'outrages' which it considered should be dealt 
with separately by what it termed 'a high tribunal'. It recommended: 
(a) That the tribunal be composed of three persons appointed by each of the following Governments: The 
United States of America, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan, and one person appointed by 
the Governments of Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia and Czechoslovakia. 
(b) That the law to be applied by the tribunal shall be 'the principles of the law of nations as they result 
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates 
of public conscience'. 
(c) That 'each Allied and Associated Government adopt such Legislation as may be necessary to support 
the jurisdiction of the international court, and to assure the carrying out of its sentences'. 
The Commission's recommendations were an attempt to bring about the establishment of a tribunal with 
basic jurisdiction similar in some respects to that of the Nuremberg Tribunal twenty five years later. However, 
the absence of agreement within the Commission on the state of established legal principles relevant to the 
jurisdiction of the proposed tribunal is manifest in a 'memorandum of reservations', presented by the 
representatives of the United States of America, to the Commission's report. 1 ° 
In the memorandum, the American representatives stated the following opinions: 
(a) ... the American representatives believed that the nations should use the machinery at hand, which had 
been tried and found competent, with a law and a procedure framed and therefore known in advance, 
rather than to create an international tribunal with a criminal jurisdiction for which there is no 
precedent, precept, practice, or procedure. 
(b) A judicial tribunal only deals with existing law and only administers existing law, leaving to another 
forum infractions of the moral law and actions contrary to the laws and principles of humanity. 
A further objection lies in the fact that the laws and principles of humanity are not certain, 
varying with time, place and circumstance, and according, it may be, to the conscience of the 
individual judge. 
(c) ... the American representatives ... were averse to the creation of a new tribunal, of a new law, of a 
new penalty, which would be ex post facto in nature, and thus contrary to an express clause of the 
Constitution of the United States and in conflict with the law and practice of civilized communities. 
Each of those three precepts was rejected by those who established and practised 'Nuremberg Law'. 
The recommendations of the Commission were not adopted by the Peace Conference and were not included 
in the Treaty of Versailles. 
In a discussion of the findings and recommendations of the Commission, t:he author of Chapter III of History 
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of U.N.W.C.C., Dr. J. Litawski, a Polish lawyer, emphasised the use by the Commission of the words 'laws 
of humanity' (p. 36): 
... it appears that the two categories of offences with which the Commission of Fifteen concerned itself, 
namely, violations of the laws and customs of war, on the one hand, and offences against the laws of 
humanity, on the other, correspond generally speaking, to 'war crimes' and 'crimes against humanity', as 
they are distinguished in the two Charters of 1945 and 1946 and in the Control Council Law No. 10. 
Thus. in 1919 we find, for the first time, the specific juxtaposition of these two types of offences.  
(emphasis added). 
The Advisory Committee of Jurists. 1920 
The marked differences of contemporary opinion on the state of international criminal law were illustrated 
when, in 1920-21, the Council of the League of Nations appointed a Committee ('the Advisory Committee of 
Jurists') to prepare plans for the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice. 
In summary form, the action taken by the Committee has been thus described: 11 
The Council of the League of Nations, in February 1920, decided to appoint a committee for the 
purpose of preparing plans for the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice 
provided for in Article 14 of the Covenant. 
In addition to the plan for the Permanent Court of International Justice. this Advisory Committee of Jurists 
adopted, as the expression of their voeu, three resolutions which were transmitted, late in 1921, to the Council 
and Assembly of the League of Nations. The second of these resolutions suggested the establishment of a high 
court of justice, separate and distinct from the International Court of Justice in organization and jurisdiction. This 
court was to be composed of one member for each State, to be chosen by the group of delegates from each State 
represented in the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The preliminary draft of this suggestion was contained in a 
proposal concerning 'the organization of international justice', submitted by the President of the Advisory 
Committee, Baron Descamps. Two of its articles, dealing with the establishment of a high court of international 
justice 'for the purpose of trying crimes against international public order, and against the universal law of 
nations', read as follows: 
'The High Court of International Justice is composed of one member for each State, chosen 
respectively by the group of delegates from each State to the Court of Arbitration. 
The High Court of International Justice shall be competent to hear and determine cases which 
shall be submitted to it by the Assembly of the League of Nations or by the Council of the 
League, and which concern international public order, for instance: crimes against the 
universal law of nations.' 
One member of the Committee, Mr. Elihu Root, a representative of the U.S.A., said that serious difficulties 
existed, for 'unless there is a law to be broken there can be no penalty for breaches of it. As only States are 
subject to international law, an individual can only be punished if the act which he has committed is punishable 
according to the national law which applies to the case.' 12 Other members expressed doubts as to the 
soundness of the proposal. For example, Dr. Loder said the plan suggested the establishment of a court 
before a definition of the law to be applied, and crimes against the universal law of nations were mentioned 
which were not yet defined. Under such circumstances, he said, 'the court could only be of a political nature'. 13 
Finally, the Committee adopted three resolutions, the second of which recommended for the consideration of 
the Council and of the Assembly of the League of Nations the following proposal for the establishment of a 
High Court of International Justice: 
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Article 1. A High Court of International Justice is hereby established. 
Article 2. This Court shall be composed of one member for each State, to be chosen by the group of 
delegates of each State at the Court of Arbitration. 
Article 3. The High Court of Justice shall be competent to try crimes constituting a breach of 
international public order or against the universal law of nations, referred to it by the Assembly or by 
the Council of the League of Nations. 
Article 4. The Court shall have the power to define the nature of the crime, to fix the penalty and to 
decide the appropriate means of carrying out the sentence. It shall formulate its own rules of procedure. 
On 27 October 1920, the Council of the League of Nations, in submitting the resolutions of the Committee of 
Jurists to the Assembly, advocated the adoption in part of the first resolution. This resolution suggested that a 
new inter-State conference to carry on the work of the Hague Conferences should be called as soon as possible, 
and that certain organisations specializing in international law should be invited to prepare draft plans to be 
submitted first to the various Governments and then to the conference- 14 
In submitting the resolutions of the Committee of Jurists to the Assembly, the Council stated its views relating 
to procedural step which it suggested should be taken concerning the Committee's second recommendation. 15 
The Council's report and that of the Committee of Jurists were referred to the Third Committee of the Assembly, 
which agreed with the opinion of the Council. It is significant that, in the course of the discussion, Mr. 
Lafontaine, the Belgian delegate, expressed the opinion that it was impossible to create an international criminal 
court 'since there was no defined notion of international crimes and no international penal law.' 16 
In its report to the Assembly, the Third Committee stated: 17 
The second recommendation communicated by the Jurists' Committee at The Hague advocates the 
establishment of a Court of International Criminal Justice, the object of which would be to prosecute 
crimes committed against international public order. The Third Committee holds that there is not yet 
any international penal law recognized by all nations, and that, if it were possible to refer certain crimes 
to any jurisdiction, it would be more practical to establish a special chamber in the Court of 
International Justice. The Committee therefore considers that there is no occasion for the Assembly of 
the League of Nations to adopt any resolution on this subject. 
In addition, the report of the Third Committee recommended: 18 
The Assembly of the League of Nations invite the Council to address to the most authoritative 
institutions which are devoted to the study of international law a request to consider what would be the 
best methods of co-operative work to adopt for the more precise definition and more complete co-
ordination of the rules of international law which are to be applied in the mutual relations of States. 
On 18 December 1920, the Rapporteur of the Third Committee, in presenting its report to the thirty-first plenary 
meeting of the Assembly, said: 19 
The Committee is of the opinion that it would be useless to establish side by side with the Court of 
International Justice another Criminal Court, and that it is best to entrust criminal cases to the ordinary 
tribunals as is at present the custom in international procedure. If crimes of this kind should in future be 
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bought within the scope of an international penal law, a criminal department might be set up in the 
Court of International Justice. In any case, consideration of this problem is, at the moment, premature. 
The Assembly did not adopt the recommendation of the Third Committee. 2° 
There was thus a strong body of opinion within the League of Nations in 1920 that the principles of public 
international law had not reached a stage at which it could be asserted that international penal laws, as were later 
to be prescribed in the London Agreement and Charter, existed in such a form as would legally justify an 
indictment on the lines of that at Nuremberg. 
The Peace Treaties of 1919-23 
The 1919 Commission on Responsibility prepared a draft of provisions for inserting in treaties with enemy 
Governments. It was based on the Commission's concept of a 'High Tribunal'. But the Japanese and American 
members dissented on some material provisions, and the American representatives proposed to institute a new 
'Committee of Inquiry'. Rather than defer the matter further, the Commission declined to agree to the proposal 
and submitted a report to the Preliminary Peace Conference on 29 March, 1919. 21 Thus the victorious Allied 
Powers were obliged to sign the Treaty of Versailles without having been able to reach agreement on the trial of 
'War Criminals'. It was for this reason that, with the exception of the special clause relating to the former 
German Emperor, Wilhelm II of Hohenzollern, the relevant provisions of the Treaty (Articles 228, 229 and 230) 
merely recognised the right of military tribunals to try 'war criminals'. The terms of these Articles were: 
Article 228 
The German Government recognises the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before 
military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. 
Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will 
apply notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory 
of her Allies. 
The German Government shall hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers, or to such one of them as 
shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of 
war, who are specified either by name or by the rank, office or employment which they held under the 
German authorities. 
Article 229 
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of one of the Allied and Associated Powers will be 
brought before the military tribunals of that Power. 
Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the Allied and Associated 
Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the 
Powers concerned. 
In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel. 
Article 230 
The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the 
production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, 
the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation reciation of responsibility. 
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The American members of the Commission successfully maintained their firm view in relation to 'the laws of 
humanity', an expression which was not included in Articles 228 to 230. Rather, the scope of liability was 
confined to 'acts in violation of the laws and customs of war'. The nature of the tribunals was simply expressed 
as 'military'. Thus the concept of an International Tribunal as conceived for Nuremberg, even though its title 
included the word 'military', was no part of the Versailles Treaty or of the Peace Treaties with Austria, 
Hungary and Bulgaria.22 
The lack of concert among the Allied Powers before and after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, and the 
limitation in that Treaty of the curial bodies which would try 'war criminals' allowed 'Germany to take the 
initiative. In December 1919 a law was passed conferring on the Supreme Court of the Reich, at Leipzig, 
jurisdiction to try war criminals. On 25 January1920 the German Government informed the Allied Powers that 
they had organised the machinery to deal with their criminals within the German judicial system. 23 
The provisions of Article 227 are a further example of the way in which the American view prevailed--on this 
occasion, in relation to the issue of the responsibility of chiefs of State for offences against the laws and customs 
of war. The first paragraph of Article 227 provided for the public 'arraignment' of the Kaiser 'for a supreme 
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties'. The third paragraph constituted a political 
statement. Clearly, the intention was to establish a legal basis, by reliance on the peace treaty provision, for the 
trial of the Kaiser by a 'special tribunal' of five judges, one from each of the five Allied Powers. The concept of 
'international morality and the sanctity of treaties', each such concept being one of moral judgment, was to be the 
basis of the tribunal's jurisdiction. 24 
Peace treaties with Turkey 
It would not be necessary to consider, in the context of this chapter, the peace treaties with Turkey but for the 
manner in which they were perceived by Dr. Litawski, the author of Chapter III of History of U. N . W. C . C. 
The first peace treaty with Turkey--the Treaty of Sevres--was signed on 10 August 1920. Articles 226-228 
followed the pattern of Articles 228-230 of the Treaty of Versailles. In addition, Article 230 contained the 
following provisions: 
The Turkish Government undertakes to hand over to the Allied Powers the persons whose surrender may 
be required by the latter as being responsible for the massacres committed during the continuance of the 
state of war on territory which formed part of the Turkish Empire on the 1st August, 1914. 
The Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to designate the Tribunal which shall try the persons so 
accused, and the Turkish Government undertakes to recognise such Tribunal. 
In the event of the League of Nations having created in sufficient time a Tribunal competent to deal with 
the said massacres, the Allied Powers reserve to themselves the right to bring the accused persons 
mentioned above before such Tribunal, and the Turkish Government undertakes equally to recognise such 
Tribunal. 
It can be accepted that Article 230 was intended to be applicable to the massacres committed by Turkish forces 
and authorities against Turkish subjects (Armenians and the Greek-speaking population of Turkey). These 
massacres had been the subject of a Declaration on 28 May 1915 by the Governments of France, Great Britain 
and Russia, in which those Powers stated that all members of the Turkish Government and its implicated agents 
would be held responsible. 25 
The author of the chapter cited above asserted:26 
The warning thus given to the Turkish Government on that occasion by the Governments of the Triple 
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Entente dealt precisely with one of the types of acts which the modem term 'crimes against humanity' is 
intended to cover, namely, inhumane acts committed by a government against its own subjects. 
It was also asserted27 that '... in this [the Versailles] Treaty, as well as in the Peace Treaties with Austria, 
Hungary and Bulgaria, the view of the American members [of the Commission on Responsibility] eventually 
prevailed, and references to the "laws of humanity" do not appear in these treaties'. 
The same author, referring to Article 230 of the Treaty of Sevres, stated: 29 
This article constitutes, therefore, a precedent for Articles 6(c) and 5(c) of the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters, and offers an example of one of, the categories of 'crimes against humanity' as understood by 
these enactments. 
However, the cited assertions, considered collectively, ignore two principal matters. First, they disregard the fact 
that the expression 'crimes against humanity' was excluded from all relevant treaties, and only the words 'acts in 
violation of the laws and customs of war' criminal acts', and (in the case of the Treaty of Sevres) 'massacres' 
were used. Second, they ignore the fact that the Treaty of Sevres was not ratified and did not become effective. In 
its place the Treaty of Lausanne was signed on 24 July 1923. This made no reference to 'war crimes'. Instead, 
despite the 1915 Declaration by the Governments of France, Great Britain and Russia and the 1920 Treaty, the 
Treaty of Lausanne was accompanied by a 'Declaration of Amnesty' for all offences committed between 1 August 
1914 and 20 November 1922. This was presumably because of Soviet pressure. 
It is difficult therefore to accept the assertion that Article 230 of the Treaty of Sevres was a precedent for Article 
6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. A warning in 1915 which did not lead to any action, a provision in a treaty which 
was made in 1920 but not ratified and a 'Declaration of Amnesty' in 1923 are unimpressive support for a 
precedent for Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter. 3° 
The Leipzig trials 
Much of the preparation for the London Agreement and the Nuremberg Charter should, irrespective of the extent 
to which it was justified in law, be examined against the background of the Leipzig trials and the fate of the 
former Emperor of Germany. 
The Leipzig trials are generally seen by historians to have been farcical and demeaning to the Allied Powers. 31 
The reluctance of the German authorities to hand over to the Allied and Associated Powers 'persons accused of 
having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war' (Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles) led 
to a compromise proposal by the German Government that instead of handing over accused persons to the Allies, 
the German Government would bring the accused persons, to trial before the Supreme Court of the German 
Empire sitting in Leipzig. Following a declaration by a commission, appointed to examine the proposal, that it 
was 'compatible' with Article 228 of the Versailles Treaty, it was accepted with a qualification, which was never 
implemented, that if justice was not administered in good faith and a fair punishment was not imposed upon the 
guilty, the Allies would set aside the proceedings and bring the accused for a new trial before their own courts'. 
The details of the Leipzig trials are not of present direct relevance, but the following summary demonstrates that 
those who were responsible for bringing 'Nuremberg Law' into existence must have been resolute to avoid a 
repetition of the juridical sabotage at Leipzig of the provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles: 32 
The net result of the trials was that out of a total of 901 cases of revolting crimes brought before the 
Leipzig Court, 888 accused were acquitted or summarily dismissed, and only13 ended in a conviction; 
furthermore, although the sentences were so inadequate, those who had been convicted were not even made 
to serve their sentences. Several escaped and the prison warders who had engineered their escapes were 
publicly congratulated. 
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The lessons which the Allied representatives who framed the London Agreement and Charter in 1945 must 
have learned from the legal aftermath of the First World War, are clear: 33 
... it is apparent that the demand by public opinion that the war criminals of 1914-1918 should be made 
to answer for their crimes had ended in a failure. When one reads Articles 228 and 229 of the Versailles 
Treaty it is obvious that the German offer to try the war criminals before their own courts was in 
complete opposition with the letter and with the spirit of the Treaty. The fact that only about ten 
accused were sentenced to punishments which were quite out of proportion with the gravity of the 
crimes, and that these penalties were never really served, showed the German public that the provisions 
of the Treaty of Versailles concerning retribution were being flouted, and led them to believe that the 
other provisions of the Treaty could be just as easily disregarded. 
Kaiser Wilhelm II 
Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty came into force on 10 January 1920, by which time the former Emperor of 
Germany had been given refuge in Netherlands. The details of the negotiations for the extradition of the 
former Emperor are significant only from the viewpoint of the legal basis on which it was sought and on 
which it was refused. 
Article 227 provided: 
The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German 
Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. 
A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to 
the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: 
namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan. 
In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to 
vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international 
morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers should be imposed. 
The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for a 
surrender to them of the Ex-Emperor in order that he may be put on trial. 
On 16 January 1920 the Secretary-General of the Peace Conference addressed a letter, signed by Clemenceau, to 
the Dutch Minister seeking the handing over of the former Kaiser. It contained details of several crimes 
committed by the Germans during the war. 
The response by the Minister of the Dutch Government was given on 24 January 1920. The refusal of the request 
for extradition was based on four mounds: 34 
(a) Holland was not a party to Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles; 
(b) Holland could not accept the international duty 'of associating herself with an act of high international 
politics of the Powers'; 
(c) Should, however, the League of Nations establish an international body competent to decree in a case of 
war on facts qualified as crimes and provide sanctions beforehand (emphasis added)—Holland would adhere 
to this; and 
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(d) 	Holland had 'des tout temps' been 'tine terre de refuge PQ1i  les vaincus des conflits intemationaux'.  
The legal foundations for the refusal of extradition as set forth in the letter of the Dutch Government were: 
(a) Article 4 of the Dutch Constitution provides for equal protection for both Dutch and foreigners on 
Dutch soil; this was laid down in the Law of 6th April, 1875, revised 15th April, 1886, on which 
extradition treaties with France (1895), Great Britain (1898) and the United States (1887) were 
concluded. 
(b) In view of the above, the request for extradition should have been formulated in accordance with the 
laws and treaties of Holland. 
(c) The crime for which extradition had been sought was qualified 'L'offense supreme contre la morale 
intemationale et l'autorite des traites  ne figure pas dans les, enales inserees dans les lois de 
Hollande ou les traits par elle conclus'. Nor could the Dutch Government have rendered legal 
help for the repression for an act which was not punishable even according to foreign law. 
(d) The political character of the crimes did not qualify the case for extradition. 
On 15 February 1920 a new Note was addressed to the Dutch Government seeking a revision of its view. The 
Note used the expression 'les droits et les principes de l'humanite'. 35 The Dutch Government declined to reverse 
its previous decision. 
The refusal of the request for the extradition of the former Kaiser reflects the differences of opinion which 
prevailed at the time in relation to the legal basis of the charges against him. From the contemporary records,36 
it seems likely that the basic justification for the Dutch Government's refusal of the request for extradition was 
that either the wrong procedure was adopted or there was in existence no appropriate procedure. Of probable equal 
weight, however, was the failure of the Allied Powers to particularise the precise legal character of the former 
Kaiser's conduct. As the author of Chapter XI of History of U.N.W.C.C. stated (at p.242): 
The Powers claimed him, without qualifying his deeds from a strictly legal point of view, for 'moral 
responsibility', which is not a legal term at all, and for 'the laws and principles of humanity', which 
were not recognised legal terms either. 
THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS UP TO 3 SEPTEMBER 1939 
The Covenant of the League of Nations 
Twice in the present century, the end of a World War has been followed by the establishment of an international 
organisation designed to promote; peace among nations. The first was the League of Nations, created after the 
First World War; the second was the United Nations Organisation,established in 1945. 
The endeavours of the members of each body did not meet with, and have not met with, any significant success, 
particularly in the case of the League of Nations. It cannot be argued that the League, through its activities, was 
responsible for any developments of significance in the concept of the principles of international criminal law, 
although it was responsible for the framing of the Covenant. This was not due to the fault of the members of the 
League but rather to the limitations in the Covenant within which it operated. In Chapter IV of History of 
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U.N.W.C.C. it was stated: 
The Covenant of the League of Nations sought to eliminate war but it stopped half way. It did not 
outlaw war, but, by means of Articles 12, 13 and 15, it endeavoured to delay the outbreak of wars, by 
insisting on the submission of disputes likely to lead to war to arbitration or judicial settlement. 
From the viewpoint of the extent to which there was, in 1919, a body of recognised principles of international 
criminal law, paragraph 7 of Article 15 of the League's Charter is significant. Despite the provisions in Articles 
12, 13 and 14 for the settlement of disputes between nations, paragraph 7 of Article 15 stipulated that if the 
Council of the League could not reach a unanimous decision, after the failure of other attempts at settlement 
under preceding Articles of the Covenant, 'the members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take 
such action as they may consider necessary for the maintenance of right and justice' (emphasis added). The author 
of Chapter IV of History of U.N.W.C.C. observed (p. 53) that 'this paragraph was the notorious "gap" in the 
Covenant by which any war, even an aggressive one, could be waged within the bounds of legality'. This 'gap' 
continued to exist throughout the history of the League, despite the provisions in Article 16 for the use of so-
called 'sanctions', which were not a powerful or effective deterrent, either in theory or practice. However, various 
other treaties sought to fill the 'gap'. 
The Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Unratified Geneva Protocol, 1924 
Article 8 of the Covenant of the League prescribed the principle of the reduction of armaments, but its 
implementation involved technical difficulties and little progress was made. The impotence of the provisions in 
Article 8 is thus emphasised by F.P. Walters, formerly Deputy Secretary General of the League of Nations 37 : 
The essence of [Article 8] of the Covenant was that the States should renounce their right to be the sole 
judges of their own armaments, and that this most dangerous of all questions, the very heart and fortress 
of nationalism, should be brought under international control. Neither this nor any of the obligations of 
the Covenant in regard to disarmament was destined to be fulfilled. No such plan as had been there 
foreseen was ever prepared by the Council. The arms traffic was never brought under the control of the 
League. Private manufacture of war material was neither prohibited nor regulated. The pledge that full and 
frank information as to their armed forces and their war industries should be exchanged between Members 
of the League was treated as impracticable ... The principal governments of the world continued to believe 
that their security depended above all on maintaining armaments equal or superior to those of their 
neighbours ... each country insisted on maintaining the right to be the judge of its own needs. 
The unwillingness of many states to abide by the provisions of Article 8 of the Covenant without a collateral 
system of guarantees against aggression led to the drafting in 1923 of a Treaty of Mutual Assistance', 
whereby it was provided, inter alia, that 'aggressive war is an international crime'.38 The Draft Treaty 
received a mixed reception by member states. It was followed by the preparation by the Assembly of the 
League of a 'Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes', in the preamble of which it was 
again stated that 'a war of aggression constitutes ... an international crime'. 39 Discussion of the Protocol 
within the League merely resulted in a further declaration by the Assembly that a war of aggression should be 
regarded as an international crime. However, neither the Draft Treaty nor the Protocol was ratified. 'Thus, 
although war was declared in two instruments to be a criminal act, neither of the instruments was ever 
ratified, and, for the time being, the principle was not accepted as a statutory part of international law.4° 
The Locarno Treaties 
The fragile character of the treaties made in the 1920s is demonstrated by the sequel to the signing of a series of 
treaties and conventions at Locarno on 16 October 1925, involving several nations. The most important 
was the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy. Two of the 
series were Arbitration Conventions to which Germany was a party; other nations involved were Belgium, 
France, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 
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In History of U.N.W.C.C., p. 57, the following summary is given of the attitude of the League of Nations to 
these agreements: 
The Assembly, during its session in 1926, noted the importance of the Treaties of Locarno. It 
considered that the general ideas embodied in these treaties, whereby provision was made for conciliation 
and security by the mutual guaranteeing of States against any unprovoked aggression, might be applied 
to different parts of the world and should be accepted among the fundamental rules which should govern 
the foreign policy of every civilised nation. The Assembly expressed the hope that other Governments 
would put these principles into practice. 
The fact that Germany, in March 1936, committed deliberate breaches of the Locarno Treaty by the occupation of 
the Rhineland is a matter of history. However, what is not always recognised is that those breaches were 
condoned. When France protested to the Council of the League over Germany's action, the Council met in 
London. The German representative, von Ribbentrop (later to be sentenced to death at Nuremberg), argued that 
France had violated the Locarno agreements by signing the Franco-Soviet pact in 1935. He said that Germany 
was prepared to offer Europe an agreement guaranteeing peace for 25 years. The British Foreign Secretary took 
the view that the breach of the Treaty did not carry with it any threat of hostilities or involve immediate action. 
Consequently, no action was taken, although Britain and France notified Belgium that they considered her 
released from any obligations under the Treaty of Locarno. 41 
The breaches by Germany of the Treaty of Locarno were the subject of particulars in paragraph VII of Appendix 
C of the Nuremberg indictment (see Chapter 8). 
General Act for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, 1928 
The Act is mentioned in this section because, following the Locarno Treaties and the Pact of Paris, 42 it 
recognised the desire of many members of the League that the Pact of Paris should be supplemented by positive 
obligations on the signatories to resort to the pacific settlement of disputes. However, when the Act was 
introduced into the Assembly it met opposition. The delegate of Hungary said his country could not fulfil the 
moral duty of putting the Act into effect without adequate guarantees of security. He asked: 'How can we, 
disarmed and defenceless, conclude a treaty of mutual assistance with nations armed to the teeth?' Accordingly, 
the Hungarian delegation refrained from voting for the General Act. 43 
A discussion of the Pact of Paris is deferred until Chapter 18. 
The Italo-Abyssinian War' 4 
The discussions within the framework of the League of Nations on the, conflict between Italy and Abyssinia, 
which continued from December 1935 until May 1936, highlighted two important facts: one was the incapacity 
of the League to fulfil its Charter of achieving the goal 1 of peace between nations; the other demonstrated the 
ambivalence of many nations in their adherence to the letter of the League's Covenant and the provisions of the 
Pact of Paris. 
The imposition of sanctions against Italy in accordance with Article 16 of the Charter appears to have been half-
hearted and certainly was ineffective. By a resolution of 4 July 1936, the League formally abandoned sanctions, 
and, in doing so, acknowledged its failure in the matter. 45 
More importantly, the British Government, on 16 April 1938, concluded an agreement with Italy, whereby it 
recognised the de facto Italian Government in Abyssinia, the capital of which, Addis Ababa, was occupied by 
Italy on 5 May 1936, four days before Italy formally annexed the State of Abyssinia. Some other member States 
of the League recognised the annexation, but others did not do so. The expressed attitude of the British 
Government at the meeting of the Council of the League on 16 April 1938 was that 'the recognition of a de facto 
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situation could not be held up indeftnitely by adherence to international principles of morality' 46 (emphasis 
added). 
The final decision of the Council is summarised in these terms: 'The Council ... decided, in view of the 
admission in the Assembly's resolution of 4 July 1936 that the League had failed, ... that the question of the 
recognition of Italy's position in Ethiopia was one which every member of the League must be held entitled to 
decide for itself in the light of its own situation and obligations'.47 
The decision of the Council, made only a few weeks after the annexation by Germany of Austria, illustrates the 
ambivalent attitude of member states of the League. In the case of Italy, its breach of the Pact of Paris was 
condoned; in the case of Germany, its similar, although far more outrageous, act against Austria was made the 
subject of a charge in the Nuremberg indictment. Although the circumstances of the two cases were very 
different, and the annexation of Austria was only one of many violations of treaties pleaded in the Nuremberg 
indictment, nevertheless the Pact of Paris was broken in each case, followed by annexation. The Tribunal at 
Nuremberg placed considerable emphasis' on the binding force of the Pact of Paris. 48 
The Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the Sino -Japanese War49 
Although on an infinitesimal scale compared with actions of the German Government that involved the, 
violation of treaties and conventions, the Japanese aggression which precipitated the Sino-Japanese War in 1931 
was frequently denounced as a breach of treaties, in particular of the Pact of Paris. Again, discussion within the 
League of Nations was protracted. The Council declared the applicability to Japan of Article 16 of the Covenant, 
but the provision for sanctions was not implemented. 5° 
The resolutions of the League were of little, if any, help to China, and the final resolution in the saga, on 30 
September 1938, again reflected the impotence of the League and the readiness of nations to condone the breach 
of the Pact of Paris. The resolution stated, in part, that: 
... The grave international tension that had developed in another part of the world could not make them 
[that is, members of the League] forget the sufferings of the Chinese people, their duty of doing nothing 
that might weaken China's power of resistance, or their undertaking to consider how far they could 
individually extend aid to China.'51 
Proposals of Specialist Bodies 
The International Law Association (I.L.A.)  This is a body which, although not closely knit, met regularly. From 
time to time, its members discussed matters relating to the laws of war. 
At its Thirtieth Conference at The Hague in 1921, it considered a proposal that there should be a codification of 
the laws of war, but the proposal was not implemented.52 
In the following year, at its Thirty First Conference at Buenos Aires, following the initiative of Dr. Hugh H.L 
Bellot, it was resolved that the creation of an International Criminal Court was essential in the interests of 
justice.53 
In accordance with an instruction to Dr. Bellot at that conference, he presented to the Thirty Third Conference of 
the Association at Stockholm in 1924 a draft statute for a permanent international criminal court. Following 
discussion, the Conference, without expressing any view upon 'the practicability or expediency' of the proposal, 
referred it to a Committee to 'see if a scheme for such a Court can be composed'. 54 
That Committee, termed the Permanent International Criminal Court committee', reported to the Thirty Fourth 
Conference of the Association at Vienna in 1926, that its opinion was that the creation of a permanent 
international criminal court was not only 'highly expedient, but also practicable'. 55 
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The draft statute presented by Dr. Bellot provided for the establishment of an International Penal Court as a 
Division of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, with separate jurisdiction 'in the cases of 
States and individuals charged with international offences as hereinafter defined'56 (emphasis added). The Seat of 
the Court was to be at The Hague. 
Article 21 provided for the jurisdiction of the Court in the following terms: 
The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all charges of: 
(a) Violations of international obligations of a penal character committed by the subjects or citizens of 
one State or by a heimatlos against another State or its subjects or citizens. 
(b) Violations of any treaty, convention or declaration binding on the States parties to the Convention 
of ..., which regulate the methods and conduct of warfare. 
(c) Violations of the laws and customs of war generally accepted as binding by civilised nations. 
Without prejudice to the original jurisdiction of the Court as hereinbefore defined, the Court shall have 
power to deal with cases of a penal character referred to it by the Council or Assembly of the League of 
Nations for trial, or for inquiry and report. 
In the event of a dispute as to whether the Court has jurisdiction the matter shall be settled by the 
decision of the Court. 
The terms of the draft statute, which may be taken as reflecting the opinions at the time of persons with expert 
knowledge of the basic principles of international criminal law, were a much more specific expression of those 
principles than had previously existed. In particular, the provisions that judgment only could be pronounced, but 
that sentence could not be passed, in respect of a state or a subject or citizen of a state which was not a party to 
the Convention or had not accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, were a recognition that, unless a state was a 
party to the Convention or had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court, it was jurisprudentially unsound to inflict 
punishment, at least by way of sentence.57 Nevertheless, those provisions were a recognition of the principle of 
consent. 
The provision in paragraph (a) of Article 21 that 'violations of international obligations were only justiciable if 
the obligations were 'of a penal character' represents the limit to which the concept of the exercise of criminal 
jurisdiction by an international court, had, in the opinion of the Association, advanced by the year 1926. 
The Inter-Parliamentary Union.  The Twenty Third Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union, which comprised 
European and American members of Parliament, was held in Washington, D.C., and in Ottawa in 1925. It 
considered a report submitted by Professor M.V.V. Pella, Professor at the University of Bucharest and a member 
of the Romanian Parliament, on behalf of the Permanent Committee for the Study of Juridical Questions of the 
Union, concerning the criminality of wars of aggression and the organization of international repressive 
measures. 
The Conference passed a resolution to institute a permanent sub-committee within the Committee for the Study 
of Juridical Questions: (a) to undertake the study of all the social, political, economic and moral causes of wars 
of aggression to find practical solutions for the prevention of that crime; and (b) to draw up a preliminary draft of 
an International Legal Code. 
The Conference directed the attention of the sub-committee to the fundamental principles stated by Professor 
Pella in his report and which were summarised in an annex to the resolution. 58 Paragraphs 1-4 of the annex 
provide& 
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I. The International Legal Code must apply to all nations. 
2. Measures of repression should apply not only to the act of declaring a war of aggression. but also to 
all acts on the part of individuals or of bodies of persons with a view to the preparation or the setting 
in motion of a war of aggression. 
3. The principle should be recognised that individuals, independently of the responsibility of States, are 
answerable for offences against public international order and the law of nations. 
4. The Offences committed by States or by individuals should be laid down and penalties provided for in 
advance in enactments drawn in precise terms. International repression should be founded on the 
principle nulla poena sine lege' (emphasis added). 
A number of sanctions applicable to individuals were prescribed in the annex, but they did not include the death 
penalty. 
The list of offences committed by individuals which it was proposed should be justiciable under the International 
Legal Code included 'international military offences and all other acts performed in time of war which are contrary 
to the rules and customs of international law' (emphasis added) and 'ordinary common law offences committed by 
foreign armies in occupied territories (massacre, pillage etc.)': that is, crimes similar to, or analogous to, the 
crimes charged in Count 3 of the Nuremberg indictment. 59 
The International Congress of Penal Law 
The first International Congress of Penal Law was organised by the International Association for Penal Law and 
held at Brussels in 1926. Twelve reports and other documents were submitted on the subject of international 
criminal jurisdiction and discussion was based on Professor Pella's conclusions (see above). The Congress 
recommended that the Permanent Court of International Justice be given punitive powers, that it be competent to 
judge any penal liability of a state as a result of an 'unjust aggression' or any violation of international law, and 
that in addition it have jurisdiction to judge individual liabilities incurred as a result of crimes of aggression and 
similar crimes or offences and any violation of international law committed in peace or war'. There was also a 
specific proposal that 'all violations committed by States or by individuals should be provided for and sanctioned 
in advance by precise texts'. The Congress expressed the opinion that 'the end in view, namely the inauguration 
of a system of international penal justice, should be, realized progressively through separate agreements 
concluded between States and acceded to by other States'. 
The Congress also recommended that a committee of the Association be established to prepare a draft statute of 
an international criminal court. This Committee first met in Paris in 1927. It charged Professor Pella with the 
drafting of this document. It adopter' his draft in January 1928. The draft was communicated to all the 
governments represented at the Congress and to the League of Nations. The Congress was not an official body 
and lacked authority to implement its resolutions. 
The Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal Court (1937) 
The difficulty in prescribing rules of international law in the field of terrorism, which has some general analogies 
with the whole question of war crimes, was illustrated by the activities of the League of Nations in the 1930s. 
The genesis of these activities was the assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia at Marseilles on 9 October 
1934. As a result, the French Government addressed a letter to the Secretary General of the League of Nations 
'emphasizing the need for ensuring the effective suppression of political crimes of an international character and 
containing a statement of principles upon which an International convention for the suppression of terrorism 
might be based'.6° 
The response by the Council was significant from the viewpoint of its perception of the then current state of 
international criminal law. In a resolution adopted by the Council on 10 December 1934 61 , it expressed the 
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view that 'the rules of international law concerning the repression of terrorist activity are not at present 
sufficiently precise to guarantee efficiently international co-operation in this matter'. Nevertheless, it established 
a 'Committee of Experts' to examine the matter and to draw up a preliminary draft of an international convention 
'to assure the repression of conspiracies or crimes committed with a political and terrorist purpose'. 62 The 
progress towards the goal of an international convention, was slow, but in November 1937 the 'International 
Conference on the Repression of Terrorism', established by the Council of the League, considered two draft 
conventions prepared by the Committee of Experts, the second of which related to the creation of an international 
criminal court.63 The Convention provided for 
An International Criminal Court, with its seat at The Hague, comprised of five regular judges and five 
deputy judges; 
The application of substantive criminal law which 'shall be that which is the least severe. In determining 
what that law is, the Court shall take into consideration the law of the territory on which the offence was 
committed and the law of the country which committed the accused to it for trial. ... Any dispute as to 
what substantive criminal law is applicable shall be decided by the Court'. 
The Convention comprised fifty six Articles, most of which were procedural. It was opened for signature at 
Geneva on 16 November 1937. 
The significant feature of the Convention was that the national laws of the contracting parties were made the 
criteria for the determination of acts as criminal. This method of providing a basis for the trials of international 
terrorists had the advantage of achieving precision, and may have led to a similar approach in respect to war 
criminals. Further progress was precluded, however, by the outbreak of World War II, by which time the 
Convention had not come into force. 
THE PERIOD DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR AND IMMEDIATELY 
THEREAFTER 
From 1941 onwards the trial of war criminals became a major issue for the Allied Powers, and remained so until 
the end of the war. This period of more than three years was marked by a number of declarations by the leaders of 
the Allied Powers of their intentions to bring Axis war criminals to trial (see Chapter 4) and by discussions by a 
number of bodies, official and semi-official, of the concept of some form of international tribunal. 
The London International Assembly 
The London International Assembly, although not an official body, was created in 1941 under the auspices of 
the League of Nations Union. Its members were recognised by the Allied Governments established in London, to 
which it made recommendations. 
By the middle of 1943 the Assembly had reached certain conclusions, which were adopted on 21 June 
1943. A proposal for an International Criminal Court was included, and its jurisdiction stated as follows: 64 
That an International Criminal Court shall be instituted, and that it shall have jurisdiction over the 
following categories of war crimes: 
(a) Crimes in respect of which no national court of any of the United Nations has jurisdiction (e.g. 
crimes committed in Germany against Jews and stateless persons and possibly against Allied 
nations); 
(b) Crimes in respect of which a national court of any of the United Nations has jurisdiction but 
which the State concerned elects not to try in its own courts (for reasons such as the following: 
where a trial in the country concerned might lead to disturbances; where a national court would 
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find it difficult to obtain evidence ); 
(c) Crimes which have been committed or which have taken effect in several countries or against 
nationals of different countries; 
(d) Crimes committed by Heads of States. 
The principal provisions of the accompanying Draft Convention for the Creation of an International Criminal 
Court, which contained sixty two Articles, were: 65 
Article 1  
The United Nations hereby establish an International Criminal Court for the trial, as hereinafter 
provided, of persons accused of war crimes. 
Article 2 
1. War crimes are any grave outrages violating the general principles of criminal, law as recognised by 
civilised nations and committed in wartime or connected with the preparation, the waging or the 
prosecution of war, or perpetrated with a view to preventing the restoration of peace. 
2. War crimes can be perpetrated, either by direct action, or by participating in the crime, by aiding or 
abetting, inciting, conspiring or giving the order to commit the crime. 
3. War crimes can be perpetrated, as a principal or an accessory, by any person whatever, irrespective of 
his rank or position, Heads of State included. 
The scope of the proposed court's jurisdiction was thus expressed: 
Article 3 
1. As a rule, no case shall be brought before the Court when a domestic court of any one of the United 
Nations has jurisdiction to try the accused and it is in a position and willing to exercise such 
jurisdiction. 
2. Accused persons in respect of whom the domestic courts of two or more United Nations have 
jurisdiction may however, by mutual agreement of the High Contracting Parties concerned, be brought 
before the Court. 
3. Provided that the Court consents, any crime as defined in Article 2 may be brought before the 
International Criminal Court, either by national legislation of the State concerned, or by mutual 
agreement of the High Contracting Parties concerned in the trial. 
The Seat of the court was to be established in London, although the Court could decide to sit elsewhere. 
The official language of the Court was to be English. 
The most significant provisions, in the present context, were contained in Article 27, as follows: 
Law to be Applied 
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1. Until a convention laying down the main principles of international criminal law, defining the 
crimes and affixing penalties to them has been agreed upon, the Court shall apply:  
(a) International custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(b) International treaties, conventions and declarations, whether general or particular, recognised by 
the High Contracting Parties; 
(c) The general principles of criminal law recognised by the United Nations; 
(d) Judicial decisions and doctrines of highly qualified publicists as subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law. 
2. No act may be tried as an offence unless it is specified as a criminal offence either by the law of the 
country of the accused, or by the law of his residence at the time of the commission of the act, or 
by the law of the place where the act was carried out, provided in each case that such law is in 
accordance with the general principles of criminal law recognised by the United ' Nations . 
(Emphasis added at beginning of the Article). 
The only interpretation to which Article 27 is open is that in 1943 the London International Assembly did 
not consider that 'the main principles of international criminal law' had been established with sufficient 
precision and certainty so as to form an acceptable basis for the proposed court. 
Furthermore, the Draft Convention of 1943, proposed some two years before the execution of the London 
Agreement and Charter, placed jurisdictional emphasis on municipal law. It was such emphasis that those who 
framed the London Agreement and Charter were at pains to exclude, so that municipal law would give 
way to the 'international law' which was embodied in the Agreement and Charter (see Chapter 7). 
The International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development 
The deliberations of the International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development, a semi-
official body comprising jurists from the United Kingdom and a number of Allied countries, did not publicly 
make any specific proposals in respect of an international criminal court . 66 However, the following account of 
the views of members of the Commission is important in relation to the perceived state of international criminal 
law in the 1940s: 
In July 1942 a committee, including all the members of the Commission and set up to advise on the rules 
and procedure relating to the punishment of crimes committed in the course of and incidental to the Second World 
War, adopted an interim resolution stating that 'while most of us believe that the time is ripe for the 
establishment of a Permanent International Criminal Court, we all hold the provisional view that a very large 
percentage of the crimes which have been and will be committed incidental to and in the course of the present 
war (which for the present we shall merely refer to as "war crimes") can be punished by means of the 
jurisdiction of the municipal courts of the Allied Powers both civil and military'. 
The chairman of the committee on rules and procedure, Sir Arnold McNair, stated his opinion that the vast 
majority of criminal acts perpetrated by enemy nationals could be punished by resorting to existing national laws 
and tribunals.... there were several powerful arguments against the creation of an international criminal court and 
an international criminal code to be administered by it. 
Other members of the Commission, while agreeing that, as a rule, war criminals should be tried by 
municipal courts, felt that there were instances where an international court would be needed. One member, Dr. 
J.M. de Moor (Netherlands), listed as such instances the same categories of crimes as those mentioned by the 
London International Assembly ... A similar view was, in this respect. taken by other members who favoured 
an international jurisdiction. No elaborate proposals concerning the organization of the tribunal 
envisaged were submitted, but it may be noted that some members of the Commission suggested that 
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the court should include neutral and even enemy judges. 67 
The proposals of the Commission and its committee did not lead to any concrete plan considered in official 
circles. 
The United Nations War Crimes Commission 68 
The United Nations War Crimes Commission was established at a meeting held at the British Foreign Office, 
London, on 20 October 1943. 
In an introductory chapter to the History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development 
of the Law of War69, Lord Wright, Chairman of the Commission from January 1945 until it was disbanded in 
March 1948, stated: 7° 
... through the work of the Commission and other agencies, the United Nations had ready to their hands 
when the time came, a more or less practical scheme for the prosecution and punishment of war 
criminals, which was capable of being completed and put into effect when the Nazi resistance collapsed. 
Lord Wright's cited statement was obviously a reference to the 'Draft convention for the establishment of a 
United Nations war crimes court, with an explanatory memorandum', approved by the Commission on 26 
September 1944 and dated 30 September 1944.71 
That document is, from a legal viewpoint, the most comprehensive and authoritative, because of the manner in 
which the Commission was established, of all the non-Government documents which preceded the London 
Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945. The fact that the preparation of the draft convention may have been 
beyond the limited scope of the Commission's objects and powers 72 is immaterial. Its importance lies in the 
evidence which it provides of the conception at the time by some Allied Powers of the extent to which the 
principles of international criminal law had become established and were enforceable against the vanquished. It 
can be seen as part of the initial framework of the Agreement and Charter. 
The draft convention may conveniently be examined under the following heads: 73 (a) the preamble; (b) 
jurisdictional scope; (c) applicable law. Relevant provisions were: 
The preamble stated that the High Contracting Parties: 
... desirous of ensuring that the perpetrators of war crimes committed by the enemy 
shall be brought to justice, Recognising that in general the appropriate tribunals for the trial 
and punishment of such crimes will be national courts of the United Nations, 
... Have decided to set up an Inter-Allied Court before which the Governments of the 
United Nations may at their discretion bring to trial persons accused of an offence to 
which the Convention applies in preference to bringing them before a national court, ... 
(There followed twenty nine Articles) 
The most significant provisions of the Articles are reproduced as follows: 
Article 1  
I. There shall be established a United Nations War Crimes Court for the trial and punishment of 
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persons charged with the commission of an offence against the laws and customs of war. 
2. The jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to the trial and punishment of any person—irrespective 
of rank or position— who has committed, or attempted to commit, or has ordered, caused, aided, 
abetted or incited another person to commit, or by his failure to fulfil a duty incumbent upon 
him has himself committed, an offence against the laws and customs of war. 
Article 18 
The Court shall apply: 
(a) General international treaties or conventions declaratory of the laws of war, and particular treaties 
or conventions establishing laws of war between the parties thereto; 
(b) International customs of war, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; 
(c) The principles of the law of nations, derived from the usages established among civilized peoples, 
from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of the public conscience; 
(d) The principles of criminal law generally recognised by civilized nations; 
(e) Judicial decisions as subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of the laws of war. 
In an accompanying explanatory memorandum it was stated: 
The draft of the convention is self-explanatory. But, during the discussion of the draft there emerged 
from time to time certain points which, in the opinion of the Commission, would require elaboration. 
A number of these have been settled or clarified in the text of the draft convention as it gradually took 
its definite shape. There remain, however, certain matters which, as they have not found their way into 
the final text, have to be specifically dealt with in this memorandum. 
(a) During the preparatory work on the convention certain drafts were submitted in which a 
detailed list of war crimes was included in article 1. The list was not meant to be exhaustive and, after 
considerable discussion, the Commission found it appropriate not to include a detailed list but to 
confine itself to the terms of the first paragraph of article 1—'an offence against the laws and customs of 
war'. It is considered that this will give the Court the necessary latitude of action to carry out the 
intention of the Allied Governments as expressed in numerous public statements, notably the 
Declaration in Moscow dated 1 November 1943. 
(b) The Commission has considered the question of 'Superior Orders'. It finally decided to leave 
out any provision on the subject for the same reason as that for which it left out the detailed list of war 
crimes. The Commission considers that it is better to leave it to the Court itself in each case to decide 
what weight should be attached to a plea of superior orders. But the Commission wants to make it 
clear that its members unanimously agree that in principle this plea does not of itself exonerate the 
offender. 
It is obvious, but understandable, that the draft convention lacked the practical approach subsequently 
adopted in the final form of the London Agreement and Charter. compared with which its provisions were much 
less precise and less definite. More importantly, the authors of the draft convention - 
Did not purport to declare the law, as was done in the London Agreement and Charter, particularly 
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in Article 6 of the Charter, 
Did not attempt to make of the essence of the trials, allegations of (a) a common plan or conspiracy 
(Count 1); (b) crimes against peace (Count 2); or (c) crimes against humanity (Count 4); and 
Did not provide for declarations of the criminality of groups or organisations (Articles 9. 10 and 11 of the 
Charter). 
Indeed, the scope of the jurisdiction of the proposed United Nations War Crimes Court was expressly 
confined to an offence against the laws and customs of war' (Article 1). Article 18 should be interpreted simply 
as definitive of the basis of the jurisdiction expressed in Article 1. 
On 6 October 1944, the Chairman of the Commission sent copies of the draft convention and the explanatory 
memorandum to the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, to whom he also conveyed the unanimous request of 
the Commission that Mr. Eden should 'convene a diplomatic conference to consider, and if thought fit to 
conclude, a Convention for the Establishment of a United Nations Coure. 74 
Eventually, on 4 January 1945, the British Foreign Secretary replied to the Chairman of the Commission. 
Because it illustrates the difficulties and delay caused by the lack of agreement between the Allied Powers, the 
reply is set out as follows: 75 
... I think that both you and the other members of your Commission are well aware that His Majesty's 
Government have throughout doubted the desirability and the practicability, especially in view of the time 
factor, of the formal establishment of an Inter-Allied Court by Treaty for this purpose. On the other 
hand, His Majesty's Government fully appreciate that some Allied countries feel that for 
constitutional and other reasons it would be difficult for them to ensure in a satisfactory manner the trial 
of at any rate all cases in which they were concerned in their national courts, as contemplated in the 
Moscow Declaration. In such cases the proposal made by your Commission for the establishment of 
mixed military courts might well afford a satisfactory solution of this difficulty. 
It should be plain, however, that this is not a matter in which His Majesty's Government would desire, 
even if it were possible, to adopt a definite position without previous consultation with the Government 
of the United States, particularly as the military operations in Western Europe are on a joint basis, and the 
Supreme Command is now in the hands of an American general. Moreover, until the two Governments 
had reached, at any rate in principle, some conclusion as to the desirability of establishing an InterAllied 
Court by treaty it was obviously impossible to pursue the suggestion made in your letter for the 
convocation of a conference to negotiate such a treaty. The matter has accordingly been the subject of 
full consultation with the Government of the United States, and as soon as the views of the two 
Governments have been definitely formed it is the desire of His Majesty's Government that the other 
Allied Governments concerned should be approached with a view to consultation as to the measures 
to be adopted. 
Although the United Nations War Crimes Commission gave its final approval to the draft convention at a 
meeting on 3 October 1944, and the Chairman sent a copy of it to the British Foreign Secretary on 6 October 
1944, discussion continued, at the next meeting of the Commission on 10 October 1944, on the question of 
whether or not the preparation for, and launching of, the existing war constituted a war crime and should be 
considered by the Commission as such. The influence of Lord Wright was apparent. He strongly argued that 
such acts should be classed as war crimes. 76 
The provisions in the draft convention whereby the paramount role in the functioning of the proposed United 
Nations War Crimes Court would be assumed by Great Britain and the first conference of the representatives of 
the signatory Powers to elect the judges of the proposed Court would be held in London (Article 2), were not 
calculated to gain support for the proposal by the political leaders and governmental officers of the United States 
of America. From 4 January 1945, the date of the letter of the British Foreign Secretary to the chairman of the 
Commission, the 'Bernays Plan', based on the concept of 'conspiracy/criminal organisation', dominated the 
discussions among the Allied Powers. 76 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Three matters are clear from a survey of the development of the laws and customs of war in the period between 3 
September 1939 and 8 May 1945, and in the next three months up to the signing of the London Agreement and 
Charter. 
First, as is discussed in Chapter 6, American political and bureaucratic policies were the determining factors in 
the formulation of the principles upon which the London Agreement and Charter were based. 
Second, Great Britain was, on the day of Germany's surrender on 8 May 1945, no closer to the development of 
practicable, concrete proposals for the trial of war criminals than it had been immediately after the cessation of 
hostilities in the First World War. hi particular, British political leaders and their advisers had, at that date, failed 
to enunciate with any precision the principles of international law upon which they were to rely so strongly at 
Nuremberg. Thereby, they left the way open for the adoption and application of American policies which, almost 
exclusively, would become the basis for 'Nuremberg Law'. More importantly, the negative approach of the 
British Government, which had the benefit of the advice of such eminent jurists as Lord Simon and Lord Wright, 
left it open to the criticism that it was a party to the London Agreement and Charter more by default than by 
reason of its formulation of an appropriate legal basis for the trials. 
Third, the material so far surveyed indicates that it could not be validly asserted that there 'were in existence any 
Le& lata, or established and practised rules or principles of international law which in themselves were a sound 
legal foundation for the contentious provisions of the London Charter. But that is not to say that the London 
Charter lacked justification as a matter of law. Other factors were relevant, including the rights of the major 
Powers in a situation of Germany's unconditional surrender and the adaptation, from a jurisprudential viewpoint, 
of accepted principles of international law in unprecedented circumstances. Those factors will be examined in 
Chapter 18. 
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1. The indictment was presented to the International Military Tribunal at Berlin on 18 October 1945. (The 
principal sources to which reference is made in this chapter are: (a) History of the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War, His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 
1948: hereinafter cited as History of U.N.W.C.C.; (b) Historical Survey of the Question of International 
Criminal Jurisdiction, United Nations - General Assembly, International Law Commission, New York, 
1949: hereinafter cited as U.N.O. Historical Survey. The latter study was undertaken pursuant to General 
Assembly resolution 175 (II) instructing the Secretary-General to 'do the necessary preparatory work for 
the beginning of the activity of the International Law Commission, particularly with regard to the 
questions referred to it by the second session of the General Assembly ...' and to General Assembly 
resolution 260 (III) B requesting the International Law 'Commission to 'study the desirability and 
possibility establishing an international judicial organ for the trial of persons charged with genocide or 
other crimes over which jurisdiction will be conferred upon that organ by international conventions' and in 
carrying out this task to 'pay attention to the possibility of establishing a Criminal Chamber of the 
International Court of Justice'.) 
2. Examples of such trials are given by Woetzel, pp. 17-27. 
3. For example, the often cited case in 1474 of Sir Peter of Haeenbach, Governor of Breisach, the Upper 
Rhine: see Woetzel, pp. 19-22. 
4. Ibid., p. 19. 
5. Glueck, The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1946, cites a case in a 
Pennsylvanian Court in 1784, Respublica  v. De Long,champs, in which the defendant was convicted and 
sentenced to imprisonment and fine for insulting and threatening bodily harm to the Secretary of the 
French Legation. The Court said that the case 'must be determined on the principles of the law of nations 
(emphasis added by Glueck), which form a part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania; and, if the offences 
charged in the indictment have been committed, there can be no doubt that those laws have been violated'. 
6. Judgment, International Military Tribunal (I.M.T.), His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, Cmd. 6964, 
p. 64. 
7. History of U.N.W.C.C., pp. 24-29. 
8. U.N.O. Historical Survey, pp. 7-8 and Appendix 1, pp. 47 - 52. 
9. U.N.O., Historical Survey, Appendix 1, pp. 47-48, note 2: See the declaration of Baron Marschall von 
Bieberstein, who, speaking at the Hague Conference of 1907 with regard to submarine mines, used the 
following expressions: 'Military operations are not governed solely by stipulations of international 
law. There are other factors. Conscience, good sense, and the sense of duty imposed by the 
principles of humanity will be the surest guides for the conduct of sailors, and will constitute the most 
effective guarantee against abuses. The officers of the German Navy, I loudly proclaim it, will always 
fulfil in the strictest fashion the duties which emanate from the unwritten law of humanity and 
civilization'. 
10. For the text see (1920) 14 AJ.I.L., pp. 95-154. 
11. U.N.O. Historical Survey, pp. 8-9. 
12. Ibid., p. 9. 
13. Ibid., p. 10. 
14. Idem. 
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15. Ibid., p. 11. 
16. Records of the First Assembly of the League of Nations. 1920, tenth meeting of the Third Committee, p. 
329. 
17. Ibid., p. 764. 
18._ Idem. 
19. Records of the First Assembly of the Leaeue of Nations, 1920, plenary meetings, pp. 744-745. 
20. U.N.O. Historical Survey, p. 12. 
21. History of U.N.W.C.C., pp. 41-43. 
22. Ibid., p. 43. 
23. Ibid., p. 44. Consideration of the Leipzig trials is deferred until later in this Chapter. 
24. Jbid„ p. 44, where it is asserted: 'It is, however, evident that this arraignment of the Kaiser was not based 
on a charge of a violation of existing law; the ex-Kaiser was charged. according to what the authors of the 
Treaty considered to be the then existing state of international law, with offences against moral. not legal 
provisions.' (emphasis added). Secl quaere. It is more probable that the drafting of the first paragraph of 
Article 227 was influenced by political considerations, in the light of public outrage at German atrocities 
during the First World War, rather than by any view of the Allied Powers with respect to 'the then 
existing state of international law'. 
25. Thid., p. 35, notes 1 and 2. The expression used in the Declaration to describe the massacres was, in the 
French text, 'contra l'humanite et la civilisation'. 
26. Ibid., pp. 35-36. 
27. aid., p. 43. 
28. Ibid., p. 45. 
29. Idem., and footnote 2. 
30. A similar assertion in respect of Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles relating to Kaiser Wilhelm II, 
Emperor of Germany, is made in History of U.N.W.C.C., p. 240. In the cited source there is reference to 
the following extract from the formal statement of the Allied and Associated Powers in a Reply to the 
German Delegation's observations and the Conditions of Peace, after the signature of the Treaty of 
Versailles on 28 June 1919 (British and Foreign State Papers, 1919, vol. 112, H.M.S.O., London, 1922, 
pp. 255-316, at p. 282): '... the public arraignment under Article 227 framed against the German ex-
Emperor has not a juridical character as regards its substance, but only in its form. The ex-Emperor is 
arraigned as a matter of high international policy, as the minimum of what is demanded for a supreme 
offence against international morality, the sanctity of treaties and the essential rules of justice. The Allied 
and Associated Powers have desired that judicial forms, a judicial procedure and a regularly constituted 
tribunal should be set up in order to assure to the accused full rights and liberties in regard to his defence, 
and in order that the judgment should be of the most solemn judicial character'. The assertion in History  
of U.N.W.C.C., p. 240, is as follows: Thus it was made quite clear that the arraignment of the Kaiser 
was not based on a charge of a violation of the existing law, but that he had been charged, according to 
what: the authors of the Treaty considered to be the then existing state of international law, with offences 
against moral, not kgal provisions. Nevertheless, Article 227 of the Versailles Treaty may be regarded as 
the precursor of Article 6 (a) of the Nuremberg Charter and of Article 5 (a) of the Tokyo Charter 
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respecting crimes against peace, with the important distinction that the crimes against peace under these 
two Charters are not merely contraventions of a moral code, but violations of legal provisions'. The 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NUREMBERG INDICTMENT AND THE 
ELABORATION OF NATIONAL SOCIALIST DOCTRINES IN 'MEIN KAMPF' AND 
OTHER GERMAN WRITINGS, SPEECHES AND DOCUMENTS. 
INTRODUCTION 
It was fundamental to the strategy underlying the conspiracy Count in the indictment, that its 'central core' 
should be proved to have been the Nazi Party, established in 1920, and the political activities of Hitler and his 
associates thereafter. 
Under the heading of Particulars of the nature and development of the common plan or conspiracy' in Count 1 of 
the indictment, there was a lengthy pleading containing particulars of the 'common objectives, methods and 
doctrinal techniques' of the alleged conspiracy. An extract from the pleading is reproduced in an Annex to this 
Chapter. 
In its Judgment, the Nuremberg Tribunal linked the public pronouncements of Hitler in the early 1920s 
concerning the aims and objectives of the Nazi Party with several of the groups of crimes charged in the 
indictment. The Tribunal identified the following five points' in the platform of the Party, from its inception as 
the successor of the German Labour Party until it was dissolved in 1945, as relevant to the changes in the 
indictment 1 
Point 1. We demand the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany, on the basis of the right of 
a self determiation all of peoples. 
Point 2. We demand equality of rights for the German people in respect to the other nations; abrogation 
of the peace treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain. 
Point 3. We demand land and territory for the sustenance of our people, and the colonisation of our 
surplus population. 
Point 4. Only a member of the race can be a citizen. A member of the race can only be one who is of 
German blood, without consideration of creed. Consequently no Jew can be a member of the race 
• • • 
Point 22. We demand abolition of the mercenary troops and formation of a national army. 
The Tribunal emphasised the public utterances of Hitler. It said: 2 
Of those aims, the one which seems to have been regarded as the most important, and which figures in 
almost every public speech, was the removal of the 'disgrace' of the Armistice and the restrictions of the 
peace treaties of Versailles and Saint Germain In a typical speech at Munich on 13 April 1923, for 
example, Hitler said with regard to the Treaty of Versailles: 
The treaty was made in order to bring twenty million 
Germans to their deaths, and to ruin the German nation 
... At its foundation our movement formulated three demands: 
1. Setting aside of the Peace Treaty. 
2. Unification of all Germans. 
3. Land and soil to feed our nation. 
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The foundation of the Tribunal's judgment in respect of substantial parts of the indictment was its 
acceptance, as relevant evidence, of the statements of Hitler and his adherents in which they expounded their 
objectives, although not always the methods by which they intended to achieve them. The Tribunal stated: 3 
The demand for the unification of all Germans in the Greater Germany was to play a large part in the 
events preceding the seizure of Austria and Cechoslovalcia; the abrogation of the Treaty of Versailles 
was to become a decisive motive in attempting to justify the policy of the German Government; the 
demand for land was to be the justification for the acquisition of 'living space' at the expense of other 
nations; the expulsion of the Jews from membership of the race of German blood was to lead to the 
atrocities against the Jewish people; and the demand for a national army was to result in measures of 
rearmament on the largest possible scale, and ultimately to war. 
The admission of evidence of the nature described above was not, because of the allegations in the indictment, 
inconsistent with the ruling of the President during the presentation of the case for the defendant Hess. 
The argument of his counsel was that the Versailles Treaty was signed by Germany under duress and therefore 
was not binding on Germany as a state. The ruling was that 'evidence as to the injustice of the Versailles Treaty 
or whether it was made under duress is inadmissible and it [the Tribunal] therefore rejects Volume 3 of the 
documents on behalf of the defendant Hess'. 4 
THE DISCLOSURES IN 'MEIN KAMPF' 
Following the abortive Munich putsch on 8 November 1923, when Hitler and some of his followers attempted 
to organise a march on Berlin, Hitler was tried for high treason, convicted and sentenced to imprisonment. While 
in prison, he wrote Mein Kampf, published in 1925. Some of the most striking extracts from the book are 
reproduced below for the purpose of establishing that Hitler did not conceal his political views or intentions, all 
of which he pursued, and in most of which he succeeded, until the tide turned in 1943. However, his 
political pronouncements had no more significance, in a legal sense, than the political statements of the Allied 
Powers in the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943, although it has been claimed that the 
Declaration had some basis in international law for the establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal (see Chapter 
18).5 
Article 21 of the Nuremberg Charter provided that 'The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common 
knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. ...' 
In opening the United States case for the prosecution on Count 1, Major F.B. Wallis, Assistant Trial Counsel, 
said:6 
The main objectives of the Party, which are fastened upon the defendants and their co-conspirators by 
reason of their membership in. or knowing adherence to the Party, were openly and notoriously avowed. 
They were set out in the Party program of 1920, were publicized in Mein Kampf and in Nazi literature 
generally, and were obvious from the continuous pattern of publication of the Party from the date of its 
founding. 
Now two consequences, of importance in the Trial of this case, derive from the fact that the major 
objectives of the Party were publicly and repeatedly proclaimed: 
First, the Court may take judicial notice of them. [Article 21 of the Charter]. 
Second, the defendants and their co-conspirators cannot be heard to deny them or to assert that they were 
ignorant of them. 
The Prosecution offers proof of the major objectives of the 'Party - and hence of the objectives of the 
conspiracy - only to refresh or implement judicial recollection. 
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Extracts from Mein Kampf upon which the American prosecution focussed attention included: 7 
One must take the point of view, coolly and soberly, that it certainly cannot be the intention of Heaven 
to give one people fifty times as much space (Grund und Boden) on this earth as to another. One should 
not permit himself to be diverted in this case by political boundaries from the boundaries of eternal 
justice ... The boundaries of 1914 do not mean anything for the future of the German nation. They did 
not represent either a defense of the past nor would they represent a power in the future. The German 
people will not obtain either its inner compactness by them, nor will its nutrition be secured by them, 
nor do these boundaries appear from a military standpoint as appropriate or even satisfactory. 8 
• • • 
If one wanted territory in Europe, this could be done on the whole at the expense of Russia, and the new 
Reich would have to set out to march over the road of the former Knights, in order to give soil to the 
German plow by means of the German sword and to give daily bread to the nation. 9 
• • • 
If this earth really has space (Raum) for all to live in, then we should be given the territory necessary. 
Of course one will not give that gladly. Then, however, the right of self-preservation comes into force; 
that which is denied to kindness, the fist will have to take. If our forefathers had made their decisions 
dependent on the same pacifistic nonsense as the present, then we would possess only a third of our 
present territory ... In contrast, we, National Socialists, have to hold on steadily to our foreign political 
goals, namely, to secure on this earth the territory due to the German people. And this action is the 
only one which will make bloody sacrifice before God and our German posterity appear justified. 1 ° 
• • • 
Thus the question of how to regain German power is not: How shall we manufacture arms?, but: How 
do we create the spirit which enables a nation to bear arms? If this spirit governs a people, the will finds 
thousands of ways, each of which ends with a weapon!" 
• • • 
The lack of a great creative idea means at all times an impairment of the fighting spirit. The conviction 
that it is right to use even the most brutal weapons is always connected with the existence of a fanatical 
belief that it is necessary that a revolutionary new order of this earth should become victorious. A 
movement which does not fight for these highest aims and ideals will therefore never resort to the 
ultimate weapon ... It is not possible to undertake a task half-heartedly or hesitatingly if its execution 
seems to be feasible only by expending the very last ounce of energy ... One had to become clear in 
one's mind that this goal [that is, acquisition of new territory in Europe] could be achieved by fight 
alone and then had to face this armed conflict with calmness and composure. 12 
In a submission to the Tribunal, Major F. Elwyn Jones, Junior Counsel for the United Kingdom, said: 13 
This book, Mein Kampf, might be described as the blueprint of Nazi aggression. Its whole tenor and 
content enforce the Prosecution's submission that the Nazi pursuit of aggressive designs was no mere 
accident arising out of the immediate political situation in Europe and the world which existed during 
the period of Nazi power. Mein Kampf establishes unequivocally that the use of aggressive war to serve 
their aims in foreign policy was part of the very creed of the Nazi Party. 
Colonel Y.V. Pokrovsky, Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the U.S.S.R., cited the following extract from Mein 
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Kampf: 
The movement eastwards is continuing, even though Russia must be erased from the list of European . 
powers. 14 
It is of interest to contrast with the language of prosecution counsel the evidence of the defendant Schacht, 
who was acquitted on both the counts under which he was charged (Counts 1 and 2). He said: 16 
As far as the book Mein Kampf is concerned, my judgment has always been the same from the very 
beginning as it is today. It is a book written in the worst kind of German, propaganda of a man who 
was strongly interested in politics, not to say a fanatical, half educated man, which to me Hitler has 
always been. In the book Mein Kampf and in part also in the Party program there was one point which 
worried me a great deal, and that was the absolute lack of understanding for all economic problems. ... 
as regards foreign policy Mein Kampf contained, in my opinion, a great many mistakes, because it 
always toyed with the idea that within the continent of Europe the living space for Germany ought to be 
extended. And if nevertheless I did co-operate later on with a National Socialist Reich Chancellor, then 
it was for the very simple reason that expansion of the German space toward the East was in the book 
made specifically dependent upon the approval of the British Government. Therefore, to me, believing 
that I knew British policy very well, this seemed Utopian and there was no danger of my taking these 
theoretical extravagances of Hitler any more seriously than I did. It was clear to me that every territorial 
change on European territory attempted by force would be impossible for Germany, and would not be 
approved by the other nations. 
FURTHER PUBLIC DECLARATIONS OF NAZI POLICIES 
The Nazis gave early public notice of their intent upon seeking in the East the Lebensraum to which they 
claimed they were entitled. The accused Rosenberg in particular was insistent that Russia would have to 'move 
over' to make way for German living space. He said: 16 
The understanding that the German nation, if it is not to perish in the truest sense of the word, needs 
ground and soil for itself and its future generations, and the second sober perception that this soil can no 
more be conquered in Africa, but in Europe and first of all in the East these organically determine the 
German foreign policy for centuries. 
The crystalisation of Hitler's plans was manifest when, at the Nuremberg Party Congress in 1934, he said: 17 
Only a part of the people will be really active fighters. But they were the fighters of the National 
Socialist struggle. They were the fighters for the National Socialist revolution, and they are the 
millions of the rest of the population. For them it is not sufficient to confess: 'I believe', but to swear: 
'I fight'. 
The extract cited above was expressive of the same theme in the Party Organisation Book: 18 
The Party includes only fighters who are ready to accept and sacrifice everything in order to carry 
through the National Socialist ideology. 
At the trial of Reichswehr officers at Leipzig in September 1930, Hitler gave evidence19 
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Germany is being strangled by Peace Treaties. ... The National Socialists do not regard the Treaty 
[Treaty of Versailles] as a law, but as something forced upon us. We do not want future generations, 
who are completely innocent, to be burdened by this. When we fight this with all means at our 
disposal, then we are on the way to a revolution. 
President of the Court: 'Even by illegal means?' 
Hitler: 'I will declare here and now, that when we have become powerful (gesiegt haben), then we shall 
fight against the Treaty with all the means at our disposal, even from the point of view of the world, 
with illegal means'. 
In a separate document tendered at the Nuremberg trial, Hitler said in relation to rearmament: 2° 
It is impossible to build up an army and give it a sense of worth if the object of its existence is not the 
preparation for war. Armies for the preservation of peace do not exist; they exist only for the 
triumphant- exertion of war. 
The accused Rosenberg was one of the most vigorous exponents of Nazi doctrine. He is thus recorded: 21 
The meaning of world history has radiated out from the north over the whole world, borne by a blue-
eyed blond race which in several great waves determined the spiritual face of the world ... 
We stand today before a definitive decision. Either through a new experience and cultivation of the old 
blood, coupled with an enhanced fighting will, we will rise to a purificatory action, or the last 
Germanic-western values of morality and state-culture shall sink away in the filthy human masses of the 
big cities, become stunted on the sterile burning asphalt of a bestialized inhumanity, or trickle away as 
a morbific agent in the form of emigrants bastardizing themselves in South America, China, Dutch East 
India, Africa. 
A new faith is arising today: the myth of the blood, the faith, to defend with the blood the divine 
essence of man. The faith, embodied in clearest knowledge that the Nordic blood represents that 
mysterium which has replaced and overcome the old sacraments. 
THE FUEHRER PRINCIPLE 
The Fuehrerprinzip (Fuehrer Principle) was a basic element of Nazi ideology. Its essential features were 
thus officially expressed:22 
Complete and total authority is vested in the Fuehrer. 
The Fuehrer Principle requires a pyramidal organization structure in its details as well as in its entirety. 
The Fuehrer is at the top. 
He nominates the necessary leaders for the various spheres of work of the Reich's direction, the Party 
apparatus and the State administration. 
He shapes the collective will of the people within himself and he enjoys the political unity and entirety 
of the people in opposition to individual interests. 
The Fuehrer unites in himself all the sovereign authority of the Reich; all public authority in the state 
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as well as in the movement is derived from the authority of the Fuehrer. We must speak not of the 
state's authority but of the Fuehrer's authority -if- we wish to designate the character of the political 
authority within the Reich correctly. The state does not hold political authority as an impersonal unit 
but receives it from the Fuehrer as the executor of the national will. The authority of the Fuehrer is 
complete and all-embracing; it unites in itself all the means of political direction; it extends into all 
fields of national life; it embraces the entire people, which is bound to the Fuehrer in loyalty and 
obedience. The authority of the Fuehrer is not limited by checks and controls, by special autonomous 
bodies or individual rights, but it is free and independent, all-inclusive and unlimited. 
The Fuehrer-Reich of the (German) people is founded on the recognition that the true will of the people 
cannot be disclosed through parliamentary votes and plebiscites but that the will of the people in its 
pure and uncorrupted form can only be expressed through the Fuehrer. 
And in amplification of this ideology 23 
Thus at the head of the Reich, stands a single Fuehrer, who in his personality embodies the idea which 
sustains all and whose spirit and will therefore animate the entire community. 
Numerous documents were tendered at Nuremberg in explanation of what was an entrenched phenomenon, 
described as the Tuehrer Principle'. Examples are: 
... It is not mere chance that millions in Germany are of the holy conviction that National 
Socialism is more than politics, that in it the word and the will of God proclaim itself, that the 
bulwark it has created against Bolshevism was conceived on higher inspiration as the last 
salvation of Occidental culture/before the threat of Asiatic atheism (extract from Joseph 
Goebbels, From Kaiserhof to Reich Chancellery', 1934, p. 12; Nuremberg Trial, document No. 
2373-PS). 
It is with pride that we see that one man is kept above all criticism--that is the Fuehrer. The 
reason is that everyone feels and knows: he was always right and will always be right. The 
National Socialism of us all is anchored in the uncritical loyalty, in the devotion to the Fuehrer 
that does not ask for the wherefore in the individual case, in the tacit performance of his 
commands. We believe that the Fuehrer is fulfilling a divine mission to German destiny! This 
belief is beyond challenge. (Hess, Speeches, Munich, 1928, p. 25; Radio speech at Cologne, 25 
June 1934; Nuremberg Trial, ibid.) 
As an extension of the doctrine of respondent superior, the 'Fuehrer Principle' was argued as a special 
plea by some of those accused at Nuremberg, including the proposition that the obedience exacted under 
the principle was unconditional and absolute, regardless of the legality or illegality of the order. The oath 
taken by political leaders (Politische Leiter) yearly was-24  
I pledge eternal allegiance to Adolf Hitler. I pledge unconditioned obedience to him and the 
Fuehrers appointed by him. 
The Nuremberg Tribunal dealt condignly with that plea when it stated: 25 
The argument that ... common planning cannot exist where there is complete dictatorship is 
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unsound. A plan in the execution of which a number of persons participate is still a plan, even 
though conceived by only one of them; and those who execute the plan do not avoid 
responsibility by showing that they acted under the direction of the man who conceived it. Hitler 
could not make aggressive war by himself. He had to 
have the co-operation of statesmen, military leaders, diplomats and business men. When they, 
with knowledge of his aims, gave him their co-operation, they made themselves parties to the 
plan he had initiated. They are not to be deemed innocent because Hitler made use of them, if 
they lmew what they were doing. That they were assigned to their tasks by a dictator does not 
absolve them from responsibility for their acts. The relation of leader and follower does not 
preclude responsibility here any more than it does in the comparable tyranny of organised 
domestic crime. 
To the same effect was the observation of the President of the Tribunal at a later stage (1947) 26 : 
It makes no difference whether sovereign power is vested in a dictator or in a parliament; 
unless the orders of either are to be controlled by the law of nations there is no security for 
the nations of the world. 
A less general, and more positive, basis for rejecting the 'Fuehrer Principle' at Nuremberg than the 
statements in the extracts cited above is that the law of nations would disintegrate if it was bound to 
recognise the bizarre dictates of a particular national ideology not recognised by any established tenet of 
positive international law. 
THE JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
The International Tribunal stated in its judgment: 27 
It must be remembered that Mein Kampf was no mere private diary in which the secret 
thoughts of Hitler were set down. Its contents were rather proclaimed from the house-tops. It 
was used in the schools and Universities and among the Hitler Youth, in the SS and the SA, 
and among the German people generally, even down to the presentation of an official copy to 
all newly-married people. By the year 1945 over 62 million copies had been circulated. The 
general contents are well known. Over and over again Hitler asserted his belief in the 
necessity of force as the means of solving international problems, as in the following 
quotation: 
'The soil on which we now live was not a gift bestowed by Heaven on our 
forefathers. They had to conquer it by risking their lives. So also in the future, our 
people will not obtain territory, and therewith the means of existence, as a favour 
from any other people, but will have to win it by the power of a triumphant sword'. 
Mein Kampf contains many such passages, and the extolling of force as an instrument of foreign policy is 
openly proclaimed. 
The precise objectives of this policy of force are also set forth in detail. The very first page of the book 
asserts that 'German-Austria must be restored to the great German Motherland,' not on economic grounds, 
but because 'people of the same blood should be in the same Reich.' 
The restoration of the German frontiers of 1914 is declared to be wholly insufficient, and if Germany is 
to exist at all, It must be as a world power with the necessary territorial magnitude. 
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Mein Kampf is quite explicit in stating where the increased territory is to be found: 
Therefore we National Socialists have purposely drawn a line through the line of conduct 
followed by pre-war Germany in foreign policy. We put an end to the perpetual Germanic 
march towards the South and West of Europe. and turn our eyes towards the lands of the East. 
We finally put a stop to the colonial and trade policy of the pre-war times, and pass over to the 
territorial policy of the future. 
But when we speak of new territory in Europe today, we must think principally of Russia and 
the border states subject to her. 
Mein Kampf is not to be regarded as a mere literary exercise, or as an inflexible policy or plan incapable 
of modification. 
Its importance lies in the unmistakable attitude of aggression revealed throughout its pages. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been shown in this chapter that the basic aims and objectives of Nazi Germany were proclaimed to the 
world before the signature of the 1928 Pact of Paris. When Hitler became Chancellor in 1933 the irrelevance, so 
far as Germany was concerned, of all 'non-aggression' pacts and treaties which could have impeded the 
attainment of those aims and objectives was manifest. 
Such fact did not constitute a basis for exculpation of the Nuremberg defendants; neither, however, was it used 
by the Tribunal as a basis for conviction. As is pointed out by Professor Woetzel in a discussion of the 
attitude of the Tribunal to the evidence of the proclaimed objectives of Hitler and his associates:28 
The programme of the Nazi Party as laid down in 1920, and the opinions expressed in Hitler's Mein 
Karnpf, cannot be regarded as planning which is criminal in the sense of the delicate. 'The Tribunal must 
examine whether a concrete plan to wage war existed, and determine the participants in that concrete plan' 
[Judgment, I.M.T., p. 43]. Furthermore, measures aimed at strengthening the Nazi Party cannot be 
regarded as criminal in the meaning of a conspiracy to wage aggressive war. 
The sienificance, as a matter of law, of the examination of Nazi doctrine as pleaded at Nuremberg was twofold. 
First, it enabled the prosecution to adduce evidence relating to acts and events, within the vast ambit of the 
indictment, over a period of 25 years (1920 to 1945). Second. it furnished a background for the proof of the 
'common plan or conspiracy' the theme of which permeated the indictment, the trial and the judgment. 29 
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ANNEXE TO CHAPTER 3: 
PARTICULARS OF THE NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON PLAN OR 
CONSPIRACY 
(A) NAZI PARTY AS THE CENTRAL CORE OF THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY 
In 1921 Adolf Hitler became the supreme leader or Fuehrer of the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartie 
(National Socialist German Workers Party), also known as the Nazi Party, which had been founded in Germany 
in 1920. He continued as such throughout the period covered by this indictment. The Nazi Party, together with 
certain of its subsidiary organizations, became the instrument of cohesion among the defendants and their co-
conspirators and an instrument for the carrying out of the aims and purposes of their conspiracy. Each defendant 
became a member of the Nan Party and of the conspiracy, with knowledge of their aims and purposes, or, with 
such knowledge, became an accessory to their aims and purposes at some stage of the development of the 
conspiracy. 
(B) COMMON OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF CONSPIRACY 
The aims and purposes of the. Nazi Party and of the defendants and divers other persons from time to time 
associated as leaders, members, supporters or adherents of the Nazi Party (hereinafter called collectively the "Nan 
conspirators") were, or came to be, to accomplish the following by any means deemed opportune, including 
unlawful means, and contemplating ultimate resort to threat of force, force and aggressive war; (i) to abrogate and 
overthrow the Treaty of Versailles and its restrictions upon the military armament and activity of Germany; (ii) 
to acquire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the World War of 1914-1918 and other territories in 
Europe asserted by the Nazi conspirators to be occupied principally by so-called "racial Germans"; (iii) to acquire 
still further territories in continental Europe and elsewhere claimed by the Nazi conspirators to be required by the 
"racial Germans" as "Lebensraum," or living space, all at the expense of neighbouring and other countries. The 
aims and purposes of the Nan conspirators were not fixed or static but evolved and expanded as they acquired 
progressively greater power and became able to make more effective application of threats of force and threats of 
aggressive war. When their expanding aims and purposes became fmally so great as to provoke such strength of 
resistance as could be overthrown only by armed force and aggressive war, and not simply by the opportunists 
methods theretofore used, such as fraud, deceit, threats, intimidation, fifth column activities and propaganda, the 
Nazi conspirators deliberately planned, determined upon and launched their aggressive wars and wars in violation 
of international treaties, agreements and assurances by the phases and steps hereinafter more particularly 
described. 
(C) DOCTRINAL TECHNIQUES OF THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY 
To incite others to join in the common plan or conspiracy, and as a means of securing for the Nazi conspirators 
the highest degree of control over the German community, they put forth, disseminated, and exploited certain 
doctrines, among others, as follows: 
I. That persons of so-called 'German blood" (as specified by the Nazi conspirators) were a "master race" 
and were accordingly entitled to subjugate, dominate or exterminate other "races" and peoples; 
'7. That the German people should be ruled under the Fuehrerprinzip (leadership principle) according to 
which power was to reside in a Fuehrer from whom sub-leaders were to derive authority in a 
hierarchical order, each sub-leader to owe unconditional obedience to his immediate superior but to be 
absolute in his own sphere of jurisdiction; and the power of the leadership was to be unlimited, 
extending to all phases of public and private life; 
3. That war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans: 
4. That the leadership of the Nazi Party, as the sole bearer of the foregoing and other doctrines of the 
Nazi Party, was entitled to shape the structure, policies and practices of the German State and all 
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related institutions, to direct and supervise the activities of all individuals within the State, and to 
destroy all opponents. 
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CHAPTER 4 	WARNINGS TO THE AXIS POWERS 
INTRODUCTION 
During the early months of World War II, it became apparent that the Nazi Government and its armed forces, 
both in occupied countries and in Germany, were committing atrocities and acts of brutality on a scale which had 
never occurred in the history of mankind. The revelations led to a number of public statements by leaders of the 
Allied and Associated Powers concerning their intended action against those responsible. The principal statements 
are referred to in this Chapter. 
An analysis of the declarations shows a political rather than a legal reaction to the horrors which were the result 
of the policies of the Third Reich. 
• By October 1943, the London International Assembly, although it was not an official body, had completed the 
final draft of documentation to establish an International Criminal Court, which was intended to apply a 'codified 
international criminal law, agreed by the United Nations'.' 
In the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 the word jurisdiction' was expressly used. Derived from the Latin 
jurisdictio, meaning a 'declaration of law', the use of the word may be perceived as a reliance on established legal 
principles. It is therefore relevant to examine the nature and extent of the warnings in respect of criminal 
proceedings which the major Allied Powers and governments in exile publicly proclaimed would be taken. 
INITIAL PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF CONDEMNATION 
Tile first major public revelation of the enormity of the Nazi crimes predictably was by the Governments in exile 
of Poland and Czechoslovakia. In a joint statement in November 1940, they declared: 
... the violence and cruelty to which their two countries had been subjected was unparalleled in 
human history. Among the brutalities instanced were: expulsion of population, banishment of 
hundreds and thousands of men and women to forced labour in Germany, mass executions and 
deportations to concentration camps, plundering of public and private property, extermination of the 
intellectual class and of cultural life. spoliation of treasures of science and art and the persecution of 
all religious beliefs.2 
A month later, the Polish Government, in a separate statement, denounced the German policy of 
denationalisation in Poland as being contrary to international law, and, in particular, to the Hague Convention of 
1907 on the rights and usages of land warfare, to which the Third Reich had adhered. 3 
World War II was in its third year before there was any significant publicaction by any of the major Powers to 
condemn the enormity of atrocities committed by the Germans in occupied territory. On 25 October 1941 the 
United States of America was a neutral nation. However, on that day simultaneous declarations were made by the 
President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. 
The text of President Roosevelt's message was: 
The practice of executing scores of innocent hostages in reprisal for isolated attacks on Germans in 
countries temporarily under the Nazi heel revolts a world already inured to suffering and brutality. 
Civilized peoples long ago adopted the basic principle that no man should be punished for the deed 
of another. Unable to apprehend the persons involved in these attacks, the Nazis characteristically 
slaughter fifty or a hundred innocent persons. Those who would 'collaborate' with Hitler and try to 
appease him cannot ignore this ghastly warning. 
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The Nazis might have learned from the last war the impossibility of breaking men's spirit by 
terrorism. Instead, they develop their Lebensraum and new order by depths of frightfulness which 
even they have never approached before. These are the acts of desperate men who know in their 
hearts that they cannot win. Frightfulness can never bring peace to Europe. It only sows the seeds of 
hatred which will one day brine frightful retribution. 
On the same day Mr. Winston Churchill issued a declaration from No. 10 Downing Street as follows: 
His Majesty's Government associate themselves fully with the sentiments of horror and 
condemnation expressed by the President of the United States upon the Nazi butcheries in France. 
These cold-blooded executions of innocent people will only recoil upon the savages who order and 
execute them. 
The butcheries in France are an example of what Hitler's Nazis are doing in many other countries 
under their yoke. The atrocities in Poland, in Yugoslavia, in Norway, in Holland, in Belgium and 
above all behind the German fronts in Russia, surpass anything that has been known since the 
darkest and most bestial ages of mankind. They are but a foretaste of what Hitler would inflict upon 
the British and American peoples if only he could get the power. 
Retribution for these crimes must henceforward take its place among the major purposes of the war. 
A more legalistic approach was adopted by the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Molotov, who, on 7 November 
1941, sent a Note to all nations which had diplomatic relations with the USSR. The Note asserted that, 
among other atrocities, Red Army prisoners had been tortured and crushed by tanks, others had been burned 
at the stake, others had been left to die of desease or had been exterminated by starvation, wounded in hospital 
had been bayonetted, and nurses and other women medical assistants had been raped . The Note concluded: 
All these facts are an outrageous violation by the German Government of the elementary principles 
and regulations of international law and of the International Agreement signed by representatives of 
Germany itself. 
In bringing these horrible facts to the notice of all countries with which the Soviet Union has 
diplomatic relations, the Soviet Government indignantly protests before the whole world against the 
barbaric violation by the German Government of the elementary rules of international law. 
The Soviet Government indignantly protests against the brutal attitude of the German Authorities 
towards Red Army prisoners, an attitude which violates the most elementary rules of human 
morality. It lays all the responsibility for these inhuman actions of the German military and civil 
authorities on the criminal Hitlerite Government. 4 
A further Note was similarly circulated by the Soviet Government on 6 January 1942. It repeated the protest 
against German brutality and declared that it held the German Government responsible for crimes committed by 
German troops.5 
With the establishment of the body known as the Inter-Allied Conference on the Punishment of War Crimes, the 
name of which was later changed to the Inter-Allied Commission on the Punishment of War Crimes, the way 
was open for an attempt to imprint on the political condemnation of the German Government a legal basis for 
the threatened retribution. 
On 13 January 1942 representatives of the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, France, Greece, 
Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, Poland and Yugoslavia issued the following declaration (commonly 
referred to as the Declaration of St. James's): 
4 7 
Whereas Germany, since the beginning of the present conflict which arose out of her policy of 
aggression, has instituted in the occupied countries a regime of terror characterised amongst other 
things by imprisonments, mass expulsions, the execution of hostages and massacres, 
And whereas these acts of violence are being similarly committed by the Allies and Associates of the 
Reich and, in certain countries, by the accomplices of the occupying Power, 
And whereas international solidarity is necessary in order to avoid the repression of these acts of 
violence simply by acts of vengeance on the part of the general public, and in order to satisfy the 
sense of justice of the civilised world, 
Recalling that international law, and in particular the Convention signed at The Hague in 1907 
regarding the laws and customs of land warfare, do not permit belligerents in occupied countries to 
commit acts of violence against civilians, to disregard the laws in force or to overthrow national 
institutions, 
(1) affirm that acts of violence thus inflicted upon the civilian populations have nothing in 
common with the conceptions of an act of war or a political crime as understood by civilised 
nations, 
(2) take note of the declarations made in this respect on 25th October 1941 by the President of the 
United States of America and by the British Prime Minister, 
(3) place among their principal war aims the punishment, through the channel of organised 
justice, of those guilty of or responsible for these crimes, whether they have ordered them, 
perpetrated them or participated in them, 
(4) resolve to see to it in a spirit of international solidarity that (a) those guilty or responsible, 
whatever their nationality, are sought out, handed over to justice and judged, (b) that the 
sentences pronounced are carried out. 
It is apparent from a consideration of the speeches made at the time of the Declaration of St. James's,6 that there 
was no clear perception at that time of the precise legal basis for the trial and punishment of war criminals. For 
example, there were references to 'a criminal campaign well thought out and prepared in advance down to the 
smallest detail;' the words contrary to law, the moral law as well as national and international law', were used; 
and the Prime Minister of Greece, M. Tsouderos, claimed that by the Declaration 'a new principle of national 
penal law has come into being'. 
The first reference to a body such as the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal appeared in a Note dated 14 
October 1942 by the Soviet Government in reply to a Note which, between July and September 1942, was 
presented on behalf of the nine signatories of the Declaration of St. James's to the British and Soviet 
Governments, the President of the United States and the Holy See. The reply of the Soviet Government included 
the following: 
The Soviet Government consider it essential to hand over without delay to the courts of the special 
international tribunal and to punish according to all the severity of the criminal code, any of the 
leaders of Fascist Germany who, in the course of the war, have fallen into the hands of States 
fighting against Hitlerite Germany. 
There are two remarkable aspects of the Soviet Note in reply. First, the extract cited assumes the future existence 
of a 'special international tribunal': second, the reference to 'the criminal code' is vague and nonspecific. 
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Two unofficial bodies were established late in 1941 and each contributed to the growing realisation that an 
appropriate framework for dealing with war criminals simply did not exist. 
The first was the London International Assembly, created under the auspices of the League of Nations Union by 
Viscount Cecil of Chelwood. The Assembly established a Commission in March 1942 to study a number of 
matters associated with war crimes. There is no evidence that the work of either the Assembly or the 
Commission produced tangible results. However, one aspect of their work is significant. It is reflected in the 
following extract: from the History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the 
Laws of War, (p. 103): 
The Assembly considered that a codified international criminal law, agreed by the United Nations, 
would be the law which should be applied by the court. Failing such a codification, the court's 
decisions were to be governed by international custom, treaties, the generally accepted principles of 
criminal law, as well as judicial precedents and doctrine. The penalty to be imposed was at the 
discretion of the court. 
The expression 'the court' was a reference to what was termed a 'Draft Convention for the Creation of an 
International Criminal Court', which the Commission had prepared in its final form by October 1943. The 
Assembly's consideration of the 'Draft Convention' appears naive, in that it was, by the end of 1943, an 
impracticable approach to believe that a.codified international criminal law could be framed and agreed to by 'the 
United Nations' (that is, the Allied and Associated Powers) by the end of the war. 
The second unofficial body which considered the general question of war crimes and related jurisdictional matters 
was the Cambridge Commission on Penal Reconstruction and Development, which comprised members of the 
Faculty of Law of Cambridge University and jurists from the occupied countries of Europe. 
There is no evidence that the Cambridge Commission achieved anything specific. This is understandable, 
because its membership did not include official representatives from any of the warring nations. However, it 
made some contribution to the development of the concept of an international tribunal. It is significant that 
the Commission considered it necessary to urge the Allied Governments to establish or codify the relevant 
fundamental principles of international law. It seems clear that the eminent jurists who comprised the 
Commission were unable to assert that principles of international law existed which were adequate to form 
the jurisdictional basis for the trials of Axis war criminals. 
Between October 1942 and October 1943, several official statements by Governments of the Allied nations 
committed them, on the successful end of the war, to a policy of the trial and punishment of Nazi war 
criminals. 
DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS AND THE SIMULTANEOUS DECLARATION OF 
PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT, 7 OCTOBER 1942 
By October 1942, the allied nations had clear evidence of the widespread inhuman conduct of members of the 
German Government and of the German armed forces, in the form of genocide, atrocities and bestial cruelty. 
On that day, Lord Maugham initiated a debate in the House of Lords, which enabled Lord Simon, the Lord 
Chancellor, to announce two major policy decisions of the British Government. 
The first was the formation of a United Nations War Crimes Commission for the Investigation of War 
Crimes, the prime purpose of which would be the identification and naming, wherever possible, of the 
persons responsible for Nazi atrocities, and in particular of organised atrocities. 7 
The second announcement was that 'named criminals wanted for war crimes should be caught and handed over at 
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the time of, and as a condition of, The Armistice, with the right to require delivery of others as soon as the 
supplementary investigations are complete'. 8 
On the same day, President Roosevelt made the following statement: 
I now declare it to be the intention of this Government that the successful close of the war shall 
include provision for the surrender to the United Nations of war criminals. 
With a view to establishing responsibility of the guilty individuals through the collection and 
assessment of all available evidence, this Government is prepared to co-operate with the British and 
other Governments in establishing a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War 
Crimes. 
The number of persons eventually found guilty will undoubtedly be extremely small compared to the 
total of enemy populations. It is not the intention of this Government or Governments associated 
with it to resort to mass reprisals. It is our intention that just and sure punishment shall be meted 
out to the ringleaders responsible for the organised murder of thousands of innocent persons and the 
commission of atrocities which have violated every tenet of the Christian faith. 9 
STATEMENT BY MR. EDEN IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, 17 DECEMBER 1942. 
On 17 December 1942, in the wake of mounting reports of widespread Nazi atrocities and acts of genocide, 
especially against Jewish persons, the the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, made the following statement in 
the House of Commons: 
The attention of the Governments of Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the USA, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Yugoslavia, and the French Committee of National 
Liberation, has been drawn to numerous reports from Europe that the German authorities, not 
content to deny to persons of Jewish race in all the territories over which their barbarous rule has 
been extended the most elementary human rights, are now carrying into effect Hitler's oft-repeated 
intention to exterminate the Jewish people in Europe. From all the occupied countries Jews are 
being transported, in conditions of appalling horror and brutality, to Eastern Europe. In Poland, 
which has been made the principal Nazi slaughterhouse, the ghettos established by the Nan invaders 
are being systematically emptied of all Jews except a few highly-skilled workers required for war 
industries None of those taken away are ever heard of again. The ablebodied are slowly worked to 
death in labour camps. The infirm are left to die of exposure and starvation or are deliberately 
massacred in mass executions. The number of victims of these bloody cruelties is reckoned in many 
hundreds of thousands of entirely innocent men, women and children. 
The above-mentioned Governments and the French National Committee condemn in the strongest 
possible terms this bestial policy of cold-blooded extermination. They declare that such events can 
only strengthen the resolve of all freedom-loving peoples to overthrow the barbarous Hitlerite 
tyranny. They reaffirm their solemn resolution to ensure that those responsible for these crimes shall 
not escape retribution, and to press on with the necessary practical measures to this end. 1 ° 
THE UNITED KINGDOM DECLARATION, 30 AUGUST 1943 
Although it was obvious that warnings of the retributive purpose of the Allied Powers had not the slightest 
effect on Germany's pursuit of its policies of mass murders in concentration camps, forced labour in factories and 
acts of cruelty in many forms, statements of the retributive aims of the Allied Powers continued to be made. 
On 30 August 1943, the British Government pronounced its resolve: 
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... to punish the instigators and actual perpetrators of the crimes ... so long as such atrocities 
continue to be committed by the representatives and in the name of Germany, they must be taken 
into account against the time of the final settlement of Germany. 11 
THE MOSCOW DECLARATION, 30 OCTOBER 1943 
It is generally accepted that the declaration made on 30 October 1943 12 at the meeting in Moscow of Prime 
Minister Churchill, President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin created the mould for the development of the 
procedureswhich culminated in the establishment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg. 
The declaration is reproduced in Appendix Ito this Chapter and is discussed in the conclusion to the Chapter. 
STATEMENT BY THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT, 30 JULY 1943 
Declarations by the Allied Powers of their intention to brine German war criminals to trial and punishment 
were made against a background of apprehension that some neutral countries might grant refuge to such 
criminals. These fears had prompted the American President to make the following public statement on 30 
July 1943, shortly before the Moscow Declaration: 12 
On August 21, 1942 I issued a statement to the press in which, after referring to the crimes against 
innocent people committed by the Axis Powers, I stated: 
The United Nations are going to win this war. When victory has been achieved, it is the 
purpose of the Government of the United States, as I know it is the purpose of each of 
the United Nations, to make appropriate use of the information and evidence in respect to 
the barbaric crimes of the invaders, in Europe and in Asia. It seems only fair that they 
should have this warning that the time will come when they shall have to stand in courts 
of law in the very countries which they are now oppressing and answer for their acts. 
On October 7, 1942 I stated that it was the intention of this Government that the successful close of 
the war shall include provision for the surrender to the United Nations of war criminals. 
The wheels of justice have turned constantly since those statements were issued and are still turning. 
There are now rumors that Mussolini and members of his Fascist gang may attempt to take refuge 
in neutral territory. One day Hitler and his gang and Tojo and his gang will be trying to escape from 
their countries. I find it difficult to believe that any neutral country would give asylum to or extend 
protection to any of them. I can only say that the Government of the United States would regard the 
action by a neutral government in affording asylum to Axis leaders or their tools as inconsistent 
with the principles for which the United Nations are fighting and that the United States Government 
hopes that no neutral government will permit its territory to be used as a place of refuge or 
otherwise assist such persons in any effort to escape their just deserts. 13 
Contemporary opinion was not, however, unanimous that neutral countries would necessarily heed the 
American President's appeal. For example, Dr. Manfred Lachs said: 14 
The replies of the neutral Governments and Press were not very satisfactory. It was pointed out that 
war crimes are somehow of the nature of political offences, and that in some circumstances the 
offender should be granted the right of asylum. 
The situation which has arisen after Moscow can be summarised as follows: The United Nations 
have again declared their determination to pursue all war criminals and to bring them to justice from 
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wherever they be found. The Neutrals are not yet convinced about their duty to refuse asylum to 
them. Should, therefore, a war criminal be found in one of the thirty two of the United Nations, he 
will not escape justice. But should he reach a neutral country, will then the right of asylum be 
granted to him? Will it mean justice? 
The right of asylum has so far been the privilege of political offenders. Can it be applied to war 
criminals, or are war criminals political offenders? An analysis of the political offence as such and 
its comparison with war crime will give us the solution of the problem. 
After analysing the principles which had been developed in civilised countries with respect to what conduct 
amounts to a political offence, so as to entitle the culprit to asylum and to resist extradition, Dr. Lachs 
concluded: 
It seems to be clear in the light of the considerations above that war crimes are definitely at variance 
with accepted ideas concerning ... political offences', to use the phrase of the St. James's Palace 
Declaration of 13th January 1942. 
All war crimes, whether committed by members of the armed forces or civilians, are completely 
deprived of those elements which entitle the political offender to claim the right of asylum. 
They are common criminals and come under the general rules of extradition. Every State on whose 
territory a war criminal sought refuge is under the obligation to hand him over to the State who 
claims him. This concerns all States, belligerent and neutral alike. 
There can therefore be no exception from the principle accepted in Moscow - that the three Allied 
Powers will pursue all war criminals to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their 
accusers in order that justice may be done. 
The claim to neutral State is legally justified. War criminals cannot be treated as political offenders. 
They will have to be handed over to the accusers. 
The cited extract from Dr. Lachs' article has been included in the text of this Chapter only because of the 
statement of the American President on 30 July 1943. The political offences doctrine has an extensive scope, but 
as it is not relevant, at least directly, to the subject matter of this study it will not be pursued. 
Finally, Allied statesmen announced at Yalta on 11 February 1944 their 'inflexible purpose to ... bring all war 
criminals to just and swift punishment'. 15 
CONCLUSION 
The chronological review in this chapter of the warnings to the Axis Powers reveals uncertainty with respect to 
the precise state of accepted international law in relation to 'war crimes', however they may be defined. 
It is noteworthy, however, that all the warnings related to war crimes stricto sensu, with one exception. That was 
the last paragraph of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943, in which it was stated: 
The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals whose offences have no 
particular geographical location and who will be punished by a joint decision of the Governments of 
the Allies. 
Insofar as the warnings referred only to offences against the laws and customs of war, they were merely political 
in character and effect; they did not expressly add, or purport to add, any new dimension to established rules of 
international law. However, they impliedly foreshadowed, although in the writer's view not intentionally, the 
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abrogation of the act of State doctrine and of the defence of superior orders. 
In respect of the exception in the Moscow Declaration, it foreshadowed, albeit in a vague and imprecise way, part 
of the Nuremberg Charter and the indictment. However, it reflected the lack of crystallisation of any definite 
policy for the proposed action against the major German war criminals. This is not surprising because of 
differing political attitudes of the Allied Powers, which were not reconciled until nearly two years later. 
The exception does, however, reinforce the judgment of the Tribunal, in which it stated: 16 
Occupying the positions they did in the government of Germany, the defendants, or at least some of 
them must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, outlawing recourse to war for the 
settlement of international disputes; they must have known that they were acting in defiance of all 
international law when in complete deliberation they carried out their designs of invasion and 
aggression. 
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APPENDIX I 	TI1E MOSCOW DECLARATION. 30 OCTOBER 1943 
The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of the 
atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in 
many of the countries they have oven -un and from which they are now being steadily expelled. 
The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all peoples or territories in their grip have suffered 
from the worst form of government by terror. 
What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating 
powers and that, in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is 
now evidenced with particular clearness by the monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet 
Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites and on French and Italian territory. 
Accordingly, the aforesaid three Allied Powers, speaking in the interest of the 32 United Nations, hereby 
solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows: 
At the time of the granting of any armistice to any Government which may be set up in Germany, 
those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for or 
have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to 
the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and 
punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be 
erected therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries, having regard 
especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union. to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia 
and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, France and Italy. 
Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, 
Belgium or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the 
people of Poland, or in the territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will 
know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples they have 
outraged. 
Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the 
guilty, for most assuredly the three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will 
deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done. 
The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals whose offences have no particular 
geographical location and who will he punished by a joint decision of the Governments of the Allies. 
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CHAPTER 5 	TIIE SIGNIFICANCE OF TIIE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES 
COMMISSION IN TIIE DEVELOPMENT OF 'NUREMBERG LAW' 
INTRODUCTION 
On 20 October 1943—more than four years after World War II began and a year after Lord Simon had announced 
in the House of Lords the proposal to create a United Nations Commission for the Investigation of War Crimes—
the United Nations War Crimes Commission was established at a meeting at the British Foreign Office, London, 
of representatives of Allied Nations. The establishment of the Commission was obviously intended to be seen as 
a practical supplement to the Moscow Declaration, which was almost contemporaneous. Its authority was 
expressed in the following limited terms:' 
1. It should investigate and record the evidence of war crimes, identifying where possible the 
individuals responsible. 
2. It should report to the Governments concerned cases in which it appeared that adequate evidence 
might be expected to be forthcoming. 
The work of the Commission will be considered in this chapter primarily by reference to the minutes of its 
meetings. It is then proposed to evaluate its achievements in the context of their significance in the development 
of 'Nuremberg Law' and preparations for the trial of Nazi war criminals. Finally, there is a brief reference to Lord 
Wright's claim concerning the contribution by the Commission in this respect. 
Consideration of the early records of the Commission 
A legal perception of the state of international law relevant to Nazi war crimes is reflected in the following 
statement made, according to the minutes, by Lord Atkin, then the representative of Australia, at the first 
unofficial preliminary meeting of the Commission in London 26 October 1943: 
It was important to free oneself from legalistic notions, whereby crimes could only be punished if they 
fell within the definition of war crimes. That would defeat the whole object ... The reason for this 
departure was that the offenders had gone right outside the realm of law. The only way was to prepare a 
list of offences for which punishment should be awarded ... he proposed that the Commission should 
draft its own list. 
Dr. Ecer, the representative of Czechoslovakia, 'said that his Government had prepared lists of all criminals, and 
had prepared laws to deal with them, adopting the principle "Loi exceptionelle sans appel." 
At the second unofficial meeting of the Commission on 2 December 1943, the first meeting at which Sir Cecil 
Hurst acted as chairman. and at which Mr. Herbert Pell sat for the first time as the official representative of the 
United States of America, the meeting adopted with two amendments a report of a sub-committee 'on the lines 
on which the Commission should approach its task'. The significant feature of this meeting was the decision of 
the Commission that the words 'and will at the same time avoid any semblance of ex post facto legislation' 
should be omitted from paragraph 8 of the report, which stated:' It will have the further advantage that it will 
enable particular acts to be added to the list of those to be treated as war crimes from time to time as 
circumstances may require.' 
The minutes of the third unofficial meeting of the Commission on 4 January 1944 make it clear that 
members of the Commission were impatient to have it officially constituted. However, for a body with very 
few staff2 the following minute appears naive, especially as the war had been in progress for more than four 
years and by then, as history has recorded, millions of 'war crimes' had already been committed: 
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It was agreed that the responsibility for placing names of war criminals on the Commission's list, i.e. 
on the list of persons whose surrender for trial the Commission recommended the United Nations to 
demand, lay entirely with the Commission. The possibility of delegating powers in this matter to sub-
committees, if there was a great influx of cases, was mentioned. 
The meeting on 18 January 1944 is noteworthy because for the first time it was mentiolled that there was a 
degree of Ministerial involvement so far as the United Kingdom was concerned. That portion of the minutes read: 
The Chairman reported that he had had an opportunity of showing to Mr. Eden, the Secretary of State 
for Foreign Affairs in the United Kingdom, the decisions reached at the meeting of the Commission on 
January 11 and that Mr. Eden was strongly in favour of the Commission getting to work forthwith as 
decided at that meeting. 
There had been discussions at earlier meetings in respect of the appointment of a so-called Technical Committee 
of the Commission, but, at the meeting on 11 January 1944, its fate appeared extremely dubious. What is 
significant, in relation to the future achievements of the Commission, is that the then Chairman, Sir Cecil 
Hurst, said that if the Technical Committee was abandoned, the War Crimes Commission would 
be the sole body representing the United Nations which 'dealt with' war crimes. The minutes do not contain any 
explanation of what the words 'dealt with' were intended to convey. 
At the meeting on 25 January 1944, the proposal for the appointment of a Technical Committee was formally 
abandoned. This meeting is important because of the contribution of Dr. Ecer (Czechoslovakia). On his motion, 
it was resolved that three sub-committees, subsequently referred to as Committees I, II and III respectively, 
should be appointed to consider (a) facts and evidence; (b) 'means and methods of enforcement' and (c) legal 
questions. 
Three significant matters are recorded in the minutes of the meeting on 8 February 1944: 
That Mr. Eden did not intend to convoke another meeting at the Foreign Office following the decision 
not to establish a Technical Committee, but that 'he thought it would be sufficient to send a Note to 
each of the Governments of the United Nations on the subject.' 
The 'maximum financial liability to be incurred by the Commission down to 31st March 1944' was 
fixed at 1,100.00 pound sterling. 
It was decided that 'the question of an International Court would not be considered for the time being.' 
The most positive achievement at the meeting on 15 February 1944 was the receipt of a report that the Polish 
Government had agreed to pay a 'basic contribution' of $400 to the expenses of the Commission, which still saw 
its role as the principal body among the Allied Powers in determining whether a prima facie case existed to 
justify the prosecution of any individual by some court or tribunal, wherever it might exist and however it might 
be constituted. 
As the Allied forces continued to advance on all fronts and preparations for the Allied landings in Europe 
progressed rapidly, the malaise associated with the United Nations War Crimes Commission continued. At a 
meeting on 22 February 1944, Mr. Pell, chairman of the Enforcement Committee, stated that the Committee 
regarded the consideration of the organisation of an international court as a necessary preliminary to its work, and 
therefore proposed, with the Commission's permission, to begin discussions on the subject as soon as possible. 
The Chairman of the Commission said he had been unable to obtain the promise of the Attorney-General of the 
United Kingdom to attend a meeting of the Commission for the purpose of discussing the question and in these 
circumstances he could not ask Committee II to wait longer before taking It up. 
There is significance in the minutes of the meeting of the Commission on 7 March 1944, at which Professor 
Glaser (Poland), chairman of Committee III (legal questions), said he 'regarded the question of the kind of 
national courts which should deal with war crimes as one for Committee II, and for the time being was leaving 
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alone the question of 'retrolctivity of legislation'. The use of such language does not suggest any conviction in 
the existence of a body of relevant established principles of international law. 
The signs of dissension and disillusionment appeared formally at the meeting on 21 March 1944, when the 
French representative, M. Burnay, who attended in place of M. Gros, read on the latter's behalf a highly critical 
declaration and asked that it be inserted in the minutes.3 
At the same meeting, approval by Committee I of a proposal of Committee H 'to intern the whole Gestapo 
at the time of the armistice' was expressed by the Belgian representative. The minutes do not contain any 
reference to the estimated numbers of members of the Gestapo at that time. In fact, a realistic estimate is 
probably between 30,000 and 40,000. 4 
The first sign that the British Government was prepared to pay any serious consideration to the activities 
of the Commission appeared at the meeting on 2 May 1944, when Sir Donald Somervell, Attorney-General of 
the United Kingdom, and Sir William Mallcim, legal adviser to the British Foreign Office, were present. The 
principal significance of this meeting was that the Commission considered a report by M. de Baer, the Belgian 
delegate, who was chairman of Committee I, which concluded with the following paragraph: 
Political action. Caution should be used in dealing with criminals politically.5 If it is contemplated to 
punish some enemy leaders by political rather than judicial action, the consequences of such action 
should be carefully measured: if such punishment is death and is inflicted soon after the Armistice(x) 
[see footnote below], there is less objection than if it were mere exile (cfr. Napoleon). But if the main 
criminals, who are responsible for the waging of war as well as for taking part in the most heinous 
crimes (annihilation of the Jewish race, deportations, policy of terrorism), are merely to be exiled, it 
will be morally impossible for any court to inflict a more severe punishment (death) upon persons 
accused of lesser atrocities or who have merely acted upon order of those major criminals. Many of us 
consider political action as undesirable altogether and would prefer judicial action but, if for reasons of 
political expediency it is impossible to do otherwise, political action should be exceptional, and 
restricted to cases such as Hitler, Hiro Hito, and others such as Mussolini, who are, in fact if not in 
name, Heads of State. 
(x) In an unspectacular way, preferably by hanging: there is no reason to make the execution of these 
people other than ignominious. Moreover, it is more difficult to make a hero out of a man who was 
obscurely hanged than out of a man who was shot or may even have been allowed to give the theatrical 
order of "Fire" at his own execution. 
The guarded response of the British Attorney-General to this conception of 'political action' is thus minuted: 
Sir Donald Somervell gave the Commission to understand that the matter was still under consideration 
between the Governments and that the Commission, while it should not exclude cases implicating such 
persons, was not called upon to seek evidence against them. 
Minutes of meetings of the Commission in May and June 1944 illustrate the perception of the Commission that 
its role should not merely be In relation to war crimes stricto sensu, but its approaches to the British 
Government on this question were not received with enthusiasm. 
One significant matter considered at a meeting on 13 June 1944 was the appointment of a sub-committee to 
study 'the question whether preparation for and launching of a war of aggression and individual acts of preparation 
for such a war were crimes'. This appears to have been the first positive step of a jurisprudential nature taken by 
the Commission. 
In view of the role played by Lord Wright in the later work of the Commission, it should be noted that, at the 
meeting on 25 July 1944, the Commission was informed that he had been appointed by the Australian 
Government to act as its representative on the Commission, in succession to Lord Atkin, who had recently died. 
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The meeting on 22 August 1944 was the first occasion on which Lord Wright was present. It appears from the 
minutes that a spirit of urgency was abroad, because they record: 
... the war with Germany was plainly reaching a climax and, as the Commission must have a first 
definitive list of war criminals ready when the armistice was granted, the Chairman suggested a date to 
which it should work. Purely as a result of his personal appreciation of the situation, he suggested 10 
November next. This was agreed to. 
The general lack of co-ordination within the Commission is strikingly illustrated by the following extract from 
the minutes of the meeting on 29 August 1944: 
It was agreed that under the supervision of Committee I evidence should be collected for the framing of 
well-considered statements of the charges which can be made against Hitler and other arch-criminals. 
These statements, after being submitted to the Commission, would be kept available for use at the 
proper moment. 
There was apparently no reference to the manner in which a body, with only a few staff, could attempt to carry 
out such a task, or of the nature and extent of liaison with other authorities, including the armed forces and 
Allied Governments. 
The meeting on 5 September 1944 is noteworthy because, for the first time, serious and detailed consideration 
appears to have been given to the questions of jurisdiction and procedure in relation to war crimes trials. The 
minutes contain a reference to a 'treaty court'. 6 Clearly there were many divergent views, despite the attempt of 
the chairman to gloss over the divergences. Lord Wright's views were thus minuted: 
Lord Wright said that at this stage only military courts can do the job effectively and speedily. He could 
see no practical alternative at this stage. The Supreme Commander should investigate and try cases. The 
Government should press this upon the military authorities. The military commander had jurisdiction to 
punish any war criminals who were in his custody, quite apart from when and where their war crimes 
were committed. Therefore no treaty was needed. (emphasis added). 
It is clear that Lord Wright had not at that stage perceived any scopes for a tribunal such as was established by 
the London Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945. 
As the ultimate victory of the Allied Powers became certain and closer in time, the minutes of the Commission 
in September 1944 showed weakness and lack of any real purpose. There was no apparent knowledge by the 
Commission of any plan among the major Allied Powers which was to lead to the London Agreement and 
Charter of 8 August 1945 and there was lack of unanimity on many matters of detail. Dr. Ecer, the representative 
of Czechoslovakia, tendered his resienation from two of the three Committees and, in a letter advising the 
Commission of this decision, said he was considering resigning from the Commission itself. He gave no reason, 
but obviously was dissatisfied with the attitude of the Commission to its functions and with its lack of 
achievement. 
It is surprising that at the meeting on 26 September 1944--within about seven months of the final capitulation 
of Germany--there was a lengthy debate as to whether the, so-called 'arch-criminals', such as Hitler and many of 
his associates who were to be tried at Nuremberg, should be included in the Commission's lists of war criminals. 
It is also surprising that the Chairman, apparently without any actual knowledge of what the principal Allied 
Powers proposed, should have said, according to the minutes: 
The Chairman said that the omission of the arch-criminals from the lists would not mean that they 
would 2o unpunished. The Moscow Declaration appeared to envisage their punishment by executive 
action rather than a judicial trial. 
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The Chairman did not elaborate on what he meant by 'executive action'; no doubt, he had in mind Churchill's 
view that the first 100 major war criminals arrested should, on proper identification, be summarily executed 
without trial. 
The influence of Lord Wright became apparent at meetings of the Commission from 3 October 1944. On 
that date, obviously oblivious of, American bureaucratic and political thinking, the Commission approved a draft 
Convention for the establishment of a 'United Nations War Crimes; Court' with jurisdiction in respect of 'an 
offence against the laws and customs of war'. The proposed jurisdiction of such a court (adapted from Article 38 
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice) and the attitude of the British Government to the views of the 
Commission are referred to in Chapter 2. All of the documents assumed there would be British dominance in the 
implementation of their provisions. In this respect they were inconsistent with the tenor of the talks in Moscow 
from 9 to 20 October 1944 between Churchill, Eden and Stalin. 
The notable feature of the meeting on 10 October 1944 was that the Commission realistically reconsidered its 
previous views on whether or not the preparation for, and launching of, the then existing war constituted a war 
crime and should be treated by the Commission as such. 
Dr. Ecer, who had submitted a minority report, in a statement amplifying his report, said, inter alia: 
If we accept the fundamental point of view that the preparation and launching of the present total war are 
crimes because the whole policy which is the background of the present war is a criminal one, we will 
better understand such crimes as the extermination of foreign races, and we shall be able to put these 
crimes into the right light. That is, we shall be able to judge them according to their real substance, i.e. 
not as simple 'violations of laws and customs of war' but as instruments of a general criminal policy 
and as part of a criminal war. 
The influence of Lord Wright was manifest at that meeting. The minutes of his remarks are reproduced in 
Appendix Ito this Chapter because they illustrate the fundamental approach to the whole problem of 'Nuremberg 
Law' which he consistently adopted and which ultimately prevailed. 
With Germany already in an incipient state of collapse, it is intriguing to study the minutes of the meeting on 
17 October 1944, at which Lord Wright was not present, and to note the views expressed on the fundamental 
question discussed, but without finality, at the previous meeting. The general consensus of opinion was that the 
acts of preparing for, and the launching of, a war of aggression were crimes, but the Commission differed about 
the method of punishing the responsible leaders--for example, as the representative of China (Mr. Wunsz King) 
said, 'whether they should be punished on a judicial or political basis'. 
In retrospect, it seems remarkable that the divergency of views was so marked that the Commission, after a 
lengthy debate, agreed without opposition to adjourn further consideration of this fundamental question for six 
weeks to enable representatives on the Commission to consult with their governments. 
The increasing authority of Lord Wright was apparent in his appointment at the meeting on 31 October 1944 to 
the vacancy on Committee I, following Dr. Ecer's resignation. However, the following extract from the minutes 
reflects a puzzling conception by the Commission of its functions, even if it was the only practical course open 
to it: 
M. de Baer (the Belgian representative, who was Chairman of Committee I) said that the Committee 
'had continued to review the cases'--of which he gave the figures--and  the work was now up to date 
(emphasis added). 
Crimes of all descriptions were, as was notorious at the time, being committed in all theatres of war by Germans 
with unabated ferocity and cruelty, but it seems that at this stage at least the Commission was dependent, in the 
compilation of lists of war criminals, on reports from miscellaneous sources . 7 
The meeting on 7 November 1944 was notable because of the proposal of Lord Wright, the representative of 
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Australia, that the Commission establish a 'detective organisation'. The minutes of the debate on the proposal 
illustrate the extent of unpreparedness within the Commission to fulfil its task--a situation which was 
exacerbated by the apparent disinterest of the British and American Governments in its achievements. The 
proposal was simply referred to Committee II. 
On 22 November 1944 there was a landmark meeting, because the Commission was in a position to adopt its 
first list of German war criminals. The minutes state: 
As far as possible each name on the Commission's list would be accompanied by particulars of the rank 
or office held at the relevant date, the general nature of the offence charged and any available information 
likely to assist identification of the accused. Successive lists of war criminals, and in many cases 
particulars supplementing the information given regarding persons already listed, would be issued as the 
work proceeded. 
The Commission resolved that the list as approved be transmitted to the Allied Governments for their 
information and for communication to the Supreme Commanders concerned, with the request that the 
Governments forward it to the European Advisory Committee of the Commission. 
The catalyst for a degree of improvement in the performance of the Commission occurred on 20 December 1944. 
The Chairman of the Commission (Sir Cecil Hurst) was absent. It was said he 'was unwell'. He did not attend 
any other meeting of the Commission. 
At that meeting, an Australian proposal (that is, of Lord Wright as its representative) for a modification of the 
system for the collection of evidence in respect of war crimes was adopted. The minutes record: 
It is recommended that in view of the increase in the number of cases which may be expected, and of the 
further fact that in many instances the work of the national offices will be carried out from their own 
countries, and not from London, close contact between the Commission and the national offices should 
be maintained, where necessary, by the appointment: by the Governments of officials for the purpose, 
or in some other appropriate way. 
In view of the developments contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the Commission decides that a 
Central Investigation Officer be appointed at the headquarters of the Commission for the purpose of 
assisting the national officers at their request in the investigation of war crimes, of collecting evidence 
which is available to the Commission in order to transmit it to the national offices and of co-ordinating 
evidence. The Central Investigation Officer will be directly responsible to the Commission. 
The most noticeable omission from the minutes of that meeting was any reference to the capacity of one 'Central 
Investigation Officer', directly responsible to the Commission, effectively to co-ordinate facts relating to German 
war crimes, which were at that stage being committed on an unprecedented scale. 
The Advent of Lord Wright as Chairman of the Commission 
A significant development in the history of the Commission occurred at a meeting on 17 January 1945, when 
the resignation, on the grounds of ill-health, of Sir Cecil Hurst as representative of the United Kingdom was 
recorded. Lord Wright was asked to act as Chairman, pending the appointment of a successor to Sir Cecil Hurst. 
Lord Finlay was the new representative of the United Kingdom. Thereafter the Commission acquired a new and 
more vigorous momentum. 
At the meeting on 31 January 1945 Lord Wright was elected Chairman. Coincidentally, it was reported that Mr. 
Pell, the representative of the United States of America, had ceased to be a member of the Commission. The 
significance of Mr. Pell's resignation is obvious. His continued membership of a body concerned with policies 
relating to future war crimes trials which were basically British in conception, ; was incompatible with 
contemporary American political and bureaucratic planning. 
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At the same meeting, there was marked lack of unanimity as to whether or not the Commission should respond 
to media criticism of its alleged lack of activity. 9 
Throughout February 1945, the minutes record very little progress. It appears that the Commission was obsessed 
by what it perceived was its inadequate public image. 10 The United States of America made it clear that it would 
dictate the essential basis of war crimes trials." 
THE PERIOD FOLLOWING THE COLLAPSE OF THE THIRD REICH 
Minutes of subsequent meetings of the Commission until the signature of the unconditional surrender of 
Germany on 8 May 1945 reveal desultory debate on disconnected issues and a general lack of perception by the 
Commission of its purpose and functions. Continuing lack of interest: in the work of the Commission by 
British political leaders and government officers is apparent. 
It is important to record that by the end of the war in Europe, the Commission's practical contribution to the 
forthcoming war crimes trials at Nuremberg and elsewhere was recorded in the minutes of the meeting on 3 May 
1945 as the 'closing' of its eighth list of war criminals and the preparation of it 'for issue'. 
In retrospect, there is considerable significance in a document adopted by the Commission on 3 May 1945, 
which set forth the following summary of an earlier discussion of the question whether the preparation for, or the 
launching of, an aggressive war was in itself a war crime, as so often asserted by Lord Wright and others: 
On 18th September, 1944, it [Committee 1111 12 reached the conclusion and recommended to the 
Commission that, while acts committed by individuals for the purpose of preparing for and launching 
aggressive war, were, le.e lata, not war crimes, it was desirable that for the future penal sanctions  
should be provided for such outrages (emphasis added). 
Dr. Ecer, representative of Czechoslovakia, disagreed with the Committee's conclusion, viz, that acts 
committed by individuals for the purpose of preparing for and launching aggressive war were not war 
crimes, and filed a separate report with the Commission. However, except as this view rendered it 
unnecessary to consider whether future penal sanctions should be provided, it was not urged that it was 
undesirable to expressly provide such sanctions. 
After discussion in the Commission, consideration of the principal question was referred to the 
Governments with the request that the Governments make known to the Commission their views 
thereon. 
One of the principles proclaimed by Chapter II of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals is as follows: 'All 
members of the Organization [the United Nations Organization] shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the 
Organization'. Thus, not only war, but 'any use of force' or 'threat of force' are prohibited by the 
proposals. 
Observance of this rule is to be enforced by the Organization not only in respect of member States but 
also in respect of States which are not members of the Organization. An effective means to ensure such 
compliance is the establishment of individual responsibility for persons who, acting for States, violate 
the rule. Therefore, it would seem that the Charter of the United Nations is an appropriate place to set 
forth the principle of individual responsibility for the threat or use of force, and thus provide future 
penal sanctions for acts committed for the purpose of preparing and launching aggressive war (emphasis 
added). 
Against this background, the Commission recommended that the Charter of the United Nations 'establish in 
substance the following rule': 
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Any person in the service of any State who has violated any rule of international law forbidding the 
threat or use of force, or any rule concerning warfare, especially the obligation to respect the generally 
recognised principles of humanity, shall be held individually responsible for these acts, and may be 
brought to trial before the civil or military tribunals of any State which may secure custody of his 
person and punished by death or any lesser punishment. 
There was a further recommendation that: 
The obligation be imposed in the Charter upon the member States to incorporate the above provision in 
the criminal statutes of their country, provide a penalty and confer upon the Courts the necessary 
jurisdiction to try and punish the offenders.I 3 
The expression of the considered view of the majority of the members of Committee III, the reference to the 
Allied Governments and the terms of the recommendations of the Commission on 3 May 1945 combine 
to demonstrate the fundamental lack of agreement on an issue which would become a basic element of 
'Nuremberg Law'. 
Minutes of meetings of the Commission on 15 May and 23 May 1945 show that it could not have been privy at 
that stage to the preparations by the principal Allied Powers for the Nuremberg trials. However, the relationship 
between the Commission and the British Government was finally clarified openly by the following letter, 
dated 1 June 1945, from the United Kingdom Foreign Office to Lord Finlay, the representative of the British 
Government on the Commission (formal parts omitted): 
1 am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to inform Your Lordship that the Pr:ime Minister has appointed 
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, K.C., Attorney-General, as the representative of the United Kingdom to join 
with Justice Robert Jackson, of the United States of America, and with the Soviet and French 
representatives when they are appointed, in preparing and prosecuting charges of atrocities and war 
crimes against such leaders of the European Axis powers and other principal agents and accessories as 
the Government of the United Kingdom may agree with any of the United Nations to bring to trial 
before an Inter-Allied Tribunal. 
2. I am to request Your Lordship to be so good as to bring this appointment to the notice of the 
President and members of the United Nations War Crimes Commission. 
At the meeting of the Commission on 27 June 1945, Dr. Ecer, the representative of Czechoslovakia, 
submitted a report, following a visit to Germany where he had spent a month interrogating prisoners of war and 
witnesses, as a member of the United Nations War Crimes Commission  and head of the Czech liaison team 
attached to the 12th Army Group. (Emphasis added). The report contained the following: 
The German people were apathetic and indifferent to their guilt, and, in his opinion, they needed a hard 
hand and compulsion to obey orders. Not until the war crimes trials began, would the full importance of 
their complicity in the war crimes committed by their leaders be realised. 
It appears that the Commission meeting on 11 July 1945 was the first at which there was reference to contact 
with representatives of the major Allied Powers. It was in the form of two letters, dated 5 and 6 July 1945, from 
Mr. Justice Jackson, United States Chief of Counsel for the Prosecution of Axis Criminality, to the Chairman 
of the Commission, in response to Lord Wright's request to Mr. Justice Jackson for a statement ... with regard to 
what exactly was required in the way of assistance from members [of the Commissionr. The basis of the 
response was confirmation of the plan set out in Mr. Justice Jackson's report to President Truman, of 7 June 
1945, 14 which Lord Wright described as 'masterly'. 
On 18 July 1945, three weeks before the signing of the London Agreement and Charter, Mr. Justice Jackson and 
advisers, including Colonel Bernays and Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, conferred in London with the Commission. 
The minutes of the conference reveal little other than repetitive platitudes. Only two indications were given of 
the aims of the prosecutors of the four Allied Powers—first, in the words of Mr. Justice Jackson, he and his 
63 
collaborators were principally concerned in finding the designers of ... atrocities and the men who by their 
organisation and conduct of the German State made "those things" happen'; second, Colonel Bernays 
foreshadowed that part of the Nuremberg indictment whereby declarations of criminality against seven groups or 
organisations would be sought, by saying: The primary duty of the four prosecutors lay with major war 
criminals. His Government hoped that in the trials before the international tribunal there would be findings of 
criminality against certain of the notorious organisations which had been major instrumentalities in the carrying 
out of the design; it was common knowledge that most of the concentration camp officials had been members of 
the Gestapo or SS. If the prosecution followed the line which was hoped for, the result of a conviction in a trial 
before the international tribunal would be a prima facie showing of guilt by reason of membership in those 
organisations.' 
THE WORK OF THE COMMISSION AFTER THE SIGNING OF THE LONDON 
AGREEMENT AND CHARTER 
On 8 August 1945, the day on which the London Agreement and Charter were signed, the Commission approved 
a further list (the 12th) of 1,000 names. It may be merely coincidental, but the minutes of that meeting contain 
the following enigmatic entry: 
It was agreed that the names of the Commandant of Belsen Concentration Camp (Josef Kramer) and staff 
of 44 men and women be included in the list as Commission charoes (emphasis added). 
The fact is that the Belsen trial took place before a British Military Court at Luneberg, Germany, between 17 
September and 17 November 1945. 
The Commission at a meeting on 29 August 1945, endorsed the London agreement and Charter, but not 
unanimously. 15 
The establishment of the International Military Tribunal naturally resulted in a decline in the activities of the 
Commission, and meetings from the latter part of 1945 until the final meeting on 31 March 1948 were 
concerned principally with the approval of lists of war criminals. However, questions concerning the legal 
validity of the jurisdiction of the Tribunal arose from time to time. 
The first serious signs of doubts concerning the validity of Article 6 of the Charter appeared at a meeting of the 
Commission on 14 November 1945, following remarks made by Colonel H.A. Smith, then Professor of 
International Law at London University, at the Belsen trial at which he appeared as counsel and made a closing 
address on behalf of all the accused. Part of the relevant minutes was: 
At the request of the Chairman, Professor Gros, representative of the provisional Government of France, 
recalled the proposal he had made at the last meeting that the Commission should obtain a copy of 
Professor Smith's exact statement to the court regarding the guilt of the accused at the Belsen trial. He 
felt that, after the legal officers had examined the statement, the Commission might wish to take some 
action. He thought that if those views were known in some of the exoccupied countries, they would 
provoke serious apprehension, and that the Commission should be ready to state that they were only the 
views of one man, and did not necessarily represent the views held by British lawyers. He suggested that 
a statement be prepared for use if the need should arise. 16 
However, at the meeting on 5 December 1945, on the initiative of Dr. Liang (China), any question of public 
criticism of Professor Smith by the Commission was abandoned, a course in which Lord Wright concurred. 17 
It is curious that a Commission, many of the members of which were internationally renowned jurists, 
should have contemplated becoming involved in a public controversy concerning the basis of the Tribunal's 
jurisdiction while the Nuremberg trials were in progress, especially when they must have anticipated that the 
question of jurisdiction would involve major issues for argument before, and determination by, the 
Tribunal. 
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As it continued to prepare lists of war criminals, the Commission from time to time was faced with fundamental 
questions in respect of its authority to take into consideration crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, 
as distinct from crimes against the laws and customs of war. At a meeting on 9 January 1946 the question was 
discussed, but inconclusively and with the expression of conflicting views. It seems strange that eight months 
after the capitulation of Germany, the Commission had not obtained clarification of the extent of its authority on 
such a basic matter. 
The debate, and the expression of different opinions by members of the Commission, continued at the meeting 
on 23 January 1946. Again, Lord Wright expressed his views with vigour, as the minutes record: 
The Chairman felt strongly that the authority of the Commission extended to all war crimes in the 
widest sense, and therefore to all the categories mentioned in the four-Power agreement [the London 
Agreement], and that if that were agreed it was not necessary to refer the question to member 
Governments, as it was merely a question of construction. 
However, other views prevailed and the discussion was adjourned. 
At the next meeting on 30 January 1946, the impasse was fmally resolved. After the further expression of 
divergent or qualified views, the Chairman moved a motion to the effect that crimes against peace and against 
humanity, as referred to in 'the four-Power agreement of 8 August 1945', are war crimes within the jurisdiction 
of the Commission. The motion was approved by nine votes, with six absentions. 
The extraordinary way in which the conflict of opinion was resolved is heightened by the fact that more than two 
years had elapsed since the establishment of the Commission and nearly six months had passed since the signing 
of the London Agreement. There is no record in the minutes of meetings of the Commission that at any time it 
sought clarification of its position from the British Government on an issue which created marked discord within 
the Commission. 
The Commission continued to collect, principally through offices of the nations represented on the Commission, 
lists of war criminals, but obviously it was becoming obsolescent, as many different types of courts in various 
European countries and zones of military occupation were conducting trials of persons alleged to have committed 
war crimes. 
At a meeting on 29 October 1947 it was decided, with the concurrence of the British, United States and 
Australian Governments, 'that the life of the Commission be terminated not later than 31st March 1948'. On that 
date the final (135th) meeting of the Commission was held. One of its last acts was the approval of the 68th list 
of war criminals. This finalised the collection of nearly 40,000 names in four and a half years. 18 
COMMENTARY ON THE COMMISSION'S WORK 
The History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War is a 
monumental work, of extreme value in a historical sense and for the purpose of analysing chronologically events 
and facts which traversed the period from the commencement of World War II until after the conclusion of the 
Nuremberg trials. 
It is not easy to conclude with any confidence how effective the Commission was in practice 19 , or to make a 
judgment on whether, if it had not existed, the course, of the prosecution of war criminals would have been 
significantly different. 
Nevertheless, the minutes of the meetings of the Commission reveal many deficiencies in its original structure 
and the methods it adopted to carry out its functions: 
Its authority was originally expressed in vague and inadequate terms. 
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It lacked the resources to accomplish anything other than a token attempt to investigate and record 
evidence of war crimes. 
There is no evidence in the minutes that at any stage it established appropriate liaison with the armed 
services of the Allied and Associated Powers. 
Through no apparent fault of its own, it was largely ignored by the British Government, which had been 
responsible for its establishment. 
It was not made privy to the negotiations between representatives of the Allied Powers prior to the 
execution of the London Agreement and Charter. 
Its deliberations were frequently marked by discord and acrimony, and it was often difficult for the 
Commission to reach agreement on fundamental matters. 
The Soviet Union was never represented on the Commission, although many of the most atrocious war 
crimes were committed on Russian soil against Russian soldiers and civilians. 20 
For more than the first year of its formal existence it lacked strong administrative leadership, and it was 
not until Lord Wright became the Chairman that, on the basis of the minutes, it manifested a sense of 
urgency in relation to its task. 
It underestimated the political strength of the United States of America in the negotiations for the 
establishment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, and, at least until the London Agreement was almost in final 
form, it erroneously assumed that Great Britain would play a much more prominent role in those 
negotiations than in fact it did. 
Criticism of the Commission should not be interpreted as directed only against some of its members. Many of 
the problems were inherent and the consequence of circumstances beyond the control of the Commission. In 
particular, the British Government did not, according to the minutes, show any enthusiasm for the task it had 
entrusted to the Commission. 
The claim by Lord Wright that 'through the work of the Commission and other agencies, the United Nations had 
ready to their hands when the time came, a more or less practical scheme for the prosecution and punishment of 
war criminals, which was capable of being completed and put into effect when the Nazi resistance collapsed' is 
not tenable. (Emphasis added). 
In relation to the concept of 'crimes against peace', it is true that from the beginning of his membership of the 
Commission Lord Wright was a strong advocate of its validity as expressive of established international law. 
However, the Commission as a body was unable to reach any clear agreement concerning the concept, and, in 
this respect, it is submitted that it is a fair conclusion that the Commission failed in one of the fundamental 
aspects of its responsibility. 
In the opinion of the writer, an overall assessment of the significance of the Commission in the development of 
'Nuremberg Law', made on a consideration of the minutes of all its meetings and associated documents, is that its 
practical influence was, at most, marginal. The Nuremberg principal trial would have proceeded under the London 
Agreement and Charter even if the Commission had not existed. Nevertheless, it fulfilled a desirable political 
purpose, especially from the viewpoint of the representatives of European Governments in exile in London. In 
that respect the Commission was a cohesive force, even though agreement on fundamental issues was often not 
forthcoming. 
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NOTES 
1. See History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission and the Development of the Laws of War, 
His Majesty's Stationery Office, London, 1948, Chapter 1, p. 3. (This work is referred to in the text and 
notes to this chapter as History of U.N.W.C.C. It was reviewed in eulogistic terms by Professor Hanbury 
in (1950) 66 L.Q.R., pp. 258-262). In the notes to this chapter, the minutes of the meetings of the 
Commission, from the unofficial preliminary meeting in London on 26 October 1943 until the final 
(135th) meeting on 31 March 1948, are designated 'U.N.W.C.C. Minutes', followed, where necessary, by 
the date of the meeting. Documents which form part of the minutes are separately described. The copies of 
the minutes perused by the writer were located within the Archives Section of the United Nations 
Organisation, New York. They are original copies of the minutes, signed by the Chairman of the 
Commission. A valuable 14-page document in the Archives Section, which the writer has considered, is 
designated 'Record Group 30: Records of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, London, 1943-49'. 
It comprises two sections thus described: '(a) History and organisation: (b) Records'. 
2. It appears that the staff then existing or approved totalled three --an officer described as the Secretary-
General, a chief clerk and a shorthand typist. See U.N.W.C.C. Minutes, 4 January 1944. 
3. The declaration was as follows: 
I made emphatic reservations regarding the document: concernirlg the preparation and transmission of 
cases which Committee I presented to the Commission on March 7th. Since then, at a meeting of the 
Committee on March 15th, I have repeated my observations, some of which were noted by the Chairman 
of Committee I. 
I wish to summarise the position which I take in regard to Committee I's first report. 
1. After 5 months of existence, barely 60 cases have been transmitted, most of which were incomplete and 
were placed in Class C. This number is horribly out of proportion with the real facts of German atrocities 
in Europe. 
For the reasons stated below, there is absolutely no ground for supposing that the Governments will ever 
be able to increase the number of cases which comply with Committee I's requirements. When at the time 
of the armistice the Governments call for our list, our failure will be manifest. 
2. Committee I cross-examines the Governments like a luge d'instruction'. In doing so it converts itself into 
a supranational judge, an attitude which no provision authorises it to adopt. For example, the Committee 
insists on having witnesses to prove acts attributed to a Gestapo chief although under some legal systems 
the real crime consists in the mere fact of being a Gestapo member operating in an oppressed territory. 
The Committee thereby refuses to put on its list a man who for the national judge is already by operation 
of the law an accused person. 
Moreover, by assuming the position of a judge, Committee I prevents any case affecting the persons who 
bear the gravest responsibility from being dealtwith, for there are no witnesses to the crimes which the 
ring-leaders have committed in the form of general orders or decrees. 
3. In the case of crimes against prisoners of war, the Committee has found that the culprits are always 
unknown and cannot be identified unless the German General Staff should hand over its operation orders. 
Here also the list is empty. 
4. The conclusion to be drawn from these observations is that the compilation of a list is not what the 
realities of the situation require. To draw up a list of war criminals might be a good idea in 1918, since 
crime had not passed the limits within which individuals can be held responsible. In 1944, when hundreds 
of thousands of persons have been put to death or terrorised millions of other persons, [sic.] crime has 
assumed a collective character to which no list of individual criminals can do justice. 
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Even if the Governments had proof of all the individual crimes, the atrocity of which Germany is guilty is 
not measured by the sum total of such crimes; it consists in her systematic organisation of crime. 
ask the Commission to examine carefully the path opened by Committee I's first report in order to make 
sure whether it leads to a solution of the problem of suppressing crime. 
I venture to recall that the Commission has before it a draft of articles for insertion in the armistice 
which providles for the compulsory internment of all Gestapo and SS members. Committee II has 
clearly perceived that individual crime cannot be suppressed except within a framework of assured 
general security against the organisation of crime. 
I ask the Committee to make a provisional report to the Governments on this question as soon as 
possible. 
The public believes that lists are being drawn up now; perhaps the Governments have the same belief. It 
would be too serious a disappointment for the oppressed peoples to discover, at the moment of Europe's 
liberation, that the Commission has not fulfilled their hopes. There is still time to say that the 
method suggested by the Governments is not satisfactory, that a list cannot at present be drawn up. 
Finally, it is open to doubt whether a list such as Committee I desires could ever be drawn up. 
The Germans have exterminated too many witnesses, destroyed too much evidence. But without 
prejudicing the future, the Commission can seek to discharge its duties by other means. I feel the 
time has come both to say this to the United Nations Governments and to do it. 
4. In his closing address to the Nuremberg Tribunal on behalf of the United States of America, Mr. Thomas 
J. Dodd, executive trial counsel, said: (p. 65 of the official record, His Majesty's Stationery Office, 
London, 1946): 'When the RSHA, the Reich Main Security Office, was created in 1939, the Gestapo was 
not dispersed, but became a distinct department of that central office, as shown by the Chart of RSHA 
introduced in evidence, and by the testimony of the witnesses Ohlendorf and Schollenberg. They easily 
estimated the number of persons in the Gestapo at from 30,000 to 40,000'. 
5. Emphasis added by the writer. 
6. This is explained by Lord Wright in his introductory chapter to History  of U.N.W.C.C., p. 7. 
7. See History of U.N.W.C.C., Lord Wright's introductory chapter pp.3-4. 
8. In the minutes, Lord Wright is recorded as having said that he desired to make clear that the Commission 
was an independent international body and was the chosen instrument of the various governments 
represented on it for the investigation of war crimes. It was not a prosecuting body, but it was the 
organisation which took the first steps in seeing that war crimes did not go unrequited. The Commission's 
primary task was to gather together the evidence upon which the military authorities would act in 
apprehending offenders. Effective liaison must be maintained with the national offices of the various 
governments (which prepared the cases sent to the Commission for placing on the lists of war criminals), 
and with the military authorities on the various world fronts (who would arrest the war criminals) In his 
view close co-operation with the Russian Extraordinary State Commission was eminently desirable. Both 
Commissions were working with the same end in view, and in his opinion their approaches to the 
common problem were not radically different. 
9. The minutes record that the following statement was approved: 'At its meeting ... this afternoon the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission adopted the following resolution: 
Reports have appeared in the Press suggesting that the success and even the continuation of the work of 
the United Nations War Crimes Commission are in danger. There is no question of the Commission 
ceasing to discharge the task placed on it by the Governments of the United Nations. On the contrary, its 
operations have been placed on a firmer basis by the liberation of Axis-occupied territory and the greatly 
increased opportunity of obtaining evidence. 
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10. It is remarkable that, at a meeting on 7 February 1945, three months before the surrender of the German 
armed forces, two members of the Commission stated that 'the mystery surrounding the Commission 
should be dissipated'. 
11. On 1 February 1945, the Acting Secretary of State of the United States of America preserved the premier 
status of America in determining the course of war crimes trials (source: Radio Bulletin 28, Washington, 
DC) when he recapitulated public pronouncements by the President of the United States commencing in 
1942 and added: 
It is therefore fitting that we should again proclaim our determination that none who participate in these 
acts of savagery shall go unpunished. The United Nations have made it clear that they will pursue the 
guilty and deliver them up in order that justice shall be done. That warning applies not only to the leaders 
but also to their functionaries and subordinates in Germany and in the satellite countries. All who 
knowingly take part in the deportation of Jews to their death in Poland or Norwegians and French to their 
death in Germany are equally guilty with the executioner. All who share the guilt shall share the 
punishment. 
Over the past months, officers of the Department of State, in consultation with other departments, have 
worked out proposals for the realization of the objectives stated by the President. Pending the outcome of 
current discussions with our allies on this subject, these proposals cannot be published. I wish, however, 
to state categorically that these proposals are as forthright and far reaching as the objectives announced by 
the President, which they are intended to implement. They provide for the punishment of German leaders 
and their associates for their responsibility for the whole broad criminal enterprise devised and executed 
with ruthless disregard of the very foundation of law and morality, including offences, wherever 
committed, against the rules of war and against minority elements, Jewish and other groups, and 
individuals. 
12. Committee III was composed of representatives of Belgium, China, Czechoslovakia, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
13. The Commission's recommendations at its meeting on 3 May 1945 do not appear to be within the 
authority given to the Commission when it was established on 20 October 1943. 
14. Jackson, Report to the President of the United States, released by the White House on 7 June 1945. 
15. The minutes record: 
Referring to Article 6 of the Charter the Chairman, Lord Wright, said that the Commission might feel 
itself impelled to agree as a corporate body, upon a declaration ' affirming the principles embodied in that 
Article. Such a declaration would be a record for the future of a consensus of opinion on vital questions of 
international law by expert lawyers from practically the whole civilised world. 
There is no record in the minutes of the Commission's meetings that any such declaration was ever made. 
16. The minutes reveal an acrimonious discussion, with very strong criticism by Lord Wright of the reported 
expression of Professor Smith's views. 
17. The Belsen trial involved forty five accused. For completeness, and in order to explain the concern of 
members of the Commission at the reported remarks of Professor Smith, the following extract from Lord 
Wright's foreword to the report of the Belsen trial in Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, selected and 
prepared by the U.N.W.C.C., Vol. 1, p. xi, dated October 1947, is reproduced: 
A distinguished Professor of International Law, Colonel Smith was permitted by leave of the Court [a 
British Military Court sitting at Luneberg] to appear as an additional Defending Officer, the sanction of 
the Convening Officer having been first obtained. The effect of his address is given in the Report as are 
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also the reply of the Prosecuting Counsel and the comments upon it by the Judge Advocate in his 
summing up; I do not think it necessary to refer further to the matter here, except to observe that all the 
material objections have now been dealt with in the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal in the sense 
opposite to Professor Smith's arguments: indeed, if his arguments were in substance good, the validity of 
all the judgments delivered in the numerous war crimes cases which have been decided in Allied 
international, military and national Courts could not stand. The Military Court in this case obviously 
rejected these contentions. Though the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in this region of war crimes 
decisions, such decisions are persuasive though not coercive, and the overwhelming mass of authority has 
now established a jurisprudence. 
18. This estimate was given by the British representative, Sir Robert Craigie, chairman of Committee I, at 
the final meeting. See also History of U.N.W.C.C., Statistical Report of Cases Listed by Committee I, 
Appendix III, pp. 508-514. On p. 514 it is stated that the Commission issued 80 lists of war criminals, 
including 26 lists of Japanese war criminals prepared by the Nanking (Chungking) Sub-Commission. 
19. There is an interesting note in the minutes of the meeting on 29 August 1945, three weeks after the 
signing of the London Agreement and Charter. Colonel Hodgson, the representative of the United States 
of America, said he had been informed and authorised to advise the Commission 'that it is the view of the 
State and War Departments of the United States, that great weight should be given to a determination of 
the War Crimes Commission placing a name upon the War Crimes List, and that, in the absence of 
extraordinary circumstances, this determination should be accepted'. It is, of course, a matter of 
speculation whether this tribute was, in the circumstances, sincere. 
20. History of U.N.W.C.C., pp. 22, 111-113 and 158-159. 
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APPENDIX I 	MINUTE OF OBSERVATIONS OF LORD WRIGHT AT TIIE 
MEETING OF U.N.W.C.C. ON 10 OCTOBER 1944 
Lord Wright said that he supported in principle Dr. Ecer's minority report. He thought that the preparation for 
and launching of the present totalitarian war constituted a war crime and should be treated by the Commission as 
such. 
The majority report correctly described it as a gave outrage against the elementary principles of international 
law. That is an apt description of a crime. It is indeed the most serious of war crimes. Unless international law 
fastens criminal responsibility on individuals for war crimes, it is not possible to postulate guilt under 
international law (which is what both military courts and the proposed Interallied Court would enforce) on the, 
part of the actual perpetrators of the atrocities, who have executed the cruelties, the mass murders, the terrorism, 
the mass deportations, the acts of wanton and revengeful destruction and devastation which were all carried out in 
pursuance of the settled and declared policy of Hitler and his associates, the authors and originators of the whole 
nefarious scheme. 
Lord Wright did not think it necessary to repeat the weighty pronouncements quoted by Dr. Ecer on international 
law, all agreeing that the launching of such a war was a crime under international law. 
The contrary view is that there can be no crime under international law unless it is possible to cite a lem lata, that 
is unless you can refer to a specific section of a valid and binding code, constituting the crime and accompanied 
by the express sanction of a defined punishment. 
Lord Wright cannot accept this narrow meaning of the nature of law. He is accustomed to finding law in the 
developing principles of the common law. For instance, in English law there is no specific statutory provision 
making murder a crime. The same is true of piracy jure gentium. In international law there is no specific code, 
indeed there has never been any competent legislature. The ius gentium is to be extracted from a number of 
sources, which has [sic] been described by this Commission or its Committees. 
The mass of expert opinion of instructed writers on international law which Dr. Ecer has quoted, constitutes 
satisfactory evidence of a general consensus of authoritative opinion as to the principle that launching a war like 
the present is a crime; this corresponds to what the moral sense of humanity demands. Thus the most essential 
source of international law is established. 
So is another source, to be discovered in solemn international treaties, conventions and the like: in particular, 
besides the Convention of the League of Nations and the Geneva Protocol, there is the Pact of Paris, or the 
Briand-Kellogg Pact, which is categorical on this point, as Dr. Ecer has shown. What dissentient voices there 
are, do not outweigh the general consensus of the civilized world. 
The absence of lex lata would no doubt prevent a man being convicted and punished for something the 
culpability of which might fairly be regarded as doubtful; the criminality of Hitler and his associates in launching 
the present total war, for which he has been preparing for years, the aggressive purpose and character of which he 
had proclaimed, cannot be contested. There was no need of an express code nor was there need of an express 
sanction, unless international law has no teeth. All that was needed was an appropriate tribunal, capable of doing 
justice when the facts were proved before it. Any other conclusion would shock the moral sense of mankind. It 
cannot be said that international law in this context only concerned itself with matters between sovereign States. 
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CHAPTER 6 	TIIE BIRTII OF 'NUREMBERG LAW' 
INTRODUCTION 
The decisions to establish the Nuremberg Tribunal and to frame the charges against the accused were made 
against a background of political disputation among the Allied Powers. The disputation is apparent from 
contemporary records, some of which have only become available by the comparatively recent declassification of 
State documents in the United States of America and Britain. 
It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the documentary record chronologically over a period of about one 
year before the London Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945. This will enable a judgment ultimately to be 
made on the legal strength of the Agreement and Charter in the light of the documentary record, and of the claims 
made by the leaders of the Allied Powers that settled principles of international law were applied in their 
formulation. 
The survey in the chapter is essentially confined to an historical account of the divisions and diversions among 
the Allied Powers, primarily Great Britain and the United States. In particular, it is designed to illustrate the 
absence of any conceptualisation of the nature and scope of the Nuremberg trials and of any precise analysis of 
their legal justification until the war was virtually at an end. 
The period from 21 August 1944 to 11 November 1944 
Although, as discussed in Chapter 4, stern warnings had been given to the Axis Powers concerning the fate of 
Nazi 'war criminals' for more than two years, it is apparent from the combined Allied Government records that no 
coherent plan had been devised, let alone agreed upon, as to how retribution would be effected pursuant to such 
warnings. Indeed, this remained the case until nearly a year after the successful Anglo-American landing at 
Normandy on 6 June 1944. 
By August 1944, the success of the Allied counter-attack, combined with the defeat of the German forces in 
North Africa and the Allied advances on Italian territory, had converted justified optimism in an Allied victory 
into a certainty. The understandable concentration of the Allies on achieving military victory until then could 
now no longer be their exclusive object. Two results of the prospective Allied victory were the need to make 
speedy decisions concerning the form of the future government of Germany and to formulate principles 
concerning the nature and scope of the threatened retributive action against the leaders of the Nazi Government 
and its armed forces. 
The first document which casts light on the broad policy in relation to war crimes of any of the Allied Powers 
was an 'interim directive' for the military government of Germany issued by the American War Department on 21 
August 1944. 1 It contained directions for the apprehension and detention of specified classes of Nazi officials 
and war criminals. 
About the same time, the American War Department issued a Handbook of Military Government for Germany, 
which set out the groups of 'Nazi police, Party, para-rnilitary and government officers who were to be interned. 2 
It was stated in the Handbook that Nazi officers in the listed categories 'will be arrested and detained upon the 
entry into Germany of the Allied Occupational Forces'. The official estimate of the total number of individuals in 
all categories was about 220,000, of whom it was estimated approximately one half would be in the western 
zone. 
In order to illustrate the attitude of the British Government in late 1944 to the scope of its intended retribution, it 
is necessary to refer in the context of this chapter to a British aide-memoire, dated 19 August 1944, from the 
British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Halifax, to the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Hu11. 3 
Essentially, that document stated: 
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... His Majesty's Government ... propose that their attitude ... should be as follows: 
(A) Sir Cecil Hurst [Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission] should be informed 
that His Majesty's, Government cannot agree to any extension of the terms of reference of the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission to enable it to deal with atrocities committed on 
racial, political or religious grounds in enemy territory. 
(B) The United Nations should not assume any formal commitment to ensure the trial of those 
responsible for such atrocities; nor should they impose upon the enemy any formal obligation 
to try them or surrender them for trial. The United Nations should, however, be prepared to 
bring pressure to bear, upon successor Governments in enemy countries to ensure that 
criminals are brought to justice. The War Crimes Commission should be informed of the 
general intentions of the United Nations in this respect. 
On 25 August 1944, a strongly worded statement on war criminals was submitted by the American Jewish 
Conference to the United States Secretary of State. The statement invited attention to the principal 
declarations of the heads of the Allied Powers, as set out in Chapter 4. It rightly claimed that 'the United 
Nations, being aware of the manifold crimes committed by the Axis Powers against the Jewish people, have 
solemnly and officially affirmed as their policy toward all those guilty of these crimes the exaction of full and 
just retribution'.4 
Near the end of August 1944 differences of opinion became manifest between political leaders in the 
United States. The Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Henry Morgenthau Jr., was a strong advocate of ruthless and 
condign punishment of the Nazi leaders, but not by any judicial process. He urged their summary 
execution by the advancing Army units in Europe. His proposals posed a major problem for the Secretary of 
War, Mr. Henry Stimson, who, on 25 August 1944, made the following notes for a conference with the 
President.5 
Policy vs. liquidation of Hitler and his gang. Present instructions seem inadequate beyond 
imprisonment. Our officers must have the protection of definite instructions if shooting is required. If 
shooting is required it must be immediate; not postwar. 
Two significant matters are apparent from other documents.6 First, even in the midst of dissension in the 
American Cabinet in the last week of August 1944 none of the leaders appears at that time to have given any 
consideration to the legal basis of the proposed action by the Allied Powers, whether it was the hard-line 
approach of Morgenthau or the more cautious, and obviously politically motivated, attitude of Stimson. Second, 
no cohesion appears to have existed at that stage between the Allied Powers in respect of the formulation of an 
overall strategy for dealing with the issue of war crimes. It is surprising that a concerted effort was not made by 
the end of August 1944 to bring together the Governments of the Allied Powers and representatives of the Armed 
Forces so that, with the best legal advice available, consensus could have been reached on the appropriate courses 
to be taken, with a sound legal basis identified and made public. The fear of reprisals against nationals of the 
Allied Powers and others at risk by means of even heightened acts of brutality by the Nazis does not seem a 
sufficient reason for the lack of formulation of a concerted policy which would stand the test of public and 
subsequent historical scrutiny. 
For the time being the hard-line policy of Morgenthau prevailed. At a meeting on 5 September 1944 of the 
Cabinet policy committee on Germany (Morgenthau, Hull and Roosevelt's confidential adviser, Harry Hopkins), 
Stimson's proposals were rejected unanimously. The policy of complete destruction of Germany was accepted. In 
a memorandum from the State Department to the Cabinet committee on Germany, dated 5 September 1944, it 
was stated: 7 
... Dissolution of the Nazi Party and all affiliated organisations. Large groups of particularly 
objectionable elements, especially the SS and the Gestapo, should be arrested and interned and war 
criminals should be tried and executed (emphasis added). 
The document was approved without change by the Secretary Of State. 
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With the support of the Cabinet committee apparently assured, on the same day Moreenthau sent a lengthy 
memorandum to the President, in which he set out details of what became known as the 'Moreenthau Plan'. This 
simply, and without regard to any legal basis, advocated summary execution of 'arch-criminals', the 
trial by military commissions of 'certain other war criminals' and the deindustrialisation of Germany 8 
The response of the Secretary of War was equally swift. On the same day, 5 September 1944, he sent the 
following memorandum to Moreenthau, with copies to the other members of the Cabinet committee 
and the President: 
It is primarily by the thorough apprehension, investigation, and trial of all the Nazi leaders and 
instruments of the Nazi system of terrorism such as the Gestapo with punishment delivered as 
promptly, swiftly and severely as possible that we can demonstrate the abhorrence which the world has 
for such a sysem and bring home to the German people our determination to expiate it and all its fruits 
forever ... 
My basic objection to the proposed methods of treating Germany which were discussed this morning 
was that in addition to a system of preventive and educative punishment they would add the dangerous 
weapon of complete economic oppression. Such methods, in my opinion, do not prevent war, they tend 
to breed war.9 
Two meetings of the Cabinet committee on 5 and 9 September 1944 with the President did not solve the 
Moreenthau-Stimson deadlock, but on 9 September 1944 the Secretary of War wrote a memorandum to 
the President, in which, for the first time, a glimmer of Nuremberg Law' can be seen. The following extract 
from the memorandum is significant: 
...I am disposed to believe that at least as to the chief Nazi officials, we should participate in an 
international tribunal constituted to try them. They should be charged with offenses against the laws of 
the Rules of War in that they have committed wanton and unnecessary cruelties in connection with the 
prosecution of the war. This law of the Rules of War has been upheld by our own Supreme Court 
and will be the basis of judicial action against the Nazis. 
I have great difficulty in finding any means whereby military commissions may try and convict those 
responsible for excesses committed within Germany both before and during the war which have no 
relation to the conduct of the war. I would be prepared to construe broadly what constituted a violation 
of the Rules of War but there is a certain field, in which I fear that external courts cannot move. Such 
courts would be without jurisdiction ... 1 ° 
A meeting between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill at Quebec in mid-September 1944 was attended by the 
British Lord Chancellor, Lord Simon, who had prepared a case for 'political execution'. This paper, dated 4 
September 1944, was discussed at the meeting. It stated: 11 
3. I am strongly of opinion that the method by trial, conviction and judicial sentence is quite 
inappropriate for notorious ringleaders such as Hitler, Himmler, Goebbels and Ribbentrop. Apart from 
the formidable difficulties of constituting the Court, formulating the charge, and assembling the 
evidence, the question of their fate is a political, pot a judicial, question [emphasis in original]. ... 
The decision must be 'the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies'. The Moscow Declaration, 
indeed, has already said so. 
The list of war criminals who might be dealt with without trial [my emphasis], which was prepared by 
the Foreign Secretary, was criticised in some quarters for its omissions, but I am disposed to think that 
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this method will only he considered appropriate and justified in the case of the small group of leaders 
who are known to be responsible for the conduct of the war, and who have at headquarters authorised, 
approved or acquiesced in the horrible atrocities which have been committed. 
The significance of Lord Simon's paper was twofold. First, it did not recognise, at a time when the Allied 
Powers were poised for victory, any question of an International Military Tribunal; rather, it emphasised 
'the formidable difficulties of constitution the Court'. Second. Lord Simon expressly preserved the concept 
of 'shoot on sight' as far as the 'small group of leaders' was concerned. 
The result of the Quebec meeting was that the American President and the British Prime Minister finally 
initialled a summary of the 'Moreenthau Plan' and agreed to send a copy of Lord Simon's paper to Marshal 
Stalin, with a request that the three Powers jointly prepare a list of top Nazis 'to be dispatched by "summary 
execution"'. 
Morgenthau's seeming victory at Quebec was, however, short-lived. Public pressure and the tide of politics 
soon forced President Roosevelt virtually to disown the 'Moreenthau Plan'. 
By the middle of September 1944 what came to be known as the 'Bernays Plan' was evolved. The author of 
the plan was Lieutenant-Colonel Bernays, chief of the Special Projects Office of the Personnel Branch (G-I). 
The 'Bernays Plan' proposed a war crimes trial system before 'an appropriately constituted international 
court', before which 'the Nazi Government and its Party and State agencies, including the SA, SS and 
Gestapo, should be charged with conspiracy to commit murder, terrorism and the destruction of peaceful 
populations in violation of the laws of war'. Colonel Bernays"proposed solution' also provided that: 12 
d. The judgment should adjudicate: 
(1)That the Nazi Government and its mentioned agencies are guilty as charged. 
(2) That every member of the Government and organizations on trial is guilty of the same 
offense. Such adjudication of guilt would require no proof that the individuals affected 
participated in any overt act other than membership in the conspiracy. 
e. Sentence would be passed by the court on the individual defendants before it. 
f. Thereafter, every member of the mentioned Government and organizations would be subject to arrest, 
trial and punishment in the national courts of the several United Nations. Proof of membership, without 
more, would establish guilt of participation in the mentioned conspiracy, and the individual would be 
punished in the discretion of the court. Proof of the commission of other criminal acts would subject 
the individual to additional punishments conformably to local law. 
10. It is particularly noted, in connection with the foregoing 
a. That in view of the nature of the charge, everything done in furtherance of the conspiracy from 
the time of its inception would be admissible, including domestic atrocities against minority 
groups within Germany, and domestic atrocities induced or procured by the German 
Government to be committed by other Axis Nations against their respective nationals. 
b. That once the conspiracy is established, each act of every member thereof during its 
continuance and in furtherance of its purposes would be imputable to all other members thereof. 
In that genesis of the London Agreement and Charter, fundamental emphasis was placed on conspiracy and 
membership of an indicted organisation. 
No attempt was made at the time by the author of the plan to justify it from the viewpoint of established 
principles of international law. The question of its legal basis was simply ignored. Nonetheless, leading 
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members of the Washington administration obviously saw its adoption as a way out of the impasse which 
had developed with respect to the 'Morgenthau Plan'. The assistant executive officer, Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of War (McCloy), Colonel Cutter, was asked to examine the plan. Within a fortnight, 
Colonel Cutter sent a memorandum to McCloy, in which he described the plan as 'ingenious', but added: 13 
... The proposal however, involves fairly radical departures from existing theories, (i) of individual 
criminality and criminal responsibility and (ii) of prosecution procedures. It also contemplates one (or a 
series) of grandiose state trials, which have obvious disadvantages in providing opportunities for the 
manufacture of national martyrs, giving the defense an effective public platform for use in propaganda, 
etc. 
Recommendation: If the file is to be sent to State and Navy, a clearer indication should be given that the 
memorandum does not yet represent War Department policy and is merely transmitted as an interesting 
individual study and suggestion ... 
The emergence of the 'Bernays Plan' kept alive the attitude of Secretary of War Stimson, who wrote a lengthy 
memorandum to Secretary of State Hull, dated 27 October 1944, in which he said: 14 
... The enclosed memorandum ['Bernays Plan'] proposes the prosecution of totalitarianism by trying the 
organizations which have made total war possible through their coercion of a whole people. It 
recognizes the unity of criminal purpose in all the acts of Naziism which have carried out the scheme 
outlined in Mein Kampf. It treats on a parity, and as part of the same conspiracy, both the acts of 
criminal aggression against neighboring countries and the persecutions of minority groups within 
enemy territory. I think the proposals set out in the memorandum are worthy of complete investigation 
and may serve as the basis of an interdepartmental conference on the general war crimes problem, which 
should be held as soon as possible. 
On 9 November 1944, a meeting of representatives of the State, War and Navy Departments was held, presided 
over by Assistant Secretary of War McCloy. At this meeting agreement 'in principle was given to the 'Bernays 
Plan' and the War Department was authorised to prepare a draft memorandum as a basis for further discussion. 15 
Colonel Bemays accordingly prepared a draft memorandum which furnished some detail of the proposal that an 
indictment should include charges of criminal conspiracy and also should be directed at organisations which the 
Allied Powers would seek to have declared criminal. The draft memorandum, dated 11 November 1944, was 
expressed to be from the Secretaries of State, War and Navy to the President. 16 
It was stated in the draft memorandum that 'the objective in the prosecution of Nazi war crimes should be not 
only to punish the individual criminals, but also to expose and condemn the criminal purpose behind each 
individual outrage ... the well-recognised principles of the law of criminal conspiracy are plainly applicable, and 
may be employed'. It was also stated that 'the proceeding will be judicial rather than political. It will rest securely 
upon traditionally established legal concepts.... we favour a court constituted by international treaty for the trial 
of this charge ... in making this recommendation we have given due consideration to the possible difficulties 
which might arise in the consummation of the necessary treaty. The process of ratification might be time-
consuming. When the proposed treaty comes before some ratifying bodies, such as the United States Senate, 
there might be suggestions of undesirable reservations ... 
The assertion in the draft memorandum that the proposed proceeding would 'rest securely upon traditionally 
established legal concepts was not supported by argument or authority, but no doubt this was not considered 
necessary at that stage. It probably was also unnecessary to state that there was no precedent in existing 
international law for the proposal. 
The period from November 1944 to 12 April 1945 
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This period is considered separately because there was a significant change in the development qf American war 
crimes policy when President Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945. 
At the beginning of the period, Washington officials were endeavouring to refine the conspiracy/criminal 
organisation concept as the basis of the trials of war criminals, which was at the heart of the 'Bemays Plan'. That 
such an attempted refinement exposed legal difficulties is apparent from a memorandum by the Judge Advocate 
General, Major General Cramer, dated 22 November 1944. 17 It revealed a determination to create, by what Major 
General Cramer described as a 'treaty provision', legal principles based on the civil law doctrine of res judicata. 
Two extracts from that memorandum illustrate how far American officials were prepared to go in order to give 
legal credibility to the 'Bernays Plan'. They were: 
1. Although the suggested concept of res judicata goes beyond anything now known to our 
criminal law, I see nothing in it repugnant to natural justice. 
... I see nothing inherently unfair or unjust in trying the organisation in a proceeding 
where it is defended and represented by its leaders, and in then making that judgment 
binding on all who voluntarily become members of the organisation. 
Major General Cramer concluded: 'Therefore ... I agree in principle with this part of the proposal also' (that is, 
the 'Bemays Plan'). 
A draft of a memorandum to the American President, dated 27 November 1944, for the signature of the Secretary 
of State and the Secretary of War (the Navy Department having indicated, as stated in the draft, that it had a direct 
interest only in war crimes in the strict sense), shows that by that stage an attempt was being made by 
Washington officials to crystallise American war crimes policy on the following bases: 18 (extracts from the text 
of the draft are indicated by quotation marks) 
(a) There should be trial and punishment for 'not only technical violations of the laws and customs of war but 
also (1) atrocities committed by the Nazis before there was a state of war and (2) atrocities committed by 
them against their own nationals on racial, religious and political grounds.' 
(b) "the criminality with which the Nazi leaders and Groups are charged ... represents the results of a purposeful 
and systematic conspiracy to achieve domination of other nations and peoples by deliberate violation of the 
rules of war as they have been accepted and adhered to by the nations of the world, the violation of treaties 
and international conventions and customs, and mass extermination of peoples.' 
(c) Following the adjudication on the conspiracy count 'the civil or military courts of the several United 
Nations ... would proceed to identify the additional members of the groups thus adjudicated to have been 
participants in the conspiracy.' 
(d) Two principal types of court could be employed for the trial of conspiracy charges of the character outlined 
above: 
I Tribunal Created by Treaty; 
II Military Courts Created by Executive Agreement or Military Arrangement.' 
The draft memorandum acknowledged that the British Government had indicated that it favoured neither 
the treaty process nor the establishment of any international tribunal for the trial of war offences, other 
than perhaps mixed military courts. 
The contents of the draft memorandum, in so far as they differed from the 'Bernays Plan' and various 
amendments of it, reflected an attempt to accommodate some of the objections to it by high government officers 
in Washington: for example, first, the assertion that the ultimate objective of the conspiracy was the 
'achieving of world domination' raised the issue of the criminality of aggressive war, and, second, that the 
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tribunal should be established by international treaty in order to avoid criticism that the charges were too 
radical an innovation and lacked a legal basis. 19 
In the ensuing weeks, the principal factor which led to a hardening of the policy being developed by officials 
in Washington was the massacre of some seventy American prisoners at Malmedy, Belgium, on 17 December 
1944 by German soldiers. American officials and politicians who supported the 'Bernays Plan' used the 
massacre to strengthen their arguments that a strategy for the punishment of German war crimes should 
include charges of conspiracy and the criminal conduct of certain specific organisations. The details of 
these arguments are contained in many of the documents reproduced by Professor Smith. 20 
By contrast, in the early part of the period under consideration doubts about the policy advocated by 
supporters of the 'Bernays Plan' were expressed in official documents. The principal examples are:- 
. A memorandum from Assistant Attorney-General Wechsler to Attorney-General Biddle (later the 
senior American judge at Nuremberg), dated 29 December 1944, an extract from which is:21 
... In proposing that the Nazi leaders be prosecuted for the type of conspiracy described above, it is 
unclear whether the War Department proposal assumes that such a charge has present legal validity under 
the laws of war or whether some additional legislative definition of the crime is necessary, in the 
existing state of international law, if the German leaders are to be brought to account in these terms. The 
proposal that the treaty define the crimes to be punished is itself ambiguous on this point and requires 
appropriate clarification. 
In developing such clarification, the principal difficulty is the fact that some of the elements of the 
conspiracy charged, (notably violation of treaties, atrocities committed upon German nationals on racial, 
religious and political grounds and atrocities committed prior to a state of war) are not embraced within 
the ordinary concept of crimes punishable as violations of the laws of war. For this reason alone, it is 
desirable that the treaty definition purport not merely to measure the jurisdiction of the tribunal but also 
to provide the substantive law under which the prosecutions 
are to be brought. (the writer's emphasis). 
In view of the final terms of the London Agreement and Charter, and in the light of the Tribunal's judgment as to 
the law of the Charter' (I.M.T. Judgment, p. 38), Wechsler's areument was perceptive. 
The following memorandum, dated 5 January 1945, by Attorney-General Biddle, in apparent response to the draft 
memorandum of 27 November 1944, shows the absence of any clarified views among American leaders 
on fundamental aspects of the proposed retribution: 22 
1. I think we should eliminate, at this point at least, any attempt to punish crimes committed before the 
war. We will have our hands full with crimes after the war. 
2. It seems to me that crimes against German Nationals within Germany should be separated. 
3. Consideration should be given to punishment of Italians and Japanese. Any treaty should be drawn broad 
enough to include both. 
4. Can the objects of a treaty to set up an international court be attained by an international agreement, 
possibly between the military, approved by the various governments. 
5. 1 think the argument that a conspiracy to do a lawful thine is illegal if the overt acts are unlawful and 
that a conspiracy to do unlawful acts is a crime irrespective of the overt act, is not applicable. The 
theory is that the crime can be fixed to mean a conspiracy to dominate the world. I doubt whether such a 
conspiracy is criminal under international law. Aside from that the theory would involve that any overt 
act is criminal—in other words any soldier fighting to carry out the conspiracy becomes a criminal by 
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reason of the conspiracy being made criminal. This would entail hopeless confusion. 
6. 1 cannot see how crimes against nationals committed within Germany could be 'pertinent proof of the 
conspiracy. 
7. I think the court should have no discretion on punishment and consider only cases punishable by death. 
Where would you find enough jails to imprison? 
8. It seems to me that a better approach would be to determine whom you wanted to get at and how many 
before determining the mechanisms of punishment. 
9. In what way are criminal prisoners of war protected under the Geneva conference as the memorandum 
seems to indicate. 
10. How many are proposed to be tried under this plan, by classification? 
11. What is the advantage of a mixed military tribunal? 
12. 1 should think that an international court or mixed military tribunal should be used for the punishment 
only of the leaders--few in number. Devices should be worked out for the punishment of other criminals 
by very many courts. Is there any way of establishing a group of mixed military tribunals to Punish the 
large mass of criminals9 
Two days earlier President Roosevelt had sent the following criptic memorandum to the Secretary of State: 23 
Please send me a brief report on the status of the proceedings before the War Crimes Commission, and 
particularly the attitude of the U.S. representative on offenses to be brought against Hitler and the chief 
Nazi war criminals. The charges should include an indictment for waging aggressive warfare, in 
violation of the Kellogg Pact. Perhaps these and other charges might be joined in a conspiracy 
indictment. 
Apparently the attention of the President had not been directed to the following extract from a memorandum 
prepared in about the middle of December 1944 in the Office of the Judge Advocate General: 24 
... Resort to war is unlawful under the Pact. [The Pact of Paris, 1928] But although international law 
is violated thereby, it by no means follows that aggressive was is made a crime. The distinction is 
important if confusion is to be avoided. The usual consequence of the violation of an international 
obligation is the duty to make reparation for the damage suffered.... 
There was further elucidation of bureaucratic attitudes in a memorandum to the President, dated 22 January 1945, 
and signed by the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the Attorney-Genera1.25 The document 
reviewed the major issues and made the following recommendations (in summary form): 
That the German leaders and the organisations employed by them ... should be charged both with the 
commission of their crimes, and also with joint participation in a broad criminal conspiracy, which 
included and intended these crimes, or was reasonably calculated to bring them about'. 
That the trial be conducted in two stages. First, that of leaders before an international tribunal created 
by 'Executive Agreement', including findings in relation to 'the complicity of the members of the 
organizations included within the charge'. Second, that 'there would be brought before occupation 
courts ... individual members of organisations charged with complicity through such membership'. 
(The detailed recommendation foreshadowed the provisions of the London Charter in relation to the 
indicted organisations). 
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'Individual defendants who can he connected with specific atrocities will be tried and punished in the 
national courts of the countries concerned, as contemplated in the Moscow Declaration'. 
The trial of the 'prime leaders' by an international military commission or military court, established 
by 'Executive Agreement' of the Allied Powers. 
Much of the work of Pentagon officers up to the end of January 1945 was directed at the preparation for the 
President of a statement of the current American official attitude to war crimes policies for use at the conference 
at Yalta between Mr. Churchill, Marshal Stalin and Mr. Roosevelt: in February 1945. But the issue was not even 
considered at Yalta and President Roosevelt remained personally uncommitted.26 
The first attempt at the formulation of a joint war crimes strategy among the Allied Nations took the form of an 
invitation in March 1945 by the British Government for an American delegation to visit London to discuss the 
issue. The three members of the delegation were strong supporters of the 'Bernays Plan'. Qualms were still held, 
although not expressed with precision, about the legal propriety of at least some fundamental parts of that 
Plan, which were summarised by the expression 'the conspiracy/criminal organisation trial system'. 
This is shown by the following cablegram sent on 4 April 1945 to the leader of the American delegation, 
Judge Roserunan, by Ambassador Davies, who was a confidant of President Roosevelt: 27 
I am strongly impressed that there now exists specific law, domestic and international, as well as 
available judicial machinery entirely adequate to provide and assure speedy and just punishment for 
outlaws and criminals, whether principals or accessories; and that therefore just punishment can be 
administered through legalized channels and within recognized principles of law which civilization has 
evolved, as chief bulwark for protection of the individual against either tyranny or injustice STOP 
Under vigorous application of present existing law no guilty person can escape STOP To resort to 
additional retroactive criminal legislation might now appease some who have suffered but would 
ultimately be condemned by more sober judgment and succeeding generations who would see in it a 
violation of the principles for which we fought STOP The ideals for which our men have died should 
not be tarnished by even the shadow of a suspicion that we have stooped to Nan methods or have 
tortured legal principle in order to wreak formalized vengeance rather than to administer dispassionate 
justice under law. 
The American delegation could not, however, have been prepared for the British approach that the leader of the 
British delegation, Lord Simon, proposed at a meeting of delegates on 6 April 1945. 28 It was a superficial 
compromise between the British proposal that, on the termination of the war, Hitler and his associates should, 
on identification, be summarily 'executed, and the American preference for some sort of judicial trial. From a 
jurisprudential viewpoint, the British proposal is astonishing. At its core was that a 'document of Arraignment' 
should be prepared in general terms and that 'an inter-allied judicial tribunal (which might include some 
members who were not professional judges) should be appointed to report upon the truth of this Arraignment 
after Hitler and Co. had been brought before the tribunal and given the opportunity to challenge the truth of its 
contents, if they could'. The plan also proposed that the Court would report to the Allies whether the 
Arraignment or any part of it had been disproved. The Allies themselves would determine what the punishment 
should be. 
It may seem strange that a jurist of the eminence of Lord Simon should state in the document: '... I think that by 
calling on Hitler and Co. to challenge and disprove, if they can, a carefully drawn document of Arraignment, we 
would secure the substance of trial before sentence ... The sort of document I have in mind (which would, of 
course, have to be most carefully settled between the principal Allies) would leave them no loophole'. Lord 
Simon was careful to say: 'I ought to add that, while I am taking upon myself to send you this description of the 
plan, I am not writing with the authority of the War Cabinet, though I know that the members of the 
Government whom I have consulted view the suggestion with favour'. 
The American delegation did not reject Lord Simon's proposal outright, but relayed it to Washington with a 
report on developments in London and the following comment by Colonel Cutter to Assistant Secretary of War 
McCloy: 29 
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'Judge Rosenman generally likes the British proposal, subject to three comments. 
(I) He feels a military court and not a civil court should try the six or seven principal leaders. 
(2) The court should pass sentence and determine punishment, although possibly subject to later 
approval by the four EAC [European Advisory Commission members—the four major Allied Powers] 
Governments through the Control Council (Germany). 
(3) There must be adequate documentation of the an-aienment instrument, so that to prove the accused 
guilty, no oral testimony will be necessary. 
He also feels that approval of this arrangement should not be given unless, for the trial of others than 
the 6 or 7 top people, the British approve the common enterprise theory'. 
Neither American political leaders nor the British War Cabinet had indicated its decision on the 'document of 
Arraignment' proposal when it was announced on 12 April 1945 that President Roosevelt had died. On the same 
day, the British War Cabinet flatly rejected the plan, which 'with its attempted compromise between trial and 
summary execution had managed to combine the worst of both worlds'. 3° 
The period from 12 April 1945 to 8 August 1945 
One of the most significant of the contemporary documents is a memorandum dated 16 April 1945 by Lord 
Simon, a copy of which was sent to the leader of the American delegation, Judge Rosenman, and 
subsequently to the Assistant Secretary of War. 31 
Lord Simon, having been rebuffed by the British War Cabinet on 12 April, repeated in the memorandum of 16 
April the British Government's view that 'execution without trial is the preferable course'. He then gave his 
reasons for this view. The following extract from the memorandum underscores the legal difficulties 
which Lord Simon envisaged would arise if the war crimes policy took the form of a judicial trial: 
... Reference has been made above to Hitler's conduct leading up to the war as one of the crimes on 
which the Allies would rely. There should be included in this the unprovoked attacks which, since the 
original declaration of war, he has made on various countries. These are not war crimes in the ordinary 
sense, nor is it at all clear that they can properly be described as crimes under international law. These 
would, however, necessarily have to be part of the charge and if the tribunal had—as presumably they 
would have--to proceed according to international law, an argument, which might be a formidable 
argument, would be open to the accused that this part of the indictment should be struck out. It may 
well be thought by some that these acts ought to be regarded as crimes under international law. Under 
the procedure of trial this would be a matter for the tribunal. and would at any rate give the accused the 
opportunity of basing arguments on what has happened in the past and what has been done by various 
countries in declaring war which resulted in acquiring new territory, which certainly were not regarded 
at the time as crimes against international law. 
The final paragraph of the memorandum (the last three sentences of which were omitted from the copy sent to the 
American delegation) was: 
H.M.G. earnestly hope that their Allies will consider the arguments set out above for they are most 
anxious that a very early agreement should be reached as to the method of dealing with Hitler and his 
chief associates, and that the method should be one in which the principal Allies concur. It would in any 
case be valuable if a document could now be drawn up giving the reasoned basis for the punishment of 
the men concerned. It may be worth consideration whether such a document could not be served upon 
each of these men (the list will have to be agreed) as soon as possible after his capture. He should then 
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be told that if he wishes to make any answer he must do so in writing within, say, 14 days, and that his 
answer will be submitted to the Government in whose charge he was, and that the principal Allies 
would thereafter promulgate their decision upon his case. This suggested procedure would not be, of 
course, in the nature of a trial and would not involve the attempt to set up a judicial tribunal, but it 
would give the accused the opportunity of putting forward what he wished to say, and might 
conceivably, in some cases, influence the decision. 
•The proposal in the memorandum involved a concept very similar to the document of Arraignment ', which had 
been rejected by the British War Cabinet. 
In contrast to the indecision and vacillation which, while Mr . Roosevelt was President, had marked the 
American approach to the formulation of a war crimes policy, his successor, Mr Truman, acted swiftly and 
surely. 
On 20 April 1945 a memorandum was prepared in the office of the American Assistant Secretary of War and sent 
to the Secretary of War, Mr Stiznson . 32 It is probably the clearest and most concise statement of the American 
viewpoint at that date. It anticipated the prosecution arguments at Nuremberg and the Judgment of the Tribunal. 
Under the sub-heading 'Punishment for Crime Should Only Follow a Judicial Trial', it was stated: 
No principle of justice is so fundamental in most men • s minds as the rule that punishment will be 
inflicted by judicial action and only for a violation of existing law which sets a standard of conduct. 
Judicial punishment is imposed only after notice to the accused of the charges against him, 
establishment of the facts upon which the charges rest, and an opportunity to defend against the charges, 
preferably with the advice of counsel. The form in which proof is presented varies from nation to 
nation. So does the extent of the opportunity to defend, the nature of the hearing, and the incidence of 
the burden of proof. This principle is applied in greater or less degree by all nations, and historically its 
recognition is the first step in the approach to the democratic standard of liberty under law. 
The dye was cast, so far as America was concerned, when, on 1 May 1945, President Truman issued an executive 
order creating an American war crimes prosecution agency and designating Supreme Court Justice Jackson as 
'Chief of Counsel'. 33 
By about the end of April 1945, and on the virtual eve of the United Nations Conference at San Francisco, the 
stage was set for positive American action. The Third Reich was on the brink of total collapse; many 
concentration camps had been overrun by the Allied armed forces; Hitler and Goebbels had committed suicide; and 
the unconditional surrender of the German Reich and its, army, naval and air forces was imminent. A lengthy 
'Memorandum of proposals for the prosecution and punishment of certain war criminals and other persons' had 
been prepared. 34  It obviously was designed to impress the British Government and bring about the abandonment 
of that Government's plan for political execution of the principal Nazi leaders. It was drafted and revised over the 
period 25 to 30 April 1945. It contained little that was new. 
Further revisions of the memorandum were made prior to the San Francisco conference. Most were matters of 
detail and are not significant in this survey. The most important development in early May 1945 was the 
preparation of a draft 'executive agreement', the first such document officially producec1. 35 There is little point in 
analysing this document in detail, because it was revised many times and was ultimately replaced by the London 
Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945. However, from the viewpoint of the legal validity of the London 
Agreement and Charter, it is significant that the first published draft of an 'executive agreement asserted the right 
of the Allied Powers to bring to trial Nazi war criminals for the following criminal acts: 
a. Violation of the customs and rules of warfare. 
b. Invasion by force or threat of force of other countries in violation of international law or 
treaties. 
c. Initiation of war in violation of international law or treaties. 
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d. launching a war of aggression. 
e. Recourse to war as an instrument of national policy or for the solution of international 
controversies. 
The Memorandum and the draft 'executive agreement' were presented to the representatives of the Allied Powers at 
the San Francisco Conference on 3 May 1945. Although no formal agreement was reached at San Francisco, the 
British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Eden, in accordance with the instructions given to him by the British War 
Cabinet, 'yielded in principle'. Thereafter, there was no scope for the British proposal for execution of Nazi 
leaders without trial. The American proponents of the 'conspiracy/criminal organisation' plan, supported by the 
expressed views of the Russian and French Governments, had successfully isolated Britain. 
In the remaining three months until 8 August 1945, the 'executive agreement' was further revised and became the 
basis for the discussions in London in June, July and August 1945 between representatives of the Allied Powers, 
leading to the signature on 8 August of the London Agreement and Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal. 
The discussion in this chapter has involved a chronological examination of the basic documents to which the 
development of 'Nuremberg Law' may be traced. To the extent to which such examination is essentially 
historical, rather than legal, it is emphasised that it is considered l necessary to state the essence of the 
documentary evidence, because a legal judgment on 'Nurernberg law' can only be made fully and fairly against 
such a background. 
THE LAW AS PROPOUNDED BY AMERICAN PROSECUTORS IN JUNE 1945 (AS 
DOCUMENTED) 
It remains to consider in this chapter two other documents: first, a document prepared by Colonel Taylor (as he 
then was), dated 'early June, 1945' 36 ; and, second, a report of Mr. Justice Jackson to President Truman released 
by the White House on 7 June 1945. Colonel Taylor wrote Document 58 very soon after his 
appointment as assistant to Mr. Justice Jackson. The following significant paragraphs of Document 58 read: 
'ILLEGAL LAUNCHING' 
... This phase of the case is based on the assumption that it is, or will be declared, a punishable offense 
to plan and launch (and lose?) an aggressive war, particularly if treaties are thereby violated. Although 
the phrase 'illegal launching' is a 'law idea', and although much legal paraphernalia will be and must 
be invoked to validate the assumption, the thing we want to accomplish is not a legal thing but a 
political thing. Its accomplishment depends on persuading the several participating nations to, take 
the political step of committing themselves to this doctrine. Whether the doctrine is presently a 
judicially valid doctrine is an interesting question, and there will be much interesting and 
stimulating discussion thereon, but the question will be settled by political acts of the several 
nations, not by argument before and judicial decision by a tribunal, though such argument and 
judicial decision might influence the political decision. 
... Ex Post Facto--Not, I believe, a bothersome question if we keep in mind that this is a political  
decision to declare and apply a principle of international law. It is the governments and people of the 
participating nations, and not the tribunal, who must be convinced that the principle is valid. Only the 
most incorrigible legalists can pretend to be shocked by the conclusion that the perpetrator of an 
aggressive war acts at peril of being punished for his perpetration, even if no tribunal has ever 
previously decided that perpetration of aggressive war is a crime. And, in any event, the ex pp facto 
question is rendered much easier by the fact of treaty violations, and by the existence of numerous 
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speeches and writings of wise and important men who have been saying for years that: it is criminal to 
launch an aggressive war. Even though no judicial mechanism has heretofore existed to punish the 
leaders of large nations which violate treaties, a man who violates a treaty must act at peril of being 
punished by the offended party's employing self-help. The fact that the self-help happens to involve the 
declaration of a new principle of international law affords the perpetrator no additional ground of 
complaint. 
Many of the atrocities committed by the defendants can be shown to violate international law, the rules 
of war, or the laws of Axis or Axis-occupied countries. Wherever possible we should show that the 
atrocity was committed in violation of previously established law or rule. But if such cannot be 
established, we need not shy off because of ex post facto. No one will be shocked by the doctrine 
that people who direct or do inhuman and barbarous things in the course of losing a war will be 
punished. Many would be shocked by the conclusion that such people may go scot-free unless a pre-
existent law or rule can be cited. For convenience, however, we may speak of 'crimes' where we 
have a pre-existent rule available and 'atrocities' where we are not so sure ... 
The views expressed by Colonel Taylor in the cited extracts are fundamental in any judgment as to the validity of 
'Nuremberg Law'. 
Within five weeks of his appointment as Chief of Counsel for the United States in prosecuting the principal 
Axis War Criminals, Mr. Justice Jackson submitted a report to the American President, which was released on 
7 June 1945. Parts of that report relate to the legal basis of the proposed Nuremberg trials. They are 
reproduced as follows because they explain the American attitude, as revealed by documents which have been 
considered in this chapter 
The legal position which the United States will maintain, being thus based on the common sense of 
justice, is relatively simple and non-technical. We must not permit it to be complicated or obscured by 
sterile legalisms developed in the age of imperialism to make war respectable. 
Doubtless what appeals to men of goodwill and common sense as the crime which comprehends all 
lesser crimes, is the crime of making unjustifiable war. War necessarily is a calculated series of 
killings, of destructions of property, of oppressions. Such acts unquestionably would be criminal 
except that International Law throws a mantle of protection around acts which otherwise would be 
crimes, when committed in pursuit of legitimate warfare. In this they are distinguished from the same 
acts in the pursuit of piracy or brigandage which have been considered punishable wherever and by 
whomever the guilty are caught. But International Law as taught in the Nineteenth and the early part 
of the Twentieth Century generally declared that war-making was not illegal and is no crime at law. 
Summarized by a standard authority, its attitude was that 'both parties to every war are regarded as 
being possessed of equal rights'. This, however, was a departure from the doctrine taught by 
Grotius, the father of International Law, that there is a distinction between the just and the unjust war 
- the war of defense and the war of aggression. 
The Nature of International Law 
International Law is more than a scholarly collection of abstract and immutable principles. It is an 
outgrowth of treaties or agreements between nations and of accepted customs. But every custom has its 
origin in some single act, and every agreement has to be initiated by the action of some state. Unless 
we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for International Law, we cannot deny that our 
own day has its right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become 
sources of a newer and strengthened International Law. International Law is not capable of 
development by legislation, for there is no continuously sitting international legislature. Innovations 
and revisions in International Law are brought about by the action of governments designed to meet a 
change in circumstances. It grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time to 
time in adapting settled principles to new situations. Hence I am not disturbed by the lack of precedent 
for the inquiry we propose to conduct. After the shock to civilization of the Last World War, however, 
a marked reversion to the earlier and sounder doctrines of International law took place. By the time the 
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Nazis came to power it was thoroughly established that launching an aggressive war or the institution 
of war by treachery was illegal and that the defense of legitimate warfare was no longer available to 
those who engaged in such an enterprise. It is high time that we act on the juridical principle that 
aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal. 
CONCLUSION 
Two matters are clear from the foregoing survey of documents. First, American political and bureaucratic 
policies were the determining factors in the formulation of the principles upon which the London Agreement 
and Charter were based. Second, Great Britain was, on the day of Germany's surrender, no closer to the 
development of practicable, concrete proposals for the trial of war criminals than it had been immediately after 
the cessation of hostilities in the First World War. In particular, British political leaders and their advisers had, 
at that date, failed to enunciate with any precision the principles of international law upon which it was to rely 
so strongly at Nuremberg. Thereby, they left the way open for the adoption and application of American 
policies which, almost exclusively, were to become the basis for 'Nuremberg Law'. More importantly, 
the negative approach of the British Government exposed it to the criticism that it was a party to the London 
Agreement and Charter more by default than by reason of its desire to apply to the trials of Axis' war criminals 
legal principles in respect of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity, which it could, and did, argue 
were accepted as being an integral part of, and of binding force in, international relations. 
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CHAPTER 7 	ANALYSIS OF THE LONDON AGREEMENT AND TI1E CIIARTER 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, 8 AUGUST 1945 
The year 1945 was marked by the emergence of a new declaration of the scope of international criminal law. As 
discussed in Chapter 6, the declaration crystallised in that year after a lone period of indecision. There had been 
many months of disputation within the United States of America and between America and Great Britain as to 
the appropriate method of giving practical effect to the political warnings by the Allied Powers to the Axis 
leaders. Several weeks had been occupied in discussions in London in June and July between representatives of 
the major Allied Powers. The result was the signature, on 8 August 1945, by representatives of the Governments 
of Great Britain, the United States, the Provisional Government of the French Republic and the Government of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of an 'agreement' for the prosecution and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis, in which was embodied, expressly as an 'integral part of the Agreement (Article 
2), the Charter of the International Military Tribunal. 
It is not intended in this chapter to examine comprehensively the Agreement and Charter so far as their juridical 
soundness is concerned: this will be considered in Chapter 18. It is proposed, however, to analyse the provisions 
of the Agreement and Charter as a preliminary step in evaluating the indictment (which, pursuant to such 
provisions, was presented to the International Military Tribunal at Berlin on 18 October 1945), the subsequent 
trial at Nuremberg and the judgment of the Tribunal. 
The Agreement was a concise and lucid document. Its preamble set out the essence of the Moscow Declaration of 
30 October, 1943. It also declared that the signatories, in concluding the Agreement, were 'acting in the interests 
of all the United Nations'. The Agreement was confined to 'the major war criminals of the European Axis'. There 
followed seven Articles, each brief and simply expressed: 
1. There shall be established after consultation with the Control Council for Germany an 
International Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offences have no particular 
geographical location whether they be accused individually or in their capacity as members of 
organisations or groups or in both capacities. 
2. The constitution, jurisdiction and functions of the International Military Tribunal shall be those 
set out in the Charter annexed to this Agreement, which Charter shall form an integral part of this 
Agreement. 
3. Each of the Signatories shall take the necessary steps to make available for the investigation of 
the charges and trial the major war criminals detained by them who are to be tried by the 
International Military Tribunal. The Signatories shall also use their best endeavours to make 
available for investigation of the charges against and the trial before the International Military 
Tribunal such of the major war criminals as are not in the territories of any of the 
Signatories. 
4. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the provisions established by the Moscow Declaration 
concerning the return of war criminals to the countries where they committed their crimes. 
5. Any Government of the United Nations may adhere to this Agreement by notice given through the 
diplomatic channel to the Government of the United Kingdom, who shall inform the other 
signatory and adhering Governments of each such adherence.' 
6. Nothing in this Agreement shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the powers of any national or 
occupation court established or to be established in any Allied territory or in Germany for the trial 
of war criminals. 
7. This Agreement shall come into force on the day of signature and shall remain in force for the 
period of one year and shall continue thereafter, subject to the right of any Signatory to give, 
through the diplomatic channel, one month's notice of intention to terminate it. Such termination 
shall not prejudice any proceedings already taken or any findings already made in pursuance of this 
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Agreement. 
The twenty four original defendants were charged in the indictment both individually and as members of any of 
the named groups or organisation to which they belonged. The pleading in the indictment in this respect was 
proper by reason of the combination of Articles 1 and 2 of the Agreement and Article 9 of the Charter. 
The precise character of the Nuremberg Tribunal has been discussed by numerous writers. The description 
'Military was adopted in Article I of the Agreement and maintained throughout it and the Charter. It was an 
appropriate designation.2 Neither document imposed any restriction in respect of the Tribunal's membership. As 
it happened, the members of the Tribunal, including alternates, were eminent judges or jurists in their own 
countries. It may have been prudent to have included in the membership of the Tribunal representation of the 
Armed Forces of the principal Allied Powers, or at least to have provided that such representatives should sit as 
assessors, in accordance with established practice in English law. However, the actual composition of the 
Tribunal has not attracted any significant criticism, apart from the claim that all the members were 
representatives of the victorious nations, sitting in judgment only on the vanquished. 3 
Article 4 of the Agreement should be examined together with the preamble. Although Article 4 did not have any 
legal relevance to the Nuremberg trial, it is questionable whether it was justifiable to refer to 'the provisions 
established  by the Moscow Declaration'. The Moscow Declaration lacked any substantial legal effect in itself. It 
was made at a time when the tide of war had begun to turn against the Axis Powers. Couched as it was in 
emotive language, which is often resorted to by political leaders, it should be understood for what it was: that is, 
a political statement for use as propaganda. It did not 'establish' any principle of international law, nor was it, at 
the time, based on any such existing principle. 
No doubt Article 4 of the Agreement should be interpreted simply as stating that the Agreement did not prevent 
individual states taking measures for the return of war criminals for trial in accordance with the lex loci. 
The Moscow Declaration should be regarded as a declaration by three allied heads of State supportive of asserted 
principles of international law, thereby confirming those principles but not establishing them. It should be noted 
that in the second paragraph of the preamble to the Agreement the word 'stated' is used with reference to the 
Moscow Declaration.4 
Some of the Articles of the Charter are briefly referred to in this chapter, although a more particular examination 
of them, as part of a legal analysis, is made in Chapter 18. 
Article 1 of the Charter provided: 
In pursuance of the Agreement signed on the 8th August 1945 ... there shall be established an 
International Military Tribunal .., for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis. 
This provision was unnecessary in its terms, as Article 1 of the Agreement provided for the establishment of the 
Tribunal. Moreover, there is some verbal inconsistency between the provisions of Article 1 of the Agreement and 
Article 1 of the Charter, although the inconsistency was not of legal significance. Of course, both documents 
must be read together, because the Charter was declared to be an integral part of the Agreement. 
Article 3 provided: 
Neither the, Tribunal, its members nor their alternates can be challenged by the prosecution, or by the 
Defendants or their Counsel. Each Signatory may replace its member of the Tribunal or his alternate for 
reasons of health or for other good reasons, except that no replacement may take place during a trial, 
other than by an alternate. 
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It was not made clear what the words 'can be challenged' precisely meant. They could have referred to any or all of 
the following: 
The legal standing of the members of the Tribunal or their alternates. 
Bias, because, in the events which happened, all members were representatives of the victorious Allied 
Powers. 
The unfitness of Russia to be a participant, because of her action in waging war against Poland and her 
record of violations of the laws and customs of war. 
The unfitness of the United States of America to sit in judgment, because some writers claimed it 
had taken, in breach of her obligations as a neutral Power, effective steps to aid Britain 
militarily, far in advance of the German declaration of war against it. 
The Tribunal did not expand on the interpretation of the provisions of Article 3 in an early ruling. 5 
Article 6 was the most contentious provision in the Charter. It read: 
The Tribunal established by the Agreement referred to in Article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the 
major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, 
acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members of organisations, 
committed any of the following crimes. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which 
there shall be individual responsibility:- 
(a) Crimes against peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a 
war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) War crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but not 
be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian 
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the 
seas, killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; 
(c) Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. 
Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common 
plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any 
persons in execution of such plan. 
The first paragraph of this Article referred only to the trial and punishment of persons. It did not include a 
reference to the declaration of a group or organisation as a criminal organisation (Article 9). The third paragraph 
of the Article was, from the viewpoint of the prosecution, essential in order to embrace all those involved in the 
common plan. However, the language used was loose. The words 'by any persons' should have been followed by 
the words 'party to the common plan or conspiracy'. Without these additional words, it is arguable that the 
provisions of the third paragraph, as a matter of construction, went beyond accepted principles of the law of 
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criminal conspiracy. . 
The inclusion in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 2 in the definition of 'war crimes' of the words 'wanton 
destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity was apt to attract 
criticism, in view of the record of the Allied Powers in aerial attacks on civilians: for example, at Hamburg and 
Dresden, and the use of atomic bombs against the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 
The use of the words in sub-paragraph (c) 'before or during the war', was controversial. The Tribunal ruled, 
however, that in order to constitute crimes against humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must 
have been in execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It said that 
this had not been satisfactorily proved.6 
There can be no doubt that Count 1 of the indictment ('the common plan or conspiracy to commit Crimes 
against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity'), especially since it necessarily was based on Article 6 
of the Charter, caused confusion during the trial. Such confusion has lingered on since the trial ended. For 
example, Professor Bradley Smith has stated: 7 
The introductory passage [that is. the first paragraph of Article 6] did include the statement that the 
Tribunal was empowered to try and judge persons either 'as individuals or as members of organisations' 
but conspiracy was not listed as a separate offense. Instead there were merely three prosecutable offenses:  
"Crimes Against Peace", "War Crimes" and "Crimes Against Humanity" (emphasis added). 
Such a construction of Article 6 is disputed. It is too narrow, especially the statement that the Article merely 
provided for 'three prosecutable offenses'. In the writer's view, sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph of 
Article 6 authorised jurisdiction in respect of three separate crimes, namely:- 
(1) The crime of planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression; 
(2) The crime of planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances; and 
(3) The crime of participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment 'of any of the 
foregoing': that is, any crime within (1) or (2) above. 
However, the crime of 'participation in a common plan or conspiracy' was not included in either sub-paragraph 
(b) or sub-paragraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article 6. It may be that the omission was accidental and due 
to the fact that the Charter was subject to substantial redrafting and amendment, but the document must be 
construed in accordance with the plain and natural meaning of its provisions. Accordingly, it is argued that: 
	
• (1) 	Article 6 provided for five, and not only three, different and separate crimes (treating separately the two 
disjunctively expressed crimes defined in the opening lines of Article 6 (a): that is, from the word 
'planning  to the word 'assurances', inclusive). 
(2) Article 6 of the Charter authorised a charge of 'participation in a common plan or conspiracy' so far only 
as the first two categories of the extended statement of 'crimes against peace' were concerned: that is, 
'planning, preparation, initiation or waging' of either a war of aggression or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances. 8 
(3) The Charter did not, within the terms of sub-paragraph 6 (a), purport to authorise a charge of conspiracy 
in respect of 'war crimes' (sub-paragraph (b) of the second paragraph,of Article 6) or 'crimes against 
humanity' (sub-paragraph (c) of the second paragraph of Article 6). 
(4) If it had been intended that the conspiracy charge should extend beyond crimes against peace, it would 
have been a simple drafting matter to have omitted from sub-paragraph (a) of the second paragraph of 
Article 6 the words 'or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of 
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the foregoing' and to have used the same words in a new, additional sub paragraph (d) in that Article, with 
any necessary consequential rearrangement. 
(5) 	By way of emphasis, the last paragraph of Article 6 did not purport to create a crime of participating in a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit a crime other than those expressed in sub-paragraph (a)of the 
second paragraph of the Article: that is, the two categories of 'crimes against peace' therein stated. 
Article 7 excluded the applicability of the 'Heads of State doctrine' in these terms: 
The official position of defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in Government 
Departments shall not be considered as freeing them from responsibility or mitigating punishment. 
Article 8 made the defence of superior orders unavailable. It read: 
The fact that the Defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him 
from responsibility but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that 
justice so requires. 
Articles 9 and 10 (to which Article 11 was supplementary) contained the following provisions relating to the 
indicted organisations: 
9. At the trial of any individual member of any group or organisation the Tribunal may declare (in 
connection with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or 
organisation of which the individual was a member was a criminal organisation. After receipt 
of the indictment the Tribunal shall give such notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution 
intends to ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the organisation will 
be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of 
the criminal character of the organisation. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the 
application. If the application is allowed, the Tribunal may direct in what manner the 
applicants shall be represented and heard. 
10. In cases where a group or organisation is declared criminal by the Tribunal, the competent 
national authority of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for 
membership therein before national, military or occupation courts. In any such case the 
criminal nature of the group or organisation is considered proved and shall not be questioned. 
Articles 9, 10 and 11 were extremely controversial, especially from the viewpoint of ex post facto. A legal 
analysis of them is included in Chapter 18. 
Articles 12 to 25 prescribed detailed procedural matters which were, in accordance with Article 13, 
supplemented by the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure of 29 October, 1945. Two only of those Articles merit 
specific mention. 
Article 15(c) provided that the Chief Prosecutors should undertake: 
(c) ... the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of the Defendants. 
That procedure was an established part of Continental law, but not of Anglo-American law. Therein was 
illustrated the diversity of the jurisprudential approach adopted in the 'law of the Charter'. 
Article 17(b) authorised the Tribunal 'to interrogate any Defendant'. It is not clear what the word 'interrogate' 
means in that provision. In Article 17(a) the Tribunal was given power 'to put questions' to witnesses. 
Presumably, the divergence in language imports a distinction. Throughout the trial, the word 'interrogation' 
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was used in relation to witnesses, or potential witnesses, in the normal use of that word in a formal sense. 
The transcript of the trial proceedings does not appear to indicate that the Tribunal 'interrogated' any accused in 
the formal sense, although, of course, members of the Tribunal from time to time, but not excessively, asked 
questions of the accused and of witnesses in open sessions of the Tribunal. 
Leaving aside at this stage any detailed legal analysis of the Agreement and Charter, and examining them only 
from the viewpoint of the basis for the indictment, they should be regarded as well-drafted documents, despite 
minor criticism to which each may be vulnerable. 
Considered together, the Agreement and Charter had the form and substance of a legislative enactment. They were 
executed within three months of the suirrnder of the German Armed Forces. They involved an accommodation of 
divergent views among the Allied Powers; in particular, they were an assertion of the Rule of Law, as against the 
British notion of summary execution. They therefore should be regarded, in themselves, as a salient contribution 
to the development of international law. However, it must be borne in mind that, apart from the three accused 
who were found not guilty of all charges against them, the fate of the accused was really sealed by the terms of 
the Agreement and Charter, which, in the words used by the Tribunal in its judgment, were 'decisive and binding' 
on it. 
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NOTES 
1. The nineteen adhering countries were: Greece, Denmark, Yugoslavia, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland, Belgium, Ethiopia, Australia, Honduras, Norway, Panama, Luxembourg, Haiti, New Zealand, 
India, Venezuela, Uruguay and Paraguay (see The Charter and Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, 
History and Analysis, memorandum submitted by the Secretary General, United Nations—General 
Assembly, International Law Commission, New York, 1949, P.  3). 
2. In an article published in June 1944 while he was a member of the staff of the Judge Advocate General's 
Department of the United States Army, Major W.B. Cowles wrote: 'A military tribunal with mixed inter-
allied personnel may properly be established by the commanding general of co-operating cobelligerent 
forces ... In the United States, the personnel of military commissions have usually been commissioned 
officers. There is, however, no legal objection to the use of qualified civilians'. (Trial of War Criminals  
by Military Tribunals, (1944) 30 American Bar Association Journal, p. 330). For a discussion of the 
character of the Tribunal, see Chapter 18. 
3. For example, see G.A. Finch (Editor-in-Chief), The Nuremberg Trial and International Law, (1947) 41 
A.J.I.L., pp. 20-37, at p. 35. 
4. In E.P.I.L., vol. 7, p. 67, Dr. Carl-August Fleischhauer gives the following description of a Declaration 
for the purposes of public international law: Declaration is a means by which States and other subjects of 
international law express their will, their, intent or their opinion when acting in the field of international 
relations. It is in essence a unilateral act by one State or a joint statement issued by several States through 
a conference or through an international organisation'. Although this definition does not refer to criminal 
international law, there is no basis to suppose that the concept of a 'declaration' would be any more 
extensive in criminal matters than in civil matters. 
5. On the second day of the trial, 21 November 1945, the President of the Tribunal said: 'A motion has been 
filed with the Tribunal and the Tribunal has given it consideration. In so far as it may be a plea to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it conflicts with Article 3 of the Charter and will not be entertained'. (No 
specific reference was then made to the motion nor was it then identified in the transcript). Official 
transcript, 21 November 1945, p. 1. For the terms of the motion, see Chapter 17. 
6. I.M.T. Judgment, p. 65. 
7. Smith, Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, Basic Books Inc., New York, 1977. 
8. The emphasised word 'or' also was emphasised in the Judgment of the I.M.T., p. 42. 
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CHAPTER 8 	TIIE NUREMBERG INDICTMENT . 
INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter an analysis is made, as a matter of law, of the four Counts of the Nuremberg indictment. The 
formal correctness, in law, of the Counts, in the light of the provisions of the London Agreement and Charter, is 
obviously of fundamental relevance to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and, as a consequence, to the validity of its 
individual findings against the accused within the terms of Part VI of the Charter. 
Such an analysis does not involve at this stage any consideration of the state of established international law at 8 
August 1945, but rests upon the relevant provisions of the Agreement and Charter and, where necessary, the 
application of such legal principles of practice and procedure as are recognised as appropriate in the legal systems 
of civilised nations, subject to the express or implied provisions of the Agreement and Charter. 
The analysis is made with due regard to the provisions in Article 16 of the Charter, designed to ensure a fair trial 
for the defendants. Moreover, the analysis is essentially independent of the merits of any individual case. 
Scant reference has been made in this chapter to sources, because authors and writers have not, to any appreciable 
degree, focussed attention on the detailed examination of the indictment in a strictly legal and formal sense. 
GENERAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE INDICTMENT 
Against the background of the London Agreement and Charter, the indictment,1 which covered 50 closely printed 
pages, must be regarded technically as superficially a well-ordered example of criminal pleading, despite the 
criticisms to which it is open and despite some blemishes. It resembled the type of document which was familiar 
to English and American trial lawyers. The draftsmen of it took full advantage of the scope afforded by the 
London Agreement and Charter, and produced a document which set out the case of the Allied Powers against the 
defendants with clarity (although some legal misconceptions can be identified) and in the most comprehensive 
detail. The British Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, claimed that 'the indictment contains more 
full particulars than probably any other indictment in the history of jurisprudence' . la 
In the light of the protracted negotiations which preceded the London Agreement and Charter, it was a remarkable 
achievement for the representatives of the Allied Powers to have been able to sign the indictment in English, 
French and Russian on 6 October 1945—less than two months after the execution of the London Agreement and 
Charter—and present it to the Tribunal in Berlin on 18 October 1945. 
According to Professor Bradley Smith? an Anglo-American sub-committee began the drafting of an indictment 
in London in June 1945. In Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg, Professor Smith gives a detailed account of the 
negotiations between representatives of the Allied Powers, which culminated in the signing of the indictment. 3 
The account is essentially historical, but from it the following matters are clear:- 
The negotiations were marked by continuing disagreement between the national representatives with 
respect to the number and identity of the defendants to be charged, the broad legal objectives which 
should fmd expression in the indictment, and the scope of the trial which would follow. The British 
sought a simple indictment, a narrow evidentiary compass and a short trial, whereas the Americans 
consistently argued for a substantial trial, with multiple charges and a large number of defendants. 
The Americans never deviated from the concept of the original 'Bemays Plan', with its concentration 
on a 'conspiracy/criminal organisation' theory. 
The American approach prevailed and was reflected in the indictment largely because of the persistent 
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and strong advocacy of the theory by the American delegation and the lack of concert between the other 
three major Powers. The first British indictment plan, proposed in mid-July 1945, which was in draft 
form, including a tentative list of defendants, covered only two and a half pages. Despite the fact that 
the indictment was signed on 6 October 1945, it was not until 9 October that the British Cabinet gave 
its assent to the inclusion of The General Staff and High Command of the German Armed Forces' 
among the organisations in respect of which a declaration of criminality would be sought from the 
Tribunal (Article 9 of the Charter). 
Professor Smith comments that, because of the precautionary attitudes of the representatives of all four nations, 
'coupled with the enormous problems and the short time available', it was guaranteed 'that the result would not 
be simple and tidy'.4 The criticism that the resulting indictment was not 'tidy' is hard to justify. Legal drafting 
is an art. The aim should be to produce a document which is concise, as simple as the particulars alleged will 
permit and which is easily understood, despite the detail in, and breadth of, the particulars. An experienced legal 
draftsman would have to concede that this aim was achieved in the drafting of the Nuremberg indictment. 
COUNT 1—THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY 
The first Count in the indictment under the above heading (with a subheading 'Charter, Article 6, especially 6(a)' 
alleged that 
all the defendants, with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding 8th May 1945, 
participated as leaders, organizers, instigators or accomplices in the formulation or execution of a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, Crimes against Peace, 
War Crimes and crimes against humanity, as defined in the Charter of this tribunal, and, in accordance 
with the provisions of the Charter, are individually responsible for their own acts and for all acts 
committed by any persons in the execution of such plan or conspiracy. 
The significance of the cited extract from the 'Statement of the Offense' lies in the fact that the American 
prosecutors had been able to place the essence of the 'Bemays Plan' in the forefront of the indictment and to 
support Count 1 by a wealth of particulars which covered ten printed pages. The particulars of 'the nature and 
development of the common plan or conspiracy' were pleaded under seven sub-headings: 
Nazi Party as the central core of the common plan or conspiracy. 
Common objectives and methods of conspiracy. 
Doctrinal techniques of the common plan or conspiracy. 
The acquiring of totalitarian control of Germany: political. 
The acquiring of totalitarian control in Germany: economic; and the economic planning and mobilization 
for aggressive war. 
Utilization of Nazi control for foreign aggression. 
War crimes and crimes against humanity committed in the course of executing the conspiracy for which 
the conspirators are responsible. 
The indictment continued: 
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3. By reason of all the foregoing, the defendants with divers other persons are guilty of a 
common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of Crimes against Peace; of a conspiracy 
to commit Crimes against Humanity in the course of melioration for war and in the course of 
prosecution of war, and of a conspiracy to commit War Crimes not only against the armed 
forces of their enemies but also against non-belligerent civilian populations. 
Appendix A of the indictment was a statement of the alleged individual responsibility of the original twenty four 
defendants for the crimes cha  etl in all four Counts. 
Appendix B of the indictment was a statement in which were named each Group or Organisation which it was 
alleged should be declared criminal, together with particulars of the factual matters which would be relied upon in 
support of the allegation. 
Appendix C of the indictment contained several pages of 'Charges and Particulars of Violations of 
International Treaties, Agreements and Assurances Caused by the Defendants in the Course of Planning, 
Preparing and Initiating the Wars'. 
As discussed in Chapter 7, Article 6 (a) of the Charter alleged to be criminal the participation in a common plan 
or conspiracy 'for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing': that is 'Crimes against peace: namely, planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances'. It did not purport to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to determine charges of 
conspiracy to commit, or which involved the commission of, war crimes or crimes against humanity. 
Nevertheless, Count 1 of the indictment charged 'a common plan or conspiracy to commit, or which involved the 
commission of, Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, as defined in the Charter of 
this Tribunal'. 
The particulars under Count 1 related primarily to Crimes against Peace (some eight pages). In two paragraphs 
near the end of the particulars, the indictment alleged the facts upon which the prosecution relied to support the 
charge of a common plan or conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity The two paragraphs 
were: 
(G) WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF 
EXECUTING THE CONSPIRACY FOR WHICH THE CONSPIRATORS ARE RESPONSIBLE 
1. Beginning with the initiation of the aggressive war on 1st September, 1939, and throughout its 
extension into wars involving almost the entire world, the Nazi conspirators carried out their common 
plan or conspiracy to wage war in ruthless and complete disregard and violation of the laws and customs 
of war. In the course of executing the common plan or conspiracy there were committed the War Crimes 
detailed hereinafter in Count Three of this Indictment. 
2. Beginning with the initiation of their plan to seize and retain total control of the German State, and 
thereafter throughout their utilization of that control for foreign aggression, the Nazi conspirators carried 
out their common plan or conspiracy in ruthless and complete disregard and violation of the laws of 
humanity. In the course of executing the common plan or conspiracy there were committed the Crimes 
against Humanity detailed hereinafter in Count Four of this Indictment. 
There followed paragraph 3 (already cited). 
Count 1, and the total particulars thereunder, was a conglomerate Count which, in effect, brought together, in so 
far as a common plan or conspiracy was concerned, the whole of the facts pleaded in respect of the totality of the 
four Counts; in particular, it made admissible in respect of Count 1 evidence of all of the alleged facts relied on 
by the prosecution, not only in respect of Count 1, but also in relation to Counts 2, 3 and 4. 
The importance of this conglomeration is evident from the judgment of the Tribunal and the fate of the 
defendants. All the twenty two who were tried at Nuremberg were charged under Count 1. Only eight were 
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convicted under that Count and 14 were found not guilty; of the eight, six were found guilty on all four Counts 
and two were convicted on at least one other Count (Hess, Count 2; Raeder, Counts 2 and 3). 
Count I was, as a matter of pleading, fundamentally defective in that it charged conspiracy in relation to war 
crimes and crimes against humanity contrary to the Charter, which confined the Tribunal's jurisdiction in respect 
of conspiracy to the two categories of crimes against peace as defined in Article 6 (a). The Tribunal did not have 
jurisdiction to hear evidence, and determine guilt, in relation to Count 1 as pleaded. It had, by virtue of Article 2 
of the Agreement, the jurisdiction 'set out in the Charter'. Article 6 of the Charter conferred jurisdiction relating 
to conspiracy only within the terms of Article 6 (a), but this did not extend beyond a common plan or conspiracy 
'for the accomplishment' of the defined two categories of crimes against peace. 
The conflict between Count 1 and the Agreement and Charter was not merely technical. It was substantive and 
fundamental. The approach of the American prosecution was unequivocal. Major Wallis, Assistant Trial 
Counsel, said on the third day of the trial, in presenting briefs and documents relevant to Count 1: 5 
The Charge in Count One is that the defendants, with divers other persons, participated in the 
formulation or execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit, or which involved the 
commission of, Crimes against Humanity (both within and without Germany), War Crimes, and 
Crimes Against Peace. 
Primary responsibility for presenting the evidence supporting Count was, by agreement between the prosecutors, 
assumed by the American counsel. In doing so, Mr. Alderman, Associate Trial Counsel, read the commencing 
words (cited above) of the Statement of the Offense (paragraph III) in the indictment but omitted any reference to 
war crimes or crimes against humanity. Mr. Alderman may have thought it was sufficient to qualify his remarks 
by his words 'so far as pertinent to the present discussion'. 6 
It is remarkable that it does not appear from the transcript that defence counsel, before the accused were called 
upon to plead, moved that the indictment be amended in order to rectify the erroneous assertion of jurisdiction so 
far as conspiracy in relation to war crimes and crimes against humanity was concerned. It is usual, at least in a 
British court, that such a motion is moved as soon as practicable, and, if defence counsel do not do so, it is the 
duty of a trial judge to raise the matter for argument. This was not done. A probable reason is that German 
counsel were not familiar with the concept of criminal conspiracy as applied in British and American courts. The 
Tribunal failed in its duty to intervene. 
On a number of occasions, defence counsel adverted to the evidentiary consequences of the conspiracy charge, but 
did not take the necessary formal steps to challenge the legal validity of Count 1 in the context of the whole 
indictment. Examples of this lack of legal acumen are: 
1. Professor Dr. Kraus, associate counsel for the defendant Schacht, in a submission on behalf of all defence 
counsel, but without any formal, 
application, said: 7 
All the defendants are accused of participation in a conspiracy. That is apparently intended to mean that 
every act brought up in the course of this Trial, no matter by whom it was committed and to whom it 
was done, is charged against every one of these defendants and that he can be convicted on every one of 
these acts. Even though the individual defense counsel finds certain fields with which he must concern 
himself particularly, there are, nevertheless, no fields at all which he can entirely ignore. 
2. The lack of precision in Count I of the indictment resulting from the use of the words 'during a period of 
years preceding 8th May 1945' was the subject of submissions by Dr. Horn, counsel for the accused von 
Ribbentrop, but again there was no formal application for further and better particulars. Dr. Horn said:8 
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... in my presentation of defense against the charges lodged in [the] special plea for the Prosecution, I 
have offered rebutting evidence in answer to these charges. I have, however, not only to confine 
myself to refuting those charges ... but 1 have ... to consider all these charges under the point of view 
of conspiracy, as according to the submission of the Prosecution, the Defendant Ribbentrop is 
party to this conspiracy and the question cannot be avoided: When did the conspiracy start? 
3. The transcript of the trial9 illustrates the confusion which the conspiracy count caused in the defence of 
the accused Schacht. His leading counsel, Dr. Dix, sought elucidation of the question of whether or not 
Schacht was accused of crimes against humanity, 'that is, not only the crime of conspiracy concerning the war 
of aggression, but also the typical crimes against humanity, for on this point the individual passages, both of 
the Indictment and of the Prosecution speech in which the charges were presented, are at variance.' In the legal 
argument that followed that submission, the American prosecution said that Schacht 'is answerable for 
every offense committed by any of the defendants up to the time when he openly broke with this outfit with 
which he became associated.' 1 ° Dr. Dix did not press the point or make any formal submission. In its 
judgment the Tribunal said: 'Schacht is indicted under Counts One and Two of the Indictment.' 
At all times from the signature of the London Agreement and Charter until the delivery of the judgment of the 
Tribunal, alleged conspiracy was at the heart of the case against all defendants. Professor Smith has given an 
intriguing account of the unfolding of the conspiracy charge and of the Tribunal's tribulation in respect of it." 
The judgment of the Tribunal on the issue of conspiracy is significant not for what it contained but for what it 
did not address. The fact that, in a judgment of 131 pages, only two were devoted to a section headed The Law 
as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy' was probably due to the desire of the Tribunal to minimise the 
importance of a fundamental feature of the trial. The crucial statements in the judgment involving legal 
principles relating to conspiracy were (pp. 42-44): 
Planning and preparation are essential to the making of war. In the opinion of the Tribunal aggressive 
war is a crime under international law. The Charter defines this offence as planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a war of aggression 'or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment ... of the foregoing'. The Indictment follows this distinction. Count One charges the 
common plan or conspiracy. Count Two charges the planning and waging of war. The same evidence 
has been introduced to support both Counts. We shall therefore discuss both Counts together. as they 
are in substance the same. The defendants have been charged under both Counts, and their guilt under 
each Count must he determined. 12 (emphasis added) 
The 'common plan or conspiracy' charged in the Indictment covers twenty-five years, from the 
formation of the Nazi party in 1919 to the end of the war in 1945.... 
The Prosecution says, in effect, that any significant participation in the affairs of the Nazi Party or 
Government is evidence of a participation in a conspiracy that is in itself criminal. Conspiracy is not 
defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the conspiracy must be clearly outlined in 
its criminal purpose. It must not be too far removed from the time of decision and of action. The 
planning, to be criminal, must not rest merely on the declarations of a party programme, such as are 
found in the twenty-five points of the Nazi Party, announced in 1920, or the political affirmations 
expressed in 'Mein Kampf in later years. The Tribunal must examine whether a concrete plan to wage 
war existed, and determine the participants in that concrete plan. 
Count One, however, charges not only the conspiracy to commit aggressive war, but also to commit 
war crimes and crimes against humanity. But the Charter does not define as a separate crime any 
conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive war. Article 6 of the Charter provides: 
'Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution 
of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for 
all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan'. 
In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and separate crime to those already listed. 
The words are designed to establish the responsibility of persons participating in a common plan. The 
99 
Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in Count One that the defendants conspired to commit war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, and will consider only the common plan to prepare, initiate and 
wage aggressive war. 
The Tribunal confined its judgment on Count 1 to 'only the common plan to prepare, initiate and wage 
aggressive war'. The judgment did not, according to the expressed reasons, take into account conspiracy for 
'the accomplishment of ... a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances' (Article 6 
(a) of the Charter), although such charge was included in the indictment (III. Statement of the Offense, lines 10 
and 11). 
The judgment declared that 'It [the conspiracy] must not be too far removed from the time of decision and action', 
(p. 43 of the Judgment), but it did not state the periods of time which the Tribunal took into account in 
reaching a verdict of guilty in relation to eight of the defendants, either in its general pronouncements (pp. 42- 
44 of the Judgment) or in the reasons given individually for the conclusions as to the eight defendants 
who were convicted under Count 1. On the contrary, in many cases such reasons detailed activities of the 
defendants over a period of many years prior to September 1939. In the case of von Neurath, the recital of his 
conduct under the heading 'Crimes Against Peace' began with his activities in 1933 as Minister of Foreign 
Affairs; in the case of Goering, the recital began in 1922. It may be areued. however, that those recitals were 
in the nature of a preamble or a statement of surrounding circumstances. 
Moreover, the omission to clarify the relevant period in each case which the Tribunal took into account may 
appear trivial. Nonetheless, having regard to the fact that fourteen of the defendants were found not guilty under 
Count 1, the indictment is open to the criticism, often made in the context of criminal conspiracy charges 
(especially when a number of alleged conspirators are indicted together), that the evidence is not weighed with 
sufficient precision in so far as each individual charged is concerned. It does not appear from the judgment that, in 
fact, the Tribunal was punctilious to determine in each case the relevant period so that it could apply its own 
precept that 'it [the conspiracy] must not be too far removed from the time of decision and of action'. 
Apparently the Tribunal did not see fit to apply established practice With respect to the joinder in one Count of 
charges of conspiracy and charges of the commission of related substantive crimes. At common law, conspiracy 
was an indictable offence, consisting in the agreement of two or more persons to do an unlawful act, or to do a 
lawful act by unlawful means. The principles relating to joinder of alleged conspiracy with other charge, are well 
established. 12a 
The argument is advanced that the pleading, advocacy and judgment in relation to the allegation of conspiracy 
were, as a matter of established law, unsatisfactory. They would not have been countenanced in a British or 
Australian, or, it is suggested, American court. A judgment based on such a proceeding would have been 
appealable. At Nuremberg, however, Article 26 of the Charter provided that the judgment of the Tribunal as to 
the guilt or the innocence of any Defendant should be final and not subject to review (cf. the provisions of 
Control Council Law No. 10, upon which the 'Subsequent Proceedings' at Nuremberg were based, and whereby 
review proceedings, at times invoked successfully, were available). 
It is not asserted in this study that the deficiencies to which attention has been directed necessarily affected the 
ultimate result so far as any individual defendant was concerned, but the matter must remain speculative. If the 
allegation of conspiracy had been treated by all involved in a manner consistent with established principles, and if 
defence counsel had sought, and been furnished with, particulars of the persons with whom the defendants were 
alleged to have conspired, with dates and other relevant details, it is equally speculative whether or not the 
ultimate result in all cases would necessarily have been the same. 
One question remains, although an answer to it has never been suggested or is likely to be forthcoming. Article 
16 of the Charter contained provisions designed to ensure 'a fair trial for the defendants'. The outstanding question 
is: If. as the Tribunal stated in its Judgment, both Counts 1 and 2 were in substance the same, on what 
evidentiary basis were Frick, Funk, Seyss-Inquart and Doenitz acquitted under Count 1 but convicted on Count 2? 
Perhaps the difficulty in furnishing an answer to the question is to be seen in the following paragraph of the 
individual judgment in the case of Frick, who was acquitted on Count 1 but convicted on Counts 2, 3 and 4 and 
sentenced to death: 
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Before the date of the Austrian aggression, Frick was concerned only with domestic administration 
within the Reich. The evidence does not show that he participated in any of the conferences at which 
Hitler outlined his aggressive intentions. Consequently the Tribunal takes the view that Frick was not 
a member of the common plan or conspiracy to wage aggressive war as defined in this Judgment. 
The other five paragraphs of the judgment against Frick under the heading of 'Crimes against Peace' were 
confined to his administrative activities after the seizure of Austria. Those activities were adjudged sufficient to 
justify his conviction under Count 2. 13 
In the 'Subsequent Proceedings' at Nuremberg, the judges in some cases applied established practice with regard 
to the joinder of conspiracy with related substantive charges. 14 
COUNT 2-CRIMES AGAINST PEACE 
Article 6 of the Charter conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal in the 
following terms: 
... to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as 
individuals or as members of organisations, committed any of the following crimes. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for 
which there shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) Crimes against peace: namely planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, 
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances 
Count 2 was based on that part of Article 6. The statement of the offense was: 
All the defendants with divers other persons, during a period of years preceding 8th May, 1945, 
participated in the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which were also 
wars in violation of international treaties, aereements and assurances. 
The particulars under the Count were: 
(A) The wars referred to in the Statement of Offense in this Count Two of the Indictment and the dates 
of their initiation were the following: against Poland, 1st September, 1939; against the United 
Kingdom and France, 3rd September, 1939; against Denmark and Norway, 9th April, 1940; against 
Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, 10th May, 1940; against Yugoslavia and Greece, 6th 
April, 1941; against the U.S.S.R., 22nd June, 1941; and against the United States of America, 11th 
December, 1941. 
(B) Reference is hereby made to Count One of the Indictment for the allegations charging that these 
wars were wars of aggression on the part of the defendants. 
(C) Reference is hereby made to Appendix C annexed to this Indictment for a statement of particulars 
of the charges of violations of international treaties, agreements and assurances caused by the 
defendants in the course of planning, preparing and initiating these wars. 
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The charge in Count 2 was of actual participation in the acts of planning, preparation, initiation and waging of 
wars of aggression 'which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and assurances'. Of the 
twenty two accused, sixteen were charged under Count 2 and twelve convicted. Of the six not charged, four were 
convicted under another Count or other Counts and sentenced to death, one was convicted on another Count and 
sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years and one was totally acquitted. 
Count 2 was clear-cut and simply phrased. It was the only Count which did not expressly involve the concept of 
a common plan or conspiracy. The German seizure of Austria and its acquisition of the major part of 
Czechoslovakia were not included as 'wars of aggression'. 
No criticism can be levelled at the actual pleading in Count 2, having regard to the provisions of the Charter. Of 
the twelve defendants convicted under Count 2, seven were, in the ultimate result, sentenced to death and five to 
terms of imprisonment varying from ten years to life. 
The justification for the charge of crimes against peace is considered in Chapter 18. 
COUNT 3--WAR CRIMES 
The aim of those responsible for the drafting and approval of the London Agreement and Charter to make the 
formulation and execution of a common plan or conspiracy the cornerstone of the whole indictment is illustrated 
by the terms of Count 3, which provided: 
All the defendants committed War Crimes between 1st September, 1939, and 8th May, 1945, in Germany and in 
all those countries and territories occupied by the German armed forces since 1st September, 1939, and in 
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Italy, and on the High Seas. 
All the defendants, acting in concert with others formulated and executed a common plan or conspiracy to 
commit War Crimes as defined in Article 6 (b) of the Charter. This plan involved, among other things, the 
practice of 'total war', including methods of combat and of military occupation in direct conflict with the laws 
and customs of war, and the commission of crimes perpetrated on the field of battle during encounters with 
enemy armies, and against prisoners of war, and in occupied territories against the civilian population of such 
territories. 
The said War Crimes were committed by the defendants and by other persons for whose acts the defendants are 
responsible (under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons when committing the said War Crimes 
performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy to commit the said War Crimes, in the 
formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the defendants participated as leaders, organisers, 
instigators and accomplices. 
These methods and crimes constituted violations of international conventions, of internal penal laws and of the 
general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilised nations, and were involved in 
and part of a systematic course of conduct. 
There followed seventeen pans of particulars, pleaded with great detail. 
Only four of the Nuremberg defendants were not charged under Count 3 - Streicher, von Shirach, Schacht and von 
Papen; of those so charged, only Hess and Fritzche were found not guilty. 
Count 3 was expressed to be based 'especially' on paragraph 6 (b) of the Charter. It embraced two classes of 
crimes: first, specific war crimes, in the strict sense, and, second, conspiracy to commit war crimes 'as defined in 
Article 6 (b) of the Charter'. Appendix A of the indictment was introduced by the following sentence: 
The statements hereinafter set forth following the name of each individual defendant constitute matters 
102 
upon which the prosecution will rely inter alia as establishing the individual responsibility of the 
defendant. 
The reference to 'individual responsibility' appears to be in furtherance of the third paragraph in the statement of 
the offence under Count 3. 
In the cases of all eighteen defendants charged under Count 3, with qualifications in the cases of Raeder, Doenitz 
and Fritzche, the particulars in Appendix A contained the words' and he authorised, directed and participated 
in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment ..." In some instances there was very brief, general 
expansion of those words, which were in conformity with the first paragraph of Coullt 3. However, the 
particulars in Appendix A did not express any overt acts by any defendant upon which the prosecution relied in 
respect or the second and third paragraphs of Count 3. 
The significant sequel is that the judgment of the Tribunal, both in its general treatment: of The Law Relating 
to War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity (pp. 64-65) and in the findings of fact in respect of all of the 
defendants convicted under Count 3 (pp. 84-130), did not purport to make any finding of guilt of conspiracy as 
charged under the second and third paragraphs of Count 3 of the indictment. The guilt of the sixteen defendants 
convicted on Count 3 rested solely on the actual commission of, or involvement in, 'war crimes' as defined in 
Article 6 (b) of the Charter. 
The Judgment of the Tribunal simply stated, without elaboration (p. 64): 
As heretofore stated, the Charter does not define as a separate 
crime any conspiracy except the one set out in Article 6 (a) dealing with crimes against peace. 
There were a number of flaws in Count 3, as a matter of law: 
First, because conspiracy was charged under the second and third paragraphs of Count 3, evidence was admissible 
on a vast range of allegations involving war crimes. As stated, no particulars of individual overt acts were given. 
The seventeen pages of particulars contained only three names, all senior military officers. Many hundreds of 
types of crimes were specified, involving several million persons. None of the eighteen accused were mentioned. 
In the particulars, the expressions 'the Germans', 'the defendants' and 'the Nazi conspirators' were used without 
specificity. The lack of specific allegations, as a matter of pleading, was not, for the reason already stated, cured 
by the inclusion in the indictment of the reference to Appendix A. In some instances, there was brief, general 
expansion of the cited words. The Tribunal met the obvious legal problem by conlining its findings against 
individuals to such parts of the particulars and evidence as it determined implicated the accused individually in the 
actual commission of war crimes. 
Second the inclusion of conspiracy charges in Count was not authorised by Article 6 of the Charter, which, as far 
as the jurisdiCtion of the Tribunal was concerned, confined alleged conspiracy to the 'accomplishment' of crimes 
against peace. 
Third, irrespective of the constraint imposed by Article 6, it was arguable, had it been necessary, that Count 3 
was bad for duplicity. The first paragraph charged the commission of war crimes. The charges of conspiracy in 
the second and third paragraphs of the same Count were based on the same particulars as those under the first 
paragraph. 
The question of duplicity has been previously considered (footnotes 12 and 12a to this Chapter) in relation to 
Count 1. On this issue, Gillies, The Law of Criminal Conspiracy,  after considering a number of English and 
Australian cases, concludes (p. 189): 
... the defendant should in general be on strong grounds in applying to the court for an order that the 
prosecution elect as to which of the Counts it wishes to proceed with, i.e. that relating to conspiracy or 
those relating to the substantive offences. 
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In the case of the Nuremberg indictment, it is submitted that the argument is a fortiori, since the 'rolled up' 
pleading in Count 3 was embraced within the same Count and the prosecution relied upon the same particulars. 
Fourth, in including in the third paragraph of the statement of offence under Count 3 the reference to 'leaders, 
organisers, instigators and accomplices' the prosecution misconceived the limited application of the last 
paragraph of Article 6 of the Charter. As the tribunal stated in its Judgment (p. 44): 
In the opinion of the Tribunal these words do not add a new and separate crime to those already listed. 
The words are designed to establish the responsibility of persons participating in a common plan. 
Since jurisdiction in relation to conspiracy was confined by Article 6 to crimes against peace, as the Tribunal 
determined, the attempt to rely on the last paragraph of Article 6 in the case of war crimes under Count 3 was 
wrong in law. 
COUNT 4-CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
The substantive provisions of Count 4 were:- 
All the defendants committed Crimes against Humanity during a period of years preceding 8th May, 
1945 in Germany and in all those countries and territories occupied by the German armed forces since 
1st September, 1939 and in Austria and Czechoslovakia and in Italy and on the High Seas. 
All the defendants, acting in concert with others, formulated and executed a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit Crimes against Humanity as defined in Article 6 (c) of the Charter. This plan 
involved, among other things, the murder and persecution of all who were or who were suspected of 
being hostile to the Nazi Party and all who were or who were suspected of being opposed to the 
common plan alleged in Count One. 
The said Crimes against Humanity were committed by the defendants and by other persons for whose 
acts the defendants are responsible (under Article 6 of the Charter) as such other persons, when 
committing the said War Crimes, performed their acts in execution of a common plan and conspiracy 
to commit the said War Crimes, in the formulation and execution of which plan and conspiracy all the 
defendants participated as leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices (emphasis added to show the 
confusion in drafting). 
These methods and crimes constituted violations of international conventions, of internal penal laws, 
of the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilised nations and 
were involved in and part of a systematic course of conduct. The said acts were contrary to Article 6 or 
the Charter. 
The prosecution will rely upon the facts pleaded under Count Three as also constituting Crimes 
against Humanity. 
Count 4 was purportedly 'especially' based on Article 6 (c) of the Charter, but the concluding paragraph of 
Article 6 also was involved. It is apparent that Count 4 was designed to charge three categories of crimes:- 
'Crimes against Humanity' (as defined in the Charter); 
Conspiracy to commit such crimes (the last paragraph of Article 6 of the Charter); 
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and 
Both the commission of, and conspiracy to commit, war crimes, the particulars of which, 
as stated in Count 3, were, by reference, embodied in Count 4 (see the last paragraph of the 
substantive provisions of Count 4 cited above). 
Thus, in short, Count 4 embraced the following types of crimes; the actual commission of both war crimes and 
crimes against humanity; and conspiracy to commit crimes in each of those categories. 
In the third paragraph of the substantive provisions of Count 4, the expression 'the said War Crimes' is used 
twice. As a matter of drafting, such use can only be a reference to the whole of Count 3 and the particulars 
thereunder. Any restriction of this wide ambit was dependent on the particulars in Appendix A of the indictment 
in relation to the alleged individual responsibility of defendants. 
Of the twenty two defendants tried at Nuremberg, only four—Raeder, Doenitz, Schacht and von Papen—were not 
indicted under Count 4. However, of these four both Raeder and Doenitz were charged under Counts 1,2 and 3. 
In the cases of Raeder and Doenitz, it is difficult, having regard to the indictment to appreciate the logic of the 
decision of the prosecution that each should be charged only under Count 3 and not also under Count 4, because 
the indictment, in effect, combined the charges under Count 3 with those under Count 4. In fact, Raeder was 
convicted under Counts 1, 2, and 3; Doenitz was found not guilty under Count 1, but guilty under Counts 2 and 
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The Tribunal found that Raeder participated in the planning and waging of aggressive war (Count 2) and the 
actual commission of war crimes (Count 3). He was also convicted under Count 1. These findings followed the 
particulars in the indictment, which alleged, inter alia, that Raeder 'authorised, directed and participated in the war 
crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment, including particularly war crimes arising out of sea warfare'. 
In the case of Doenitz, the Tribunal found that 'the evidence does not show that he was privy to the conspiracy to 
wage aggressive wars or that he prepared and initiated such wars'. Count 1. In respect of Count 2, however, the 
finding was that he was 'active in waging aggressive war'. Under Count 3, in accordance with which he was 
charged with having 'authorised, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count 3 of the 
Indictment, including particularly the crimes against persons and property on the high seas', he also was found 
guilty. 
Count 4 posed legal problems of substance. As in the case of Count 3, it can be criticised as containing several 
flaws. 
First, the concept of conspiracy was again introduced into a Count in which related substantive crimes also were 
charged. Second, there was no authority under Article 6 of the Charter to invoke its provisions in relation to 
allegations of conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity, because conspiracy charges were confined by 
Article 6 (a) to crimes against peace. Third, the use twice of the words 'the said War Crimes' in the third 
paragraph of the 'statement of the offence' was either simply an error or, if not, the result of misconception. 
Fourth, as in the case of Count 3, reliance on the last paragraph of Article 6, was, as pleaded, not legally valid. 
Fifth, as stated, by virtue of the fifth paragraph in the 'statement of the offence' all the facts pleaded under Count 
3 were again relied upon as constituting crimes against humanity under Count 4, with obvious resultant 
duplication. 
The basis for the criticism has been stated above in relation to Count 3. 
It does not appear from the transcript that defence counsel attacked the legal defects to which attention has been 
directed. 
So far as is relevant, the Tribunal merely stated in its Judgment (p. 65): 
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... from the beginning of the war in 1939 war crimes were committed on a vast scale, which were also 
crimes against humanity; and insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the indictment, and committed 
after the beginning of the war, did not constitute war crimes, they were all committed in execution of, 
or in connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore constituted crimes against humanity. 
In an earlier section of its Judgment, in which the Tribunal analysed 'The Law of the Charter', it did not 
expressly refer to crimes against humanity It adopted the law of the Charter as decisive and binding upon it. 
Criticism is not directed at the inclusion of sub-paragraph (c) of Article 6. It was proper that jurisdiction in 
respect of crimes against humanity should have been conferred on the Tribunal, but, in the circumstances, it was 
not incumbent on the prosecution to invoke that jurisdiction. 15 
It is therefore argued that the asserted defects in relation to Count 4 were not addressed by the Tribunal. Count 4, 
as it was pleaded, has the appearance of a concluding and separate 'catch all' charge, embodying allegations of 
conspiracy, war crimes and crimes against humanity, without regard to duplication. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Before stating the conclusions to which the analysis of the indictment leads, it is convenient to refer to one 
general question which is relevant to the legal issues concerning the indictment: that is, the general substantive 
and procedural rules to which, independently of the provisions of the Agreement and Charter, the trial was, if 
necessary, subject. 
In relevant literature—and in the course of the trial—frequent references may be found to 'Anglo-American' legal 
systems, including principles relating to the law of criminal conspiracy. 16 The Nuremberg Tribunal was not 
obliged to pay regard to any particular national concepts relating to either substantive or procedural law. The 
Agreement and Charter prescribed both the substantive law and rules for the conduct of the trial. It was an 
international tribunal, with members from four different nations. All the accused were nationals of a fifth 
country. It was not appropriate for the Tribunal to adopt a predilection for any one national legal system; nor did 
it do so. Insofar as the Charter left some matters to the determination of the Tribunal, it did not attempt to 
prescribe the manner of exercise by the Tribunal of its discretion by referring to any national system of law. 
Article 16 of the Charter prescribed evidential and procedural rules 'to ensure fair trial for the defendants'. The 
rules were those applicable, with some variations, in the legal systems of civilised countries, whereby it is hasic 
that the trial must be fair, not only in relation to the facts but: also to the law. 
The essential question is whether, if the foregoing criticism of Counts 1, 3 and 4 of the indictment is valid, the 
accused had a fair trial. 
In an article first published in 1947, 17 Professor Quincy Wright surveyed the 'Law of the Nuremberg Trial' but 
was not critical of the indictment. 18 Indeed there is scant published analysis of the four Counts in the strictly 
legal sense. Yet critical, detailed examination of any indictment, especially one so lengthy and factually 
comprehensive as that at Nuremberg, is the primary duty of defence counsel, and, in default, of the trial judge. 
It is evident that the American prosecutors were determined that the trial should be all-embracing. It seems not 
unlikely that, to the extent to which the indictment was objectionable, the reason was the American preference 
for excessive length and breadth of the indictment. 
The conclusion is advanced that two and not four Counts would have been appropriate: that is, only crimes 
against peace and war crimes. 
As was stated by the Tribunal in the High Command Case in the 'Subsequent Proceedings', the inclusion in the 
indictment of the conspiracy allegation did not advance the case for the prosecution, and the Count was struck 
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No argument can be advanced against the confining of the Counts in the indictment to crimes against peace and 
war crimes on the basis that thereby relevant evidence would not have been admissible. Further, an examination 
of the individual judgments indicates that the ultimate results of the trials would not have been different, 
including the punishment of those found guilty, with one possible exception—the case of von Shirach. He was 
charged under Counts 1 and 4, acquitted on Count 1, convicted under Gount 4 and sentenced to imprisonment for 
twenty years. The Tribunal found as to von Shirach that '... while he did not originate the policy of deporting 
Jews from Vienna [he] participated in this policy after he had become Gauleiter of Vienna. He knew that the best 
the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the Ghettoes of the East. Bulletins describing the Jewish 
extermination were in his office.' There as no reason why his guilt under Count 4 could not have been 
established under Count 3, especially as the definition of 'war crimes' in Article 6 (b) of the Charter was 
expressed not to be exhaustive. 
The fact that the Charter conferred jurisdiction on the Tribunal in respect of crimes against humanity was no 
reason why there should have been in the indictment a separate Count relating specifically to crimes against 
humanity. If it had been thought appropriate to include in the indictment the concept of crimes against humanity, 
there could have been a combination, in one Count, of war crimes and crimes against humanity, in accordance 
with the definitions in Article 6 (b) and 6 (c) of the Charter. 
The omission of Counts 1 and 4 would, it is argued, have had the following beneficial results (not only in the 
principal trial but also in the 
'Subsequent Proceedings): 
The prolixity of the indictment would have been considerably reduced. 
The time occupied by the trial would have been much less. 
The scope for argument, in relation both to the admissibility of evidence and legal issues, especially in 
respect of conspiracy, would have been much narrower. 
The legal integrity of the indictment must have been enhanced because it would have been inherently more 
cohesive and not overweighted. 
The Tribunal's burdensome task would have been alleviated to a substantial degree. 
There would have been much less public criticism of the trial at the time and subsequently. 
For the future, there would have been the opportunity to appraise more objectively, so far as the prosecution 
was concerned, a trial which the President described in an opening statement on the first day as one which is 
'unique in the history of the jurisprudence of the world and is of supreme importance to millions of people 
all over the globe'. 
The divergence of published views in relation to the conspiracy count, sparse though they are, is illustrated by 
Brigadier General Taylor: 
It became apparent during the I.M.T. trial, not only from the arguments of defense counsel but from 
the reactions of the Continental members of the Tribunal, that many European jurists view the Anglo-
Saxon concept of criminal conspiracy with deep suspicion. Indeed, after the close of the I.M.T. 
proceedings the French member of the Tribunal (Professor Donnedieu de Vabres) delivered a public 
lecture in which he uttered some very harsh words about conspiracy and made it plain that he, for one, 
had endeavoured at Nuremberg to confine that doctrine to the narrowest limits. It is an interesting 
contrast that Mr. Henry L. Stimson, in one of the most distinguished pieces of writing on the 
Nuremberg trials, declared that in his opinion the principal defect in the I.M.Ts judgment was the 
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very limited scope which had been allowed to the doctrine of conspiracy. 2° 
As Mr. Alderman, American Associate Trial Counsel, said in presenting the detail relating to aggressive war and 
conspiracy: '... the aggressive war phase of the entire case is really, we think, the heart of the case ... everything 
else in this case, however dramatic, however sordid, however shocking and revolting to the common instincts of 
civilised people, is incidental to, or subordinate to, the aggressive war aspect of the case'. 2I 
Even among prosecution counsel there was confusion and misunderstanding in relation to the conspiracy Count. 
For example, Captain Sprecher, American Assistant Trial Counsel, in presenting the case on the individual 
responsibility of the defendant Fritzsche 'for Crimes against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity as 
they relate directly to the Common Plan or Conspiracy', said:22 
It is planned to make this presentation in three principal divisions: 
First, a short listing of the various positions held by the Defendant Fritzsche in the Nazi State. 
Second, a discussion of Fritzsche's conspiratorial activities within the Propaganda Ministry from 1933 
through the attack on the Soviet Union. 
Third, a discussion of Fritzsche's connection, as a Nazi propagandist, to the atrocities and the ruthless 
occupation policy which formed a part of the Common Plan or Conspiracy. 
Counsel was, according to the transcript, in error in asserting that Fritzsche was charged with crimes against 
peace (Count 2). He was indicted on Counts 1, 3 and 4 23 and acquitted of all charges. However, the principal 
criticism of the cited passage from the presentation of prosecution counsel is that it illustrates the confused 
thinking in relation to the crime of conspiracy when charged in conjunction with substantive crimes (Counts 3 
and 4) alleged to have been the purpose of the conspiracy. 
Nuremberg law would have been the richer and more enduring if the indictment had concentrated on the two 
essential elements, crimes against peace and war crimes, and if the particulars had been curtailed by omitting 
substantial parts, especially the cumulative allegations, or, alternatively, aggregating much of the detail and 
leaving it to defence counsel, if they wished, to require further and better particulars. It is unlikely that the 
defence would have made such a request, as the alleged facts were seldom disputed. 
In the light of the foregoing analysis, the ultimate conclusion concerning the indictment is that legally it was 
not as appropriate as it should have been. It is regrettable that the disputation concerning Nuremberg has not 
been focussed more closely on the most basic of all the relevant instruments—the indictment. 
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CHAPTER 9 	TIIE INDICTED ORGANISATIONS 
It is surprising that there is comparatively little published comment on the inclusion in the London Charter 
of Articles 9, 10 and 11. They provided for the Tribunal to make declarations that the group or organisation, of 
which a convicted person was a member, was a criminal organisation, with potential consequences for all the 
members of the organisation. 
The full terms of the three Articles were: 
9. At the trial of any individual member of any group or organisation the Tribunal may declare (in connection 
with any act of which the individual may be convicted) that the group or organisation of which the 
individual was a member was a criminal organisation. 
After receipt of the Indictment the Tribunal shall give notice as it thinks fit that the prosecution intends to 
ask the Tribunal to make such declaration and any member of the organisation will be entitled to apply to 
the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal upon the question of the criminal character of the 
organisation. The Tribunal shall have power to allow or reject the application. If the application is allowed, 
the Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard. 
10. In cases where a group or organisation is declared criminal by the Tribunal the competent national authority 
of any Signatory shall have the right to bring individuals to trial for membership therein before national 
military or occupation courts. In any such case the criminal nature of the group or organisation is 
considered proved and shall not be questioned. 
11. Any person convicted by the Tribunal may be charged before a national military or occupation court referred 
to in Article 10 of this Charter with a crime other than of membership in a criminal group or organisation 
and such court may after convicting him impose upon him punishment independent of and additional to the 
punishment imposed by the Tribunal for participation in the criminal activities of such group or 
organisation. 
It is noteworthy that the London Agreement did not itself refer to the declaration of a group or organization as 
criminal.] Nevertheless, the Tribunal was required to construe the Agreement and Charter as one document, 
irrespective of the soundness of the legal basis for the provisions relating to criminal organizations. 
In analysing the indictment, it is necessary to consider the manner in which the question of the criminal character 
of the named groups or organizations was woven into its whole fabric. The structure of the indictment was not 
only novel but also extremely ingenious. Sub-paragraph (H) of paragraph IV under Count 1 of the indictment, 
with the heading 'Individual Group and Organization Responsibility for the Offense Stated in Count One' ('the 
common plan or conspiracy') was as follows:- 
... Reference is hereby made to Appendix B of this Indictment for a statement of the responsibility of the groups 
and organizations named herein as criminal groups and organizations for the offense set forth in this Count One 
of the Indictment. 
Similar phraseology was used in paragraph VII under Count 2, in paragraph IX under Count 3 and in paragraph 
XI under Count 4. 
The manner of pleading was such that the indictment brought together, and forged into one (a) the specific 
charges against the individual defendants (b) the common plan or conspiracy, and (c) the allegations of the 
criminality of the named groups and organizations. The link was patent. obviously deliberate and, from the 
viewpoint of evidence, devasting in its effect. 
The Nuremberg trials were in practical terms one conglomerate trial of Nazi. Germany as an entity, of its leaders 
and of hundreds of thousands of members of the named groups or organizations. The acts charged covered varying 
periods—in the cases of the Reich Cabinet and the Gestapo the period commencing with the appointment of 
Hitler as Chancellor of the German Republic on 30 January 1933 and ending with the surrender of Germany on 8 
May 1945; in some cases (for example, Goering, Rosenberg, Streicher and von Shirach), acts done and 
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statements made before 30 January 1933 were the subject of evidence; in other cases the relevant period was not 
specified. 
Because of the link between all four Counts and all of the allegations against the named groups and 
organisations, evidence was admissible over a vast range of activities within the German Government and the 
armed forces over a very long period. Such evidence was admissible if the Tribunal deemed it 'to have probative 
value' (Article 19 of the Charter). In truth, it was the third Reich which was on trial. 
A clear acknowledgment of the novelty of the jurisdictional authority conferred by Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the 
Charter, and, pursuant to them, of the terms of the indictment relating to the groups or organisations which it 
was alleged should be declared criminal, was made in the opening address of Mr. Justice Jackson, when he said: 2 
The unconditional surrender of Germany created for the victors novel and difficult problems of law and 
administration. Being the first such surrender of an entire and modernly organised society, precedents 
and past experiences are of little help in guiding our policy toward the vanquished. 
In the order in which they were named in the indictment the organisations were: The Reich Cabinet, The 
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, The SS (including the SD), The Gestapo, The SA, and The General Staff 
and High Command of the German Armed Forces. 
As an example of the vast mass of documentary and other evidence which became admissible by virtue of 
Articles 9, 10 and 11, the particulars in Appendix B of the indictment concerning the Reich Cabinet were typical. 
The Cabinet, it Was pleaded, consisted of (a) the persons who were members of the ordinary cabinet after 30 
January 1933, meaning the 'Reich Ministers, i.e., heads of departments of the central government; Reich 
Ministers without portfolio; State Ministers acting as Reich Ministers; and other officials entitled to take part in 
meetings of this cabinet; (b) members of the Council of Ministers for the Defence of the Reich; and (c) members 
of the Secret Cabinet Council.' 
The indictment alleged against the Cabinet members: 
Under the Fuehrer, these persons functioning in the foregoing capacities and in association as a group, 
possessed and exercised legislative, executive, administrative and political powers and functions of a very 
high order in the system of German government. Accordingly, they are charged with responsibility for the 
policies adopted and put into effect by the government including those which comprehended and involved 
the commission of the crimes referred to in Counts One, Two, Three and Four of the indictment. 
Irrespective of the question of the legality of Articles 9, 10 and 11, the particular criticism is made that the 
provisions of those Articles were far too expansive. It has been estimated 3 that if all six organisations had been 
declared criminal about one and a half million persons would have potentially been chargeable for membership of 
an organisation before 'national, military or occupation courts'. In any such case, 'the criminal nature of the 
organisation' was to be considered proved and could not be questioned (Article 10). In fact, very few charges were 
laid under Article 10, and they were mainly in some of the 'Subsequent Proceedings 'at Nuremberg. 4 
The consequences of the drafting of the indictment in such wide terms were that many months were spent in 
argument by counsel, the tendering of evidence and voluminous documents, the consideration thereof by the 
Tribunal and the production of its eighteen-page judgment on the issue, together with all the associated work. In 
addition, the Tribunal appointed a Commission (Article 17 (e) of the Charter) to examine the evidence submitted, 
especially by affidavit, by members of the indicted organisations.5 
In his closing address, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe said: 6 
No one can say hereafter that every opportunity has not been afforded them [the groups and organisations] 
for their defence. An elaborate procedure has been evolved to obtain and place before you theirevidence. 102 
witnesses have been heard before your Commissioners--witnesses selected by Defense Counsel from the 
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many thousands of members of the organizations available. You have the transcripts of their evidence. Of 
these witnesses Defense Counsel have selected 20, who have given evidence in this Court and whom you 
have seen and heard yourselves. In addition to this oral testimony, you have also had submitted to you the 
substance of no less than 136,213 affidavits for the SS, 155.000 for the Political Leaders, 2,000 for 
the Gestapo, 10,000 for the SA and 7,000 for the SD, a total of 310,213. And you have also had 
presented before your Commissioners another 1,809 affidavits either in substance or in whole, the 
majority of which are now contained in the transcript of the Commissioners' proceedings. 
Perhaps the answer to the question as to why the indictment was drafted in such wide terms is in the concluding 
sentences of the final address of Colonel Taylor (as he then was) in relation to the criminality -of the German 
General Staff and High Command: 7 
This was not war, it was crime. This was not soldiering; it was savagery. ... We cannot here make history 
over again, but we can see that it is written true. 
The pleading in the indictment concerning the criminality of groups or organisations on such a vast scale was the 
responsibility not of those who framed the Charter or of the Tribunal, but of those who approved the indictment-
-that is, the Committee of Chief Prosecutors (Article 14 (c)). 
Moreover, the form of the indictment was objectionable in that it charged the six organisations, and, in some 
cases, the unnamed members thereof, with criminal responsibility for all the crimes set forth in the four counts. 
This was an excess of pleading. It is true that an individual, member of a group or organisation declared criminal 
would have had to be personally charged in subsequent proceedings and the nature and extent of his association 
with the organisation proved before he would be punished. However, such proceedings would have begun with an 
established and irrebuttable determination of the criminal character of the organisation. 
Control Council Law Number 10 included among the crimes which it declared 'is recognised as a crime' 
'membership in categories of a criminal group or organisation declared criminal by the International Mililtary 
Tribunal'. The maximum punishment on conviction was the death penalty. 
Criticism of-the Tribunal's judgment, some of which was identified by Professor Woetze1, 8 was unfounded. 
Much of the criticism stemmed from one sentence in the Judgment9 : 'A criminal organisation is analogous to a 
criminal conspiracy in that the essence of both is cooperation for criminal purposes'. This was a general 
statement which was, it is submitted, true and apposite in the context. Unfortunately, it has resulted in 
obfuscation. 1° Professor Woetze1, 11 under the heading The Legal Basis for the Judgment on Criminal 
Organisations', wrote at length on the crime of conspiracy generally. 
What some authors appear to have overlooked is that the Tribunal's Judgment relating to organisations emanated 
from Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Charter, which prescribed the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. What the Tribunal 
stated in its Judgment was designed to mitigate the rigour of those Articles. The Tribunal's concern was reflected 
in an announcement by the President on the 33rd day of the trial. 12 
The Tibunal made declarations of criminality against the Leadership Corps, the SS (including the SD) and the 
Gestapo. It declined to do so in the cases of the Reich Cabinet, the General Staff and High Command (the 
Russian member dissenting in each of those cases) and the SA. 
The Tribunal recognised the potential scope for injustice when it said in its Judgment: 
This is a far-reaching and novel procedure. Its application, unless properly safeguarded, may produce great 
injustice. 13 
The Tribunal proceeded, as a matter of interpretation of its discretionary jurisdiction under Article 9, to include 
qualifications in its declarations and to make recommendations. The Judgment stated: 
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Since declarations of criminality which the Tribunal makes will be used by other courts in the trial of 
persons on account of their membership in the organisations found to be criminal, the Tribunal feels it 
appropriate to make the following recommendations: 
1. That so far as possible throughout the four zones of occupation in Germany the classifications, sanctions 
and penalties be standardised. Uniformity of treatment so far as practical should be a basic principle. This 
does not, of course, mean that discretion in sentencing should not be vested in the court; but the discretion 
should be within fixed limits appropriate to the nature of the crime. 
2. Law No. 10, to which reference has already been made, leaves punishment entirely in the discretion of the 
trial court. even to the extent of inflicting the death penalty. The De-Nazification Law of 5th March, 
1946, however, passed for Bavaria, Greater-Hesse and Wuerttemberg-Baden, provides definite sentences for 
punishment in each type of offence. The Tribunal recommends that in no case should punishment 
imposed under Law No. 10 upon any members of an organisation or group declared by the Tribunal to be 
criminal exceed the punishment fixed by the De-Nazification Law. No person should be punished under 
both laws. 
3. The Tribunal recommends to the Control Council that Law No. 10 be amended to prescribe limitations on 
the punishment which may be imposed for membership in a criminal group or organisation so that such 
punishment shall not exceed the punishment prescribed by the De-Nazification Law. 14 
In each of the three declarations of criminality, the Tribunal, in its conclusion, carefully described the types of 
persons who could be affected thereby. It therefore justly restricted the scope of its jurisdiction. It also put in 
proper perspective the essential purpose of Articles 9, 10 and 11 when it stated in its judgment in relation 
to the 'Reich Cabinet': 
The Tribunal is of opinion that no declaration of criminality should be made with respect to the Reich 
Cabinet for two reasons: (1) because it is not shown that after 1937 it ever really acted as a group or 
organisation; (2) because the group of persons here charged is so small that members could be 
conveniently tried in proper cases without resort to a declaration that the Cabinet of which they 
were members was criminal. 
... it is clear that those members of the Reich Cabinet who have been guilty of crimes should be brought 
to trial; and a number of them are now on trial before the Tribunal. It is estimated that there are 48 
members of the group, that eight of these are dead and 17 are now on trial, leaving only 23 at the most, as 
to whom the declaration could have any importance. Any others who are guilty should also be brought to 
trial; but nothing would be accomplished to expedite or facilitate their trials by declaring the Reich 
Cabinet to be a criminal organisation. Where an organisation with a large membership is used for such 
purposes. a declaration obviates the necessity of inquiring as to its criminal character in the later trial of 
members who are accused of participating through membership in its criminal purposes and thus saves 
much time and trouble. There is no such advantage in the case of a small group like the Reich Cabinet. 15 
In the writer's opinion, the only respect in which the Tribunal's Judgment concerning its jurisdiction under 
Article 9 can be criticised relates to its general observations, which were obiter, concerning the iniquities of 
unnamed members of the General Staff and High Command In unrestrained language, the Tribunal denounced 
unidentified persons. It stated in its Judgment: 
Where the facts warrant it, these men should be brought to trial so that those among them who are guilty of 
• these crimes shall not escape punishment. 16 
One detects in such a pronouncement a measure of compromise in relation to Soviet views and those of the 
representatives of other Allied Powers. 
The recommendation was gratuitous and beyond jurisdiction. 
1 14 
There is in the character of the organisations declared to be criminal at Nuremberg an analogy with contemporary 
perceptions.of corporate crime. Braithwaite,I 7 in his recent work on corporate crime in the pharmaceutical 
industry, emphasised that people in groups behave in ways that would be inconceivable for any of them as 
individuals. And so it was with some of the members of the organisations declared criminal at Nuremberg. By 
reason of that human trait, the inclusion of Articles 9, 10 and 11 in the London Charter was, in part, justified 
on pragmatic grounds, but the legality of their inclusion involves deeper considerations, which are 
examined in Chapter 18. 
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NOTES 
1. The Agreement was entitled 'An Agreement ... for the prosecution and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis'. The third paragraph of the preamble referred to 'major criminals'. Article 
I related to 'war criminals'. Further, Article 1 of the Charter was confined to 'the major war criminals of 
the European Axis'. This footnote is not a criticism. 
2. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. VIII, p. 353. 
3. For example, Calvocoressi, Nurembera: The Facts the Law and the Consequences, Chatto and Windus, 
London, 1947, p. 79. 
4. The 'Medical Case', the 'Pohl Case', the 'Flick Case', the 'LG. Farben Case', and the 'Ministries Case'. 
(See the discussion of those cases in Chapter 13). 
5. The Commission was directed by Lieutenant-Colonel A.M.S. Neave, a well-known writer on the 
Nuremberg trial. The Commissioners heard about one hundred witnesses called by defence counsel and 
considered over 300,000 affidavits. Some of those witnesses also gave evidence before the Tribunal. 
Some of the affidavits were presented in full to the Tribunal and the rest were summarised in the 
Commission's report. (Calvocoressi, op. cit., p. 78). 
6. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. )0(11, p. 176. 
7. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. XXII, p. 297. 
8. Woetzel, op. cit., pp. 190-217. 
9. I.M.T. Judement, p. 67. 
10. This is illustrated by the analysis by Dr. J.A. Appleman, Military Tribunals and International Crimes, 
Indianapolis, 1954, of the concepts of conspiracy and the criminality of the named organisations, pp. 40- 
45. The discussion is joint: 'In either case, they involve collective responsibility, and so will be discussed 
together' (ibid., p. 40). 
11. Woetzel, o_p, cit., pp. 202-216. 
12. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. V, pp. 228-229. The full text of the President's announcement is 
reproduced as an Annexe to this Chapter. 
13. I.M.T. Judgment, p. 66. 
14. I.M.T. Judgment, p. 67. 
15. I.M.T. Judgment, p. 81. 
16. I.M.T. Judgment, p. 83. 
17. Braithwaite, Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1984, p. 
3. The author observes: 'Borkin (1978) has documented in horrifying detail how today's leaders in the 
international pharmaceutical industry brutalised its slave labour force in their quest to build an industrial 
empire to match Hitler's political empire. After the war, the Allies insisted that none of the convicted war 
criminals be appointed to the boards of the new I.G. [Farben] companies. Once Allied control loosened, 
however, Hoechst in June 1955 appointed Friedrich Jaehne, one of the twelve war criminals sentenced to 
imprisonment at Nuremberg [the 'Farben Case] to its supervisory board. In September of that year he was 
elected Chairman. Bayer appointed Fitzter Meer, sentenced to seven years at Nuremberg, as Chairman of 
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its board in 1956.' 
ANNEXE TO CHAPTER 9 	ANNOUNCEMENT BY TIIE PRESIDENT OF THE I.M.T. 
RELATING TO CRIMINAL ORGANISATIONS 
The Tribunal has been giving careful consideration to the duty imposed upon it by Article 9 of the Charter. 
It is difficult to determine the manner in which the representatives of the named organizations shall be permitted 
to appear in accordance with Article 9, without considering the exact nature of the case presented for the 
Prosecution. 
For this reason, the Tribunal has come to the conclusion that, at this stage of the Trial, with many thousands of 
applications being made, the case for the Prosecution should be defined with more precision than appears in the 
Indictment. 
In these circumstances, therefore, it is the intention of the Tribunal to invite argument from the Counsel for the 
Prosecution and for the defense, at the conclusion of the case by all prosecutors, in regard to the questions 
hereinafter set forth. 
The questions which need further consideration are as follows: 
1. The Charter does not define a criminal organization, and it is therefore necessary to examine the tests of 
criminality which must be applied and to decide the nature of the evidence to be admitted. 
Many of the applicants who have made requests to be heard assert that they were conscripted into the 
organization, or that they were ignorant of the criminal purposes of the organization, or that they were 
innocent of any unlawful acts. 
It will be necessary to decide whether such evidence ought to be received to rebut the charge of the 
criminal character of the organization, or whether such evidence ought more properly to be received at the 
subsequent trials under Article 10 of the Charter, when the organizations have been declared criminal, if 
the Tribunal so decides. 
2. The question of the precise time within which the named organization is said to have been criminal is 
vital to the decision of the Tribunal. 
The Tribunal desires to know from the Prosecution at this stage whether it is intended to adhere to the 
limits of time set out in the Indictment. 
3. The Tribunal desires to know whether, in the light of the evidence, any class of persons included within 
the named organizations should be excluded from the scope of the declaration, and which, if any. 
In the indictment of the Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Prosecution have reserved the right to 
request the Politische Leiter of subordinate grades or ranks, or of other types or classes, be exempted from 
further proceedings without prejudice to other proceedings or actions against them. 
Is it the intention of the Prosecution to make any such request? If so, it should be done now. 
4. The Tribunal would be glad if the Prosecution would also: 
(a) Summarize in respect of each named organization the elements which in their opinion justify the 
charge of being a criminal organization. 
(b) Indicate what acts on the part of individual defendants, indicted in this Trial--in the sense used in 
Article 9 of the Charter--justify declaring the groups or organizations of which they are members to be 
criminal organizations. 
(c) Submit in writing a summary of proposed findings of fact as to each organization, with respect to 
which a finding of criminality is asked. 
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The Tribunal hopes it is not necessary to say to the Prosecution that it is not seeking to interfere with the 
undoubted right of the Prosecution to present its case in its own way, in the light of the full knowledge of all the 
documents and facts which it possesses, but the duty of the Tribunal under Article 9 of the Charter makes it 
essential at this time to have the case clearly and precisely defined. 
This announcement will be communicated to the Chief Prosecutors and to Defense Counsel in writing. 
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CHAPTER 10 	THE PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIAL FAIRNESS OF TILE 
NUREMBERG TRIAL 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to assess, in the light of the transcript of the trial, the degree of procedural and 
evidential fairness, so far as the defendants were concerned, which marked it. Fundamental to such an assessment 
is the view of the Tribunal, expressed in its judgment, that 'the law of the Charter is decisive and binding upon 
the Tribunal'. 
There are several criteria for an assessment of the procedural fairness of the trial: 
First, the provisions in the Charter which were expressed to be designed to 'ensure fair trial for the defendants' 
(Article 16, see infra. 
Second, the prescribed course of the proceedings (Article 24, see infra.  
Third, the rules of procedure drawn up by the Tribunal (Article 13 and Annexe Ito this Chapter). 
Fourth, the manner in which the Tribunal applied the prescribed provisions and rules, supplemented, where 
necessary, by rulings in respect of matters for which there was no prescription in the Charter. In the latter ease, 
the Tribunal was not bound to follow any principles or rules of any particular national jurisprudence, but rather 
to apply the letter and the spirit of the laws of evidence and procedure practised in most civilised countries, 
although subject to the terms of the Charter. 
All members of the Tribunal, including the alternate members, were eminent judges. No serious suggestion has 
been made by commentators that, in view of the provisions of the London Agreement and Charter, there was any 
conspicuous unfairness. However, there were a number of cases, for example that of the defendant Kaltenbrunner, 
in which the Tribunal's procedural fairness, and that of prosecuting counsel, can be questioned. Such cases are 
examined in this chapter by detailed references to the transcript. 
Only the most outstanding matters of evidence and procedure are discussed in the text. Matters of lesser general 
importance are presented in Appendix I, to which notes are separately appended. All references to the transcript 
are derived from the twenty four volumes, including two index volumes, of the official text in the English 
language, published in accordance with the direction of the International Military Tribunal by the Secretariat of 
the Tribunal, under the jurisdiction of the Allied Control Authority for Germany The remaining eighteen 
volumes of the series contain reprints of the documents admitted as evidence during the trial. 
Of the twenty four accused persons named in the indictment when it was presented to the Tribunal in Berlin on 
18 October 1945, only 22 remained as defendants when the trial began on 20 November. The reduction in the 
number was due to the suicide in his cell on 25 October 1945 of Robert Ley and the ruling of the Tribunal 
whereby Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach was severed from the proceedings. 
Martin Bormann was presumed to be alive and at large, in the absence of any clear evidence to the contrary. He 
was tried in absentia. 
Ernst Kaltenbrunner suffered a cranial haemorrhage and was a hospital patient. As a result he was present at the 
trial for only one period of a few days. 
Article 12 of the Charter of the Tribunal was relevant in the cases of both Bormann and Kaltenbrunner. It 
provided: 
The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with crimes set out in 
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Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds 
it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence. 
Counsel for two of the defendants, Rudolph Hess and Julius Streicher, applied to the Tribunal for an order 
dismissing the proceedings against their clients on the alleged grounds of their mental incapacity to stand trial. 
The manner in which the Tribunal dealt with these matters is discussed below. 
MATTERS AFFECTING INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS 
Gustav Krupp von Bohlen und Halbach 
The name of Gustav Krupp von Bohlen was 13th on the list of twenty four defendants accused in the indictment. 
On 4 November 1945 counsel for Krupp, Dr. Klefisch, filed a motion by which he sought that the 
'proceedings against this accused be deferred until he is again fit for trial ... I request that the accused be not tried 
in his absence.'I It was stated in the motion that Krupp, then 75 years of age, 'has for a long time been 
incapable of trial or examination owing to his severe physical and mental infirmities. He is not in a position to 
be in contact with the outside world nor to make or receive statements.' In support of the 'request' that the 
accused not be tried in his absence, Dr. Klefisch said: 2 
If by Article 12 of the statute (sic) the trial of an absent defendant is allowed then this exception to the 
rule can only.be applied to a defendant who is unwilling to appear though able to do so. As is the case 
with the criminal procedure rules of nearly all countries, it is on this principle that the rules and 
regulations concerning the trial of absent defendants are based. 
In an emotive answer to the motion, filed on 12 November on behalf of 
the United States, Mr. Justice Jackson said: 3 
Public interests, which transcend all private considerations, require that Krupp von Bohlen shall not be 
dismissed unless some other representative of the Krupp armament and munitions interests be substituted. 
The answer described the part played by four generations of what was 
termed 'a Krupp family enterprise' and gave the following details of Alfried, the son of the accused Gustav 
Krupp von Bohlen: 4 
About 1937 ... Alfried Krupp became plant manager and was actively associated in policy-making and 
executive management thereafter. In 1940, Krupp von Bohlen, getting on in years, became Chairman of 
the Board of the concerns, thus making way for Alfried, who became President. In 1943, Alfried became 
sole owner of the Krupp enterprises by agreement between the family and the Nazi Government, for the 
purpose of perpetuating this business in Krupp family control. 
On 14 November, Dr. Klefisch formally made the motion orally 'to suspend the proceedings against this 
defendant, at any rate not to carry out the trial against this defendant.' 5 
Mr. Justice Jackson opposed the motion as Chief of Counsel for the United States, and also on behalf of the 
Soviet Union and with the concurrence of the French prosecution. It was an address charged with emotion, 
at the end of which the President of the Tribunal said: 
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But you have stated have you not, and you would agree, that according to the municipal law of the 
United States of America, a man in the physical and mental condition of Krupp could not be tried. 6 
Mr. Justice Jackson replied: 'I think that would be true in most of the jurisdictions'. 7 
Sir Hartley Shawcross expressed the British view, which was in marked contrast to those of the other three 
prosecutors. He objected to any further delay and opposed any joinder of Alfried Krupp if it involved delays in the 
trial of the remaining defendants. Rule 2(a) of the Rules of the Tribunal, made pursuant to Article 13 of the 
Charter and adopted on 29 October 1945, provided that there should be a period of not less than 30 days between 
the service on a defendant of the indictment and the commencement of the trial. Despite this provision, Mr. 
Justice Jackson had proposed that if Alfried Krupp were joined in the indictment the trial could begin on 2 
December. Mr. Justice Jackson did not present any argument justifying a departure from such a clear rule. 
Sir Hartley Shawcross said: 
This is a court of justice, not a game in which you can play a substitute, if one member of a team falls 
sick.8 
The Tribunal gave its ruling on the motion on 15 November. It said that on 5 November it had appointed a 
medical commission of six experts, representative of the prosecuting Powers, who had unanimously reported to 
the Tribunal 'that Krupp von Bohlen suffers from senile softening of the brain; that his mental condition is such 
that he is incapable of understanding court procedure and of understanding or co-operating in interrogations; that 
his physical state is such that he cannot be moved without endangering his life; and that his condition is unlikely 
to improve but rather will deteriorate further'.9 
In rejecting. the United States submission, the Tribunal said: 'Where nature rather than flight or contumacy has 
rendered ... a trial impossible, it is not in accordance with justice that the case should proceed in the absence of a 
defendant.' 1° 
The Tribunal formally made orders that '(1) the application for postponement of the proceeding against Gustav 
Krupp von Bohlen is granted; (2) the charges in the indictment against Gustav Krupp von Bohlen shall be 
retained upon the docket of the Tribunal for trial hereafter, if the physical and mental condition of the Defendant 
should permit 
The Tribunal added that further questions raised by the chief prosecutors, including the question of adding another 
name to the indictment, would be considered later. 
On 16 November, a motion was filed by the Soviet, French and American chief prosecutors to designate Alfried 
Krupp as a defendant. The British prosecution did not join in the motion. The motion also sought that the 
relevant time period in respect of Alfried Krupp should be abridged from 30 days until 2 December. The Tribunal 
rejected the motion. Its ruling was thus tergely expressed: 
The motion to amend the indictment by adding the name of Alfried Krupp has been considered by the 
Tribunal in all its aspects and the application is rejected. 12 
The Tribunal's ruling was correct and fair. 
Martin Bormann 
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As the commencing day for the trial approached, Martin Bormann had not been located, although a number of 
special investigators had been engaged in an effort to ascertain his fate. On 17 November 1945 the Tribunal 
invited the prosecutors to submit their views on whether or not Bormann should be tried in his absence in 
accordance with Article 12 of the Charter. 
On behalf of Great Britain, the United States and France, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe summarised the information 
available about Bormann. 13 
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe said: 
... The prosecution cannot say that the matter is beyond probability that Bormann is dead. There is still 
the clear possibility that he is alive. 14 
The Soviet representative concurred in the suggestion on behalf of the prosecutors of the other three nations that, 
in the circumstances, it would be proper for Bormann to be tried in his absence. The Tribunal accepted this 
submission, and announced that counsel would be appointed to defend Bormann Subsequently, Bormann's 
counsel moved for the postponement of the proceedings against Bormann However, the Tribunal 
rejected the application. When its ruling was given on 22 November, the President said: 
... in view of the fact that the provisions of the Charter and the Tribunal's rules of procedure have been 
strictly carried out in the notices which have been given, and the fact that counsel for Bormann will 
have ample time before he is called upon to present defense on his behalf, the motion is denied. 15 
On 13 October 1945 the Tribunal had made an order relating to notice to Bormann of the indictment against 
him, including a statement that he was entitled to be heard in person or by counsel. The manner of notice was 
thus stated: 
This notice shall be read in full once a week for four weeks over the radio, the first reading to be during 
the week of October 22, 1945. It shall also be published in four separate issues of a newspaper 
circulated in the home city of Martin Bormann. 16 
The procedural ruling in respect of Bormann was correct and reasonable. 
Ernst Kaltenbrunner 
The case of Ernst Kaltenbrunrier presented the Tribunal with difficult problems. He had been a leading Nazi and 
involved at top level with police matters throughout the Reich. The particulars relating to him in Appendix A 
of the indictment were: 
The defendant Kaltenbrunner between 1932-1945 was: a member of the Nazi Party, a General in the SS, 
a member of the Reichstag, a General of the Police, State Secretary for Security in Austria in charge of 
the Austrian Police, Police Leader of Vienna, Lower and Upper Austria, Head of the Reich Main 
Security Office and Chief of the Security Police and Security Service. The defendant Kaltenbrtuaner used 
the foregoing positions and his personal influence in such a manner that: he promoted the consolidation 
of control over Austria seized by the Nazi conspirators as set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and 
he authorized, directed and participated in the War Crimes set forth in Count Three of the Indictment and 
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the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment, including particularly the 
Crimes against Humanity involved in the system of concentration camps. 
On 18 November 1945, two days before the commencement of the trial, Kaltenbrunner suffered a spontaneous 
subarachnoid haemorrhage. He was admitted to hospital for treatment, but returned to the jail on 6 
December. He was present at the session of the Tribunal on 10 December and for several days thereafter, but 
his condition deteriorated and he was readmitted to hospital. 
When the defendants were, on 21 November 1945, required to plead to the indictment, the President said, 
in relation to Kaltenbrunner: 'In the absence of Ernst Kaltenbrumaer, the Trial will proceed against him, but he 
will have an opportunity of pleading when he is sufficiently well to be brought back into court'.I 7 In fact a 
plea of not guilty was entered at the commencement of the afternoon session on 10 December 1945. 
On 2 January 1946, Kaltenbrunner's counsel, Dr. Kauffmatm, applied for the postponement of the proceedings 
against him on the ground of his illness. The Tribunal's initial ruling was somewhat obscure. It was to the effect 
that (1) the prosecution should proceed with any evidence which it proposed to direct against the criminality of 
organisations with which Kaltenbrunner was connected, (2) any prosecution evidence directed against 
Kaltenbrunner as an individual should be withheld until the prosecution reached that part of its case in which it 
had planned to trace the responsibility of individual defendants, and (3) Kaltenbrunner's case should properly be 
left until the end of this section of the evidence. If at that time the defendant should still be unable to be present 
in court, the Tribunal ruled that 'the evidence will have to be given in his absence.' 18 
The potentially confusing practical result of this ruling could well have been due to the desire of the Tribunal to 
be seen as not unsympathetic to the situation of a seriously ill person charged with grave crimes. Certainly, it 
posed problems, both strategical and tactical, for defence counsel. 
Following the ruling, submissions were made by prosecution and defence counsel to the Tribunal in closed 
session, and as a result the ruling was modified. Since it was considered impossible to separate prosecution 
evidence against Kaltenbrunner as an individual from that which was relevant to the organisations of which he 
was the head, the Tribunal decided it would hear the prosecution evidence in totality. However, Kaltenbrunner's 
counsel was given the right to cross-examine later any witnesses who gave evidence against him. Further, the 
Tribunal stated that defence counsel would have the opportunity to deal with any documentary evidence against 
him when the defence case was presented. 19 
Kaltenbrunner was indicted under Counts 1, 3 and 4. He was found not guilty under Count 1, but guilty on 
Counts 3 and 4. He was sentenced to death by hanging. 
The discovery of the personal courtroom diaries of the senior American judge, Mr. Francis Biddle, has shed light 
on the manner in which the verdicts against Kaltenbnumer were reached--essentially by compromise, but against 
a background of certain knowledge by all the judges that the death sentence would follow a verdict of guilty on 
any Count. Such an attitude was inevitable in view of the strength of the case against Kaltenbrunner. 2° 
One point of procedure remains unresolved in a consideration of the position of Kaltenbrunner. He stayed alive 
until he was hanged; yet his inability for health reasons, to be present at the trial during a lengthy and significant 
period made a successful defence impossible except under Count 1. 
The trial of a person in a state of health similar to that of Kaltenbrunner would not have proceeded in a civilised 
country, irrespective of the inconvenience which might have been caused if his trial had been postponed. He 
could have been held in custody and tried before a military court when he was fit to be tried. The Nuremberg trial 
scenario would not thereby have been depreciated; rather it would have been enhanced. 
The procedural decision concerning Kaltenbrunner was misconceived; however, it could be argued that few would 
be concerned because of the enormity of his alleged misdeeds. Such an argument is fallacious. A sound judicial 
approach in such a case should recognise that the greater the crime the more important it is to ensure that the 
person concerned receives a scrupulously fair trial. Kaltenbrunner did not receive such a trial. 
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Streicher 
On 15 November 1945, counsel for Julius Streicher, Dr. Marx, 'suggested' orally to the Tribunal that there be a 
psychiatric examination of his client. He said: 
Defense Counsel should have at his disposal all the evidence on the nature, personality and 
motives of the defendant which appears necessary to enable him to form a clear picture of his 
client. 
In my own interests I consider it essential that such an examination be authorized by the 
Tribunal. I emphasize particularly that this is not a formal motion ... I deem it necessary as a 
precaution in my own interests, since my client does not desire an examination of this sort, and 
is of the opinion that he is mentally completely normal. I myself cannot determine that; it must 
be decided by a psychiatrist.21 
The Tribunal required that the 'suggestion' should be in the form of a written motion or application. The 
President said: 
... if, as you say, the defendant Streicher does not wish it or is unwilling that such an 
examination should be made, then your application ought to state in writing that the Defendant 
Streicher refuses to sign the application.22 
On 22 November 1945, the President said that Streicher had been examined by three medical experts on behalf of 
the Tribunal, who had submitted a report to the Tribunal as follows: 
1. The Defendant Julius Streicher is sane. 
2. The Defendant Julius Streicher is fit to appear before the Tribunal, and to present his defense. 
3. It being the unanimous conclusion of the examiners that Julius Streicher is sane, he is for 
that reason capable of understanding the nature and policy (sic) of his acts daring the period of 
time covered by the indictment.23 
The President said that the Tribunal accepted the report of the medical experts and that the trial of Streicher would 
proceed. 
There is no basis for impugning the Tribunal's ruling. Streicher gave and made a final 'statement'. It appears 
from the transcript that he was coherent and lucid. 
Hess 23a 
Probably the real reason will never be known why Rudolph Hess, on 10 May 1941, flew a German 
Messerschrnitt pursuit-fighter from Augsburg, near the German city of Munich, to the estate of the Duke of 
Hamilton, in south-west Scotland, where he parachuted to safety. He was subsequently interned and at the end of 
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the war was returned to Nuremberg where he was indicted under all four Counts. He was found guilty on the first 
two Counts but not guilty under Counts three and four. In its judgrnent, the Tribunal said: 24 
As previously indicated the Tribunal found, after a full medical examination of and report on the 
condition of this defendant, that he should be tried, without any postponement of his case. Since that 
time further motions have been made that he should again be examined. These the Tribunal denied, after 
having had a report from the prison psychologist. That Hess acts in an abnormal manner, suffers from 
loss of memory, and has mentally deteriorated during this trial, may be true. But there is nothing to 
show that he does not realise the nature of the charges against him, or is incapable of defending himself. 
He was ably represented at the trial by counsel, appointed for that purpose by the Tribunal. There is no 
suggestion that Hess was not completely sane when the acts charged against him were committed. 
Immediately after his arrival in England Hess acted in a bizarre fashion. In the Nuremberg prison, he asserted 
consistently that he was suffering from amnesia and was unable to recollect facts concerning his past activities. 
On 7 November 1945, his then counsel, Dr. von Rohrscheidt, filed with the Tribunal a motion that a medical 
expert 'make a thorough examination of the Defendant Hess and report in an exhaustive manner as to whether the 
said defendant is (a) mentally competent, (b) capable of being tried, and to summon the medical expert at the 
Trial'. It was stated in the motion that: 
... The defendant is not in a position to give his Counsel any information whatsoever regarding the 
crimes imputed to him in the Indictment. The expression of his face is lifeless and his attitude towards 
his Counsel and in view of the impending Trial is the reverse of every natural reaction of any other 
defendant. The defendant declares that he has completely lost his memory since a long period of time, 
the period of which he can no longer determine.25 
On 24 November 1945 the Tribunal rejected the motion because it sought the appointment of an expert 
designated by the medical faculty of either the University of Zurich or of Lausanne to examine Hess. Instead, the 
Tribunal designated a commission of 10 members from the four prosecuting Powers, headed by Dr. E. 
KrasnushIcin, Professor of Psychiatry at the Medical Institute of Moscow. The President of the Tribunal said the 
reports of the examiners had been received and appointed 30 November as the date on which the arguments of 
counsel would be heard.26 
Three separate reports were submitted by members of the Commission. The conclusions were not unanimous. 
On the issue of current insanity, they varied from the view that he was not suffering from any form of ,insanity 
to the qualified judgment, that he was not insane 'in the strict sense'; Seven members of the ten-man commission 
expressed the latter view. 27 
On 29 November. counsel for Hess filed a motion seeking: (a) The adjournment of the proceedings temporarily; 
(b) 'That in case incapacity to be tried is "asserted", proceedings in absentia against the defendant should not be 
carried on; and (c) that if an adjournment should be denied "a super (sic) expert opinion be obtained from 
additional eminent Psychiatrists". 28 
On the same day, answers were filed by the four chief prosecutors in which they stated 'we do not challenge or 
question the report of the Committee (sic). Further, 'it is our position that the defendant Rudolph Hess is fit to 
stand trial'.29 
The United States filed additional observations relating to the motion, including a report on Hess by an officer of 
the Medical Corps of the United States Army of the rank of major. The report, dated 16 October 1945, whilst 
describing Hess as 'a profound neurotic of the hysterical type', asserted he was 'sane and responsible'.3° 
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Whatever decision the Tribunal might have reached on the basic issue of whether or not Hess was fit to stand 
triaI31 was pre-empted when, at the afternoon session on 30 November 1945, Hess said: 
Mr. President: At the beginning of this afternoon's proceedings, I handed my defense counsel a note stating 
that I am of the opinion that these proceedings could be shortened if I could speak briefly. What I have to say 
is as follows: In order to prevent any possibility of my being declared incapable of pleading—although I am 
willing to take part in the rest of the proceedings with the rest of them, I would like to make the following 
declaration to the Tribunal although I originally intended not to make this declaration until a later time. 
My memory is again in order. The reason why I simulated loss of memory was tactical. In fact, it is 
only that my power for concentration is slightly reduced but in conflict to that my capacity to follow 
the trial, my capacity to defend myself, to put questions to witnesses or even to answer questions—in these, 
my capacities are not influenced. I emphasize the fact that I bear full responsibility for everything 
that I have done, signed or have signed as co-signatory. My fundamental attitude that the Tribunal is 
not legally competent, is not affected by the statement I have just made. Hitherto, in my 
conversations with my official defense counsel, I have maintained my loss of memory. He was, 
therefore, acting in good faith when he asserted I had lost my memory.32 
In the light of the statement of Hess, the ruling of the Tribunal, given on the following day, was inevitable. It 
was: 33 
The Tribunal has given careful consideration to the motion of Counsel for the Defendant Hess, and it has had 
the advantage of hearing full argument upon it both from the Defense and from the Prosecution. The Tribunal 
has also considered the very full medical reports, which have been made on the condition of the Defendant 
Hess, and has come to the conclusion that no grounds whatever exist for a further examination to be ordered. 
After hearing the statement of the Defendant Hess in court yesterday, and in view of all the evidence, the 
Tribunal is of the opinion that the Defendant Hess is capable of standing his trial at the present time, and the 
motion of Counsel for the Defense is, therefore, denied, and the trial will proceed. 
It is of value to compare this decision of the Tribunal, at the end of November 1945, with the subsequent 
evidence and its decision, announced on 20 August 1946 in response to a motion by counsel for Hess, then Dr. 
Seidl, on 2 August 1946. The 'motion, which reviews at length the previous examinations and psychiatric 
history of Defendant Hess, was a request "to subject the Defendant Hess once more ... to an examination by 
psychiatric experts with regard to his ability to stand trial and his soundness of mind."'34 The motion led to a 
report on the mental competence of Hess by the prison psychologist, Dr. G.M. Gilbert, which is reproduced 
verbatim in a note. 35 
In that report, Dr. Gilbert firmly expressed the view that Hess was not insane in a legal sense. 
The Tribunal ruled that the trial of Hess would continue. It added: 'The Tribunal will not call for any further 
report upon the defendant Hess at the present time'. 
In view of the expert psychiatric and psychological opinions and the personal statement of Hess that he had 
simulated loss of memory for 'tactical' reasons, no other ruling could have been justly made at any stage of the 
trial of Hess. In this respect, there was no procedural unfairness. 
RULES OF PROCEDURE 
There was no legal precedent for the procedural rules to which the Nuremberg trial was subject because it was 
unique. Nevertheless, it was necessary for clear and detailed procedural provisions to be made applicable to the 
trial, in amplification of the provisions in the Charter (see infra this Chapter) 
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Article 13 of the Charter required the Tribunal to draw up rules for its procedure, not inconsistent with the 
provisions of the Charter. 
In accordance with this requirement, by which in practical terms the Tribunal was bound, it adopted on 29 
October 1945 rules of procedure, which, in the view of the author, were not surpassed in fairness by the then 
current procedural codes or practice of any western nation. A copy of those rules of procedure is reproduced as 
Annexe 1 to this chapter. 
Rule 11 was significant for the self-imposed restraint on the Tribunal. It provided that the rules were subject to 
amendment, but only 'in the interest of fair and expeditious trials'. Rule 11 could have become significant in the 
case of, the Krupp family (see previous section in this chapter), but the Tribunal's ruling made it irrelevant. 
Elaborate proof was given of compliance with the orders of the Tribunal regarding notice to individual defendants, 
to members of groups and organisations and to the defendant Bormann. 
In form the rules of procedure were completely fair and just. 
THE PRESIDENT'S OPENING STATEMENT 
On 20 November 1945, before the accused were called upon to plead to the indictment, the President made a 
preliminary statement in which he set the stage for the trial in unimpassioned language. He emphasised that the 
purpose of the establishment of the Tribunal was the 'just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war 
criminals of the European Axis' (Article 1 of the Charter). 
The statement was a firm, but fair, indication of the manner in which the Tribunal would conduct the trial, which 
the President said 'is unique in the history of the jurisprudence of the world and ... is of supreme importance to 
millions of people all over the globe'. 
The fact that the statement referred to the 'punishment' of those on trial was understandable in view of the 
provisions of Article 1 of the Charter. 
The statement is contained in Annexe II to this Chapter. 
THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE BY THE PROSECUTION 
On the third day of the trial, 22 November 1945, Col. Storey, one of the two United States executive trial 
counsel, began the presentation of evidence on Count 1. It had been agreed between the four prosecution teams 
that primary responsibility for the presentation of the prosecution cases should be divided as follows: 
Count 1: United States 
Count 2: Great Britain 
Counts 3: and 4: France as 'to crimes in Western Occupied countries and Russia in respect of the Eastern 
countries. 
Col. Storey described in meticulous detail the methods by which 'literally hundreds of tons of enemy documents 
and records were screened and examined'.36 His description was supported by a lengthy affidavit by Major W.H. 
Coogan, then Chief of the Documentation Division, Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, in which it 
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was certified: 'all documentary evidence offered by the United States Chief of Counsel, including those documents 
from British Army sources, are in the same condition as captured by the United States and British Armies; that 
they have been translated by competent and qualified translators; that all photostatic copies are true and correct 
copies of the originals and that they have been correctly filed, numbered and processed _ 67 
Written briefs were made available to the Tribunal and defence counsel on each phase of the American case, 
including a citation of all documents and legal propositions, accompanied by a document brief containing copies 
in English of all documents referred to in the brief. It was intimated that copies in the German language of 
documents to be tendered in evidence had been, or would be, furnished to defence counsel. More than 2,500 
documents had been filed in the Court House, of which it was intended that at least several hundred would be 
offered in evidence. 
At times, the massive task of furnishing copies of documents to defence counsel in the German language led to 
problems in the court room, but a perusal of the transcript shows that the President was astute to ensure that the 
defence counsel would not be prejudiced. For example, at one stage of the third day of the trial, the President said: 
The Tribunal is glad that defendants' counsel are making efforts to co-operate in the Trial. After the 
adjournment, the Tribunal will consider the best method of providing defendants' counsel with as many 
translations as possible, and you are right in thinking that you will be able to make objections to any 
document after you have had time to consider it. 38 
The sheer volume of the documentary evidence obviously posed a problem for defence counsel, and to some 
degree for the Tribunal. After a discussion with counsel, the President said: Every document, when it is 
put in, becomes a part of the record and is in evidence before the Tribunal, but it is open to the defendants to 
criticize and comment upon any part of the document when their case is presented'. 39 
As the trial progressed, there Was increasing difficulty with respect to the availability to defence counsel, and 
the defendants. of copies of documents in the German language. Following a conference between counsel for 
the prosecution and the defence, the President, on 26 November, announced the following provisional 
arrangement' 
1. That in the future, only such parts of documents as are read in court by the Prosecution shall in the 
first instance be part of the record. In that way those parts of the documents will be conveyed to 
defendants' counsel through the earphones in German. 
2. In order that defendants and their counsel may have an opportunity of inspecting such documents in 
their entirety in German, a photstatic copy of the original and one copy thereof shall be deposited in 
the defendants' counsel room at the same time as they are produced in court. 
3. The defendants' counsel may at any time refer to any other part of such documents. 
4. Prosecuting counsel will furnish defendants' counsel with 10 copies of their trial briefs in English 
and five copies of their books of documents in English, at the time such briefs and books are 
furnished to the Tribunal. 
5. Defendants' counsel will be furnished with one copy of each of the transcripts of the proceedings. 
Such a procedure appears reasonable. However, it is apparent from a perusal of the transcript containing the 
submissions of counsel that the arrangement would not have been achieved if the Tribunal had not made it clear 
on a number of occasions that it would not permit defence counsel or the defendants to be prejudiced by their not 
being furnished with copies of documents in the German language in a timely manner. 
On another occasion, the President dealt firmly with United States counsel. It emerged in the course of the 
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opening that about 250 copies of documents in the English language were made available to the Press. Under the 
provisional arrangement (supra), only five copies were to be available to defence counsel and the defendants. The 
President tersely observed: 
If you can afford to give 250 copies of the documents in English to the Press, you can afford to give 
more than five copies, to the defendants' counsel—one each.... In the future that will be done.41 
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AFFIDAVIT EVIDENCE 
There were numerous instances of challenges by defence counsel to the probative value of affidavit material. An 
early example was an affidavit by George S. Messersmith relating in particular to the defendant von Papen and to 
some extent to the defendant Doenitz. The United States prosecutor objected to a submission by counsel for von 
Papen that the deponent, who lived in New Mexico, should be called as a witness. Although the Tribunal over-
ruled the defence submission—and, it is argued, rightly did so—it stressed the rights of the defendants in such 
circumstances. The President said:42 
The Tribunal has already ruled that the affidavit is admissible; that its probative value will of course be 
considered by the Tribunal, and the defendants' counsel have the right, if they wish, to submit 
interrogatories for the examination of Messersmith. Of course, defendants will have the opportunity of 
giving evidence when their turn comes, then Admiral Doenitz, if he thinks it right, will be able to deny 
the statements of the affidavit. 
On the same day, the Tribunal considered an objection by counsel for the defendant Seyss-Inquart, Dr. Laternser, 
to the admissibility of an affidavit by Kurt von Schuschnigg, formerly Foreign Chancellor of Austria, which was 
executed at Nuremberg on 19 November 1945. In a considered ruling, the Tribunal upheld the objection, and the 
President said: 43 
If the Prosecution desires to call von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can apply to do so. Equally if the 
Defense wishes to call von Schuschnigg as a witness, it can apply to do so. In the event von 
Schuschnigg is not able to be produced, the question of affidavit evidence by von Schuschnigg being 
given will be reconsidered. 
There were numerous successful objections to the use by the prosecution of affidavit evidence.' 4 In the 
instances cited above, the Tribunal's rulings were clearly correct. Later in the trial, two further somewhat 
similar evidentiary issues concerning affidavit evidence arose. In the first such instance, the affidavit was 
admitted, but the Tribunal said: 
It is open to the defendants' counsel, in accordance with the Charter and the Rules, to make a motion, in 
writing, if they wish to do so, for the attendance of [the deponent] for cross-examination and to state in 
that motion the reasons therefor. 
The second such case immediately arose and the Tribunal made the same ruling. 
The latter two rulings should be considered in the light of the detailed facts pertaining to each and not as 
establishing any precedent. It is difficult to argue that either ruling was incorrect. 
OUR SPECIAL RULINGS 
(a) Near the end of the cross-examination of a prosecution witness, Dr. Stahmer, counsel for the defendant 
Goering, sought what he termed 'a fundamental ruling on whether the defendant also has the right personally 
to ask the witness questions. According to the German text of the Charter, Paragraph 16, I believe this is 
permissible'.45 
The submission was opposed by Mr. Justice Jackson. The Tribunal retired to consider the question, and 
when the trial resumed the President said: 
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The Tribunal has carefully considered the question raised by Dr. Stahmer, and it holds that defendants 
who are represented by counsel have not the right to cross-examine witnesses. They have the right to 
be called as witnesses themselves and to make a statement at the end of the Tria1. 46 
Dr. Stahmer's submission was based on Article 16 (e) of the Charter which provided that 'a defendant shall 
have the right through himself or through his Counsel to present evidence at the Trial in support of his 
defence, and to cross-examine any witness called by the Prosecution'. 
The ruling of the Tribunal was expedient but doubtfully correct as a matter of the strict and literal 
construction of Article 16 (e). One does not have to adopt the words of Mr. Justice Jackson that a ruling in 
accordance with Dr. Stahmer's submission would cause the proceedings 'to become a performance rather 
than a trial'. However, the whole proceedings would have become unacceptably prolonged and unwieldy if 
the ruling had been otherwise. The problem arose because of the inept drafting of Article 16 (e). 
(b) When the trial was resumed on 6 December 1945, the President said he had received an urgent request from 
the defendants' counsel that the Trial be adjourned at Christmas for a period of three weeks. The 
President said: 'the Tribunal considers that it is not only in the interest of the defendants and their 
counsel but of everyone concerned in the Trial that there should be a recess.' The decision was that the 
Tribunal would not sit after 20 December 1945 until 2 January 1946. In all the circumstances it was a fair 
decision, but this patent fact did not prevent Mr. Justice Jackson from saying: 'I should like, in justice to 
my staff, to note the American objection to the adjournment for the benefit of the defendants (emphasis 
added) 47 
The American Chief of Counsel was factually in error. The adjournment was not simply for the benefit of 
the defendants but for the reasonable convenience of all involved in the trial. 
(c) Dr. Stahmer, counsel for the defendant Goering, objected to the tendering in evidence of an extract from the 
pre-trial interrogation of Goering which had been taken on 29 August 1945. The President overruled the 
objection on the ground that Article 15 (c) of the Charter provided for the preliminary examination of the 
defendants and Articles 16 (b) and 16 (c) respectively provided that 'during any preliminary examination ... 
of a Defendant he shall have the right to give any explanation relevant to the charges ...' and that 'a 
preliminary examination of a defendant shall be conducted in, or translated into, a language which the 
Defendant understands'. The ruling was that the interrogations of the defendants could be put in evidence. 47 
This ruling was correct and in accordance with British and American laws of evidence. In particular, the 
evidence was explicitly relevant in the context because Goering's answer to a question during his 
interrogation had been: 48 
On the day when England gave her official guarantee to Poland, the Fuehrer called me on the telephone and 
told me that he had stopped the planned invasion of Poland. I asked him then whether this was just 
temporary or for good. He said 'No, I will have to see whether we can eliminate British intervention'. 
EVIDENCE TENDERED IN THE FORM OF FILM 
A strikingly effective course was taken by prosecution counsel for the United States, without any objection by 
defence counsel, when it tendered in evidence a motion picture entitled 'The Nazi Plan'. It was divided into four 
parts: 
Part 1 	 The Rise of the N.S.D.A.P., 1921 to 1933'; 
Part 2 	 'Acquiring Totalitarian Control of Germany, 1933 to 1935'; 
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'Preparation for Wars of Aggression, 1935 to 1939'; and 
'Wars of Aggression, 1939 to 1944'. 
All the film, including pictures of early Nazi newspapers, was original German film, to which the prosecution 
added only the titles in English. All German narration heard was in the original form as filmed by the Nazis. 49 
The showing of the film occupied most of the trial on 11 December 1945. The original films were made part of 
the permanent records of the Tribunal. 
The tactic of showing the film was legally legitimate. It was admissible to the extent to which it was relevant in 
accordance with the indictment. Its effect must have been devastating in respect of all Counts. In particular, it 
enabled the prosecution, in effect, to begin its case from the year 1921 and continue it, against a background of 
authentic German Film, until 1944. 
The Tribunal did not question the admissibility of the film; nor did it make any comment. 
On 13 December 1945, a short strip of silent motion pictures, made on an 8-millimeter home camera, was 
shown to the Tribunal. Counsel for the United States claimed that the film 'offers undeniable evidence, made by 
Germans themselves, of almost incredible brutality to Jewish people in the custody of the Nazis, including 
German military units'. 5° Counsel said it was believed that the film was taken by a member of the SS; it had 
been captured by the United States military forces in an SS barracks near Augsburg, Germany. The film showed 
a number of persons in German military uniform, but no individual was identified. As described, the film 
depicted scenes of disgusting horror. The film had had been shown beforehand to all defence counsel. It was not 
suggested that any of the defendants was involved in the scenes depicted. No objection was made to the 
admissibility of the film, nor, again, did the Tribunal make any comment. 
In view of the particulars furnished under Count 3, the film was admissible as part of the res gestae. 
On the same basis, a number of photographs were projected on the screen in the court room on 14 December 
1945 without objection. They depicted the liquidation (a word used at Nuremberg as a euphemism for 'killing') of 
Jews by the destruction of buildings by fire and explosives.51 
All the evidence tendered in the form of film was admissible, having regard to the terms of the indictment. 
Significantly, no counsel for the accused objected. However, the tendering of the film evidence, although strictly 
admissible, could well have been challenged on the basis of the recognised discretion of a Court to exclude such 
evidence. 
THE TENDERING IN EVIDENCE OF PARTS ONLY OF DOCUMENTS 
On numerous occasions, defence counsel complained to the Tribunal that the prosecution, mainly the United 
States, sought to tender in evidence parts only of documents and omitted other parts which were relevant. The 
complaint usually was that the omission of some relevant parts of a document was calculated to prejudice a 
defendant, because a true and complete assessment of the probative value of a document was not possible if 
portions of significance, at least in the opinion of defence counsel, were omitted. A perusal of the transcript 
shows that in all cases the rulings of the Tribunal reflected its scrupulous attitude that there should be no basis 
for any complaint of prejudice by any defendant. Early examples of this attitude are:52 
Part 3 
Part 4 
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Dr. Thoma: [Counsel for the accused Rosenberg]: I know only one thing: I already have in my hand the 
document which the Prosecution wishes to submit and I can see from it that it contains only fragments of the 
whole interrogation. What in particular it does not contain is the fact that Rosenberg always insisted on 
voluntary recruiting only and that he continually demanded a reduction of the quota. That is not contained in 
the document to be submitted. 
The President: If counsel for the Prosecution reads a part of the interrogation, and you wish to refer to another 
part of the interrogation in order that the part he has read should not be misleading, you will be at liberty to do 
so when he has read his part of the interrogation. Is that clear? 
The President: Mr. Dodd, [United States Executive Trial Counsel] the Tribunal considers that if you propose to 
put in a part of the interrogation, the whole interrogation ought to be submitted to the defendant's counsel, and 
then you may read what part you like of the interrogation, and then defendant's counsel may refer to any other 
part of the interrogation, directly if it is necessary, for the purpose of explaining the part which has been read by 
counsel for the Prosecution. So before you use this interrogation, Rosenberg's counsel must have a copy of the 
whole interrogation. 
The President: But of course that doesn't quite meet their difficulties because they [German Counsel] don't all of 
them speak English, or are not all able to read English, so I am afraid you must wait until Rosenberg's counsel 
has got a copy of the entire interrogation in his own language. 
THE CASE AGAINST THE 'INDICTED' ORGANISATIONS 
A fundamental ruling was made by the Tribunal on 14 December 1945 on an application by Mr. Justice 
Jackson, which was summarised in these terms by the President of the Tribunal: 53 
That the question of the criminality of these organisations should not be argued before the evidence is 
put in; that the United States counsel should put in their evidence first, and that they hope to put the 
majority of it in evidence before the Christmas recess, but that the German counsel (defendants' counsel) 
shall be at libertY at any time, up to the time the United States case is finished, to make objection to 
any part of the evidence on these criminal organisations. 
The Tribunal ruled in favour of this application, despite initial objection by defence counsel. 
It is clear from the transcript that the President intended also to reserve to counsel for the defendants the right to 
make legal submissions in respect of the 'indicted' organisations, as well as to object to any part of the evidence, 
after the evidence had been tendered and before the United States case was closed. 
This ruling was fair. It had the advantage of saving considerable time. There was force in the argument of Mr. 
Justice Jackson that unless the course he proposed were taken 'piecemeal argument ... would not be orderly, but 
would be repetitious, incomplete, poorly organised and of little help to the Tribunal. The issues deserve careful, 
prepared presentation of the contentions on both sides.'54 
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THE BREADTII OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE 
There were obvious difficulties in tendering documents in cases in which the prosecution desired to rely only on 
portions of them. The Tribunal, at an early stage, made a formal order that only such portions of documents 
which were read in court would be admitted as evidence. 55 This practice was not always satisfactory and, on 17 
December 1945, the initial order was replaced by the following order: 56 
All documents may be filed in court. The Tribunal shall only admit in evidence, however. 
1. Documents or portions of documents which are read in court; 
2. Documents or portions of documents which are cited in court, 
Such an order was eminently fair. It put a brake on the practice which had developed, particularly in the case of 
United States counsel, of their tendering a substantial document but, on being questioned by the President, 
declining to read to the court more than a small fraction of it. Moreover, there were numerous instances in 
which the President intervened to indicate to prosecution counsel that they should read certain additional 
parts of a document, obviously to present a more complete and balanced picture. 
Experienced counsel are aware that, especially in an extremely lone trial, it is not proper for the 
prosecution to refer to part only of a document, and leave it to counsel for an accused, at a remote date, to refer 
again to the document in order, in evidence, to elicit an exculpatory explanation from his or her client. 
There was one such example on 10 January 1946, during the presentation of the detailed individual case against 
the defendant Frank, who at all relevant times was Governor General of Occupied Poland. The transcript 
illustrates the fairness of the Tribunal: 57 
The President: Lieutenant Colonel Baldwin [American Assistant Trial Counsel]: I asked you what was 
the whole content of the document from which you were reading this paragraph. According to counsel 
for Frank, the document, which is a very long document, shows that Frank was suggesting remedies for 
the difficulties which he here sets out. Is that so? 
U. Col. Baldwin: That is so ... I did not cite this portion of that document, as I will later demonstrate, 
to show that Frank did or did not suggest remedies for these conditions, but only to explain that these 
conditions existed as of a certain period. 
The President: Well, when you cite a small part of the document, you should make sure that what you 
cite is not misleading as compared to the rest of the document.... The Defendant Frank's counsel will 
speak at some remote date, and it is not a complete answer to say that he will have an opportunity of 
explaining the document at some future date. It is for Counsel for the Prosecution to make sure that no 
extracts which they read can reasonably make a misleading impression upon the mind of the 
Tribunal. 
The Tribunal (Mr. Biddle) to defence counsel: ... What is not satisfactory to the Tribunal is that you did 
not give us the real purport of the document. 
The President: What we would like, would be, if possible, that when an extract is made from a 
document, counsel who are presenting that extract should instruct themselves as to the general purport 
of the document so as to make certain that the part that is read is not misleading. 
There was another example on the following day, when American counsel, in the presentation of the case against 
the defendant Schacht (who was acquitted on both the Counts under which he was charged) read portion only of a 
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document. The President said to defence counse1: 58 
I am not sure that that gives a full or quite fair interpretation of the document. Don't you think perhaps 
you ought to read the paragraph before? 
And, again, 59 the President later said: 
Are you going to read the passage that follows that at a later stage? 
THE ALLEGED INTRUSION OF THE VATICAN 
The strength and the prudence of the Tribunal, especially of the President, are illustrated by the 
following exchange between defence counsel and the Tribunal during the presentation of supplemental evidence 
concerning the suppression of the Christian Churches in Germany and in the Occupied Territories'. The 
American prosecution had said that 'a large part of this proof will be from the official files of the Vatican'. 60 
During the presentation of the evidence, Dr. Seidl, counsel for the defendant Frank, intervened and said: 61 
The United States Prosecution said earlier in the proceedings that a certain part of the material now being 
presented as evidence in the question of the opposition to the churches was made available by the Vatican. 
The Defendant Frank has just sent me some questions which I do not want to withhold from the Tribunal. 
The questions are these: 
1. Is the Vatican a Signatory to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal? 
2. Did the Vatican deliver the material in an accusatory capacity? 
3. Has the Vatican, acting as a co-prosecutor, identified itself with the principles of these 
proceedings? 
The Defendant Frank adds by way of explanation that his continued membership in the Roman Catholic 
Church depends on the reply to these questions. 
After the President had sought the restatement of the questions and the members of the Tribunal had 
conferred, the President said: 62 
In the opinion of the Tribunal the observations which have just been made by counsel on behalf of the 
Defendant Frank are entirely irrelevant, and any motion which they were intended to support is denied. 
The Prosecution will therefore continue. 
DID THE TRIBUNAL MEMBERS KEEP OPEN MINDS? 
The Tribunal members professed that in the course of the extremely long trial they had open minds on the factual 
matters which were the subject of evidence. For example, during the presentation of evidence relating to 
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concentration camps by M. Dubost, Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic, the transcript 
records:62a 
M. Dubost: These two days of testimony will obviate my reading the documents any further, since it 
seems established in the eyes of the Tribunal, that the excesses, ill-treatment, and crimes which our 
witnesses have described to you, occurred repeatedly and were identical in all the camps; and therefore are 
evidence of a higher will originating in the government itself, a systematic will of extermination and 
terror under which all occupied Europe had to suffer. Therefore I shall submit to you only, without 
reading them, the documents we have collected, and confine myself to a brief analysis whenever they 
might give you ... 
The President [interrupting]: M. Dubost, you understand, of course, that the Tribunal is satisfied with 
the evidence it has heard up to date; but, of course, it is expecting to hear evidence, or possibly may 
hear evidence, from the defendants; and it naturally will suspend its judgment until it has heard that 
evidence, and, as I pointed out to you yesterday, I think, under Article 24(e) of the Charter, you will 
have the opportunity of applying to the Tribunal, if you think it right, to call rebuttal evidence in 
answer to any evidence which the defendants may call. All I mean to indicate to you now is that the 
Tribunal is not making up its mind at the present moment. It will wait until it has heard the evidence 
for the Defense. 
No doubt the President's, cited statement was appropriate in the circumstances, but on the next day, 
following the first recess, he 
stated: 63 
M. Dubost, the Tribunal has been considering the question of the evidence which you have presented on 
the concentration camps; and they are of the opinion that you have proved the case for the present, 
subject, of course, to any evidence which may be produced on behalf of the defendants, and, of course, 
subject also to your right under Article 24(e) of the Charter to bring in rebutting evidence, should the 
Tribunal it think it right to admit such evidence. They think, therefore, that it is not in the interests of 
the Trial, which the Charter directs should be an expeditious one, that further evidence should be 
presented at this stage on the question of concentration camps, unless there are any particular new points 
about the concentration camps to which you have not yet drawn our attention; and, if there are such 
points we should like you to particularise them before you present any further evidence upon them. 
M. Dubost: I shall, therefore, consider as established provisionally the proof that Germany, in its 
internment camps and concentration camps, pursued a policy tending towards the annihilation and 
extermination of its enemies, while at the same time creating a system of terror which it exploited to 
facilitate the realisation of its political aims. 
The above cited statement by the President, made on the 46th day of a trial which occupied a total of 218 days, 
was not calculated to create an impression of a Tribunal with completely open minds. It is true that the need 
for an expeditious trial was emphasised in the Charter, but the statement left the Tribunal open to the criticism 
that it had made, at least provisionally, findings of fact against most of the accused. The statement was 
gratuitous and unnecessary, as the initial statement would have been sufficient to expedite the presentation 
of evidence. 
'SPEECHES' BY PROSECUTION COUNSEL 
Despite the fact that counsel for the defendants were frequently advised 
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by the Tribunal—and properly so—that they should not make speeches during the conduct of the trial except 
in accordance with the procedural provisions of the Charter, no effective constraints were uniformly imposed on 
the prosecution. 
Article 24 of the Charter prescribed the course which the proceedings at the trial should take. The criticism 
of the liberty which the Tribunal allowed the prosecution which is contained in this section of this 
chapter, requires an appreciation of the details of the prescribed procedural course. Article 24 of the Charter 
provided 
The proceedings at the Trial shall take the following course: 
(a) The Indictment shall be read in court. 
(b) The Tribunal shall ask each Defendant whether he pleads "guilty" or "not guilty". 
(c) The Prosecution shall make an opening statement. (emphasis added). 
(d) The Tribunal shall ask the Prosecution and the Defence what evidence (if any) they wish to 
submit to the Tribunal, and the Tribunal shall rule upon the admissibility of any such evidence. 
(e) The witnesses for the Prosecution shall be examined and after that the witnesses for the Defence. 
Thereafter such rebutting evidence as may be held by the Tribunal to be admissible shall be 
called by either the Prosecution or the Defence. 
(f) The Tribunal may put any question to any witness and to any Defendant at any time. 
(g) The Prosecution and the Defence shall interrogate and may cross-examine any witnesses and any 
Defendant who give testimony. 
(h) The Defence shall address the Court. 
(i) The Prosecution shall address the Court. 
(i) 	Each Defendant may make a statement to the Tribunal. 
(k) 	The Tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence. 
The presentation of the case against the defendants was divided among the four prosecution delegations on the 
basis already outlined in this chapter. Many counsel participated in the course of opening comments on evidence 
to be adduced, the tendering of trial briefs and document books. In virtually all cases there were 'speeches' and 
comments, embellished by rhetoric. The Tribunal did not effectively restrain prosecution counsel, despite the 
clear provisions of Article 24 of the Charter, in particular paragraph (c). 
There are many instances in the transcript of excessively long and inflammatory speeches by prosecuting 
counsel. An example which illustrates that criticism relates to the French prosecution. Having, in his own 
words, 'completed his presentation of facts', M. Dubost, Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic, made 
an impassioned speech relating to the facts and law, which culminated in a quotation from the Bible. He was 
immediately followed by M. Faure, also a French Deputy Chief Prosecutor, who continued the 'opening' at 
extreme length, interspersed with comments.64 
Near the end of the presentation of the French case, the President mildly intervened as follows: 
M. Faure, you will forgive my interrupting you, but the Tribunal feels that what you are now 
presenting to us, however interesting—and it is interesting—is really an argument and is not presenting 
evidence to us. And as we have already heard an opening on behalf of the United States, an opening on 
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behalf of Great Britain, and an opening on behalf of France, we think that you really ought to address 
yourself, if possible, to the evidence which you are presenting rather than to an argument.65 
The 'opening' of the case of the French prosecution continued, however, at uncontrolled length. M. Mounier, 
Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic, appeared to ignore attempts by the President to confine his 
presentation to an outline of evidence as distinct from argument. He blatantly made passionate speeches and 
emotive conunents.66 The President did say to M. Mourner that he should confine himself to a presentation of 
the evidence,67 but counsel persisted. 
The Soviet prosecutors caused similar difficulties, leading to intervention by the Tribunal on two occasions: 
The President: Colonel Polcrovsky, ... I have interrupted all the other prosecutors to point out to them 
that one opening speech had been made on behalf of their delegation, and that really their function was 
to present the documents.... You have just presented a document which states that three volunteers were 
shot. I think that any comment upon that is really unnecessary.68 
The President: Colonel Smimov ... we really don't want any comment upon each one of these 
documents. The passage you have just read to us now is nothing but comment upon the frightful 
document which you have just read. It all takes time. If you could find your way to cut out the 
comment after these documents and simply to present us with the documents, it will save time. 69 
The charter did not provide for any opening statement or address by counsel for the defendants, who were 
confined to calling witnesses and closing addresses. The 'opening statements' by a large number of prosecuting 
counsel lengthened the trial considerably. More importantly, they left the clear impression that the Tribunal's 
attitude to prosecution and defence counsel was not even-handed. However, the denial of the usual right of 
counsel for an accused to make an 'opening statement' was the consequence of the provisions of the Charter. The 
provisions were unfair. 
THE TRIBUNAL AND THE PRESS 
It was indicative of the high standard of professional propriety on the part of defence counsel, as well as of the 
readiness of the Tribunal to criticise the German Press, that on the 74th day of the trial, 5 March 194.6, the 
President made a prepared statement in defence of Dr. Marx, counsel for the defendant Streicher. The statement 
fully defended the manner in which Dr. Marx had discharged his professional obligations. 70 
REFERENCES TO WRTTEN NOTES 
On 8 March 1946 the President said: 71 
... The Tribunal has received an application from Dr. Nelte, counsel for the defendant Keitel, inquiring 
whether a defendant, in order to support his memory, may make use of written notes while giving oral 
evidence. The Tribunal sanctions the use of written notes by a defendant in those circumstances, unless 
in special cases the Tribunal orders otherwise. 
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This was a magnanimous concession, as it was not subject to the usual qualifications in English law that such 
notes may only be used if the memory of a witness is exhausted and that they must have been made at or about 
the relevant time. 
Later, during the evidence of a witness for the defendant Goering, this concession was extended to witnesses. The 
President said: 72 
The Tribunal has observed that the witness is using notes whilst giving evidence. The ruling which I 
announced this morning was confined to the defendants and did not extend to witnesses. Nevertheless, 
the Tribunal will allow the same rule to be applied to witnesses. But the evidence must not be read, the 
purpose of the rule being merely to assist recollection in giving evidence. 
WITNESSES FOR AND DOCUMENTS TENDERED BY DEFENDANTS 
Before the presentation of the cases for the defendants began, the Tribunal heard submissions by all defence 
counsel relating to the witnesses whom it was sought to call and the documents which it was desired should be 
tendered. This process occupied several sitting days and was carried out with meticulous care on the part of the 
Tribunal, which showed little sign of impatience. 
Tedious though this procedure was, it undoubtedly led to the shortening of the length of the trial because in 
many cases it was agreed by counsel that, instead of calling a witness in person—often from a distant place—an 
affidavit would suffice or interrogatories would be administered. It is true that, by the procedure, the prosecution 
was able to obtain a more comprehensive overview of the totality of the defence cases than would normally be 
possible, but there was no objection by defence counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
It has been acknowledged--and certainly there has been an absence of significant criticism—that the Nuremberg 
trial was generally conducted fairly and justly, taking into account the terms of the London Agreement and 
Charter. The analysis in this chapter confirms that assessment. 
The hearing of evidence, submissions and addresses and the delivery of the Judgment occupied 218 days, from 20 
November 1945 to 1 October 1946, when the reading of the Judgment was completed. The transcript of the 
proceedings covered 22 volumes. In addition there were numerous 'closed' sessions, of which no official transcript 
is available. The transcript contained in the 22 volumes was translated into four languages. A total of 18 
volumes of documents also were formally tendered in evidence. 
The burden on the four judges and their alternates was heavy in the extreme, but throughout decorum was 
observed and the letter and spirit of a 'fair trial' in the terms of the London Agreement and Charter generally 
prevailed. 
Although attention has been directed in this chapter and in Appendix I to some instances of procedural or 
evidential unfairness, in the author's opinion, in relation to particular matters and some individual defendants, an 
overall perspective of the transcript impels a conclusion that the conduct of the trial was nevertheless essentially 
'fair' in the forensic sense of that word. Much of the credit for this achievement clearly belonged to the President 
of the Tribunal, Lord Justice Lawrence, whose firm hand and, with few exceptions, even judicial temperament 
combined to present a portrait of a tribunal which was determined that not only should justice be done but that, 
in the time-honoured words of English law, it should manifestly be seen to be done. 
One should not omit a reference in the context of this chapter to the professional conduct of German counsel for 
the accused. They were, for the most part, contending with a mass of factual material and authentic documents 
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which not only proved the guilt of their clients but also betokened cruelty, depravity and inhumanity on a scale 
unprecedented in the histor,y of mankind. They strived resourcefully, albeit for the most part unsuccessfully. 
They were not familiar with the basic forensic setting; there were language difficulties; the stern voices of the 
Soviet prosecutors and, at times, the arrogance of American counsel were forbidding. Despite all this, their 
manner of representation of their clients could only have enhanced their professional standing. Is there a recorded 
speech by defence counsel in modern times which surpasses in brilliance that of Dr. Stahmer, counsel for 
Goering? I doubt it.73 
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amnesia at the beginning of the trial. The opinions of the psychiatric commissions in this regard and 
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necessarily be the same as those of the original psychiatric commissions, to wit: Hess is not 
insane but suffering from hysterical amnesia. I have discussed this case with the present prison 
psychiatrist, Lt. Col. Dunn, who has recently examined Hess, and he is also of the opinion that 
Hess's present mental state is apparently the same as that indicated in the original psychiatric 
reports, which he has read. 
36. Nuremberg, Trial, I.M.T., vol. II, pp. 156-157. 
37. Ibid., p. 160. 
38. Ibid., p. 191. 
39. Ibid., p. 204. 
40. Ibid., pp. 255-256. 
41. Ibid., p. 293. 
42. Ibid., p. 365. 
43. Ibid., p. 385. 
44. For example, see Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. VI, pp. 80-81. 
45. Nuremberff Trial, I.M.T., vol. III, pp. 31-32, p. 33. 
143 
46. Ibid., p. 209. 
47. Ibid., p 247. 
48. Idem. 
49. Ibid., pp. 400-402. 
50. Ibid., p. 536. 
51. Ibid., p. 558. 
52. Ibid., pp. 425-427. 
53. Ibid., pp. 597-601. 
54. Ibid., p. 599. 
55. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. IV, p. 2. 
56. Idem. 
57. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. V., pp. 81-82. 
58. Ibid., p. 132. 
59. Ibid., p. 133. 
60. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. IV, p. 498. 
61. Ibid., pp. 503-504. 
62. Ibid., p. 504. 
62a. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. VI., p. 321. 
63. Ibid., pp. 338-339. 
64. Ibid., pp. 418-460, pp. 467-488, pp. 499-533, pp. 554-566; vol, VII, pp. 3-9, pp. 23-25. 
65. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. VII, p. 25. 
66. Ibid., pp. 72-104. 
67. Ibid, p. 86. 
68. Ibid., p. 429. 
69. Ibid., p. 448. 
70. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. VIII, pp. 532-533. The statement was: 
The attention of the Tribunal has been drawn by Dr. Marx, one of the German counsel appearing in this 
case for the Defense, to an article which was published in the newspaper Berlinger Zeitung for February 2, 
•under the heading 'A Defense Counsel'. The article, which I do not propose to read, criticizes Dr. Marx in 
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The matter assumes a graver aspect still because the article goes on to threaten Dr. Marx with complete 
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Charter, the Tribunal was at great pains to see that all the individual defendants and the named 
organizations should have the advantage of being represented by counsel, and the Defense Counsel have 
already shown the great service they are rendering in this Trial, and their conduct in this regard should 
certainly not leave them open to reproach of any kind from any quarter. 
The Tribunal itself is the sole judge of what is proper conduct in Court and will be zealous to insure that 
the highest standard of professional conduct is maintained. Counsel, in discharge of their duties under the 
Charter, may count upon the fullest protection which it is in the power of the Tribunal to afford. In the 
present instance the Tribunal does not think that Dr. Marx in any way exceeded his professional duty. 
The Tribunal regards the matter as one of such importance in its bearing on the due administration of 
justice that they have asked the Control Council for Germany to investigate the facts and to report to the 
Tribunal. 
71. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol IX, p. 1. 
72. Ibid., p. 13. 
73. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. XVII, pp. 497-550. 
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ANNEXE 1 TO CHAPTER 10 
RULES OF PROCEDURE 
(Adopted 29 October 1945) 
Rule 1. 	Authority to Promulgate Rules 
The present Rules of Procedure of the International Military Tribunal for the trial of the major war criminals 
(hereinafter called "the Tribunal") as established by the Charter of the Tribunal dated 8 August 1945 (hereinafter 
called "the Charter") are hereby promulgated by the Tribunal in accordance with the povisions of Article 13 of 
the Charter. 
Rule 2. 	Notice to Defendants and Right to Assistance of Counsel 
(a) Each individual defendant in custody shall receive not less than 30 days before trial a copy, translated into a 
language which he understands, (1) of the Indictment, (2) of the Charter, (3) of any other documents lodged with 
the Indictment, and (4) of a statement of his right to the assistance of counsel as set forth in sub-paragraph (d) of 
this Rule, together with a list of counsel. He shall also receive copies of such rules of procedure as may be 
adopted by the Tribunal from time to time. 
(b) Any individual defendant not in custody shall be informed of the indictment against him and of his right to 
receive the documents specified in sub-paragraph (a) above, by notice in such form and manner as the Tribunal 
may prescribe. 
(c) With respect to any group or organization as to which the Prosecution indicates its intention to request a 
finding of criminality by the Tribunal, notice shall be given by publication in such form and manner as the 
Tribunal may prescribe and such publication shall include a declaration by the Tribunal that all members of the 
named groups or organimtions are entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 9 of the Charter. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to confer immunity of any 
kind upon such members of said groups or organizations as may appear in answer to the said declaration. 
(d) Each defendant has the right to conduct his own defense or to have the assistance of counsel. Application for 
particular counsel shall be filed at once with the General Secretary of the Tribunal at the Palace of Justice, 
Nuremberg, Germany The Tribunal will designate counsel for any defendant who fails to apply for particular 
counsel, or where particular counsel requested is not within ten (10) days to be found or available; unless the 
defendant elects in writing to conduct his own defense. If a defendant has requested particular counsel who is not 
immedialely to be found or available, such counsel or a counsel of substitute choice may, if found and available 
before trial, be associated with or substituted for counsel designated by the Tribunal, provided that (1) only one 
counsel shall be permitted to appear at the trial for any defendant, unless by special permission of the Tribunal, 
and (2) no delay of trial will be allowed for making such substitution or association. 
Rule 3. Service of Additional Documents 
If before the trial, the Chief Prosecutors offer amendments or additions to the Indictment, such amendments or 
additions, including any accompanying documents shall be lodged with the Tribunal and copies of the same, 
translated into a language which they each understand, shall be furnished to the defendants in custody as soon as 
practicable and notice given in accordance with Rule 2 (b) to those not in custody. 
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Rule 4. 	Production of Evidence for the Defense  
(a) The Defense may apply to the Tribunal for the production of witnesses or of documents by written 
application to the General Secretary of the Tribunal. The application shall state where the witness or document is 
thought to be located, together with a statement of their last known location. It shall also state the facts proposed 
to be proved by the witness or the document and the reasons why such facts are relevant to the Defense. 
(b) If the witness or the document is not within the area controlled by the occupation authorities, the Tribunal 
may request the Signatory and adhering Governments to arrange for the production, if possible, of any such 
witnesses and any such documents as the Tribunal may deem necessary to proper presentation of the Defense. 
(c) If the witness or the document is within the area controlled by the occupation authorities, the General 
Secretary shall, if the Tribunal is not in session, communicate the application to the Chief Prosecutors and, if 
they make no objection, the General Secretary shall issue a summons for the attendance of such witness or the 
production of such documents, informing the Tribunal of the action taken. If any Chief Prosecutor objects to 
the issuance of a summons, or if the Tribunal is in session, the General Secretary shall submit the application 
to the Tribunal, which shall decide whether or not the summons shall issue. 
(d) A summons shall be served in such manner as may be provided by the appropriate occupation authority to 
ensure its enforcement and the General Secretary shall inform the Tribunal of the steps taken. 
(e) Upon application to the General Secretary of the Tribunal, a defendant shall be furnished with a copy, 
translated into a language which he understands, of all documents referred to in the Indictment so far as they may 
be made available by the Chief Prosecutors and shall be allowed to inspect copies of such documents as are not 
so available. 
Rule 5. Order at the Trial 
In conformity with the provisions of Article 18 of the Charter, and the disciplinary powers therein set out, the 
Tribunal, acting through its President, shall provide for the maintenance of order at the Trial. Any defendant or 
any other person may be excluded from open sessions of the Tribunal for failure to observe and respect the 
directives and dimity of the Tribunal. 
Rule 6. 	Oaths; Witnesses 
(a) Before testifying before the Tribunal, each witness shall make such oath or declaration as is customary in his 
own country. 
(b) Witnesses while not giving evidence shall not be present in court. The President of the Tribunal shall direct, 
as circumstances demand, that witnesses shall not confer among themselves before giving evidence. 
Rule 7. 	Applications and Motions before Trial and Rulings during the Trial 
(a) All motions, applications or other requests addressed to the Tribunal prior to the commencement of trial shall 
be made in writing and filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal at the Palace of Justice, Nuremberg, 
Germany. 
(b) Any such motion, application or other request shall be communicated by the General Secretary of the 
Tribunal to the Chief Prosecutors and, if they make no objection, the President of the Tribunal may make the 
appropriate order on behalf of the Tribunal. If any Chief Prosecutor objects, the President may call a special 
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session of the Tribunal for the determination of the question raised. 
(c) The Tribunal, acting through its President, will rule in court upon all questions arising during the trial, such 
as questions as to admissibility of evidence offered during the trial, recesses, and motions; and before so ruling 
the Tribunal may, when necessary, order the closing or clearing of the Tribunal or take any other steps which to 
the Tribunal seem just. 
Rule 8. 	Secretariat of the Tribunal 
(a) The Secretariat of the Tribunal shall be composed of a General Secretary, four Secretaries and their Assistants. 
The Tribunal shall appoint the General Secretary and each Member shall appoint one Secretary. The General 
Secretary shall appoint such clerks, interpreters, stenographers, ushers, and all such other persons as may be 
authorized by the Tribunal and each Secretary may appoint such assistants as may be authorized by the Member 
of the Tribunal by whom he was appointed. 
(b) The General Secretary, in consultation with the Secretaries, shall organize and direct the work of the 
Secretariat, subject to the approval of the Tribunal in the event of a disagreement by any Secretary. 
(c) The Secretariat shall receive all documents addressed to the Tribunal, maintain the records of the Tribunal, 
provide necessary clerical services to the Tribunal and its Members, and perform such other duties as may be 
designated by the Tribunal. 
(d) Communications addressed to the Tribunal shall be delivered to the General Secretary. 
Rule 9. 	Record. Exhibits. and Documents 
(a) A stenographic record shall be maintained of all oral proceedings. Exhibits will be suitably identified and 
marked with consecutive numbers. All exhibits and transcripts of the proceedings and all documents lodged with 
and produced to the Tribunal will be filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal and will constitute part of 
the Record. 
(b) The term "official documents" as used in Article 25 of the Charter includes the Indictment, rules, written 
motions, orders that are reduced to writing, findings, and judgments of the Tribunal. These shall be in the 
English, French, Russian, and German languages. Documentary evidence or exhibits may be received in the 
language of the document, but a translation thereof into German shall be made available to the defendants. 
(c) All exhibits and transcripts of proceedings, all documents Iodized with and produced to the Tribunal and all 
official acts and documents of the Tribunal may be certified by the General Secretary of the Tribunal to any 
Government or to any other tribunal or wherever it is appropriate that copies of such documents or 
representations as to such acts should be supplied upon a proper request. 
Rule 10. Withdrawal of Exhibits_and Docom•tats 
In cases where original documents are submitted by the Prosecution or the Defense as evidence, and upon a 
showing (a) that because of historical interest or for any other reason one of the Governments signatory to the 
Four Power Agreement of 8 August 1945, or any other Government having received the consent of said four 
Signatory Powers, desires to withdraw from the records of the Tribunal and preserve any particular original 
documents and (b) that no substantial injustice will result, the Tribunal shall permit photostatic copies of said 
original documents, certified by the General Secretary of the Tribunal, to be substituted for the originals in the 
records of the Court and shall deliver said original documents to the applicants. 
148 
Rule 11. Effective Date and Powers of Amendment and Addition  
These Rules shall take effect upon their approval by the Tribunal. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to 
prevent the Tribunal from, at any time, in the interest of fair and expeditious trials, departing from, amending, or 
adding to these Rules, either by general rules or special orders for particular cases, in such form and upon such 
notice as may appear just to the Tribunal. 
ANNEXE 11 TO CHAPTER 10 
OPENING STATEMENT 
(20 November 1945) 
THE PRESIDENT: Before the defendants in this case are called upon to make their pleas to the Indictment which 
has been lodged against them, and in which they are charged with Crimes against Peace, War Crimes, and Crimes 
against Humanity, and with a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit those crimes, it is the wish of the 
Tribunal that I should make a very brief statement on behalf of the Tribunal. 
The International Military Tribunal has been established pursuant to the Agreement of London, dated the 8th of 
August 1945, and the Charter of the Tribunal as annexed thereto, and the purpose for which the Tribunal has 
been established is stated in Article 1 of the Charter to be the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major 
war criminals of the European Axis. 
The Signatories to the Agreement and Charter are the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Government of the French 
Republic, and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
The Committee of the Chief Prosecutors, appointed by the four Signatories, have settled the final desienation of 
the war criminals to be tried by the Tribunal, and have approved the Indictment on which the present defendants 
stand charged here today. 
On Thursday, the 18th of October 1945, in Berlin, the Indictment was lodged with the Tribunal and a copy of 
that Indictment in the German language has been furnished to each defendant, and has been in his possession for 
more than 30 days. 
All the defendants are represented by counsel. In almost all cases the counsel appearing for the defendants have 
been chosen by the defendants themselves, but in cases where counsel could not be obtained the Tribunal has 
itself selected suitable counsel agreeable to the defendant. 
The Tribunal has heard with great satisfaction of the steps which have been taken by the Chief Prosecutors to 
make available to defending counsel the numerous documents upon which the Prosecution rely, with the aim of 
giving to the defendants every possibility for a just defense. 
The Trial which is now about to begin is unique in the history of the jurisprudence of the world and it is of 
supreme importance to millions of people all over the globe. For these reasons, there is laid upon everybody 
who takes any part in this Trial a solemn responsibility to discharge their duties without fear or favor, in 
accordance with the sacred principles of law and justice. 
The four Signatories having invoked the judicial process, it is the duty of all concerned to see that the Trial in no 
way departs from those principles and traditions which alone give justice its authority and the place it ought to 
occupy in the affairs of all civilized states. 
This Trial is a public Trial in the fullest sense of those words, and I must, therefore, remind the public that the 
Tribunal will insist upon the complete maintenance of order and decorum, and will take the strictest measures to 
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enforce it. It only remains for me to direct, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter, that the Indictment 
shall now be read. 
APPENDIX I 	PROCEDURAL AND EVIDENTIAL FAIRNESS: INDIVIDUAL 
ACCUSED AND THE INDICTED ORGANISATIONS 
This appendix contains comments on questions of procedural and evidential fairness in relation to most of the 
individual defendants and the 'indicted' organisations. The comments are by no means exhaustive and are confined 
to the principal matters which appear relevant in the light of the transcript of the trial. They are designed to 
present an overview of the manner in which the trial was conducted, independently of the question of the 
Tribunal's jurisdiction in a strictly legal sense. 
Even though there was, of course, no jury at Nuremberg, the manner in which a defendant and his counsel are 
treated by a court or tribunal is a critical factor in the attainment of justice. It is not suggested that any of the 
rulings or decisions in relation to procedure or evidence which are criticised in the appendix would, if they had 
been given in favour of individuals, have led to different verdicts or sentences. My views are expressed, as a trial 
lawyer, in order to give a more complete picture of 'Nuremberg justice' than is projected by the writings of many 
jurists and authors. 
The appendix does not contain any references to Streicher, Raeder or Seyss-Inquart, as individual accused, because 
in their cases the transcript does not reveal any instances of procedural or evidential unfairness. 
1. 	Goering 
Obviously, the defendant Goering was the principal Nazi among the defendants. He began his evidence early in 
the afternoon of 13 March 1946. His evidence-in-chief, in answer to questions by his counsel, continued 
throughout 14 and 15 March; it extended for a very short time into 16 March. Throughout this period, Goering 
was heard virtually without any interruption from the Tribunal. Most of his answers to questions by his counsel 
were extremely lengthy—in some cases their transcription covered many pages, at times nearly 10. 
Mr. Justice Jackson was the only prosecutor who objected to the admissibility of any of Goering's evidence-in-
chief. The objection was over-ruled.' 
For most of the remainder of the sessions on 16 March and for part of the sessions on 18 March, other defence 
counsel examined or cross-examined Goering. The Tribunal seldom interrupted. 
The cross-examination of Goering by Mr. Justice Jackson began before the luncheon adjournment on 18 March. 
It was interrupted following an arrangement among counsel that a witness for Goering be interposed. He was 
Birger Dahlerus who was extensively questioned by many counsel. 
Mr. Justice Jackson resumed his cross-examination late on the afternoon of 19 March. It continued for almost the 
whole of the sessions on 20 March. For the most part it was acerbic and at times petulant. It was not of the 
professional standard which characterises the forensic methods of prosecution counsel in major criminal cases in 
the highest English and Australian courts. It was in marked contrast to the quality of the much briefer cross-
examination (148 pages of transcript) by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe (Britain) and of the Chief U.S.S.R. prosecutor, 
General Rudenko. The Chief Prosecutor for the French Republic did not cross-examine Goering, who was briefly 
re-examined. 
A consideration of the transcript of the evidence of Goering, given over a period of several days, demonstrates 
the all-pervading tolerance, patience and judicial fairness shown generally by the Tribunal. The typical attitude of 
the Tribunal is probably best illustrated by the following remark of the President near the end of Goering's re- 
examination: 2 
The Tribunal would wish that you should not make speeches ... we have already heard you say that 
more than once and we do not wish to hear it again. 
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When the principal evidence of Goering had been completed. there was lengthy legal argument concerning the 
right of defence counsel to read extracts from documents submitted in evidence to the Tribunal as the 'Document 
Book' of a particular defendant. Mr. Justice Jackson objected to this course. The answering arguments of defence 
counsel were extremely coeent. 3 
The ruling of the Tribunal in the following terms was typically fair. 4 
In considering the matters which have been raised this morning, the Tribunal has had in mind the 
necessity for a fair trial and at the same time for an expeditious trial, and the Tribunal has decided that 
for the present it will proceed under rules heretofore announced, that is to say: 
First, documents translated into the four languages may be introduced without being read but in 
introducing them counsel may summarize them, or otherwise call their relevance to the attention of the 
Court, and may read such brief passages as are strictly relevant and are deemed important. 
Second, when a document is offered, the Tribunal will hear any objections that may be offered to it and 
in this collection, I would refer to the rule which the Tribunal made on the 8th of March 1946, which 
reads as follows: 
To avoid unnecessary translations, Defense Counsel shall indicate to the Prosecution the exact 
passages in all documents which they propose to use in order that the Prosecution may have an 
opportunity to object to irrelevant passages. In the event of disagreement between the 
Prosecution and the Defense as to the relevancy of any particular passage, the Tribunal will 
decide what passages are sufficiently relevant to be translated. Only the cited passages need to 
be translated, unless the Prosecution requires the translation of the entire document. 
The Tribunal has allowed the Defendant Goering, who has even evidence first of the defendants and who 
has proclaimed himself to be responsible as the second leader of Nazi Germany, to give his evidence 
without any interruption whatever, and he has covered the whole history of the Nazi regime from its 
inception to the defeat of Germany 
The Tribunal does not propose to allow any of the other defendants to go over the same ground in their 
evidence except insofar as it is necessary for their own defense. 
Defence Counsel are advised that the Tribunal will not ordinarily regard as competent evidence, extracts 
from books or articles expressing the opinions of particular authors on matters of ethics, history, or 
particular events. 
2. 	Hess 
One matter of interest which arose during the presentation of the case for the defendant Hess, which is analogous 
to the ruling in the last paragraph of the extract cited above, was the argument of counsel that the Versailles 
Treaty was signed by Germany under duress and therefore was not binding on Germany as a state. The ruling of 
the Tribunal was: 
The Tribunal rules that evidence as to the injustice of the 	Versailles Treaty or whether it was 
made under duress is inadmissible and it therefore rejects Volume 3 of the documents on behalf of 
the defendant Hess. 
There can be no doubt that this ruling was legally correct. Any challenge to the effect of the Treaty of Versailles 
would have required much more cogent evidence than was proposed: the mere opinions of individuals could not 
have been admissible on any basis. 
It is noteworthy that the defendant Hess disputed the jurisdictional competence of the Tribunal and did not give 
evidence. The principal presentation of his case occupied only 90 pages of transcript. 
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Hess was in all respects treated fairly. 
3. Von Ribbentrop 
Throughout his cross-examination of the accused von Ribbentrop, Col. Amen, American Associate Trial 
Counsel, was aggressive and bullying.5 The Tribunal did not rebuke counsel so far as his manner was concerned, 
but the President did say: 6 
... The Tribunal has already heard a very long cross-examination of the defendant, and they think that 
this is not adding very much to what they have already heard. The Defendant has given very similar 
evidence already. 
4. Kei tel 
Keitel was an articulate witness, but was cross-examined with devastating effect by Sir David Maxwell-
Fyfe.7 The accused was treated fairly. 
5. Kaltenbrunner 
Kaltenbrunner was indicted on Counts 1, 3 and 4. The allegations in the indictment against him were vague, 
general and lacked particularity. He defended himself with spirit, but also with dignity. 
His evidence-in--chief was given with precision and as much supporting detail as he was allowed to state. 
His cross-examination by American counsel lacked the force and effect of that of Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe in 
other cases. Counsel frequently interrupted the responses to his questions, but the Tribunal seldom prevented this 
abuse of authority by prosecuting counsel. 
Kaltenbrunner complained at one point 8 that 'surprise affidavits' were being used against him in cross-
examination—that is, affidavits which had not been previously tendered in evidence and which he had not 
previously seen. The Tribunal remained silent on the protest. Nevertheless, Kaltenbrunner, as soon as he 
was allowed, gave strongly expressed responses to the affidavits (which technically were answers to cross-
interrogatories administered to two senior German Government officers who had previously answered 
interrogatories administered by counsel for the accused). 
6. Rosenberg 
The Tribunal allowed much more licence in cross-examination of Rosenberg by prosecution counsel than it 
accorded to the defendant in answering questions. 9 There was technically no procedural unfairness. However, 
the closing address of Counsel, Dr. Thoma, was curtailed by pressure from the Tribunal. The President 
said: 1 ° The Tribunal would like you to finish your speech [which occupied only 59 pages of transcript] 
before lunch, if you could possibly summarize some parts of it. I don't know whether that is possible. ... 
All the speech will be taken as being presented to the Tribunal ... the Tribunal will take note of it all.' 
Thereupon, Counsel omitted a substantial part of his address. The manner of expression of the pressure to 
do so would have been cold comfort to counsel and to Rosenberg, who had been indicted on all four Counts. 
In the result, he was convicted as charged and sentenced to death. 
7. Frank 
The examination-in-chief of Frank was very brief. He gave his evidence with clarity and confidence. There were 
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virtually no interruptions by the Tribunal. Including cross-examination, his evidence occupied only 43 pages of 
transcript. 
The strongest evidence against Frank was contained in the 42 volumes of his diary, which he voluntarily gave to 
the authorities after he had been taken into custody. Clearly, they were admissible. 
Frank appears to have been an impressive witness - dignified and not loquacious. The whole of his evidence was 
marked by a lack of acrimony. American counsel played virtually no part. 
In only two instances could it be suggested that the Tribunal was to some degree unfair in the case of Frank. It 
upheld prosecution objections to any reference by defence counsel to (a) the Potsdam Declaration on 2 August 
1945, whereby a Council of Foreign Ministers was established to prepare a peace settlement which recognised 
the formation of a German national government; or (b) the establishment of 'concentration camps' in the 
American Occupation Zone after the capitulation of the Third Reich. The issue was not one of admissibility but 
of cogency, on which the Tribunal was in a position to make a judgment. 
The references by counsel to (a) and (b) above were designed to support his arguments by analogy. With respect 
to (a), the Tribunal, without any prosecution objection, did not prevent counsel for the defendant Von Ribbentrop 
from referring at length to the Potsdam Declaration. 11 
In respect of both (a) and (b) above the Tribunal did not act in an even-handed manner. 
8. Frick 
During the defence case for the defendant Frick, 12 it became apparent that procedures adopted by the American 
prosecution prejudiced a number of the defendants. Frick, who was convicted on Counts 2, 3 and 4 and sentenced 
to death, did not give evidence. Documents were submitted on his behalf, and one witness only was called in his 
defence. The witness was Dr. Gisevius, a German Government civil servant, who became a Gestapo official in 
1933. He later was an officer of the Ministry of the Interior and in this and other positions was in close touch 
with a number of the defendants. He took a prominent part in the planning of the so-called 'Rohm Purge' in 
1934 and plots against Hitler personally, including the unsuccessful attempt on Hitler's life on 20 July 1944. 
In his 'cross-examination' of Dr. Gisevius, the following questions were put to him by Mr. Justice Jackson: 13 
Question: The Tribunal perhaps should know your relations with the Prosecution. Is it not a fact that 
within 2 months of the surrender of Germany I met you at Wiesbaden, and you related to me your 
experiences in the conspiracy that you have related here [the plots to kill Hitler which originated in the 
German Army]? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And you were later brought here and after coming here were interrogated by the Prosecution 
as well as by the counsel for Frick and for Schacht? 
Answer: Yes. 
The fact that Mr. Justice Jackson interrogated Dr. Gisevius, and the consequences of his so doing, raise important 
procedural issues. Such interrogation of a person not a defendant, and the manner of its subsequent use by 
prosecution counsel when the person gave evidence for the defendant Frick, does not appear to have been justified 
by the provisions of the Charter, despite Article 24 (g). At least, the circumstances were such that the Tribunal 
had a discretion whether or not the 'cross examination' was admissible, but the discretion was not exercised. No 
reason was advanced as to why the Prosecution did not itself call Dr. Gisevius as a witness. 
When Mr. Justice Jackson 'cross-examined' Dr. Gisevius, it can be inferred from the details in the questions that 
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he used information gained during that interrogation with devastating effect against a number of the defendants, 
especially Frick, Kaltenbrunner, Goering and Keitel, as well as the SA and the SS. A partial source of 
information for such 'cross-examination' may, however, have been a book which Dr. Gisevius had written. The 
'cross-examination' reads like a classic examination-in-chief. When he had completed it, Mr. Justice Jackson said: 
'I have concluded the examination'. 14 
Curious though this procedure would appear to trial counsel accustomed to western criminal practice and 
procedure, it is strange that even German counsel did not object to the 'cross-examination', which it was 
technically, but certainly not in substance; nor did the Tribunal intervene. Even more strange is the fact that none 
of the counsel for the three above-named defendants, other than Frick, each of whose case had been so 
prejudicially affected by the tactic, sought to cross-examine Dr. Gisevius in any respect, least of all as to whether 
any promises or inducements had been made, given or offered to him. 
Unless expressly authorised by the Charter, such a tactic was improper. The Charter cannot, it is submitted, be 
construed as authorising it. Article 13 provided: The Tribunal shall draw up rules for its procedure. These rules 
shall not be inconsistent with the provisions of this Charter'. It is true that Article 15 was in the following 
terms: 
The Chief Prosecutors shall individually, and acting in collaboration with one another, also undertake 
the following duties: 
(a) investigation, collection and production before or at the Trial of all necessary evidence, 
(b) 
(c) the preliminary examination of all necessary witnesses and of the Defendants, 
• • • • 
If the American prosecution had wished to call Dr. Gisevius as a witness, it could have done so as part of the 
prosecution case, rather than rely on personal discussions between the defence witness and prosecuting counsel 
and the subsequent formal pre-trial interrogation. The word 'tactic' has been used because the 'cross examination' 
does not ring true. 
One other aspect of the 'cross examination' of Dr. Gisevius was the extent to which hearsay evidence was 
admitted. This was authorised by Article 19 of the Charter, which the Tribunal interpreted liberally so far as the 
prosecution was concerned. For example, during the evidence of Dr. Gisevius the President said to counsel for the 
German General Staff and High Command. 15 
If you mean that the evidence is hearsay, that will be perfectly obvious to the Tribunal, and doesn't 
make the evidence inadmissible, and you will be able to cross-examine him later. 
This was one of very many applications of Article 19 of the Charter in respect of hearsay evidence. 
It is of note that the defendant Streicher. who began his evidence on the same day as Dr. Gisevius gave evidence, 
in an obvious reference to him, described him as a traitor. Mr. Justice Jackson intervened to protect Dr. Gisevius. 
The Tribunal rebuked Streicher for the use of the description 'traitor'. 16 
In. other respects there was no procedural unfairness in the presentation of the defence case for Frick'. His counsel 
was not interrupted on any occasion. 
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9. Schacht 
Schacht was indicted under Counts 1 and 2 and acquitted of each charge. The indictment alleged that between 
1932 and 1945 Schacht was a member of the Nazi Party. This was proved to be incorrect. 17 The indictment also 
asserted that he was a member of the Reichstag. This allegation also was proved to be incorrect. 18 The 
indictment generally was confusing, as appears from the submissions of Schacht's counse1. 19 
The constant interruptions by Mr. Justice Jackson during the examination-in-chief of Schacht were unfair in view 
of the indictment and should not have been permitted, as frequently they were. 
The cross-examination of Schacht by Mr. Justice Jackson was very lone, tedious and repetitive. It was marked by 
interrogation which often consisted of multiple questions. On no occasion did the Tribunal intervene. Schacht 
was at all times the master and his evidence only revealed his innate strength of mind and character. 2° A 
disgruntled American Chief of Counsel concluded with the words 'I am through with him. No doubt Mr. Justice 
Jackson, rather than the witness, was relieved. 
In my opinion, Schacht should not have been indicted, as the evidence presented against him was tenuous. At 
least, at the end of the defence case for Schacht the prosecution should have abandoned the charges. But American 
stubbornness prevailed. The dissenting opinion of the Russian member of the Tribunal was unconvincing and 
ignored much of the undisputed, favourable evidence in Schacht's case. 21 
10. Funk 
The conduct of the case against Funk provided an outstanding example of the art of fair advocacy. Funk was 
indicted under all four Counts. He took office as Minister of Economics and Plenipotentiary General for War 
Economy in early 1938 and as President of the Reichsbank in January 1939, succeeding Schacht in all positions. 
He was acquitted on Count 1, and found guilty under the other three Counts. 
In examination-in-chief his responses were impressive, but his defence was destroyed when Mr. Dodd, Executive 
Trial Counsel, in cross-examination, produced an affidavit by Herr Puhl, Funk's assistant. It contained damaging 
evidence, which, if true, negated much of the evidence-in-chief of Funk. 
Defence counsel objected to the use of the affidavit, without a copy of it in the German language having 
previously been made available to the defence. The Tribunal ruled that the affidavit was admissible. The ruling 
was clearly correct, especially as the Tribunal immediately adjourned until the next day, before the affidavit was 
used in cross-examination. There was no obligation on the prosecution to disclose its existence to the defence 
until it was produced before the Tribunal. The tactics of prosecution counsel were fair, especially as Herr Puhl 
was called as a witness for cross-examination. 
11. Doenitz 
The case against the defendant Doenitz proceeded on predictable lines, but two matters relevant to procedural 
fairness merit mention. 
First, the Tribunal disallowed the use by prosecution counsel in the cross-examination of Doenitz of an unsworn 
letter written by the widow of a submarine commander under his command relating to an alleged order 'to fire at 
helpless seamen who were in distress in the water'. The ruling was correct and it was unfair for the prosecution to 
have attempted to use the letter. 
Second, the attitude of the President of the Tribunal during the cross-examination of Admiral Wagner, the 
principal witness for Doenitz, cannot be supported. Admiral Wagner was, at the commencement of the war, head 
of the operational group in the operations section of the Naval Operations, Staff. He was asked by Colonel 
155 
Phillimore, junior counsel for the United Kingdom, if he approved of a 'Fuhrer Order' of 18 October 1942, 
which, under his own signature, he passed on to naval commands. The Order concerned the treatment of naval 
prisoners of war captured by German forces. The transcript records the following evidence: 22 
Col. Phillimore: Did you approve of that order? 
Wagner I regretted that one had to resort to this order, but in the first paragraph the reasons for it are set 
forth so clearly that I had to recognize its justification. 
Col. Phillimore: You knew what handing over to the SD meant, did you not? You knew that meant shooting? 
Wagner No, that could have meant a lot of things. 
Col. Phillimore: What did you think it meant? 
Wagner It could have meant that the people were interrogated for the counter intelligence; it could have 
meant that they were to be kept imprisoned under more severe conditions, and finally it could have 
meant that they might be shot. 
Col. Phillimore: But you had no doubt that it meant that they might be shot, had you? 
Wagner: The possibility that they might be shot undoubtedly existed. 
Col. Phillimore: Yes, and did that occur to you when you signed the order sending it on to commanders? 
Wagner: I would Ike to refer to paragraph 1 of this order, where it ... [interruption] 
Col. Phillimore: Do you mind answering the question? Did it occur to you that they might be shot when you 
signed the order sending it on to commanders? 
Wagner: Yes, the possibility was clear to me. 
Dr. Siemers [acting as counsel for Doenitz]: Mr. President, the witness was asked whether he approved of this 
order. I do not think that Colonel Phillimore can cut off the witness' answer by saying that he may not refer to 
Paragraph 1 of the order. I believe that Paragraph 1 of the order is of decisive importance for this witness ... 
The President: You have an opportunity of re-examining the witness. 
Dr. Siemers: Yes. 
The President: Then why do you interrupt? 
Dr. Siemers: Because Colonel Phillimore has interrupted the answer of the witness and I believe that even in 
cross-examination the answer of the witness must at least be heard. 
The President: Well, the Tribunal does not agree with you. 
The President's last statement in that extract does not appear correct or fair, especially since, in subsequent cross-
examination on the same subject matter, Admiral Wagner was interrupted several times by prosecuting counsel 
and his answers to questions were cut short. The Tribunal did not intervene. A judge has a duty to do so in such 
circumstances. 
12. Von Schirach 
The procedural and general fairness of the conduct of the trial of von Schirach should be judged against the 
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background of the indictment against him. 
His Party and other offices were thus described in the Tribunal's Judgment: 
He joined the Nazi Party and the SA in 1925. In 1929 he became the Leader of the National Socialist 
Students Union. In 1931 he was made Reichs Youth Leader of the Nazi Party with control over all Nazi 
youth organisations including the Hitler Jugend. In 1933, after the Nazis had obtained control of the 
Government, von Schirach was made Leader of Youth in the German Reich, originally a position 
within the Ministry of the Interior, but, after 1st December, 1936, an office in the Reich Cabinet. In 
1940, von Schirach resigned as head of the Hitler Jugend and Leader of Youth in the German Reich, but 
retained his position as Reichsleiter with control over Youth Education. In 1940 he was appointed 
Gauleiter of Vienna, Reichs Governor of Vienna, and Reiclis Defence Commissioner for that territory ... 
As Reichs Defence Commissioner, he had control of the civilian war economy. As Reichs Governor he 
was head of the municipal administration of the city of Vienna, and, under the supervision of the 
Minister of the Interior, in charge of the governmental administration of the Reich in Vienna. 
Von Schirach was indicted only under Counts 1 and 4. He was found not guilty on Count 1 but convicted under 
Count 4. The evidence admitted against him was wide-ranging and not confined by the Tribunal to the specific 
charges against him. The particulars alleged in the indictment were: 
... he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and the consolidation of their control 
over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the psychological and educational 
preparations for war and the militarization of Nazi dominated organizations set forth in Count One of 
the Indictment; and he authorized, directed and participated in the Crimes against Humanity set forth in 
Count Four of the Indictment including, particularly, anti-Jewish measures. 
It is relevant to the procedural fairness, from an evidentiary viewpoint, of von Schirach's trial to note that the 
particulars in the indictment against him under Count 4 were in no way specific. However, Count 4 in essence 
involved both (a) the commission of crimes against humanity and the formulation and execution of a common 
plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against humanity as defined in Article 6(c) of the Charter; and (b) after a 
deviation in phraseology from crimes against humanity to war crimes (although von Schirach was not charged 
under Count 3), involvement in a common plan to commit war crimes. 
Count 4, in the statement of the offence, was formally linked with Counts 1 and 3; on the former charge von 
Shirach was found not guilty, and he was not charged under Count 3. Nevertheless he was convicted under Count 
4. 
It is true that his counsel did not object to any of the evidence which led to his conviction on Count 4. 
Nevertheless, it is the duty of a criminal court or tribunal to be vigilant that the evidence against an accused 
person is, in accordance with the indictment, confined to the specific allegations: secuntium alleg,ata et probata. 
In the judgment of the Tribunal, under the heading of 'Crimes against Peace', von Shirach was found not guilty 
of involvement in the development of Hitler's plan for territorial expansion by means of aggressive war and of 
having participated in the planning or preparation of any of the wars of aggression. However, in the judgment of 
the Tribunal23 he was guilty of crimes against humanity, primarily because it was found that, as Gauleiter of 
Vienna, he participated in the deportation of Jews from Vienna. Although such a finding was open on the 
evidence, the fact that von Shirach was indicted only under Counts 1 and 4 required a strict limitation of the 
evidence against him to those two charges. Moreover, the indictment did not, as required by Article 16(a) of the 
Charter, 'include full particulars specifying in detail' the charges against him (emphasis added). In fact, there were 
only the most scanty particulars. The Tribunal was silent in respect of this deficiency. 
In summary, von Schirach's evidence was presented against a vague background of particulars related to a 'rolled 
up' indictment and the cross-examination by the American prosecution exacerbated the damaging result. 
The Tribunal also failed to ensure that the evidence admitted against him conformed to the indictment. 
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For these reasons, the conduct of the trial of von Schirach was not procedurally fair. No doubt his counsel should 
have submitted to the Tribunal that, to ensure fairness, the particulars in the indictment should have heen 
amended, but there was no express provision in the Charter for amendment. Nevertheless, the provisions of 
Article 16(a) of the Charter were mandatory and explicit. 
13. Sauckel 
The accused Sauckel was charged, among other things, with having 'promoted the accession to power of the Nazi 
conspirators'. In his examination-in-chief he attempted to explain why, after a very humble upbringing, he joined 
the Nazi Party in 1923. But he was peremptorily cut short by the President of the Tribunal, as the following 
extract from the transcript shows: 24 
Dr. Servatius [counsel for Sauckel]: ... come back to the question of the Party. 
Sauckel: This has to do with the question of the Party, for we must all give some reasons as to 
how we got there. I myself ... [interruption] 
The President: ... I stated at the beginning of the defendant's case that we had heard this account from the 
defendant Goering and that we did not propose to hear it again from 20 defendants. It seems to me that 
we are having it inflicted upon us by nearly every one of the defendants. 
Dr. Servatius: I believe, Mr. President, that we are interested in getting some sort of an 
impression of the defendant himself. Seen from various points of view, the facts look different. 
I will now briefly ... [interruption]. 
The President: It is quite true, Dr. Servatius, but we have had half an hour, almost, of it now. 
Dr. Servatius: I shall limit it now. 
Equally unfair, because it was not an issue raised in the indictment, in relation to Sauckel, was the following 
passage in the cross-examination of Sauckel by M. Herzog, Assistant Prosecutor for the French Republic: 25 
M. Herzog: Did you approve of Hitler's theory of living space? 
Sauckel: The Fuhrer wrote about living space in his book. How far I agreed or disagreed with 
him cannot, in my opinion, be dealt with in this Trial, for I had no influence as to how the 
Fuhrer himself should interpret the word Lebensraum. 
The President: The Tribunal think that you must answer the question, whether or not you approve 
of the doctrine of Lebensraum. 
Sauckel: I am not fully acquainted with the statements made by the Fuhrer about the doctrine 
of Lebensraum. I should like to emphasize that I never thought of Lebensraum in connection 
with the carrying out of wars, or wars of aggression; neither did I promote the idea; but the idea 
of Lebensraum is perhaps best brought home to us by the fact that the population of Europe in 
the last 100 years has increased threefold, from 150 million to 450 million. 
M. Herzog: Did you, or did you not approve of the theory of Lebensraum? Answer "Yes" or "No". 
Sauckel: I did not agree with the theory of Lebensraum if it had to do with wars of aggression. 
In cross-examination by Dr. Thoma, counsel for the defendant Rosenberg, Dr. Thoma said to Saucke1: 26 
Witness, the Delegate for the Four Year Plan gave you special powers concerning conscription in 
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dealings with all authorities and, in my opinion, it is not right that you should now deny these methods 
of recruitment and pass responsibility for them on to the Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. 
Dr. Servatius then said: The defense counsel for Defendant Rosenberg may engage in cross-questioning, but it 
does not appear to me to be the right moment for him to make a speech of accusation against my client'. 
The Tribunal remained silent, although it had frequently criticised virtually all defence counsel for making 
'speeches' or comments in the course of their interrogation. 
Mr. Biddle, the American member of the Tribunal, interrogated Sauckel at length (twenty one pages of 
transcript). Sauckel had already been cross-examined by four prosecution counsel. Mr. Biddle frequently mis-
stated questions he had previously asked and interrupted the defendant 
in his answers. He demonstrated the truth of the dictum that 'the art of cross-examination is not to examine 
crossly'. His performance in what amounted to cross-examination was unprofessional as a lawyer and unjudicial 
in his office as a member of the Tribunal. 
14. Jodl 
The case against the defendant Jodi is noteworthy for the extreme licence extended by the Tribunal to the 
principal cross-examining counsel--Leading Counsel for Great Britain, Mr. G.D. Roberts, K.C. He was a 
barrister of very wide experience. In the course of his cross-examination he frequently asked questions unrelated to 
the acts charged in the indictment against Jodi and of a political or legal character. Such matters, when a number 
of the accused had attempted to raise them, had been properly rejected by the Tribunal as not being admissible 
because they did not deal with factual evidence. The cross-examination by Mr. Roberts transgressed this ruling on 
many occasions. 27 
The crosss-examination was lengthy (67 pages of transcript) and often 'cumulative', a word which was 
frequently used by the Tribunal in ruling that questions by defence counsel were inadmissible. Yet the Tribunal 
did not at any stage interrupt Mr. Roberts or attempt in any other way to prevent inadmissible questions being 
put to Jodi, whose trial does not appear to have been marked by even-handed procedural justice. However, he was 
found guilty on all four Counts, and it could not be argued that, on the admissible evidence, the verdicts were not 
justified. 
The inanity of the questioning of Jodi by Mr. Biddle, the American member of the Tribunal, is demonstrated by 
an extract from the transcript.28 
15. Von Papen 
The case of von Papen discloses instances of both substantive and procedural unfairness. He was indicted under 
Counts 1 and 2 only. The individual allegations against him were fragmentary and infelicitously drawn. They 
were: 
... he promoted the accession to power of the Nazi conspirators and participated in the consolidation of 
their control over Germany set forth in Count One of the Indictment; he promoted the preparations for 
war set forth in Count One of the Indictment; and he participated in the political planning and 
preparation of the Nazi conspirators for Wars of Aggression and Wars in violation of International 
Treaties, Agreements and Assurances set forth in Counts One and Two of the Indictment. 
Such particulars would not be regarded as adequate according to Anglo American criminal practice and procedure. 
In the event, von Papen was found not guilty under both Counts and discharged, although the Soviet, member of 
the Tribunal, Major General Nikitchenko, delivered a dissenting opinion. 
The case against von Papen, as framed, failed to recognise the political situation involving the President of 
Germany, von Hindenburg, in the period preceding the accession to power of Hitler as Chancellor on 30 January 
1933. Von Papen had been Chancellor of the Reich from 1 June 1932 until he was succeeded by von Schleicher 
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on 2 December 1932. As the majority judgment of the Tribunal records (pages 118-119): 
Von Papen was active in 1932 and 1933 in helping Hitler to form the Coalition Cabinet and aided in 
his appointment as Chancellor on 30th January, 1933. As Vice-Chancellor in the Cabinet he 
participated in the Nazi consolidation of control in 1933. On 16th June, 1934, however, von Papen 
made a speech at Marburg which contained a denunciation of the Nazi attempts to suppress the free press 
and the church, of the existence of a reign of terror, and of '150 per cent Nazis' who were mistaking 
'brutality for vitality'. On 30th June, 1934, in the wave of violence which accompanied the so-called 
Roehm Purge, von Papen was taken into custody by the SS, his office force was arrested, and two of 
his associates, including the man who had helped him work on the Marburg speech, were murdered. Von 
Papen was released on 3rd July, 1934. 
The defects in the framing of the indictment against von Papen were reflected in the procedures adopted, with the 
acquiescence of the Tribunal, at his trial. Significantly, he was not as a witness restrained by the Tribunal in his 
responses, which generally were succinct and reasonably brief. It is clear from the transcript that in cross-
examination he was the master of the situation. The cross-examination was conducted almost entirely by Sir 
David Maxwell-Fyfe, Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom, who completely failed to sheet home to 
the defendant the case alleged against him. The longer the cross-examination continued, the more the frustration 
of the cross-examiner became manifest. His questions became tedious and prolix, often occupying a page or more 
of transcript. The Tribunal had previously required all defendants to make short answers to questions and not 
'speeches'. In no instance did the President of the Tribunal intervene to make a similar requirement of the cross-
examiner in von Papen's case. Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe was reduced in the end to entering into a trivial dispute 
with von Papen about his use of the German personal pronoun 'du' in addressing a colleague, the Foreign 
Minister to Austria, Herr Schmidt. Von Papen caused the discontinuance of this cross-examination when he 
said:29 
Sir David, if you had ever been in Austria in your life, you would know that in Austria almost 
everyone says 'Du' to everyone else, and to clear up this incident, may I add the following: On the day 
of our separation, when I left Austria, I said to Foreien Minister Schmidt, of whom I am very fond, 
'Dear friend, we have worked together so much, now we can say "Du" to each other'. 
From the viewpoint of procedural fairness, the Tribunal exhibited licence to Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe which it 
consistently denied to the defence. A typical instance is the following convoluted question put to von Papen 
without objection from the Tribunal: 30 
Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe: What I want to know is this. My question was: Who were the Leading 
German personalities? You are not going to tell the Tribunal that Habicht, who was a liaison man with 
the NSDAP in Austria, was a leading Reich-German personality. Who were they? You are not going to 
say that Austrian Nazis were leading Reich-German personalities. Who were they? Who were the leading 
Reich-German personalities that you were talking about? 
A charitable view would be that the Tribunal was conscious that von Papen was intellectually quite able to 
control the cross-examination throughout and did not need its protection. However, the case of von Papen 
illustrates that the Tribunal did not always display judicial impartiality. Perhaps it redeemed itself by its majority 
verdict of acquittal of von Papen. 
16 . Speer 
The defendant Speer appears from the transcript to have been among the most impressive of all the twenty one 
defendants before the Tribunal. He was the third last of the defendants who gave evidence. Probably because of 
his apparent demeanour—deferential but not servile—and his frank admissions, he was treated by the Tribunal with 
tolerance. He was never interrupted and was even protected by the Tribunal from what was often puerile cross-
examination by Assistant Prosecutor Raginsky, of the Soviet Union. Mr. Justice Jackson, Chief of Counsel for 
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the United States of America, was mild and even bland in his attitude to Speer. 
No doubt this benign treatment of Speer was due largely to his admissions early in his examination-in-chief, a 
typical example of which was: 31 
Dr. Flachsner [counsel for Speer]: 	 as technical minister, do you wish to limit your 
responsibility to your sphere of work? 
Speer: No; I should like to say something of fundamental importance here. This war has 
brought an inconceivable catastrophe upon the German people, and indeed started a world 
catastrophe. Therefore it is my unquestionable duty to assume my share of responsibility for 
this disaster before the German people. This is all the more my obligation, all the more my 
responsibility, because the head of the Government has avoided responsibility before the 
German people and before the world [a reference to the suicide of Hitler]. I, as an important 
member of the leadership of the Reich, therefore, share in the total responsibility, beginning 
with 1942. I will state my arguments in this connection in my final remarks. 
That extract is highlighted by the following passage in Speer's memoirs: 32 
After reading it [the indictment] I was overwhelmed by a sense of despair. But in that despair at what had 
happened and my role in it, I found the position I felt I should take in the trial: to regard my own fate as 
insignificant, not to struggle for my own life, but to assume the responsibility in a general sense. In 
spite of all the opposition of my lawyer and in spite of the strains of the trial, I held fast to this resolve. 
There can be no doubt, on a consideration of the transcript, that Speer had a completely fair trial. 
17. Von Neurath 
Although the Tribunal did not direct restrictions on the defendant von Neurath personally, it did constantly 
prevent his counsel, Dr. Ludinghausen, from putting to his client many questions which were clearly admissible. 
Von Neurath was indicted on all four Counts. The particulars of his alleged individual responsibility were 
extremely general and devoid of specific allegations. His counsel attempted to meet the general allegations, 
combined with the case against von Neurath as presented by the prosecution, with a comprehensive account of 
his involvement with the progression of the Nazi regime, and his denial of anti-Semitic activity in 
Czechoslovakia, after he was appointed Reich Protector for Bohemil and Moravia on 18 March 1939. But his 
counsel was frequently denied by the Tribunal any opportunity to develop an in-depth defence to the allegations, 
which involved the whole gamut of the prosecution case as framed in the indictment. 
It is clear from the transcript that the Tribunal was determined to bring the trial to as expeditious a conclusion as 
it could achieve. In its Judgment the Tribunal gave scant reasons for its verdict of guilty on all four Counts, 
other than a general finding of culpability in respect of them. 
Von Neurath's case was not adequately presented, because his counsel was too frequently denied the opportunity 
to do so. 
The Tribunal did not accord counsel for von Neurath procedural fairness. 
But the procedural and evidential unfairness of the presentation of the case against von Neurath reached its height 
in the cross-examination of him by the Deputy Chief Prosecutor for the United Kingdom, Sir David Maxwell-
Fyfe, who, without any intervention by the Tribunal, frequently abused his right to cross-examine the defendant. 
In particular, he: 33 
(a) 	Often interspersed questions with comment adverse to the defendant; 
(b) 
	Put to the defendant, in a manner which purportedly asserted their accuracy and truthfulness, a miscellany 
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of statements, reports of persons (some tendered before the Tribunal and some which were not subject to 
any form of oath) and newspaper comments; and 
(c) 	Interrupted the defendant's answers to questions on many occasions. 
Although von Neurath was indicted on all four Counts, his cross-examination by Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe was 
confined almost exclusively to the years 1932 to 1940-41. It did not canvass the allegations in the indictment 
in respect of Counts 3 and 4. An overall assessment of the cross-examination must be that it was inadequate. 
The patent gaps in it were furnished by the Tribunal in its Judgment, but as the product of its own interpretation 
of evidence and material not elicited in cross-examination by the Principal cross-examiner. 
18. Fritzsche 
The defendant Fritzsche was indicted on Counts 1, 3 and 4; he was found not guilty on all three Counts and 
discharged. 
Fritzsche was, from December 1938, head of the Home Press Division of the Ministry of Popular 
Enlightenment and Propaganda. From October 1942, he was the Ministerial Director. In November 1942 he was 
appointed head of the Radio Division of the Propaganda Ministry. Obviously, he , was accused at Nuremberg in 
the absence of any more appropriate defendant to bear the opprobrium attached to the excesses of the Nazi 
propaganda machine, since Dr. Goebbels had committed suicide near the end of April 1945. 
The transcript of the evidence for his defence reveals a bland attitude to him by the Tribunal. Procedurally, his 
trial was completely fair, and neither he nor his counsel was interrupted by the Tribunal. His cross-examination 
by the prosecution was conducted by the Chief Prosecutor for the Soviet, General Rudenko. The defendant was 
the master. The Tribunal on occasions intervened to protect the defendant. Twice the President said: 'Let the man 
answer/explain'.34 
The complete acquittal of Fritzsche was predictable, although the Soviet member of the Tribunal gave a 
dissenting opinion which was entitled 'The unfounded acquittal of defendant Fritzsche'. He said: 35 'I consider 
Fritzsche's responsibility fully proven. His activity had a most basic relation to the preparation and the conduct 
of aggressive warfare as well as to the other crimes of the Hitler regime'. This judgment was contrary to the 
evidence. It was vengeful. The Soviet member of the Tribunal did not address any question to Fritzsche. 
19. Bormann (in absentia) 
Article 12 of the Charter provided: 
The Tribunal shall have the right to take proceedings against a person charged with crimes set out in 
Article 6 of this Charter in his absence, if he has not been found or if the Tribunal, for any reason, finds 
it necessary, in the interests of justice, to conduct the hearing in his absence. 
Borman was indicted on Counts 1, 3 and 4. His counsel, Dr. Bergold, endeavoured to establish that it was most 
likely that Bonnann died on 1 May 1945, during an attempted escape from the Reich Chancellery. The only 
evidence in support of this submission was an affidavit by a woman who had been one of Bormann's large group 
of secretaries from the end of 1942 until after Hitler's death. The affidavit was not explicit but equivocal. Dr. 
Bergold said: That is all I am able to submit; the real witnesses have unfortunately not been found'. 36 He then 
referred to some documents which had been tendered in evidence and contained orders which had been made by 
Bormann. These documents were not relevant to the question of whether or not Bormann was still alive. 
At a later stage, a former driver of Hitler gave evidence from which, it was sought to argue that Bormann was 
killed during the night of I May 1945 in escaping from the Reich Chancellery. The evidence was not conclusive. 
Bormann was properly tried in his absence, although it proved to be a barren exercise. 
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In its Judgment, the I.M.T. said: 37 
His [Bormann's] counsel, who has laboured under difficulties, was unable to refute this evidence 
[that is, the evidence tendered to the Tribunal, signed by Bormann]. In the face of these documents 
which bear Bormann's sigiature it is difficult to see how he could do so even were the defendant 
present. Counsel has argued that Bormann is dead and that the Tribunal should not avail itself of 
Article 12 of the Charter ... But the evidence of death is not conclusive ... If Bonnami is not dead 
and is later apprehended, the Control Council for Germany may, under Article 29 of the Charter, 
consider any facts in mitigation, and alter or reduce his sentence, if deemed proper. 38 
20 	The indicted organisations 
So far as the indicted organisations were concerned, a fundamental procedural decision was announced by the 
President on 8 June 1946 in the following terms: 39 
In the future, counsel for the organizations which the Prosecution have asked the Tribunal to 
declare to be criminal will not be permitted to examine or to cross-examine any witnesses other 
than the defendants in this Court. If they wish to examine or to cross-examine those witnesses, 
they must call them before the commissions which are sitting for the taking of evidence on the 
questions with which the organizations are concerned. 
That decision led to an acrimonious exchange later the same day between defence councel and the President. 
Defence counsel argued that the practical effect of the decision was that witnesses, other than the defendants, who 
gave evidence to the Tribunal were 'lost' to the defence if they could not be cross-examined. In the words of Dr. 
Loftier, counsel for the SA: '... we appreciate the Tribunal's grounds, but we feel obliged to point out from the 
point of view of the defense that these reasons are justified in theory, but entail in practice the loss of that 
witness'. Logical though the argument of defence counsel was, the Tribunal was unmoved and refused to hear any 
further argument on the question. 4° 
The Tribunal's ruling was based on a very narrow interpretation of the words in Article 9 of the Charter—'... The 
Tribunal may direct in what manner the applicants shall be represented and heard.' Article 9 also provided that '... 
any member of the organisation will be entitled to apply to the Tribunal for leave to be heard by the Tribunal 
upon the question of the criminal character of the organisation'. 
Article 16 of the Charter contained provisions for the fair trial of defendants, but those provisions did not extend 
expressly to the 'indicted' organisations. The consequences of a declaration that a group or organisation was 
criminal were potentially extremely grave (see Chapter 9). Although the ruling was expedient from the viewpoint 
of an expeditious trial and was arguably within the discretion of the 'Tribunal under Article 9, it was in conflict 
with a fundamental principle of justice to the extent that the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion was vitiated. 
The fault was heightened by the fact that the ruling was made without defence counsel being permitted an 
opportunity to present argument. 
CONCLUSION 
In the individual cases of unfairness, in the writer's opinion, discussed in this Appendix, I have placed emphasis 
on a strict forensic approach to questions of procedure and evidence. Regard has also been paid to the provisions 
of the London Agreement and Charter, by which the Tribunal was bound, particularly the requirement that the 
trial be confined to 'an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges' (Article 18(a)). I am not satisfied 
that in any of the cases in which unfairness was apparent, the ultimate result was thereby affected. In particular, 
Schacht, von Papen and Fritzsche were acquitted of all charges. 
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The Tribunal (Mr. Biddle): Now, only one other question, about Russia; I want to see if I understood your 
point clearly. You feared an invasion of Germany by Russia; is that right? 
Jodi: I expected, at a certain moment, either political blackmail on the strength of the large 
troop concentration or an attack. 
Mr. Biddle: Now, please, Defendant, I asked you if you did not fear an attack by Russia. You did at one 
time, did you not? 
Jodi: Yes, I was afraid of that. 
Mr. Biddle: All right. When was that? When? 
Jodl: It began through ... [interruption] 
Mr. Biddle: When did you fear it? When did you first fear that attack? 
Jodi: I had that fear for the first time during the summer of 1940; it arose from the first talks with the 
Fuhrer at the Berghof on 29 July. 
Mr. Biddle: Then from the military point of view, from that moment on, it was necessary for you to 
attack first, was it not? 
Jodi: After the political clarification, only then; up to then it had only been a conjecture. 
Mr. Biddle: How could you afford to wait for the political clarifying work if you were afraid of an 
immediate attack? 
Jodl: For that reason we increased our defensive measures to begin with, until the Spring of 1941. Up to 
then we only took measures for defense. It was not until February 1941 we began concentrating troops for 
an attack. 
Mr. Biddle: Now, then, just one other question. I am not at all clear on this. During that attack did you 
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then advise that Germany attack first, or did you advise that Germany should not attack? What was your 
advice? You saw this danger; what did you do about it? 
Jodi: That problem, too, like most of the others, was the subject of a written statement I made to the 
Fuhrer in which I drew his attention to the tremendous military effects of such a decision. One knew of 
course how the campaign would begin. But no human being could imagine how it would end... 
[interruption] 
Mr. Biddle: We have heard all that. I did not want to go into that. What I wanted to get at is this: You 
were afraid that Russia was going to attack. If that was true, why didn't you advise Germany to attack at 
once? You were afraid Russia would attack, and yet you say you advised against moving into Russia. I do 
not understand. 
Jodi: That is not the case. I did not advise against marching into Russia; I merely said that if there were 
no other possibility and if there was really no political way of avoiding the danger, then I, too, could only 
see the possibility of a preventive attack. 
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CHAFFER 11 	THE NUREMBERG JUDGMENT: AN ANALYSIS 
INTRODUCTION: STRUCTURE OF THE JUDGMENT 
The London Agreement and Charter, the indictment and the I.M.T. Judgment I are interlinked, and an analysis of 
the Judgment involves some additional discussion of the Agreement and Charter and of the indictment, which are 
the subjects of Chapters 7 and 8 respectively. It has been necessary, in evaluating the Judgment, to recognise the 
joint treatment by some authors of the four documents. 
In a summary initial reference to the indictment, the Tribunal listed the Counts in order of 2, 3, 4 and 1 (the 
latter being the conspiracy Count). 
The Tribunal stressed that the case against the defendants 'rested in a large measure on documents of their own 
making, the authenticity of which has not been challenged, except in one or two cases. 
The Tribunal repeated the provisions of Article 6 of the Charter and stated: 'these provisions are binding upon the 
Tribunal as the law to be applied to the case' (emphasis added). That fundamental statement will be discussed later 
against the background of the Tribunal's elaboration of it. 
The final general introductory observation of the Tribunal was: 'For the purpose of showing the background of 
the aggressive war and war crimes charged in the indictment, the Tribunal will begin by reviewing some of the 
events that followed the first world war, and in particular by tracing the growth of the Nazi Party under Hitler's 
leadership to a position of supreme power from which it controlled the destiny of the whole German people, and 
paved the way for the alleged commission of all the crimes charged against the defendants'. 
The next section of the Judgment surveyed in some detail the pre-war Nazi regime in Germany, from the origin 
and public pronouncement of the aims of the Nazi Party,2 its seizure and consolidation of power, leading to the 
measures of rearmament that it adopted. Much of this section dealt with matters included in Count 1 of the 
indictment, particularly the allegation that the Nazi Party was the 'central core of the common plan or 
conspiracy' (Count 1, Paragraph IV (A).) 
After some early doubts, and subject to the views expressed in Chapters 8 and 18 concerning the validty of 
Count 1 as an expression of established international law, the writer considers that the particulars under that 
Count, the evidence accepted in relation to those particulars and the discussion and findings of the Tribunal in 
relation thereto were in accordance with normal legal principles, and that, in any event, the evidence was 
admissible as part of the res gestae.3 
Against the jurisdictional background provided by Article 6 (a) of the Charter, it is noteworthy that the Judgment 
of the Tribunal (p. 13 et se_q) dealt together with Counts 1 and 2. It stated: 'It will be convenient to consider 
the question of the existence of a common plan [Count I] and the question of aggressive war [Count 2] 
together ...'. In fact, the indictment had inextricably assimilated the two separate allegations. Count 2 was a 
conglomerate allegation of the commission of the commission of crimes against peace as defined in Article 6 (a). 
Count 1 was confined to the separate averred crime of conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, war crimes and 
crimes against humanity. Particulars under Count 2 did not include the annexation of Austria or the seizure of 
Czechoslovakia. They began with initiation of the war against Poland on 1 September 1939 and ended with the 
declaration of War against America on 11 December 1941. Further. in Count 2 it was merely stated: 'Reference is 
hereby made to Count One of the Indictment for the allegations charging that these wars were wars of aggression 
on the part of the defendants.' The legal consequences of the Tribunal co-mingling its consideration of Counts I 
and 2 will be discussed later. 
Violations of international treaties 
In strict conformity with the provisions of Article 6 (a) of the Charter, the Judgment stated (p. 36): 
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The Charter defines as a crime the planning or waging of war that is a war of aggression or a war in 
violation of' international treaties. The Tribunal has decided that certain of the defendants planned and 
waged aggressive wars against twelve nations, and were therefore guilty of this series of crimes. This 
makes it unnecessary to discuss the subject in further detail, or even to consider at any length the 
extent to which these aggressive wars were also "wars in violation of international treaties, 
agreements. or assurances". [emphasis added] These treaties are set out in Appendix C of the 
Indictment. [In fact, twenty six treaties, agreements or assurances were pleaded. They are hereafter 
collectively described as 'treaties']. 
The Tribunal then made brief reference to three of the relevant Treaties:- The 1899 and 1907 Hague 
Conventions, the Versailles Treaty and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact. It merely mentioned other treaties 
of mutual euarantee, arbitration and non-aggression. Only a small number of findings of breaches of treaties 
were made, and the Tribunal concluded that section of judgment with the observation (p. 38): 
The Tribunal does not find it necessary to consider any of the other treaties referred to in the 
Appendix, or the repeated agreements and assurances of her peaceful intentions entered into by 
Germany. 
However, the Tribunal stated (p. 38) that it had made full reference to the nature of the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
and its legal effect in another part of its judgment. 'It is therefore not necessary to discuss the matter further 
here, save to state that in the opinion of the Tribunal this Pact was violated by Germany in all the cases of 
aggressive war charged in the Indictment'. (Because of the emphasis placed by the prosecution and the Tribunal 
on the relevance of the Pact of Paris to the crime of aggressive war, that question will be discussed 
separately in Chapter 18). 
In respect of Article 6 (a) of the Charter, the Tribunal was content to base its determination of guilt against a 
number of the accused on its finding that they had planned and waged aggressive wars. That finding alone was 
sufficient to support convictions under Count 1, assuming that Count was properly included in the indictment 
and pursued by the prosecution together with the substantive offences alleged to be the object of the conspiracy. 
The findines and observations of the Tribunal in relation to the alleged violations of treaties were, in strict law, 
obiter. No doubt the Tribunal considered that it should address the question to some degree; 4 further, the nature 
and extent of any proved violations were relevant to punishment., The Tribunal was legally entitled to adopt the 
restricted approach which it did. It was, however, unfortunate that the prosecution relied so strongly in opening 
and closing addresses on alleged violations of treaties and adduced voluminous evidence in relation hereto. Had it 
not done so, or, in view of the alternative bases for establishing guilt under Count 1, if defence counsel had 
sought a ruling at an early stage from the Tribunal as to the scope of the pleading, the length of the trial may 
have been considerably shortened. 
The Tribunals which decided the 'Subsequent Proceedings' generally adopted what was a more practical and 
realistic judicial approach to 'Crimes against Peace'. 5 
THE LAW OF TIIE CHARTER 
The Tribunal began its discussion of 'The Law of the Charter' by stating (p. 38): 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is defined in the Agreement and Charter, and the crimes coming 
within the jurisdiction, for which there shall be individual responsibility, are set out in Article 6. The 
law of the Charter is decisive and binding upon the Tribunal'. (emphasis added). 
The following extract is the most important, and has been the most controversial, in the Judgment (p. 38): 
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The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power by the countries to which 
the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and the undoubted right of these countries to legislate for 
the occupied territories has been recognised by the civilised world. The Charter is not an arbitrary 
exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the Tribunal, as will be 
shown, it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent is 
itself a contribution to international law. 
The Signatory Powers created this Tribunal, defined the law it was to administer, and made regulations 
for the proper conduct of the Trial. In doing so, they have done together what any one of them might 
have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special courts to 
administer law. With regard to the constitution of the court, all that the defendants are entitled to ask is 
to receive a fair trial on the facts and law. 
The Charter makes the planning or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international 
treaties a crime; and it is therefore not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent 
aggressive war was a crime before the execution of the London Agreement. But in view of the great 
importance of the questions of law involved, the Tribunal has heard full argument from the Prosecution 
and the Defence, and will express its view on the matter. 
There are fundamental matters which should be discussed in the context of the above cited extracts from the 
Judgment. 
As is emphasised in Chapter 18, Germany had surrendered unconditionally to the four Allied Powers, which were 
in occupation of the whole of the country from 8 May 1945, and remained so until long after the Tribunal's 
Judgment had been delivered and the punishment resulting from it had been put into effect. 
In such circumstances, the validity of the assertion by the Tribunal that the making of the Charter [and the 
Agreement] was an exercise of 'sovereign legislative power' can initially be considered strictly from the 
viewpoint of existing international law, without regard to the Manner of the exercise of such power or the precise 
content of those instruments. 
The Tribunal did not justify its basic assertion by reference to any judicial authority, works by learned authors or 
any other precedent. Indeed, in his opening statement the President of the Tribunal described the trial as 'unique 
in the history of the jurisprudence of the world. More fundamental scrutiny of the assertion is therefore 
necessgry. 
The treatment by Professor Lauterpacht of the issue is in some respects equivocal. His initial view is thus 
expressed:-6 
In contradistinction to hostile acts of soldiers by which the latter do not lose their privilege of being 
treated as lawful members of armed forces, war crimes are such hostile or other acts of soldiers or other 
individuals as may be punished by the enemy . on capture of the offenders. They include acts contrary to 
International Law perpetrated in violation of the law of the criminal's own State, such as killing or 
plunder for satisfying private lust and gain, as well as criminal acts contrary to the laws of war 
committed by order and on behalf of the enemy State. To that extent the notion of war crimes is based 
on the view that States and their organs are subject to criminal responsibility under International Law. 
In his subsequent discussion of the issue, Professor Lauterpacht stated: 7 
The question whether the conferment of jurisdiction upon the Tribunal with regard to crimes against 
peace constituted an innovation in International Law (i.e. the question whether recourse to aggressive 
war is criminal or merely unlawful) is discussed elsewhere in this volume and answered in the negative 
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[this proposition will be considered later]. In the Judgment of the Tribunal, only one [this is not correct] 
out of twenty one accused was found guilty under that head alone and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Similarly, only two of the accused were found guilty of crimes against humanity alone. All other 
accused who were sentenced by the Tribunal were found guilty, in addition to other crimes, of ordin2ry 
war crimes as defined in the Charter in full conformity with existing law. In the light of that fact the ... 
Tribunal ... must be viewed primarily as a tribunal constituted for the punishment of war crimes proper. 
This was done through the joint exercise, by the four States which established the Tribunal, of a right 
which each of them was entitled to exercise separately on its own responsibility in accordance with 
International Law. 
I confess to being perplexed by the following footnote which Professor Lauterpacht appended to the text 
immediately above cited: 8 
In view of this it may be difficult to accept without substantial qualification, the following statement 
in the Judgment of the Tribunal: 'The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign 
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered; and 
undoubted right of these countries to legislate for the occupied territories has been recognized by the 
civilized world'. however, in the same passage the Tribunal proceeded to state that the Charter was not 
in the nature of an arbitrary exercise on the part of the victorious nations, but an expression of 
existing International Law according to which aggressive war was not only illegal, but also criminal. 
Professor Lauterpacht then observed: 9 
The combination of the question of the punishment of war crimes by an international organ with the 
question of criminal jurisdiction is probably calculated to complicate a problem which in itself is of 
considerable difficulty. 
Thus in a text covering 22 pages (Chapter VI, Part IV, ibid.), Professor Lauterpacht, as editor of the 7th edition 
of Oppenheim's work, did not support, without qualifications, the Tribunal's cited pronouncement. 
It is therefore necessary to examine his more general treatment of the question in an earlier part of the text. 1° I 
am unable to find in that chapter, or infer from it, any endorsement of the Tribunal's assertion of the 'exercise of 
sovereign legislative power'. Moreover, the following footnote 11 appears to the writer to obscure Professor 
Lauterpacht's views even more: 
It is therefore possible that much--though not all—of the criticism of the Charter of the Tribunal might 
have been avoided, without substantially affecting the result of the proceedings, if it had been limited to 
war crimes proper. For criticism of the Charter on the ground of the alleged retroactivity of its 
provisions has been directed almost exclusively to 'crimes against the peace' and 'crimes against 
humanity'. The Tribunal—rightly, it is believed ... rejected the view that with regard to crimes against 
the peace the provisions of the Charter were retroactive. It also observed that the maxim nullum crimen 
sine leoe is not a limitation of the sovereign legislative power but a principle of justice. 
In general. it would appear that the decision of the authors of the Charter to include in the indictment the 
charge of crimes against the peace was supported not only by a correct appreciation of the legal position 
on the subject but also by most compelling considerations of international peace and of justice. The 
same, in a different sphere, applies to the charge of crimes against humanity--a provision of significance 
inasmuch as it affirmed the existence of fundamental human rights superior to the law of the State and 
protected by international criminal sanction even if violated in pursuance of the law of the State. ... 
However, the provisions of the Charter in this matter were somewhat ambiguous. In their original 
formulation they seemed to give to the Tribunal jurisdiction with regard to crimes against humanity 
irrespective of their connection with crimes against the peace or war crimes. 
As the result of a Protocol subsequently signed on October 6, 1945, the semi-colon, in the English and 
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French texts, after the words 'during the war' in Article 6 (c) was replaced by a comma to correspond 
with the Russian text. In consequence, though for no apparent imperative reason, the Tribunal held that 
it had jurisdiction only in respect of such acts enumerated in Article 6 (c) as had taken place after the 
commencement of the war. 
In so far as crimes against humanity were, prior to the war, committed in pursuance of a policy of 
initiation and preparation of a war of aggression, they ought to have been considered to fall within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
It is possible that an international military tribunal concerned primarily with war crimes proper may not 
have been the proper agency for exacting punishment for crimes against humanity. For the cumulation 
of jurisdiction in respect of war crimes and crimes against humanity tended both to draw uninformed 
criticism upon the charge of war crimes and, in the end, to reduce the effectiveness of the charge of 
crimes against humanity. On the other hand, there were cogent and decisive objections against setting up 
different courts to try the same accused. 
THE VIEWS OF PROMINENT AUTHORS, JURISTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
ORGANISATION 
It is now proposed to consider some of the other literature and comments selected from a vast mass, limited to a 
discussion of the Tribunal's Judgment concerning 'The Law of the Charter'. 
Professor Lauterpacht 
In his work 'International Law and Human Rights' published in 1950, Professor Lauterpacht discussed only 
'Crimes Against Humanity in relation to the London Agreement and Charter, and limited that discussion to the 
essential context of his thesis, in the light of the provisions in the Charter of the United Nations: that is the 
securing of the natural and inalienable rights of man. 
Mr. Justice Jackson 
In his opening address to the Tribunal, Mr. Justice Jackson referred to some of the legal issues involved, such as 
the concept of an 'aggressive war' and 'crimes against peace'. He did not touch upon the 'sovereign legislative 
power' of the Allied Powers. 
Brigadier General Taylor 
Brigadier General Taylor, in a very brief reference to the part of the Judgment under discussion, did not mention 
the question of 'sovereign legislative power'.I 2 
Nearly all authors do not differentiate between the concept of 'sovereign legislative power' and the provision in 
the Charter prescribing a war of aggression as a crime against peace. But the stated concept, if it were correct, is 
the root of all that followed the capitulation of the German Armed Forces, culminating in the execution of the 
London Agreement and Charter. Without that root, the provisions of the Agreement and Charter would have 
acquired a different perspective. 
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Calvocoressi 
In his discussion of the subject, Calvocoressi 13  ignores the Tribunal's assertion of sovereign legislative power 
and justifies the formulation of the Agreement and Charter on their expression and application of existing, 
international law. In the view of the writer, the source of such justification must be distinguished from the 
Tribunal's rationalisation that 'the law of the Charter is decisive and binding and that its derivative force was the 
sovereign legislative power of the Allies. 
Professor Brownlie 
A more logically constructed exposition of the legal basis for the Agreement arid Charter was published 
by Professor Ian Brownlie in 1963. 
The exposition was a chronological analysis of opening addresses by prosecution counsel, the argument by 
defence counsel with its concentration on the ex post facto character of the law stated in the Charter, and the 
widespread affirmation of the principles declared in the Judgment, including the judgments of the Tokyo 
Tribunal and in the 'Subsequent Proceedings' at Nuremberg. Professor Brownlie's arguments, to which further 
reference will later be made, are persuasive that it was the manner of expression of the reasoning of the Tribunal 
rather than its content which led to much of the criticism of its validity. 14 
Professor Emeritus Morgan 
A contrary view was expressed at an early stage by Professor Emeritus J.H. Morgan K.C. 15 Before this view is 
considered, it is convenient to set ont the following extracts from the preface of that monograph by 
Viscount Maugham, formerly Lord Chancellor: 16 
The validity and effectiveness, of this epoch-making Agreement rested upon the fact that the whole 
area of Germany was in the occupation of the armies of the four Powers who were parties to it. Their 
de facto authority over that territory was fully established. The German Government, having ceased to 
exist, it was necessary that public order and safety should be reestablished until a new German 
government (or governments) should be set up under a treaty of peace. I will not attempt to define the 
limits of the rights of occupying authorities in such a case according to the rules of International Law. 
On the one hand, they have not been settled; and on the other, an attempt to guide or interfere with the 
steps taken by a victorious army in a conquered land would seldom or never be a profitable enterprise. 
It was definitely a military court with laws or principles of its own. 
I think his [Professor Emeritus Morgan's] criticisms are unanswerable; and I much regret that the 
Tribunal, being a military tribunal appointed for a special purpose, thought fit to travel outside its 
proper jurisdiction. 
... Offences against the laws and customs of war have long been recognised as punishable by the 
military courts of a belligerent. But when it comes to doubtful additions, to the terms of the Pact of 
Paris, the defence of 'Superior Orders', the liability of persons for laws made ex post facto, I will 
assert that there is the greatest doubt whether propositions on these matters have received such 
agreement by the general body of civilised nations, namely, the assent to be bound by the 
propositions, as would be necessary to qualify them as rules of International Law. 
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Expressed against the background of his experience as British Deputy Adjutant-General, the views of 
Professor Emeritus Morgan merit close attention. In summary, they were that the only Count in the 
indictment that legally was invulnerable to criticism was Count 3--that is, war crimes. Before 
expanding on Professor Morgan's views, limited to the context of this chapter, it is convenient to 
reproduce his prefatory observations: 17 
In questioning, however, the validity in International Law of two, possibly three, of the Counts of the 
Indictment, I would not have it supposed for a moment that I question either the jurisdiction of the 
Court or the 'law' it laid down on those three Counts, so far as Germany and German law are concerned. 
It must always be remembered that, under the terms of the 'Unconditional Surrender' of Germany all 
sovereignty, including legislative sovereignty, over the country passed to the four Allied Governments, 
who assumed 'supreme authority'. 1 8 Thereby they acquired full authority to make what laws for 
Germany they pleased, including what lawyers call ex post facto, in other words retrospective, 
legislation. It was long ago laid down by Lord Mansfield in a famous case. Campbell v Hall 19 that 
'conquest' invests the conquering Power with the prerogative right 'to make what law he pleases' for the 
conquered country, subject always to any conditions in the articles of capitulation. In this case there 
were no such articles and, therefore, no such qualification. The 'Agreement', providing for the 
establishment of the Tribunal, as also 'the charter of the Tribunal', were legitimate exercises of such 
sovereignty. And the Charter declares that the planning and waging of a war of aggression and the 
'conspiracy' to that effect 'are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal', which Tribunal 
'cannot be challenged by the prosecution or by the defendants or their counsel.' But nowhere do either of 
these documents, or the Indictment itself, declare that the offences charged are offences against  
International Law, an elementary fact which every commentator appears hitherto to have overlooked. In 
his massive opening speech—a speech in every way worthy of the highest traditions of forensic oratory-
- the Attorney-General, Sir Hartley Shawcross, declared, with perfect truth, that the Charter of the 
Tribunal, 'has prescribed that wars of aggression are crimes' and that 'the Charter is the Statute and the 
Law a this Court, adding that it was 'not incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that they are, or 
ought to be, international crimes'. Nor was it incumbent. 
It is considered that the prefatory statement reaches the heart of the difficulty in examining the coherence of the 
Judgment under the heading of The Law of the Charter ' and the first two paragraphs thereunder. Although the 
final opinion of the author on this fundamental issue, as also is the case with many others, is deferred until 
Chapter 18, it is convenient at this stage to express complete concurrence with the propositions advanced 
by Professor Morgan. 20 
United Nations Organisation 
The force of the basic argument advanced immediately above is strengthened by an official United Nations 
document,21 extracts from which are: 
The Agreement and the Charter thus appear as a lex in casu to be applied by an ad hoc tribunal to a 
special case or group of cases. This situation was recognised by the Tribunal [in passages cited above]. 
But, on the other side, the Court allowed the prosecution and the defence to present extensive arguments 
as to whether or not the Charter could be considered as compatible with existing international law. It is 
true that the Tribunal dismissed a motion made by the defence at the beginning of the proceedings, 
expressing doubts as to the consistency with international law of certain provisions in the Charter and 
that an opinion on the legal basis of the trial be, secured from internationally recognised experts ...The 
motion was disallowed, however, only in so far as it constituted a plea to the jurisdiction of the Court 
[Article 3 of the Charter]. 
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In so far as it contained other arguments, the Court declared itself prepared to hear them at a later stage. 
And not only was the compatibility of the Charter with existing international law discussed by the 
parties. The Court itself examined this problem carefully when interpreting and applying several of the 
provisions of the Charter. [There followed references to the Judgment which have already been cited 
above]. 
According to the Court, the Charter has then a double foundation [emphasis added] in international law. 
Firstly, it was created by the signatory Powers in the exercise of their competence under international 
law; and secondly, the Charter does not, as to its contents, deviate from the law of nations, it merely 
gives expression to already existing international law. 
The Court thus considerably widened the scope of the Charter and, at the same time, of its own findings. 
It affirmed the validity of the Charter not only as a ]ex in casu, as the law of the case which it had been 
set to judge, but also as an authoritative expression of general international law [which became binding 
on the Tribunals which determined the 'Subsequent Proceedings' at Nuremberg]. And it consequently 
presented its interpretation and application not only of a lex in casu but also of general international 
law. 
Professor Glueck 
It is instructive to examine some of the literature written in the closing months of World War II before the plans 
for the principal Nuremberg Trial had been crystallised. As an example, Professor Glueck, in his treatment of 
'Violations of Law by Axis Nationals', wrote in September 1944: 22 
... let us define 'war criminals'. Considering the Nazi conception of 'total war', we may legitimately 
define war criminals as persons—regardless of military or political rank—who, in connection with the 
military, political, economic or industrial preparation for or waging of war, have, in their official 
capacity, committed acts contrary to (a) the law and customs of legitimate warfare or (b) the principles 
of criminal law generally observed in civilized States; or who have incited, ordered, procured, 
counselled or conspired in the commission of such acts; or having knowledge that such acts were 
about to be committed, and possessing the duty and power to prevent them, have failed to do so. 
Professor Glueck identified five features of this definition: 
First, it is not intended to include the 'crime' of flagrantly violating solemn treaty obligations or 
conducting a war of aggression; 
Secondly, we do not include illegal acts by soldiers ... in their private, non-official capacity ... these 
are punishable by domestic tribunals; 
Thirdly, we include those persons--usually high-placed officers or political persons who, in the words 
of the Moscow Declaration ... 'have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and 
executions'. 
Fourthy, we include not only military heads but political chieftains and henchmen; 
Finally, we include high-ranking, policy-framing industrialists and bankers with political connections. 
Professor Glueck considered that the acts enumerated in the last two paragraphs were of a kind 'which 
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might more appropriately and conveniently be tried in the ordinary national courts of the victims'. However, he 
added: '... but some of these crimes are of such a serious and widespread nature that they ought to be prosecuted 
under the joint auspices of the United Nations'. 
Professor Woetzel 
Professor Woetzel, in his penetrating analysis of the historical developments relating to 'Crimes Against 
Peace'23 , does not express a definitive view as to whether or not the Tribunal correctly equiparated the provisions 
of Article 6 (a) of the Charter with existing recognised international penal law. His conclusion is thus 
expressed:24 
While none of these arguments constitutes sufficient legal basis for the crime against peace, it is clear 
from the discussion in the preceding chapters that confirmation of the principles of the Charter and the 
Judgment by the international community would justify the I.M.T. in assuming that individuals could 
be held liable for the crime against peace. Such endorsement would not definitely confirm this delict as 
part of international law; this would depend on the future practice of states.  But, as has been shown, it 
would constitute sufficient basis for assuming that it was an international crime for which individuals 
could be held liable. (emphasis added). 
Professor Woetzel's views concerning the legal significance of the Pact of Paris will be considered in Chapter 18. 
In the present context it is, however, convenient to refer to his discussion relating to the rights of the Allied 
Powers as occupants of Germany at the time at which the London Agreement and Charter were executed. In 
discussing the conflicting arguments of a number of authors, Professor Woetzel states: 25 
The Allies were, therefore [it has been argued] bound by Article 43 of the Hague Rules, and their 
military tribunals could only prosecute crimes which had been committed before the beginning of 
occupation if the German courts were not able to function. It has been pointed out that this was not 
the case after the winter of 1945. If the conditions did not warrant the exercise of power under Article 
43, the occupying states did not have the right to take jurisdiction over any crimes, except war crimes, 
which had been perpetrated before the beginning of the state of occupation. 26 
But the view canvassed in the above cited passage has not found general acceptance. Professor Woetzel's own 
opinion appears to be expressed in the following passage: 27 
There is evidence for the conclusion that the Allies did not regard the Hague Rules as applicable for 
the occupation of Germany, and they felt justified in assuming the 'supreme authority' and exercising 
it with regard to the war crimes trials. This standpoint has been supported by many writers. 
Professor Wright 
In a general survey of the law of the Nuremberg Trial, Professor Quincy 
Wright expressed this view: 28 
The idea that the four powers acting in the interest of the United Nations had the right to legislate for 
the entire community of nations, though given some support by Art. 5 of the Moscow Declaration of 
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November 1, 1943, and by Art. 2 (6) of the Charter of the United Nations was not referred to by the 
Tribunal. The preamble of the agreement of August 8, 1945, however, declares that the four powers in 
making the agreement 'act in the interests of all the United Nations and invited any government of the 
United Nations to adhere, and nineteen of them did so. Since the Charter of the United Nations 
assumed ,that that organization could declare principles binding on non-members, it may be that the 
United Nations (sic) in making the agreement for the Nuremberg Tribunal intended to act for the 
community of nations as a whole, thus making universal international law. While such an 
assumption of competence would theoretically be a novelty in international law, it would accord with 
the practice established during the nineteenth century under which leading powers exercised a 
predominant influence in initiating new rules of international law. It is not, however, necessary to 
make any such assumption in order to support the right of the parties to the Charter to give the 
Tribunal the jurisdiction it asserted. That right can be amply supported by the position of these 
powers as the Government of Germany or from the sovereign right of each to exercise universal 
jurisdiction over the offenses stated. 
With full respect, one finds some of the assertions in the cited extract confusing. The Charter of the United 
Nations did not come into effect ntil 24 October 1945. The 'examples, by analogy, cited in a footnote 29 are 
not convincing and appear remote. 
Professor Finch 
In the same volume of the American Journal of International law, Professor G.A. Finch, Editor-in-Chief of the 
journal, strongly criticised what he described as the obiter dicta (as they were) in the Judgment. 3° He 
stated: 31 
The charge of Crimes against Peace is a new international criminal concept. It was not envisaged in the 
warnings issued by the Allies before hostilities ended nor made a part of the original terms of reference 
to the United Nations War Crimes Commission established in London during the war. It may be 
traced to the influence of Professor A.N. Trainin, of the Institute of Law of the Moscow 
Academy of Sciences. 
Professor Finch also trenchantly criticised the Tribunal's Judgment in relation to the effect and force of the Pact 
of Paris,32 an issue which; will be considered in detail in Chapter 18. 
Professor Jescheck 
Professor Jescheck, in a typically restrained article, wrote: 33 
The Judgment of the Court affirmed individual liability for the crime against peace on the basis of the 
Charter—which was characterized as 'decisive and binding upon the Tribune—and also, in supporting 
dicta, on the basis of already existent international law. The latter ground for the decision is very 
questionable, since this legal norm existed neither in written nor in unwritten international law prior 
to 1945. Another disputed legal question involved the scope of individual responsibility for the 
conduct of a war of aggression. Fleet Admiral Donitz was unexpectedly convicted on this point, 
although he had been promoted to Naval Commander-in-Chief only in January 1943; the Tribunal 
supported this decision with the reasoning that 'Donitz was consulted almost continuously by Hitler'. 
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The United Nations War Crimes Commission 
Dr. Litawslci, the author of Chapter IX of History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission, expressed 
the following somewhat generalised conclusions: 34 
The work done in the field of International law by the victorious United Nations and embodied in the 
Four Power Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals, and further 
developed by the International Military Tribunal is of momentous importance. The Tribunal was fully 
conscious that its task was not limited to the solution of the problem which it was directly facing, 
namely, the punishment of the German Major War Criminals, but that its work would be of 
fundamental importance for the future development of international law. The Tribunal stated in the 
Judgment that the Charter is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; 
and to that extent is itself a contribution to international law. 
Thus the Tribunal made it clear that the law of the Charter was declaratory of existing international 
customary law and would be applicable to any future transgressor. This means that aggressive war 
involves personal responsibility of the leaders of the aggressor States, similar to the responsibility for 
war crimes in the technical meaning of the term. 
It is obvious that much more has to be done than has been achieved up to now. It is true that the 
foundations have been firmly laid down, but the erection of the whole building of peace-protecting 
measures of international law has hardly begun. 
This requires further legislative work based on the Charter and the findings of the Tribunal, 
development of the principles enunciated in those documents, the entrusting of the application of 
adopted principles in a supreme judicial body, and, finally, the most difficult task of making sure that 
effective sanctions would be applied to any future transgressor. 
Conclusion 
From the foregoing discussion of a number of expressions of opinion (although they are, of course, only 
a minuscule of the available relevant; literature35 ), it is apparent that the conflict of views as to the correctness 
in law of the fundamental principles expounded in the Judgment ; is stark and irreconcilable. 
The Tribunal placed particular emphasis on its perception of the legal effect of the Pact of Paris. Almost half of 
the Judgment under the heading of The Law of the Charter' was devoted to that question, although the Tribunal 
stated that it was 'not strictly necessary' to do so. Further discussion of the issues already referred to is 
postponed until Chapter 18. 
It remains to mention in the present context the only published judicial authority to which the Tribunal referred 
in its Judgment: a Parte Quinn, (1942) 317 United States Reports, 1. In dealing with two defence 
submissions, the Tribunal said (p. 41): 
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the actions of sovereign States, and provides 
no punishment for individuals; and further, that where the act in question is an act of state, those who 
carry it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the 
State. In the opinion of the Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. That international law 
imposed duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been recognised. In the 
recent case of Ex Parte Quinn  (1942 317 US I), before the Supreme Court of the United States, persons 
were charged during the war with landing in the United States for purposes of spying and sabotage. 
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The Late Chief Justice Stone, speaking for the Court, said: 
'From the very beginning of its history this Court has applied the law of war as including that 
part of the law of nations which prescribes for the conduct of war, the status, rights and 
duties of enemy nations as well as enemy individuals' 
He went on to give a list of cases tried by the Courts, where individual offenders were charged with 
offences against the laws of nations, and particularly the laws of war. Many other authorities could be 
cited, but enough has been said to show that individuals can be punished for violations of international 
law. Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by 
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be 
enforced. 
The defence arguments were not sustainable in law, particularly in view of Article 7 of the Charter, and the cited 
authority is not of any significance in an analysis of the Judgment. 
THE LAW AS TO THE COMMON PLAN OR CONSPIRACY 
This section of the Judgment occupied two printed pages. 
The Tribunal obviously was conscious of the difficulty created by the joinder in Article 6 (a) of the Charter of 
three separate crimes: (1) the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, and (2) 
planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war in violation of international Treaties, agreements or 
assurances, and (3) participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of 'any of the 
foregoing'. 
Count: 1 of the indictment, by the technique of alleging conspiracy to commit three separate crimes, namely 
crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, coupled with the expansive scope of the 
concluding separate paragraph at the end of Article 6 (a) and the provision or 'individual responsibility' in the 
opening words of Article 6 (a), in reality embraced all the charges against all of the defendants. • 
In order to obviate the practical consequences of the all-embracing pleading in Count 1. the Tribunal construed 
Counts 1 and 2 in these terms (p. 42): 
Count One charges the common plan or conspiracy. Count Two charges the planning and waging of 
war [this was an abbreviated description of the actual pleading in Count 2]. The same evidence has 
been introduced to support both Counts. We shall therefore discuss both Counts together, as they are 
in substance the same. The defendants have been charged under both counts and their guilt under each 
Count must be determined. 
In fact, sixteen of the accused were charged in the indictment under each of Counts 1 and 2, regardless of other 
charges. Eight of those sixteen were convicted on both of those Counts. Four of the sixteen were acquitted under 
Count 1 hut convicted under Count 2. The remaining four of those sixteen were found not guilty under each of 
Counts 1 and 2. 
Of the six accused who were not charged under each of Counts 1 and 2, all six were charged under Count 1 but 
not under Count 2. 
In view of that statistical analysis, it is difficult to comprehend the statement in the Judgment emphasised above 
that ' they [Counts 1 and 2] are in substance the same'. 
The Tribunal's Judgment is more confusing in view of three elements of the indictment. First, Count 1, in its 
terms, charged 	the defendants with conspiracy thereunder; second, paragraph IV (G) 3 of 'Particulars of the 
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nature and development of the common plan or conspiracy' under Count 1 alleged that the defendants were guilty 
of conspiracy for the accomplishment of crimes against peace, to commit crimes against humanity and to 
commit war crimes; third, Appendix A of the indictment provided particulars against all the original twenty four 
accused under Count 1 and against seventeen of them under Count 2 (von Krupp did not stand trial (see Chapter 
10) and Ley committed suicide). 
Finally, it was not correct to state that 'The defendants have been charged under both Counts ...' (emphasis 
added). 
The Judgment did qualify the concept of the alleged conspiracy to some degree. It was stated (p. 43): 
Conspiracy is not defined in the Charter. But in the opinion of the Tribunal the conspiracy must be 
clearly outlined in its criminal purpose. It must not be too far removed from the time of decision and 
of action. The Tribunal must examine whether a concrete plan to wage war existed and determine the 
participants in that concrete plan. ... the evidence established, with certainty the existence of many 
separate plans rather than a single conspiracy embracing them all. 
Finally, the Tribunal stated its important conclusion, which, as a matter of construction (see Chapter 8), was 
patent: the Charter did not define 'as a separate crime any conspiracy except the one to commit acts of 
aggressive war' [more accurately, 'for the accomplishment' of crimes against peace, as defined in Article 6 
(a)]. The Judgment continued: 
The Tribunal will therefore disregard the charges in Count One that the defendants conspired to 
commit war crimes and crimes against humanity, and will consider only the common plan to prepare, 
initiate and wage aggressive war. [It should be noted that the words 'or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances'--Article 6 (a) of the Charter—were omitted from the 
preceding sentence, despite the fact that the latter category of crimes was included disjunctively in the 
definition of 'crimes against peace' in Article 6 (a)]. 
The submission is made respectfully that the delineation of the 'Law as to the Common Plan or Conspiracy' 
(pp. 42-44 of the Judgment) was not cohesive and highlights the problems of interpretation, and also in respect 
of the indictment, which the Tribunal recognised. 
The Judgment is in striking contrast with that of the Tribunal in the 'High Command Case', some detail of 
which is cited in Chapter 13.36 
In the available literature there is little concentration on the strictly legal significance of the inclusion of the 
conspiracy Count in the indictment. But Professor Brownlie has said: 37 
... planing and preparing for specific wars of aggression or, in some cases, holding high office with 
knowledge of aggressive plans, led to conviction [of eight accused] on Count One. This being so there 
would seem to be no reason why the responsibility could not have been adequately assessed as 
preparation and planning under Count Two. The conspiracy Count was superfluous and led to 
criticism of the notion of conspiracy as applied by the prosecution and the Tribunal, in spite of the 
fact that the Tribunal applied a very narrow test of responsibility.38 (emphasis added) 
The validity in law and the strategical prudence of including the conspiracy Count will be further considered in 
Chapter 18. 
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THE LAW RELATING TO WAR CRIMES 
The I.M.T. experienced no difficulty in its exposition of the law relating to 'war crimes', but was careful not to 
express opinions outside the strict scope of Count 3 of the indictment, despite the inclusion in that Count of 
allegations of a common plan or conspiracy to commit 'war crimes'. 
The Tribunal again recognised that it was bound by the definition in Article 6 (b) of the Charter as to what 
constituted 'war crimes', which it stated were already recognised as war crimes under international law; (Articles 
46, 50,52 and 56 of the Hague Convention of 1907, and Articles 2, 3, 4, 46 and 51 of the Geneva Convention 
of 1929). The Tribunal stated (p. 64): 
That violations of those provisions constituted crimes for which the guilty individuals were 
punishable is too well settled to admit of argument. 
Two arguments of a technical nature that the Hague Convention was not applicable were summarily dealt with 
by the Tribunal ruling that it was not necessary to decide them. 'By 1939 these rules laid down in the 
Convention were recognised by all civilised nations, and were regarded as being declaratory of the laws and 
customs of war which are referred to in Article 6 (b) of the Charter' (p. 65). 
In its treatment of the facts relating to war crimes, the Tribunal was in an impregnable position. It stated (p. 
44): 
The evidence relating to war crimes has been overwhelming, in its volume and its detail. It is 
impossible for this argment adequately to review it, or to record the mass of documentary and oral 
evidence that has been presented. The truth remains that war crimes were committed on a vast scale, 
never before seen in the history of war ... war crimes were committed when and wherever the Fuehrer 
and his close associates thought them to be advantageous. They were for the most part a result of cold 
and criminal calculation. 
... when planning to exploit the inhabitants of the occupied countries for slave labour on the very 
greatest scale, the German Government conceived it as an integral part of the war economy, and 
planned and organised this particular war crime down to the last elaborate detail. 
Other war crimes, such as the murder of prisoners of war who had escaped and been recaptured, or the 
murder of Commandos or captured airmen, or the destruction of the Soviet Commissars, were the 
result of direct orders circulated through the highest official channels. 
The Tribunal stated (p. 45) that it 'proposed to deal quite generally with the question of war crimes, and to 
refer to them later when examining the responsibility of the individual defendants in relation to them'. 
In the relevant section of the Judgment relating to the facts which it found established (pp. 44-64), the 
Tribunal dealt with most of the allegations in Count 3 of the indictment under the following headings: 
Murder and III-Treatment of Prisoners of War, 
Murder and Ill-Treatment of Civilian Population; 
Slave Labour Policy; and 
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Persecution of the Jews. 
The Tribunal did not follow the normal practice of making determinations in accordance with the ten categories 
of war crimes set forth in the very detailed particulars under Count 3. It is therefore difficult to analyse the 
judgment against the background of the pleaded facts and in accordance with the phrase of American and English 
jurisprudence: secundum alleata et probata.  39 
The Tribunal summarised its findings under Count 3 in these terms (p. 45): 
Prisoners of war were ill-treated and tortured and murdered, not only in defiance of the well-established 
rules of international law, but in complete disregard of the elementary dictates of humanity. Civilian 
populations in occupied territories suffered the same fate. Whole populations were deported to 
Germany for the purposes of slave labour upon defence works, armament production and similar tasks 
connected with the war effort. Hostages were taken in very large numbers from the civilian 
populations in all the occupied countries, and were shot as suited the German purposes. Public and 
private property was systematically plundered and pillaged in order to enlarge the resources of Germany 
at the expense of the rest of Europe. Cities and towns and villages were wantonly destroyed without 
military justification or necessity. 
Those findings are significant in the elaboration in Chapter 18 of the suggested alternatives for dealing with 
German war criminals. 
Eighteen accused were indicted under Count 3 and sixteen were convicted. The four not charged were Streicher, 
von Shirach, Schacht and von Papen. Streicher was sentenced to death by hanging for crimes against humanity; 
von Schirach was sentenced to imprisonment for twenty years, also for crimes against humanity Schacht 
and von Papen were acquitted of all charges. Of the sixteen accused who were convicted under Count 3, eleven 
were sentenced to death by hanging. Further reference to the significance of these statistics will be made in 
Chapter 18. 
THE LAW AS TO CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 
All defendants were actually charged (Count 4) with crimes against humanity except Raeder, Doenitz, Schacht 
and von Papen.4° However, Count 4 of the indictment began with the words 'All the defendants committed 
Crimes against Humanity .... The allegation of a common plan or conspiracy again was expressly incorporated 
in Count 4. Significantly, it also was pleaded that 'the prosecution will, rely upon  the facts pleaded under Count 
Three as also constituting Crimes against Humanity' (emphasis added). Some detailed particulars were pleaded 
under Count 4, but were repetitive of, or cumulative upon, the particulars under Count 3. They were also 
expressed descriptively in some cases, and phrases such as 'As above stated' and 'under paragraph VIII (A) 
above' were used. 
In an analysis of the law relating to crimes against humanity as pronounced by the I.M.T., the following 
statement by Brigadier General Taylor41 provides a succinct and convenient summary, which is adopted: 
In this section, too, the Tribunal dealt summarily (and, in the writer's view, unsatisfactorily) with the 
concept of 'crimes against humanity The laws of war are operative only in wartime; to what extent 
do atrocities committed in peace-time constitute offenses against international law? Under what 
circumstances are atrocities committed within the boundaries of a single nation—such as the prewar 
persecution of Jews, Gypsies, and others by the Nazis—matters of international judicial concern? These 
nettles the court did not grasp. An avenue of escape was found in the language of the Charter. 
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The policy of persecution, repression, and murder of civilians in Germany before the war of 
1939, who were likely to be hostile to the Government, was most ruthlessly carried out. The 
persecution of Jews during the same period is established beyond all doubt. To constitute 
Crimes against Humanity, the acts relied on before the outbreak of war must have been in 
execution of, or in connection with, any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 
The Tribunal is of the opinion that revolting and horrible as many of these crimes were, it 
has not been satisfactorily proved that they were done in execution of. or in connection 
with, any such crime [that is, as declared a crime by Article 6 (c) of the Charter under the 
description of 'crimes against humanity' either 'before or during the war]. The Tribunal 
therefore cannot make a general declaration that the acts before 1939 were Crimes against 
Humanity within the meaning of the Charter. ... 
After the outbreak of war, however, the atrocities were clearly committed in connection with 
aggression and therefore were within the IMTs jurisdiction: 
... insofar as the inhumane acts charged in the Indictment, and committed after the beginning 
of the war, did not constitute War Crimes, they were all committed in execution of, or in 
connection with, the aggressive war, and therefore constituted Crimes against Humanity 
In short, atrocities committed during the war by Germans against Germans, or against nationals of 
the "satellite" allies of Germany (such as Hungary and Rumania), although not in violation of the 
laws of war (which apply only between belligerents), were given international juridical recognition as 
crimes against humanity. Atrocities committed prior to the war, however shocking were declared, 
under the language of the Charter, to be beyond the IMTs judicial pale. 
From a strictly legal viewpoint, the Tribunal's decision to convict some defendants on both Counts 3 and 4, 
essentially on the same facts, is uestionable, even though the facts did theoretically justify a conviction on 
each Count eo nomine by virtue of the provisions of Article 6 of the Charter. 
The basic principle of English law, of which the English judges and prosecuting counsel must have 
been completely aware, has been thus expressed:42 
Where an indictment contains alternative Counts, if the jury convict on one Count, they should be 
discharged from giving a verdict on the other. 
and 
Where two charges arising out of the same incident have been preferred and one of them has merged, as 
it were, into the other, it is not proper that it should be left open to the jury to convict on both 
charges. 
It is the practice in Australia for a judge to direct a jury, in a case in which the accused is charged with two 
Counts, each of which is a separate substantive crime, but both charges arise out of the same facts, that it would 
convict (unless it acquits on both Counts) on one or the other according to its view of the evidence, but not on 
both. 
In the reasons for judgment in respect of each defendant charged under both Counts 3 and 4, the evidence relating 
to war crimes (Count 3) and crimes against humanity (Count 4) was considered together. The same joint heading 
was used in all such cases: 'War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity', except in the cases of Seyss-Inquart and 
von Neurath. In each of those cases, which involved all four Counts, there were convictions on both Counts 
Three and Four, and the evidence was analysed as a whole, with the heading 'criminal activities ...' used in each 
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case. No attempt was made in the relevant cases—even though the scope for differentiation in accordance with the 
principle stated above was limited-- to assien milt in relation to specific acts charged under one or other of the 
two counts. 
THE LAW RELATING TO THE GROUPS AND ORGANISATIONS NAMED AS 
CRIMINAL 
In Chapter 8, some details have been stated relating to the novelty, scope and consequences of the provisions of 
Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Charter, concerning what are commonly referred to as the 'indicted organisations'. In 
this section of this chapter attention will be focussed only on the judgment of the Tribunal; comment will be 
made in Chapter 18 with respect to the whole concept of this part of the indictment. 
The I.M.T. was at pains to make it manifest that it appreciated the significance of the character of the discretion 
vested in it by the relevant Articles. 43 
There can be no criticism of the I.M.T. for its approach to the 'novel' criminal process upon which the Charter 
required it to embark. The decision that it should do so was an executive one, characterised by political 
determination to destroy the organisational structures which had constituted the 'central core' of the alleged 
common plan or conspiracy. 
The 1.M.T. was careful to mitigate the possible harsh consequences of a declaration of criminality and to make 
recommendations of an ameliorative character, as shown by the extracts from the Judgment cited in Chapter 9. 
Nor can there be any valid criticism of the actual decisions in the individual cases. Of the 'indicted organisations' 
named in the indictment, declarations of criminality (with or without qualifications) were made in respect of the 
Leadership Corps of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo and SD (both considered together) and the SS. No such 
declaration was made, however, in relation to the SA, the Reich Cabinet or the General Staff and High 
Command. It is submitted that the reasoning in all six cases cannot be impugned. 
THE FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF INDIVIDUAL ACCUSED 
It would not serve any purpose sought to be achieved by this study to canvass the cases of all twenty two accused 
who stood trial. In many cases, guilt in terms of the Charter was established beyond any possible doubt; in a 
small number of cases the decisions were borderline. 
Since Brigadier General Taylor was one of the American Associate Trial Counsel, his views should be 
repeated: 
The concluding portion of the judgment, dealing with the guilt or innocence of the individual 
defendants, is perhaps the least satisfying part of the opinion. The decision in each case required that 
the general principles laid down earlier in the judgment be interpreted and applied to a particular set of 
facts established by the proof. With twenty two such sets, some of which presented very delicate 
problems, the I.M.T. was unable to avoid a number of pitfalls, and troublesome inconsistencies are 
readily apparent. 
The central feature of the Judgment is the deliberate decision of the Tribunal that the charges under Count 2 (wars 
of aggression) should have precedence over the dubious allegation of conspiracy under Count 1. The statistics 
presented previously in this chapter reflect that decision. 
The hard-line Soviet attitude found expression in the dissenting opinion of the Soviet member of the Tribunal, 
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Major General Jurisprudence Nikitcllenko, in respect of the acquittal of Schacht, von Papen and Fritzsche. the 
sentence of life imprisonment imposed on Hess, and the decisions not to declare criminal the Reich Cabinet and 
the General Staff and High Command The reasoning of Major General Nikitchenko was expressed logically and 
in detail. It is an example of the manner in which Anglo-American juries often are unable to agree with respect 
to the facts of a case, subject to the law as judicially directed. There could be no valid criticism of the Russian 
dissent. 
In the opinion of the writer, the most controversial statement in the Judgment concerned the accused Speer, 
who was acquitted under Counts 1 and 2, but was convicted of Counts 3 and 4 and sentenced to imprisonment for 
twenty years, a sentence which he served in full. The Tribunal stated (at p. 122) 
The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer's activities do not amount to initiating, planning, or preparing 
wars of aggression or conspiring to that end. He became the head of the armament industry well after 
all the wars had been commenced and were under way. His activities in charge of German Armament 
Production were in aid of the war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the 
waging of war; but the Tribunal is not prepared to find that such activities involve engaging 
in the common plan to wage aggressive war as charged under Count 1 or waging aggressive war as 
charged under Count II. 
The Tribunal, having found Speer guilty under Counts 3 and 4, set out in its judgment (at p. 124) mitigating 
circumstances on which it based its sentence. A consideration of the transcript of Speer's evidence affords an 
insight into his high intellectual capacity. He obviously impressed the Tribunal with his proclaimed 
sincerity. The Russian representative did not dissent. 
The Judgment bore the stamp of many pens. It lacked the imprint of juridicial sagacity. It 
unnecessarily attempted to defend some of the provisions of the London Agreement and Charter. These, and 
other, aspects of the Judgment will be discussed in Chapter 18. 
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NOTES 
1. The Judgment (with the dissenting opinion of the Soviet member) is set forth in the document Cmd. 
6964, His Majesty's Stationery Office. London. It is hereafter cited as 1.M.T. Judgment'. The following 
footnote 30 at p. 262 in the monograph by Brigadier General Taylor (see Chapter 8, note 18) is of 
interest: 'Following the practice of many American appellate tribunals, the United States member and 
alternate equipped themselves with legal assistants of very high calibre. A large share of credit for the 
judgment should be given to the able supporting work of these assistants, among them Professor Quincy 
Wright of the University of Chicago. Herbert Wechsler, former Assistant Attorney General and Professor 
of Law, at Columbia University, James H. Rowe, former Assistant to the Attorney General, and Capt. 
Adrian L. Fisher, now General Counsel of the Atomic Energy Commission. Lt. Col. A.M.S. Neave, 
B.A.O.R., of the Tribunal's Secretariat, also made a significant contribution.' (Lt. Col. Neave was the 
author of Nuremberg ; A Personal Record of the Trial of the Major Nazi War Criminals in 1945-6, 
Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1978.) 
2. The expression 'Nazi Party' is used to designate compendiously the political parties of which Hitler was 
the leader, and special bodies affiliated with them, commencing with the German Labour Party (1920), 
followed by the National Sozialistiche Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP) (1921). 
3. See Archbold, Criminal Pleading. Evidence and Practice, 41st edn., p. 867. The scope of this principle 
was considered by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in R. v. Ratten (1971) A.C., 378: 'In the 
context of the law of evidence, the expression res Restae may be used ... when a situation of fact (e.g. a 
killing) is being considered, the question may arise: When does the situation begin and when does it end? 
It may be artificial to confine the evidence to the firing of the gun or the insertion of the knife, without 
knowing, in a broader sense, what was happening'. See also O'Leary v. R, (1946) 73 C.L.R. 566; R. v. 
Bastin, (1971) Crim. L.R. 529. 
4. For example, in the judgment against Raeder, the Tribunal said (p. 111): 'He admits the Navy violated the 
Versailles Treaty, insisting it was, "a matter of honour for every man" to do so, and alleges that the 
violations were for the most part minor and Germany built less than her allowable strength'. 
5. See the references in individual cases discussed in Chapter 13. 
6. Oppenheim, International Law, vol. II, 7th edn., 1952 (Lauterpacht, ed.), Chapter VI, Part IV, pp. 566- 
587. (See the review of this edition by F.A. Mann in (1952) 29 B.Y.I.L., Reviews of Books, pp. 515- 
517). 
7. Ibid., pp. 579-581. 
8. Ibid., p. 581, footnote 1. 
9. Ibid., pp. 585-586. 
10. ibid., pp. 177-197. 
11. ibid., pp. 579-580, footnote 5. 
12. Taylor, op. cit., pp. 263-264. 
13. Calvocoressi, Nuremberg, the Facts, the Law and the Consequences, Chatto and Windus, London, 
1947, pp. 30-44. 
14. Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1963, pp. 167-194 
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and pp. 195-213. 
15. Morgan, formerly Deputy Adjutant-General and Vice-Chairman of the British Government 'War Crimes' 
Committee of 1918-1919, The Great Assize, London, 1948. 
16. Ibid., Preface, pp. iv to vii. 
17. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 
18. See Articles 1 and 13 of the Allied Declaration of 5 June 1945, Cmd. 6648. 
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to assume that international or military courts which will try these individuals will not exercise 
appropriate standards of justice. This is a far-reaching and novel procedure. Its application, unless properly 
safeguarded, may produce great injustice. 
Article 9, it should be noted, uses the words The Tribunal may declare' so that the Tribunal is vested with 
discretion as to whether it will declare any organisation criminal. This discretion is a judicial one and does 
not permit arbitrary action, but should be exercised in accordance with well settled legal principles, one of 
the most important of which is that criminal guilt is personal, and that mass punishments should be 
avoided. If satisfied of the criminal guilt of any organisation or group, this Tribunal should not hesitate to 
declare it to be criminal because the theory of "group criminality' is new, or because it might be unjustly 
applied, by some subsequent tribunals. On the other hand, the Tribunal should, make such declaration of 
criminality so far as possible in a manner to insure that innocent persons will not be punished. 
44. 	Taylor, op. cit., p. 268. 
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CHAPTER 12 
	
TILE DEFENCE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of respondeat superior as a defence to a criminal charge is desparate from any issue which may 
arise concerning the jurisdiction of the tribunal before which the trial takes place. However, in a study of the 
jurisdictional basis of the Nuremberg trial the plea of obedience to superior orders has some relevance, at least 
indirectly, for a number of reasons. 
First, it is relevant to a consideration of the London Aereement and Charter. Article 8 of the Charter negated, so 
far as responsibility was concerned, the applicability of the plea of respondeat superior without any qualification 
and confined its relevance to the possible mitigation of punishment. 
Second. many of those accused at Nuremberg expressly relied on the defence and in the course of the trial 
questions arose concerning the evidentiary basis for reliance on the plea as well as the legal effect of Article 8 of 
the Charter. By this confluence of factual and legal issues, one element of the question of procedural fairness was 
forged. 
Third, the United Nations General Assembly, at its 55th plenary meeting on 11 December 1946, in resolution 95 
(I), unanimously affirmed 'the principles of international law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal'. 1 Irrespective of the status in international law of such an affirmation. 
it did in fact amount to a unanimous endorsement of the Nuremberg judgment insofar as the Tribunal went 
beyond Article 8 of the Charter and made some general pronouncements concerning the doctrine of respondeat 
superior (see later in this chapter). 
Fourth, in his Report to the President of the United States of America in June 1945, Mr. Justice Jackson, Chief 
of Counsel for the United States, anticipated the significance of the plea of superior orders in the forth-coming 
trials when he said: 2 
With the doctrine of immunity of a head of state usually is coupled another, that orders from an official 
superior protect one who obeys them. It will be noticed that the combination of these two doctrines 
means that nobody is responsible. Society as modernly organized cannot tolerate so broad an area of 
official irresponsibility. There is doubtless a sphere in which the defense of obedience to superior orders 
should prevail. If a conscripted or enlisted soldier is put on a firing squad, he should not be held 
responsible for the validity of the sentence he carries out. But the case may be greatly altered where one 
has discretion because of rank or the latitude of his orders. And of course, the defense of superior orders 
cannot apply in the case of voluntary participation in a criminal or conspiratorial organization, such as 
the Gestapo or the S.S.  An accused should be allowed to show the facts about superior orders. The  
Tribunal can then determine whether they constitute a defense or merely extenuating circumstances, or 
perhaps carry no weight at all. (emphasis added) 
Some writers appear to have overlooked the fact that the last sentence of the extract cited from the Jackson 
Report expressly recognised that he then considered that the plea of respondeat superior essentially 
involves factual issues, the resolution of which may establish a complete defence. 3 
However, the significant point is that in the interval between the time of his Report to the President and the 
commencement of the trial, 'a new leaf was turned'.4 In his opening speech, Jackson emphasised that under 
Article 8 of the Charter, in the formulation of which he had been involved, no defence based on obedience to 
orders could be entertained, although in the following passage he introduced a qualification, but without being 
specific except in the case of a firing squad:5 
Of course, we do not argue that the circumstances under which one commits an act should be 
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disregarded in judging its legal effect. A conscripted private on a firing squad cannot expect to hold an 
inquest on the validity of the execution. The Charter implies common sense limits to liability, just as 
it places common sense limits upon immunity. 
The signifcance of that qualification, especially the reference to 'implications' in the Charter, will be considered 
later in this chapter. 
CONFLICTING DOCTRINES : SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS 
The doctrine of tesgord_eati 	superior 
Expressed to its full extent, the doctrine of respondent superior means that a member of the armed forces of a 
country who commits a war crime in obedience to the order of a hierarchical superior is automatically relieved of 
responsibility, unconditionally and without qualification. The superior alone bears the responsibility. 
Decided cases and the writings of learned authors in the present century some of which are discussed in this 
chapter, justify the assertion that the doctrine has little modern support, especially since the Nuremberg 
judgment. I prefer to explain the shift in adherence to the doctrine on the basis of a realisation, seldom actually 
expressed, of the enormity of the crimes to which attempts were made to apply it at Nuremberg, rather than to 
acknowledge that it has been due to an acceptance of the legal reasoning expressed in the Nuremberg judgment in 
so far as the reasoning went beyond the 'decisive and binding' effect of Article 8 of the Charter. 
In contrast to the principle of respondeat superior, a number of other doctrines had been advocated prior to the 
Nuremberg trial, some of the more popular of which will be considered in this section. 5a 
The theory of absolute liability 
Professor Dinstein has expressed the theory of absolute liability in the following terms: 6 
The doctrine of absolute liability, or as the French term it rather derisively, les baionnettes 
intelligentes, ... in accordance with which a soldier must examine and weigh every superior order that 
is given to him ... has been advocated and sometimes gained acceptance. If it is an order to perform a 
criminal act, he must refuse to carry it out, and it is impossible to punish him for the refusal. If he 
obeys the order, he does so at his own risk. The fact of obedience to orders will not save him from 
criminal conviction. 
The first two theories appear diametrically opposed, although Professor Dinstein claims that 'neither 
"solution" overcomes the dilemma' [that is, of the individual serviceman] because 'the first doctrine is 
incompatible with the interests of criminal law, the second is inconsistent with the demands of military 
discipline'.7 
It should be noted that it is not universally accepted that there necessarily is conflict between the first two 
doctrines. For example, Professor Johnson, then Challis Professor of International Law at the University of 
Sydney, stated: 8 
A curious provision in Queen's Regulations and Orders in Canada (Chapter 19) lays down that 'every 
officer and man shall obey the orders of officers and men who are senior to him', but goes on to say 
that 'if an officer or man is given an order that he considers to be in conflict with the National Defence 
Act, QR and 0, or general or particular orders binding on him, he shall point out the conflict orally, or 
in writing if the order does not require immediate obedience, to the superior by whom the order was 
given. If the superior still directs him to obey the order, he shall do so'. Whoever drafted this 
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provision was clearly doing so in an attempt to resolve Professor Dinstein's dilemma, and doing so in 
a manner which may be considered appropriate to an army in a democratic country in the present age. 
Whether such a system would be feasible on active service is open to doubt. For it would be a mistake 
to assume that the principle of military discipline and the principle of compliance with rules of 
international law are necessarily in conflict. Indeed situations may arise in which there is a conflict, 
but in general, as is quite clear from the Hague Regulations and other enactments, international, law 
relies heavily on military discipline for the enforcement of its rules. 
The 'manifest illegality principle' 
In an attempt to devise a compromise between the two opposing extreme doctrines, there emerged a principle 
which Professor Dinstein terms 'the manifest illegality principle'; that is, that 'the general rule is that a soldier 
committing an offence in obedience to superior orders is relieved of his responsibility for his wrongdoing. If, 
however, the illegality of the order is clear on the face of it, that is, manifestly and palpably, the soldier must 
refuse to obey it or else pay the penalty'. 9 
Professor Dinstein finds support for the principle in a provision of the Criminal Code Ordinance 1936 of Israel, 
s. 19 (b) of which states: 
A person is not criminally responsible for an act or omission if he does or omits to do the act under 
any of the following circumstances, that is to say: 
(b) 
	
in obedience to the order of a competent authoFity which he is bound by law to obey, unless 
the order is manifestly unlawful. 1 ° 
The connotation of the word 'manifestly' in that statutory context was explained in the judgment of the Israel 
District Military Court in the Kafr Kassem Case (first instance) in these terms: 11 
The distinguishing mark of a 'manifestly unlawful order should be displayed like a black flag over the 
order given, as a warning reading 'Prohibited!' Not formal unlawfulness, hidden or half-hidden, not 
unlawfulness which is discernible only to the eyes of legal experts is important here, but a 
conspicuous and flagrant breach of the law, a certain and imperative unlawfulness appearing on the 
face of the order itself, a clearly criminal character of the order or of the acts ordered, an unlawfulness 
which pierces the eye and revolts the heart, if the eye is not blind and the heart not obtuse or 
corrupted-that is the extent of 'manifest' unlawfulness required to override the duty of obedience of a 
soldier, and to charge him with criminal responsibility for his acts. 
The Military Court of Appeal referred to that passage as 'striking' and 'deserving to be heeded and remembered'; 
further, it said that 'the manifest illegality principle' is 'something like a golden mean', as well as 'the best 
attainable'. 12 
Some judicial consideration of the 'manifest illegality' principle 
The circumstances in which the German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht) tried alleged war criminals in Leipzig 
after World War I are well known and have frequently been stated in works relating to the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. By Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles, the Allied Powers had authority to bring German war 
criminals to trial and the German Government was required to surrender the accused. It refused to do so on 
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the ground that it feared the consequences of the reaction of the German population to such action. The political 
compromise was that the German Supreme Court would try German alleged war criminals. 
Professor Dinstein has discussed a number of such cases, in which 'the Court tackled the question of obedience 
to orders'. 13 
The case a Robert Neumarm. 14 The case is of doubtful relevance. The accused, a trained soldier, was charged on 
17 counts of physical illtreatment of British prisoners during 1917 and on one count of insulting a prisoner, in 
breach of the Military Penal Code and the Imperial Penal Code. One charge only is apposite in this context. The 
facts as found by the Court were as follow. Some 24 prisoners on night shift deliberately refused to work. In 
order to compel obedience, a non-commissioned officer, acting on the instructions of the camp commandant, 
ordered the sentries 'to fall in and attack'. This order was carried out by the use of rifle butts. Some prisoners were 
wounded. The accused participated in the attack. He fell on one prisoner, and belabored him with fists and feet. In 
reasons expressed in less than half a page, the Court held that the accused was not responsible for the events: 'He 
was covered by the order of his superior, which he was bound to obey. According to s. 47 of the Military Penal 
Code a subordinate can only be criminally responsible under such circumstances, when he knows that his orders 
involve an act which in civil or miltary crime. This was not the case here. ... As matters stood there could be no 
doubt of the legality of the order. Unless there is to be irreparable damage to military discipline, even in a 
body of prisoners disorderly tendencies have to be nipped in the bud relentlessly and they have to be stamped out 
by all the means at the disposal of the commanding officer and if necessary even by the use of arms.' 
Unlike Professor Dinstein,15 I do not consider that this case in any significant way illuminates the 
'manifest illegality' principle, in particular the criteria for determining whether or not an order is 
'manifestly' illegal The Court simply ruled that the order was, in the circumstances, legal. Consequently it 
acquitted the accused. 
The Dover Castle' Case. 16 The accused, a First Lieutenant in the German Navy, was a submarine commander. 
He was charged with having torpedoed the English hospital ship Dover Castle without warning and with having 
sunk her with exceptional brutality. Six men were killed. The accused admitted the basic facts, but pleaded that 
he merely carried out an order of the German Admiralty, his superior authority. The German Government had 
claimed that enemy governments were using hospital ships for military purposes in breach of the 10th Hague 
Convention. According to the judgment of the Court, the German Government 'gave proof in support of its 
assertions'. The German Admiralty gave written notice in two memoranda of its intention to take reprisals: '... 
enemy hospital ships in the Mediterranean would be regarded as vessels of war and forthwith attacked'. 
Accordingly, the German Admiralty issued an order that, subject to certain exceptions which are not relevant, 
'every hospital ship on the routes; named is to be attacked forthwith'. The order was communicated to the 
accused. Previously the two memoranda had been brought to his attention. 
In its judgment the German Supreme Court said: 17 
It is a military principle that the subordinate is bound to obey the orders of his superiors. This duty of 
obedience is of considerable importance from the point of view of the criminal law. Its consequence is 
that, when the execution of a service order involves an offence against the criminal law, the superior 
giving the order is alone responsible. 
This is in accordance with the terms of the German law, s. 47, para. I of the Military Penal Code. It 
also accords with the legal principles of all other civilized states.... 
The Admiralty Staff was the highest service authority over the accused. He was in duty bound to obey 
their orders in service matters. So far as he did that, he was free from criminal responsibility. 
Therefore he cannot be held responsible for sinking the hospital ship Dover Castle according to orders. 
Under s. 47 of the Military Penal Code quoted above, there are two exceptional cases in which the 
question of the punishment of a subordinate who has acted in conformity with his orders can arise. He 
can in the first place be held responsible if he has gone beyond the orders given him. In the present 
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case the accused has not gone beyond his orders. 
According to s. 47 of the Military Penal Code No. 2, a subordinate who acts in conformity with 
orders is also liable to punishment as an accomplice, when he knows that his superiors have ordered 
him to do acts which involve a civil or military crime or misdemeanor. There has been no case of this 
here. 
The judgment is open to the criticism that it expounded principles which were extraneous and thereby 
introduced unnecessary complications. In the extract cited above there are passages which, on the facts so 
clearly established, were °biter. 
Again, the Dover Castle Case is not an illustration of the general rule that 'a subordinate, committing an 
offence in obedience to superior orders does not incur criminal responsibility'l 8 nor does the case involve the 
doctrine of respondeat superior. The Court found that the accused believed the reprisal was legitimate. It is 
implicit in the judgment that the Court considered, on the evidence, that it was in fact legitimate. 
Therefore there was no 'crime. As was stated in the judgment in the 'Einsatzgruppen Case', one of the twelve 
'Subsequent Proceedings conducted at Nuremberg in the years 1946-49, 'Unless it is established that the deed in 
question is a crime, then naturally there needs to be no explanation for its commission'. 
The 'Llandovery Castle' Case.  Despite the extensive bibliography relating to this case 19 and the detailed 
analysis of the judgment by Professor Dinstein, 2° I consider the case has been widely misunderstood and that it 
represents a simple and uncomplicated application of well-settled law. Indeed a distinctive feature in that the two 
German naval officers who were charged with homicide were convicted only as accessories to acts of killing by 
another. 
The following facts were found established by the German Supreme Court. Until 1916 the steamer Llandovery 
Castle  had been used for the transport of troops. In that year she was commissioned by the British Government 
to carry wounded and sick Canadian soldiers home to Canada from the European theatre of war. Thereafter she 
was exclusively used for the transport of sick and wounded. She never again carried troops and never had taken 
munitions on board. At the end of June 1918 the vessel was on her way back to England from Halifax after 
having carried sick and wounded there. In the evening of 27 June 1918 the steamer was sunk in the Atlantic 
Ocean by a torpedo fired from a German U-boat, the commander of which was First Lieutenant Patzig. 
Subsequently he was promoted captain. At the time of the trial his whereabouts were unknown. Of those on 
board the vessel-- crew, medical personnel and nurses-234 were drowned and only 24 were saved. 
The accused Dithmar was the first officer of the watch and the accused Boldt the second. In accordance with 
international law, German U-boats were forbidden to torpedo hospital ships, to which category the Llandovery 
Castle  belonged. The German Naval Command had given orders that hospital ships were only to be sunk within 
the limits of a certain barred area. 'However', it was stated in the judgment, 'this area was a lone way from the 
point we have now under consideration. Patzig knew this and was aware that by torpedoeine the Llandovery 
Castle  he was acting against orders. But he was of the opinion, founded on various information ... that, on the 
enemy side, hospital ships were being used for transporting troops and combatants, as well as munitions. He, 
therefore, presumed that, contrary to international law, a similar use was being made of the Llandoverv Castle. In 
particular, he seems to have expected ... that: she had American airmen on board. Acting on this suspicion, he 
decided to torpedo the ship, in spite of his having been advised not to do so by the accused Dithmar [and a 
witness].' 
The vessel sank in about 10 minutes. Some lifeboats were successfully lowered. However, the 24 occupants of 
one lifeboat were the only survivors. None of the other several lifeboats launched was subsequently traced. The 
Court made a finding that after the torpedoeing of the ship 'the lifeboats of the Llandovery Castle were fired on in 
order to sink them' The judgment stated: 21 
The Court finds that it is beyond all doubt that, even though no witness had direct observation of the 
effect of the fire, Patzig attained his object so far as two of the boats were concerned... For the firing 
on the lifeboats only those persons can be held responsible who at the time were on the deck of the 
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U-boat; namely Patzig, the two accused and the chief boatswain's mate. Patzig gave the decisive order, 
which was carried out without demur in virtue of his position as commander. ... The act of Patzig is 
homicide, according to para. 212 of the Penal Code. By sinking the lifeboats he purposely killed the 
people who were in them. ... The firing on the boats was an offence against the law of nations ... in 
war at sea, the killing of shipwrecked people, who have taken refuge in lifeboats, is forbidden ... The 
rule of international law, which is here involved, is simple and is universally known. No possible doubt 
can exist with regard to the question of its applicability. The Court must in this instance affirm Patzig's 
guilt of killing contrary to international law. The two accused knowingly assisted Patzig in this killing 
by the very fact of their having accorded him their support. It is not proved that they were in agreement 
with his intentions. The decision rested with Patzig as the commander. The others who took part in this 
deed carried out his orders. It must be accepted that the deed was carried out on his responsibility, the 
accused only wishing to support him therein. A direct act of killing, following a deliberate intention to 
kill, is not proved against the accused. They are, therefore, only liable to punishment as accessories. 
(Para. 49 of the Penal Code). 
Patzie's order does not free the accused from guilt. It is true that according to para. 47 of the Military 
Penal Code, if the execution of an order in the ordinary course of duty involves such a violation of the 
law as is punishable, the superior officer issuing such an order is alone responsible. According to No. 2, 
however, the subordinate obeying such an order is liable to punishment, if it was known to him that the 
order of the superior involved the infringement of civil or military law. This applies in the case of the 
accused. 
It is certainly to be urged in favor of the military subordinates, that they are under no obligation to 
question the order of their superior officer, and they can count upon its legality. But no such confidence 
can be held to exist, if such an order is universally known to everybody, including also the accused, to 
be without any doubt whatever against the law. This happens only in rare and exceptional cases. But 
this case was precisely one of them, for in the present instance, it was perfectly clear to the accused that 
killing defenceless people in the life-boats could be nothing else but a breach of the law. As naval 
officers by profession they were well aware, as the naval expert Saalwachter has strikingly stated, that 
one is not legally authorized to kill defenceless people. They well knew that this was the case here. 
They quickly found out the facts by questioning the occupants in the boats when these were stopped. 
They could only have gathered, from the order given by Patzig, that he wished to make use of his 
subordinates to carry out a breach of the law. They should, therefore, have refused to obey. As they did 
not do so, they must be punished.22 
The correct view of the judgment is that. under German national law, Patzig was guilty of homicide. The two 
accused were accessories. It is true that they acted under orders, but the Court found that they knew their 
actions were unlawful under international law. In these circumstances, a verdict of guilty was inevitable, but the 
criminal liability was impose by virtue of international law. 
The facts of the case were so simply and clearly established that it should not be regarded as authority for any 
proposition other than adherence, on the facts, to settled legal principle. In particular, it did no more than refer 
to the 'manifest illegality' principle in a case in which there was a finding of actual knowledge by the accused of 
the illegality of the acts which were the subject of orders by a superior. 23 
The Stenger and Cruscius Case.24 The selected list of 45 persons submitted for trial by the German Supreme 
Court at Leipzig included two German officers, General Stenger and Major Cruscius. General Stenger, 
Commander of one of the armies in France, was charged with having issued an order that no quarter should be 
afforded to French prisoners of war. Major Cruscius was charged with having carried out this order, resulting in 
the murder of large numbers of French prisoners, some of whom he shot with his own revolver. Stenger was 
acquitted on the basis of the Court's finding that Cruscius had misinterpreted the order given by Stenger. 
Cruscius was acquitted of most of the charges because of the Court's view that he was not 'master of his nerves'. 
He was convicted on one charge of manslaughter by negligence, for which the sentence was imprisonment for 
two years. The public support for the two accused strikingly demonstrated the farcical character of the Leipzig 
trials.25 No legal principle should be derived from the cases of Stenger or Cruscitts. 26 
Professor Dinstein epitomized what he described as 'a clear-cut and unified approach to the question of obedience 
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to superior orders' demonstrated by the Leipzig trials- excluding the _Stenger and Cruscius Case, in the form of 
the following propositions: 
(1) As a general rule, a subordinate committine a criminal act pursuant to an order should not incur 
responsibility for it. 
(2) This rule is inapplicable if the subordinate knew that the order entailed the commission of a 
crime and obeyed it nonetheless. 
(3) To determine whether the subordinate was aware of the fact that he had been ordered to perform a 
criminal act, the Court may use the auxiliary test of manifest illegality. 
The first proposition is firmly settled. 
I would prefer to combine the second and third propositions and express them thus:- 
(2) 	This rule is inapplicable either (a) if it is established that the subordinate had actual knowledge that the 
order entailed the commission of a crime but obeyed it nonetheless (as in the case of the Llandovery 
Castle) or (b) if such knowledge is imputed to him because the order entailed the commission of an act 
which was manifestly unlawful but which he obeyed nonetheless. 28 
It should be noted that Professor Dinstein concluded his consideration of the Leipzig trials by stating: 
Clearly the Reichsgericht in Leipzig applied and interpreted principles of German national law, and not 
of international law, in dealing with the problem of obedience to orders. But the Court gave 
expression to a certain way of solving the problem, and the question that we ought to ask ourselves 
now is whether the same may also serve the needs of international law. 29 
This question will be considered in the conclusion to this chapter. 
The mens rea principle 
Professor Dinstein perceived a possible solution to what he termed 'the quagmire of the problems pertaining to 
the subject of obedience to superior orders' in the application of the two elements of mistake of law and 
compulsion. 
He did not express any firm view as to whether international law recognised or repudiated the maxim itmorantia 
juris non excusat. But he asserted that both the fact of obedience to orders and the factor of compulsion could be 
regarded as factual aspects of another defence--that of mistake of law. 
His next step was to reject the doctrine of respondent superior and the doctrine of absolute liability; further, 
he rejected 'intermediate solutions which deny to the fact of obedience to orders the status of an automatic a 
priori defence but nevertheless recognise it as a defence mr se under appropriate circumstances'. 3° He 
continued:31 
Such intermediate solutions are endorsed by many writers, who contend, expressly or by implication, 
that obedience to superior orders should be accepted as a defence, though only when the orders involved 
are not manifestly illegal, or when the offender complying with the orders acts without being aware of 
the fact that he was ordered to perform an illegal act or when the offender acts under compulsion. 
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Professor Dinstein then developed his reasoning by equiparating the defence of mistake of fact with mistake 
of law. In the context of those defences, such equiparation is valid both on principle and by precedent. 
Thus Professor Glueck stated: 32 
... The defence of ignorance or mistake of fact is of course also available to soldiers, and might indeed 
be used often as a device for mitigating the rigors of the superior-orders defence, by using the fact of 
obedience to orders as a stepping-stone to proof of ignorance or mistake of fact. 
And Sir James Fitzlames Stephen emphasised the device thus: 
... the fact that he did so act, and the fact that the order was apparently lawful are in all cases relevant to 
the question whether he believed, in good faith and on reasonable grounds, in the existence of a state of 
facts which would have justified which he did apart from such orders. 33 
There is abundant precedent, arising from trials before military and national courts in a number of 
countries, that mistake of fact as excluding mens rea if established to the Competent tribunal, entitles an 
accused person to acquittal. Some of the cases are discussed below. 
From a juridical viewpoint an established relevant mistake of fact is part of the totality of the evidence upon 
which the essential mens rea of the accused is judged. The asserted mistake of fact may be accompanied by a 
superior order, or even arise out of the form of such an order, but the existence of the combination is not 
necessary. 
The Scuttled U-Boats Case. 34 An engineer officer of a German U-boat, Gerhard Grumpelt, was charged before a 
British Military Court at Hamburg, Germany, on 12 and 13 February 1946 with the war crime of having scuttled 
two U-boats which had been surrendered by the German Government to the Allies. He claimed that he was not 
aware of the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, since these had not been notified to him in any way, and 
further that he had received intimation that a general order for the scuttling of all U-boats should be put into 
effect, while at the same time not hearing of any countermanding order, which had in fact been given before the 
scuttling. 
The summing up by the Judge Advocate was to a large extent confined to the facts of the case and centred 
predominantly around the question of the mens rea of the accused, on which his defence entirely depended. 
The Judge Advocate put the issue to the Court in these terms: 35 
Are you satisfied that the man's state of mind at the time in question was this: 'I honestly believed I had 
an order; I did not know anything about any surrender; it was not for me to inquire why the higher 
command should be scuttling submarines; I honestly, conscientiously and genuinely believed I had been 
given a lawful command to scuttle these submarines and I have carried out that command and I cannot 
be held responsible'. ... The defence suggests if you look at the evidence as a whole that that is a 
reasonable possibility ... in my view, if the accused did not have any knowledge of those terms [of 
surrender] and he did believe honestly that he had an order of this kind and that he carried it out ... you 
will be entitled to acquit him. 
The Court rejected the plea of mistake of fact because of its view of the evidence and convicted the accused. 
The findings were confirmed by higher authority. 35a 
The Almelo tria1.36 The accused were charged before a British military court at Almelo, Holland, on 24-26 
November 1945 with war crimes. The accused SI was in command of a party which killed a British officer 
prisoner of war and a Dutch civilian who had been living in hiding in a Dutch home. The accused S2 fired the 
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actual shots, and two other accused H and W assisted. One of the pleas advanced was the absence of mens tea. 
The evidence in support of the plea was tenuous. It was suggested that the accused could reasonably believe the 
British officer was a spy, connected with the Dutch underground, and that the Dutch civilian had committed war 
treason. 
In summing up the case, the Judge Advocate said that 'if the Court felt that circumstances were such that a 
reasonable man might have believed that this officer had been tried according to law, and that they were carrying 
out a proper judicial legal execution, then it would be open to the Court to acquit the accused'. 37 
In the event, the Court rejected the plea based on the absence of mens rea and all four accused were found guilty. 
The trial of Oscar Hans. 38 The case was heard at first instance by the Lagmarmsrett in Norway in January 1947. 
The accused, a member of the SS, had been employed by the Sipo in Oslo and was in charge of death sentences 
passed by German authorities. He was charged on five Counts of having executed Norwegian patriots; two of the 
Counts included the execution of Russian citizens. The executions involved in the first two Counts were, it was 
claimed, acts of reprisal for the killing of two German policemen and for several attempts at sabotage. The 
executions to which the remaining three Counts related were the result of decisions of the Sipo and were carried 
out without trial. 
The Lagmannsrett acquitted the accused on Count 1 of the Indictment as it was held that at that time the 
accused may have been in justifiable ignorance of the fact that the executions were decided upon without previous 
trial. The Court stressed the fact that on that occasion the Untersuchungsfuhrer had attended the execution and had 
read out the contents of the documents to the victims, a circumstance which might have given the accused the 
impression that sentence had been passed by the court. 
As to Count 2, the prosecution had already before the trial decided to withdraw the charge involved. 
The Court acquitted the accused of the execution of the Russian citizens mentioned in Counts 4 and 5, as the 
accused might have assumed that those sentences had been passed by the Wehrmacht's courts-martial. 
As regards the executions of Norwegian victims referred to in Counts 3, 4 and 5 of the Indictment, the 
Lagmannsrett held that the acts could be regarded as being at variance with the laws and customs of war. The 
Court thereupon proceeded to examine whether the mental element of crimes had also been present. 
The accused said that during his office he had always been aware of the fact that no execution could legally be 
carried out without a trial. After having heard the evidence submitted to the Court, he realised that some of the 
executions had in fact been carried out without previous trial. He pleaded, however, that he could not see how he 
could be held responsible for having acted bona fide on orders of his superiors. He had received the execution 
orders from the superior personally and they had all stated that the condemned had been 'sentenced' to death. He 
had been confident that his superior would not give him orders which were in any way contrary to law. 
A majority of the Court rejected the plea. Two of the judges dissented and voted for the acquittal of the accused 
on all Counts. 
On appeal to the Supreme Court, which was constituted by nine judges, it unanimously quashed the verdict and 
sentence. Its basic reason was that the accused could not be found guilty unless it had been shown that he 
was actually aware that the victims had not been tried and sentenced according to law; constructive 
knowledge was not sufficient. 39 
It should be noted in the context that although the question of superior orders entered into the trial, it appears that 
such orders were regarded as relevant only in so far as they created, or helped to create, a mistake of fact in 
the mind of the accused; the duress aspect of superior orders was not considered by the Supreme Court. 40 
The trial of Karl Buck and Ten Others4I This trial by a British Military Court at Wuppertal, Germany, on 6-10 
May 1946, is relevant to the defence of mistake of fact. Other details have been omitted. 
197 
The eleven accused were charged with having committed war crimes by killing ten prisoners of war and four 
French nationals. The editor of the report included in it the following note: 42 
Counsel acting for the accused in general pointed out that in Germany there had been not only courts-
martial hut also 'so-called S.S. and police courts for German persons and members of the S.S.'. He 
claimed that the interrogations of the victims by [a German officer], on whose reports [the executions 
were ordered], constituted a trial by the Security Police. The accused, he claimed, had had no other 
information on the matter than that the prisoners had been tried and condemned, and had acted on that 
assumption. They had 'neither the sense for technicalities nor the mental abilities to look deeper into 
this case'. The Prosecutor, on the other hand, submitted that the obliteration of all traces of the 
crime and the steps taken by the accused to suppress all knowledge of the crime belied any 
contention that they thought that they were performing a legal execution. Lawful executions 
did not take place in woods, nor were those shot buried in bomb craters with their valuables, 
clothing and identity markings removed. ... could it have been shown that a bona fide impression 
had existed in the minds of the accused that the execution was the consequence of a trial in which 
the victims had been legally condemned to death, the plea of mistake of fact, which the 
Defence raised, might well have been effective. In the circumstances of the case, however, the Court 
did not see fit to give effect to it. 
The Stalag Luft fflCase 43 This notorious case, which involved the execution of 50 escaped Allied officer 
prisoners, was important in that the defence of the eighteen accused raised the absence of mens rea. It specifically 
invoked the principle of mistake of fact, in that the accused claimed that they did not realise that the prisoners 
were prisoners of war but thought that they were spies and saboteurs. The Prosecutor, in his closing address, said 
that if the Court found that ; the accused acted in such a belief it should acquit them.44 The plea of the absence 
of mens rea failed. With one exception, all accused were found guilty of most of the charges. In the exceptional 
case, the accused was convicted on two Counts. 
It must be emphasised, as Professor Dinstein frequently did, that as a defence mistake of fact does not stand apart 
from the other factual matters and the legal issues which arise in a trial. It is one of the strands woven into the 
structure of the defence, and takes its place, not in isolation, but as part of the whole. 
Professor Dinstein's thesis was that 'the common denominator' of mistake and compulsion is lack of piens rea. 
He pointed out that the first scholar to pursue this avenue as a touchstone for the establishment of guilt or 
Lnnocence in appropriate cases was Lauterpacht, who in 1942 said: 
It is necessary to approach the subject of superior orders on the basis of general principles of criminal 
law, namely, as an element in ascertaining the existence of mens rea as a condition of accountability. 
Professor Dinstein referred to a number of authors who had discussed the principle of mens rea in the context of 
considering the question of the defence of superior orders. 46 
It seems that the basis of his criticism of the treatment of the question of mens rea by those authors was that 
they were not sufficiently direct and incisive in moulding a defence based on mistake of law or fact or 
compulsion into the wider fabric of a plea of absence of mens rea. Consequently, Professor Dinstein said:47 
The rule that ought to be deduced is, in my opinion, as follows: the fact of obedience to orders 
constitutes not a defence per se but only a factual element that may be taken into account in conjunction 
with the other circumstances of the given case within the compass of a defence based on the lack of 
mens rea, that is, mistake of law or fact or compulsion. Only lack, of mens rea, of which obedience to 
orders constitutes circumstantial evidence, serves to protect from criminal responsibility in this case. 
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TIIE BARREN YEARS: 1919-1945 
During the period between 1919 and 1945, the world enjoyed decades of comparative peace, with some 
exceptions: for example, the Abyssinian war. The politicians became involved with the tangled skein of the 
defence of superior orders. Bodies such as the Birkenhead Committee, appointed by the British Government in 
1918, and the Commission on the Responsibilities of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties 
48 made recommendations which did not illuminate the controversial subject. Nor did the Peace Treaty of 
Versailles, at least expressly, provide elucidation. The Leipzig trials did crystallise certain principls, as discussed 
previously. However, the Washington Conference of 1922 proved abortive. A Commission of Jurists, the task of 
which was confmed to the formulation of rules relating to aerial warfare and the use of radio in time of war, 
recommended that: 49 
Radio operators incur no personal responsibility from the mere fact of carrying out the orders which 
they receive in the performance of their duties as operators. 
The rationale of this recommendation was that 'a radio operator works in a cabin'. 50 
Dinstein's summation of the instruments in the period under review is that 'they do not carry the subject of 
obedience to orders much further forward'. 51 One is obliged to agree. 
The dawn before the London Agreement and Charter 
Even before the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943, there were discussions among the Allied Powers 
concerning the punishment of war crimes and attention became focussed on the defence of superior orders. As 
stated in footnote 45, in 1942 Lauterpacht submitted a memorandum to a Committee established, by the 
International Commission for Penal Reconstruction and Development, in which he rejected both the doctrines of 
respondeat superior and absolute liability and stated:52 
There ought to be no doubt that should courts entrusted with the trial of war crimes disregard altogether 
the plea of superior orders, they would be adopting a course which could not be regarded as defensible. 
On the other hand ... the fact of superior orders need not warp the effectiveness of the law in a manner 
which may rightly be regarded as a perversion of justice. 
The difficulty that I find with Lauterpacht's analysis is that, although he recognised the need to approach the 
subject of superior orders as an element in ascertaining the existence of mens rea, he did not link the fact of 
superior orders, as an evidential element, with a plea of a specific defence based on established legal grounds, 
such as mistake of law or fact or compulsion. The need for such a link to be recognised as a potential basis for 
acquittal is illustrated by considering a converse situation. A person accused of war crimes may well assert, and 
prove, that he acted under a mistake of law or fact but nevertheless, on a consideration of the whole of the 
evidence, the prosecution may well prove that he had the requisite mens rea because of, for example, sadistic 
reasons, or motives of revenge or any other circumstance which would establish mens rea. It is for this reason 
that a judge in a criminal trial, in directing a jury on matters of law, must carefully emphasise that its verdict 
should be based on a consideration of the whole of the evidence and not merely on fragmented parts of it. 
It is clear that in the formative period before the London Agreement and Charter, American attitudes to what was 
perceived would be a crucial matter in the forthcoming trials were clarified. Thus, one proposal was: 53 
The fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction shall not 
constitute an absolute defense but may be considered either in defense or in mitigation of punishment if 
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the tribunal before which the charges are being tried determines that justice so requires. 
For the purposes of a special conference to be convened shortly afterwards, the American proposal was amended 
as follows: 54 
In any trial before an International Military Tribunal the fact that a defendant acted pursuant to order of a 
superior or government saslction shall not constitute a defense per se, but may be considered either in 
defense or in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
There was no difference of substance between the two American proposals, each of which was consonant with the 
'mens rea principle'. From a diferent viewpoint, however, each was defective by reason of the use of the words 'if 
... justice so requires'. The connotation of the words was metaphysical rather than strictly legal and would have 
led to dispute as to what, in the circumstances, was the appropriate perception of 'justice'. 
We have discussed in this chapter the approach of Mr. Justice Jackson to the defence of superior orders and his 
ultimate endorsement of Article 8 of the London Charter, on which we shall now focus attention. Undoubtedly 
the final form of Article 8 was the result of compromise to accommodate the hard-line Russian view that 
absolute liability so far as guilt or innocence was concerned must be the fundamental principle to be applied, in 
complete disregard of superior orders. Article 8 provided: 
The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him 
from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that 
justice so requires. 
It should be noted at once that the concluding words 'if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires' were 
unnecessary. Article 16 of the Charter contained provisions 'in order to ensure fair trial for the defendants'. 
Outstanding jurists such as those who comprised the International Military Tribunal could be expected 
throughout the trial, in determining guilt or innocence, and particularly in imposing punishment (Article 27 of 
the Charter), steadfastly to act in accordance with principles of justice. A direction to pay regard to the 
requirements of 'justice' was gratuitous. But such considerations are not significant. The basic criticism of Article 
8 is seen in the comment of Professor Dinstein, which I regard as compelling: 55 
The doctrine of absolute liability was impressively confirmed, within the compass of the Charter, as the 
proper solution of the problem of obedience to orders. To my mind, this vigorous approach does not 
rest on solidly logical foundations; and the mere fact that the London Conference decided to draft Article 
8 in a certain way cannot conclusively determine the issue of obedience to orders in general international 
law. 
However, I am unable to subscribe without qualification to Professor Dinstein's subsequent observation that '... 
the fact that we are not satisfied with the strict and inelastic conception underlying Article 8 does not detract in 
any way from its legal validity in its sphere of application ...' 56 I shall later in this chapter discuss the question 
of the existence of any basis in international law for the provision in Article 8. 
THE NUREMBERG JUDGMENT 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis, and in any event irrelevant, to analyse the numerous attempts by 
prosecution and defence counsel at Nuremberg to engraft onto Article 8 nuances which its plain words did not 
permit. It should be recognised that Article 8 was intended to mean what the words used in it clearly stated: that 
is, that there was no scope whatever at Nuremberg for a plea of obedience to orders except in relation to 
mitigation of punishment. 
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The real problem for examination is the validity of assertions that the justification for including the provision in 
the form in which it was drafted in Article 8 was established by existing principles of international law, or, as 
the British chief prosecutor, Sir Hartley Shawcross, argued in his closing speech, that Article 8 was merely 
declaratory of existing international law: 57 
There is no rule of international law which provides immunity for those who obey orders which ... are 
manifestly contrary to the very law of nature from which international law has grown. 
It was central to the judgment of the Tribunal that 'The law of the Charter is decisive and binding on the 
Tribunal'.58 That statement could not, in my opinion, be controverted. The London Agreement and Charter 
spoke for themselves, for better or for worse. In so far as it was 'for worse', the responsibility lay with the 
political leaders of the Allied Powers, who, in the months preceding 8 August 1945, met, talked and 
compromised. The product, in the form of the London Agreement and Charter, cast the law in a mould which 
could not be changed by ingenuity in argument at the trial. 
In the case of the accused Keitel, whose defence raised the doctrine of 'superior orders', the Tribunal, with 
consistency but without qualification, said that reliance on the doctrine was prohibited by Article 8 of the 
Charter. But the Tribunal went further, and perhaps gave some relevant meaning to the concluding words of 
Article 8, although not expressly:59 
There is nothing in mitigation. Superior orders, even to a soldier, cannot be considered in mitigation 
where crimes as shocking or extensive have been committed consciously, ruthlessly and without 
military excuse or justification. 
In the case of the accused Jodi, the Tribunal said:6° 
His defence, in brief, is the doctrine of 'superior orders', prohibited by Article 8 of the Charter as a 
defence. There is nothing in mitigation. Participation in such crimes as these has never been required of 
any soldier and he [Jodi] cannot now shield himself behind a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience 
at all costs as his excuse for commission of the crimes. [Jodl was charged and found guilty on all four 
counts]. 
The Tribunal did not, however, content itself with reliance merely provisions of Article 8. In a bald 
pronouncement it said: 
... the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the 
national obligations of obedience imposed by the individual State. He who violates the laws of war 
cannot obtain immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in 
authorising action moves outside its competence under international law. 
It was also submitted on behalf of most of these defendants that in doing what they did they were acting 
under the orders of Hitler, and therefore cannot be held responsible for the acts committed by them in 
carrying out these orders. The Charter specifically provides in Article 8: 
The fact that the defendant acted pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not 
free him from responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment'. 
The provisions of this Article are in conformity with the law of all nations. That a soldier was ordered 
to kill or torture in violation of the international law of war has never been recognised as a defence to 
such acts of brutality, though, as the Charter here provides, the order may be urged in mitigation of the 
punishment. The true test, which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most nations, is not 
the existence of the order, but whether moral choice was in fact possible. 
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The Tribunal did not cite any authority for these propositions; it did not attempt any historical excursus; 
it did not mention any of the arguments addressed to it on the question of superior orders; it did not recognise the 
relevance of the doctrine of mens rea, although, in the cases of those accused at Nuremberg, it would have been 
difficult to isolate allegations of crimes in which there would have been reasonable opportunity to plead 
mistake of law or fact or compulsion. 
Perhaps the most perplexing aspect of the cited extract from the Judgment is the thinking which prompted the 
last sentence. The question may be posed: 'true test of what?' Assuming the answer is: 'of guilt or innocence it is 
intriguing to speculate what the Tribunal meant precisely by the words 'whether moral choice was in fact 
possible'. Again one asks a question: 'How can a moral choice be made so that as matter of fact it reflects 
something that is 'possible'? In so far as the last sentence is a brief exegesis by the Tribunal, it fails to justify 
the provisions in Article 8 from the standpoint of positive international law. 62 
A simple explanation of the meaning of the troublesome sentence, which I am not aware has been previously 
suggested, at least directly, is that it was an isolated attempt by the Tribunal to engraft on Article 8 an implied 
principle which it perceived as a correct statement of international law, thereby mitigating the dogmatic rigidity 
of Article 8 and thus making the Tribunal's firm reliance on it appear more plausible. However, if this was the 
Tribunal's purpose it seems surprising that it purported to achieve it by adding a sentence which, even in the 
suggested context, could not have been relevant, while ignoring any mention of other recognised international 
law principles. 
The following opinion of Professor Dinstein is apposite to the foregoing: 63 
It is permissible to voice astonishment that the Nuremberg chief prosecutors themselves found it 
necessary to resort to an analysis of the Article which divests it of any significance as an authority in 
general international law. A suspicion hovers in the mind that they were not satisfied with the rigid 
wording of Article 8 a general stipulation and accordingly interpolated an artificial rider which voids the 
Article of its content. 
In my opinion the criticism in the extract above cited could, with parity of reasoning, be applied to the 
Tribunal's judgment (supra). 
THE TOKYO TRIBUNAL 
Chapter 14 of this thesis contains a general account of the events leading to the establishment of the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Tribunal') and of matters relevant to the subject of this 
thesis. In this section of this chapter it is proposed to confine reference to the Tokyo Tribunal to the question of 
superior orders. 
Three months after the indictment was presented to the International Military Tribunal at Berlin, General 
MacArthur issued a Special Proclamation at Tokyo in his capacity as the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers in the Far East. Annexed to it was the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. 
The provisions of Articles 7 and 8 of the London Agreement and Charter were combined in one Article in the 
case of the Tokyo Tribunal, as follows: 
Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an accused acted pursuant to 
order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such accused from 
responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires'. (emphasis added) 64 
It is surprising, as Professor Dinstein noted, that 'Jurists, in general, hold the opinion that the provisions of the 
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London and Tokyo Charter in regard to obedience to orders are coincident'. 65 In my opinion the words in Article 
6 of the Tokyo Charter, emphasised in the foregoing , involve a fundamental divergence from Article 8 of the 
London Charter, in that they reflect the basic opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson in his Report to the 
President in June 1945 but cannot be interpreted as consonant with Article 8 of the London Charter. 
It is even more surprising that a majority of the eleven judges who constituted the Tokyo Tribunal were 
oblivious to the basic difference between the two Charters in relation to obedience to superior orders, so much so 
that they said: 66 
With the foregoing opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the reasoning by which they are reached, 
this Tribunal is in complete accord ... In view of the fact that in all material respects the Charters of 
this Tribunal and the Nuremberg Tribunal are identical, this Tribunal prefers to express its unqualified 
adherence to the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal rather than by reasoning the matters 
anew in somewhat different language to open the door to controversy by way of conflicting 
interpretations of the two statements of opinions. (emphasis added) 
Thus, not only did the majority of the Tokyo Tribunal fail to appreciate the legal significance of the words of 
itself in Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter, but they endorsed ,the pronouncements of the Nuremberg Tribunal cited 
previously in this chapter, including the controversial reference to moral choice. 
THE CASES OF EICHMANN AND CALLEY 
The two most noteworthy cases after the 'subsequent proceedings' in Nuremberg were the trials of Adolf 
Eichmann in Jerusalem in 1961 and of Lieutenant William L Calley in the United States of America in 1973. 
Each is instructive in relation to perceptions of the contemporary state, of international law in respect of the 
defence of superior orders, and will briefly be considered. 
Adolf Eichmann 
The indictment in the case of Adolf Eichmann was unique from the viewpoint of the defence of superior orders in 
that it was framed under a post-World War 2 Israeli statute the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law 
1950.67 Provisions of the Israeli Criminal Code Ordinance 1936 recognise the defences of constraint, necessity 
and obedience to superior orders if the orders are not manifestly unlawful. However, the 1950 special statute 
excluded the availability of those defences in the case of charges within the terms of that statute. 
Eichmann's defence essentially was based on his claim that he was 'nothing more than a "small cog" in the 
extermination machine'. However, he incriminated himself inextricably by his own evidence, both under pretrial 
examination and by his testimony before the District Court of Jerusalem. 68 
The Court of first instance rejected the plea of the accused in the light of the relevant statutory provisions and, in 
any event, held that the orders obeyed by Eichmann were manifestly illegal. His conviction was inevitable in 
view of his own evidence that 'I must declare that I see in this murder, in the extermination of the Jews, one of 
the gravest crimes in the history of humanity' 69 
It is of interest to note that in reaching its judgment the District Court adopted the London Charter (Article 8), 
and also relied on the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations in respect of the Affirmation 
of the Nuremberg Principles. It did not otherwise examine the state of positive international law. 7° 
The Supreme Court of Israel, on appeal, discussed in some detail the legal issues involved in the plea of superior 
orders, but dismissed the appeal on the sole basis of the facts of the case.7I 
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In view of the special statutory provisions on which the indictment against Eichmann was framed, the sheer 
enormity and heinousness of the proven charges and the admissions of the accused, the judgments of both courts 
do not advance the study of the state of international law in respect of the defence of superior orders at the time of 
Eichmann's trial. 
Lieutenant William L. Calley 
The ease of Lieutellant William L. Calley is generally regarded as the most important since the Second World 
War that involved obedience to superior orders. 72 Certainly it is the most well-known case. 
Calley was charged before a court-martial with the premeditated murder of 22 infants, children, women and old 
men, in the village of My Lai (correctly called Son My) 73 on 16 March 1968. CaHey was convicted. The Army 
Court of Military Review affirmed the finding. A petition to the United States Court of Military Appeals 
(Darden CJ., Duncan J., and Quinn J.) for further review was rejected. 
The facts were simple . Calley was the leader of a platoon, part of C Company, which had been operating in the 
area of Son My for some time. Each time Company C had entered the area it had suffered casualties from sniper 
fire and indirect forms of attack. Calley claimed that as a result of the casualties, the Company commander 
issued orders to the effect that the units of C. Company involved in the attack were to kill every living thing—
men, women and children and even animal. The Company commander denied the reference to women and 
children, and stressed that ' you must use common sense'. Calley's platoon entered the village apparently 
without, resistance. The villagers were assembled, including mothers with babies. Calley claimed that he twice 
received a radio signal from the Company commander asking why the operation was taking so long. Finally, 
Calley alleged he was told by the Company commander: 'Waste them'. The commander denied this. Calley 
claimed that having been taught that he must always obey orders, he proceeded to carry out the massacre, with 
the help of a private soldier. 74 
The Court of Military Appeals focussed its consideration of the petition on the instructions given by the military 
judge to the members of the court-martial in the following terms: 75 
(i) if Calley received an order to kill unresisting Vietnamese within his control or within the control 
of his troops, that order would be an illegal order; 
(ii) however, a determination that an order is illegal does not, of itself, assign criminal responsibility 
to the person following the order for acts done in compliance with it; 
(iii) although soldiers are taught to follow orders, the obedience of a soldier is not the obedience of an 
automaton. A soldier is a reasoning agent, obliged to respond, not as a machine, but as a person; 
(iv) the law takes these factors into account in assessing criminal responsibility for acts done in 
compliance with illegal orders: and 
(v) the acts of a subordinate done in compliance with an unlawful order given him by his superior are 
excused and impose no criminal liability upon him unless the superior's order is one which a man 
of ordinary sense and understanding would, under the circumstances, know to be unlawful, or if 
the order in question is actually known by the accused to be unlawful. 
These instructions appear clear, concise. logical and consonant with accepted principles of positive international 
law. It is regrettable that, in Calley's Case, they became the subject of an exercise in semantics, as is shown by 
the following extract from Professor Johnson's exposition: 
Although differing in their opinions slightly, both Quinn J. and Duncan J. were satisfied as to the 
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correctness of this directive, which was in fact based on paragraph 216(d) of the Manual for Courts 
Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev.). 
Counsel for Calley had argued that the test should be not 'a man of ordinary sense and understanding', but 
a person of 'the commonest understanding'. The opinion of the leading American commentator on military 
law, Colonel William Winthrop, was invoked. According to Winthrop's Military Law and Precedents, 2nd 
edn., 1920 reprint, pp. 296-297, 'for the inferior to assume to determine the question of the lawfulness of 
an order elven, him by a superior would, of itself, as a general rule, amount to insubordination, and such 
an assumption carried into practice would subvert military discipline'. Consequently, according to 
Winthrop, it was the duty of an inferior to obey an order according to its terms, ' the only exceptions 
recognized to the rule of obedience being cases of orders so manifestly beyond the legal power or 
discretion of the commander as to admit of no rational doubt of their unlawfulness'. However, Quinn J. 
thought that the order allegedly given to Lieutenant Calley was 'so palpably illegal that whatever 
conceptional difference there may be between a person of "commonest understanding" and a person of 
"common understanding", that difference could not have had any impact' on the court. 
Darden CJ., on the other hand, considered the correct test to be 'palpable illegality to the commonest 
understanding'. He believed the provision in the Manual to be too strict, and he was convinced that the 
phrasing of the defence of superior orders should have as its principal objective fairness to the 
unsophisticated soldier and those of somewhat limited intellect who nonetheless are doing their best to 
perform their duty'. It is impossible not to sympathise to some extent with this view of Darden CJ., 
especially when it is borne in mind that the United States forces in Vietnam consisted to a large extent of 
conscripts and that, because of various devices used by more 'sophisticated' people to avoid the draft, an 
unusually heavy burden fell upon the 'unsophisticated soldier'. As against that, there is force in the point 
made by the Army Court of Military Review in Calley's Case that 'barbarism tends to invite reprisal to 
the detriment of our own force or disrepute which interferes with the achievement of war aims, even 
though the barbaric acts were preceded by orders for their commission. Casting the defence of obedience to 
orders solely in subjective terms of mens rea would operate practically to abrogate those objective 
restraints which are essential to functioning rules of war'. (emphasis added) 
The merit of the judgment in Calley's Case will be examined in the author's conclusion to this chapter. 
THE CURIOUS CASE OF THE 'AMERICAN INSTRUCTIONS' 
Some months before the judgment of the Nuremberg Military Tribunal was delivered, the United States War 
Crimes Group, European Theatre, prepared a document, dated 15 July 1946, entitled 'Annotations Prepared by 
War Crimes Group on Legal Questions Arising in Trials of War Criminals'. The document was later published 
as part of the 'Manual for Trial of War Crimes and Related Cases', prepared by the Deputy Theater Judge 
Advocate's Office, War Crimes Group, United States Forces, European Theatre, dated 1 February 1947. 77 In a 
foreword to the Manual it was stated: 
This manual for trial of war crimes cases is prescribed for use by all personnel concerned in such 
trials. It contains a compilation of the directives covering the important aspects of trials, together with 
citations of authorities derived from past decisions on questions arising therein, as well as prescribed 
forms for the records of trials. 
Although the Manual was dated 1 February 1947, the relevant observations do not contain any specific reference 
to the judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal, which had then been public for four months. 
The Manual was not only seriously defective but, since the relevant part lacked incisiveness and positive 
direction, was calculated.to  confuse, rather than assist, those for whose use it was prescribed. 
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The relevant part was introduced by what purports to be an 'extract from the London Agreement on 8 August 
1945' in the following terms: 
the fact that a defendant acts pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction shall not 
constitute an absolute defense but may be considered either in defense or in mitigation of punishment 
if the tribunal before which the charges are being tried determines that justice so requires'. (emphasis 
added) 
There followed the following extract from FM 27-10, WD, US Army, 'Rules of Land Warfare': 
Liability of offending individuals (Added) — Individuals and 	organisations who violate the 
accepted laws and customs of war may be punished therefor. However, the fact that the acts 
complained of were done pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction may be taken into 
consideration in determining culpability either12y way of defense or in mitioation of punishment.  
The person giving such orders may also be punished. (Par. 345.1, 15 Nov. '44). (emphasis added) 
After referring to the Llandovery Case in accurate terms and to the well-known citation from Dr. Goebbels' 
article in the Berliner Borsenzeitun of 28 May 1944 entitled 'The Air Terror of our Enemies', the Manual cites an 
extract from an opinion of the Deputy Theater Judge Advocate for War Crimes in the case of United States v. 
Bury and Hafner, September 1945. 
The extract contains the following: 
(a) An accurate reproduction of para. 345.1 of U.S. Army 'Rules of Land Warfare' cited above, but 
thereby repeating the emphasised words in that citation to which the United States had ceased to 
subscribe by its signature of the London Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945. 
(b) A citation in general terms from 'Wharton on Homicide' which did not elucidate the issue in 
any fundamental way. 
(c) An extract from the Report to the President, of 7 June 1945 by Mr. Justice Jackson (cited above in 
this chapter), from which he had resiled within two months by endorsing the London Agreement and 
Charter. 
(d) An extract from an opinion of the Deputy Theater Judge Advocate for War Crimes in the case of 
United States v. Thomas December 1945, in which, on the facts and for the purposes of that case, 
the law was correctly stated. 
It is incomprehensible how a document such as has been cited, which was inaccurate and confusing, could have 
been disseminated to United States legal personnel as a 'prescription', presumably for use in the 'subsequent 
proceedings' at Nuremberg. 
CONCLUSION 
The dimensions of this chapter do not permit of additional detailed analysis of the views of outstanding scholars 
in the field: for example, Sir Hersch Lauterpacht and Professor L.C. Green. Most of the writings of such scholars 
recognise the dilemma posed by the conflicting doctrines of respondeat superior and absolute liability. However, 
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the search for a solution has led scholars along many by-paths, on some of which semantics have been 
paramount. 
The essential question for discussion in this conclusion is whether the law relating to the defence of superior 
orders is, from the standpoint of international law, now clearly established, and, if so, whether it is based 
on principles which civilised states can accept as just and appropriate. These questions must be answered 
with a realisation that be circumstances in which major international warfare may occur in the futurc will, in 
all probability, be very different from those which evailed in the Second World War and resulted in the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. There will, of course, be exceptions: for example, the Falklands War of 1983 
illustrates how, in modern times, warfare can erupt suddenly, although on a limited scale. But we live in the 
nuclear age, and it is not possible to predict what scope may exist for doctrines related to obedience to superior 
orders in the event of a nuclear conflagration. 
At first sight, Professor Dinstein's thesis based on the principle of mens rea appears attractive, but in the 
opinion of the writer it has some practical disadvantages. 
As was pointed out by Professor Johnson: 'the various tests discussed by the judges in the United States 
Court of Military Appeals in Calley and by the Israeli ... courts in Kafr Kassem, with a view to determining the 
limits of the defence of superior orders, have a lone history behind them'. 78 
The result of the application of the 'mens rea principle', in strict and direct form, would, as was stated by the 
appeal court in Calley in the passage cited above, remove any objective test and substitute a completely 
subjective measure for determining culpability. Such a transition would be inimical to the doctrine of the 
supremacy of the law in international society. 
Further, the concept of mens rea, although well known and understood in English law, is much less clear and at 
times jurisprudentially elusive in other systems, including Russia. 79 
The author is indebted to Professor J.N. Hazard, New York, for the following exposition of contemporary 
Russian law: 80 
In Soviet law there is a requirement that is set forth in general terms in the current USSR 
Constitution in Art. 160: 'No one may be adjudged guilty of a crime and subjected to punishment as a 
criminal except by sentence of a court and in conformity with law'. The Russian Republic's Criminal 
Code of 1960 has in Art. 7, THE CONCEPT OF CRIME, a definition of crime as a 'socially 
dangerous act'. Paragraph 2 reads: 
An action or omission to act shall not be a crime, although it formally contains the indicia 
of an act provided for by the Special Part of the present Code, if by reason of its 
insignificance it does not represent a social danger. 
Since abolition of the principle of 'analogy' with adoption of the 1960 Code, the principle has been 
established that no one can be held responsible for an act not defined in the code, i.e.. he must have had 
notice that the act will be treated as criminal. Before that date, the court had only to find that the act was 
in the court's definition of the term 'socially dangerous'. At the time of Nuremberg, I think one could 
say that the accused need not have been warned if the court decided that they had committed a socially 
dangerous act. The present rule is not as strong as it sounds because some definitions in the Special 
Part of the Code are vague, and a court has considerable room to conclude that an act is dangerous, but• 
it must relate its finding to the vague definition in some way. Intent is now related to knowledge 
of the prohibition. Negligent acts may also be criminal under the usual rules of criminal negligence in 
other systems. 
Until there is a universally accepted and practised formulation of the content and bounds of the mens rea 
doctrine--not just the English perception of it--it does not appear to be practicable to attempt to make it, as a 
distinct legal principle, an integral part of international law. 
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More than 40 years since Nuremberg, and in the light of the enormous volume of literature which has been 
written on war crimes since then, as well as against a background of many thousands of cases determined by 
courts of diverse jurisdictions, my opinion is that international law on superior orders is clear, at least in 
principle, and in terms which are accepted by an overwhelming percentage of nations. That law is just. It is fair 
to the serviceman; it respects the supremacy of the law. It is that expressed by the United States Court 
of Military Appeals in the case of Calley, as cited previously in this chapter. Specifically, I endorse the 
instructions given by the military judge to the members of the court-martial as already cited. The legal 
exposition by the judges in the case of CaLley would still leave room for the defences of mistake of law or fact 
or compulsion in appropriate cases. 
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CIIAPTER 13 	PROCEEDINGS AT NUREMBERG SUBSEQUENT TO TIIE 
PRINCIPAL TRIAL: 	1946-1949 
THE ESTABLISIIMENT OF JURISDICTION 
It was inevitable that the principal Allied Powers should perceive that the complicated machinery and procedure 
prescribed, of necessity, for the International Military Tribunal were not appropriate for the trial of the large 
number of war criminals who could fairly be classified as 'major' and who fell into the hands of the Allies in the 
months following the unconditional surrender of Germany on 8 May 1945. During the same period vast masses 
of documents, of an extraordinarily incriminating character, came into the possession of the Allies. They were to 
provide a cogent evidentiary basis for subsequent proceedings. 
In his Report to the President of the United States on 7 June 1945, Mr. Justice Jackson said:' 
Whom will we accuse and put to their defense? We will accuse a large number of individuals and 
officials who were in authority in the government, in the military establishment, including the 
General Staff, and in the financial, industrial and economic life of Germany, who by all civilized 
standards are provable to be common criminals ... Our case against the major defendants is concerned 
with the Nazi master plan, not with individual barbarities and perversions which occurred 
independently of any central plan. 
Thus the rationale for the trials at Nuremberg, which are commonly referred to as the 'Subsequent Proceedings', 
was proclaimed. In contrast to the tria of major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal, the 
trials encompassed within the 'Subsequent Proceedings' were conducted under the direct authority of the Allied 
Control Council as an integral part of the administration of the American Zone of Occupation, one of the four 
zones established by the Allied Powers.2 
On 20 December 1945, the four Occupation Powers, by an instrument signed at Berlin by the four Zone 
Commanders, promulgated Control Council Law No.10 entitled 'Punishment of Persons guilty of War Crimes, 
Crimes against Peace and against Humanity'. The preamble of the Law was: 
In order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the London 
Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto and in order to estblish a 
uniform legal basis in Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders, other 
than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal, the Control Council enacts as follows: 
(emphasis added) 
Because a dear appreciation of the terms of Law No. 10 is essential to an understanding of its jurisdictional 
status, it is presented in Annexe I to this chapter. 
Supplementary to Law No. 10 was Military Government Ordinance No. 7, issued on 18 October 1946. It also is 
basic to the question of the jurisdiction of the Tribunals established under Law No. 10, and, for that reason, is 
reproduced in Annexe 2. 
Some writers have regarded Law No. 10 (supplemented by Ordinance No. 7) as virtually identical with the 
London Agreement and Charter,3 but it will be argued in this chapter that such a view is too simplistic and, in 
fact, incorrect. 
It must be borne in mind that the genesis of the 'Subsequent Proceedings' was a Law put into force by the 
Powers which were in joint occupation of Germany, just as the Charter of the International Military Tribunal 
was the expression of the legislative authority of the same occupying Powers, although the Charter was not 
described by the word 'Law'. Both instruments were executed in accordance with established principles of 
international law, in the circumstances which existed; that is, a former belligerent having surrendered 
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unconditionally to the Allied Powers, which were at all relevant times in actual occupation of the defeated 
country, in which there was no national Government. That statement of the legal Authority of the occupying 
Powers is developed in Chapter 18. 
But despite this identity of origin, it is necessary to examine the detailed provisions of the London Charter and of 
Law No.10 (of which Ordinance No.7 was an integral part) in order to identify the differences of substance 
between the two instruments. 
First, Article 1 of Law No.10 expressly provided that 'the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the 
London Agreement of 8 August 1945' (of which the Charter annexed to the Agreement was, by virtue of Article 
2 of the Agreement, declared to 'form an integral part' thereof) 'are made integral parts of this Law'. Arguably, 
this provision was perceived by those who framed the Law as enhancing the authority of the Moscow Declaration 
and the London Agreement, and, in part, as being calculated to assist thc prosecution in rebutting a defence based 
on the ex post facto principle. 
Second. Article II, paragraph 1(a), in its specification of 'Crimes against Peace' as crimes was more expansive 
than the corresponding provision in The London Charter in two respects: (a) 'Initiation of invasions of other 
countries' was recognised as a crime against peace, thereby expressly including the invasion of Austria on 12 
March 1938 and the ultimate seizure of the major part of Czechoslovakia on 15 March 1939 as bases for a Count 
in the indictment charging crimes against peace; (b) the concept of a 'war of aggression' was differently 
conceived. In the London Charter, the definition of 'crimes against peace' related to 'a war of aggression' or 'a war 
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances'. In Law No. 10, the words 'laws and' were inserted 
before the word 'treaties' (first occurring). In the writer's opinion, the inclusion of those words furnished a 
jurisdictional basis for charging war criminals with initiating wars of aggression in violation not only of 
international treaties but also 'international laws', an expression which is understood by the writer to embrace the 
whole body of positive international penal law. 
Thus, in the 'Ministries Case', paragraph 1 of Count 1 of the indictment was phrased precisely in accordance 
with Article II, paragraph 1(a) of Law No.10. Paragraph 24 of Count 1, under the heading 'Violation of Law' 
was in these terms: 
24. 	The acts and conduct set forth in this Count were committed by the defendants unlawfully, 
wilfully and knowingly, and constitute violations of international law, treaties, agreements and 
assurances, and of Article II of Control Council Law No.10. (emphasis added). 
In its judgment in the 'Ministries Case', the Tribunal said (pp. 336-337 of volume 14 of the series referred to 
later in this chapter as 'N.M.T.'): 
We hold that the invasions and wars described in paragraph 2 of the indictment [Count I] ... were 
unlawful and aggressive, violated international law, and were crimes within the definition of the 
London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10. (emphasis added) 
Several of those accused in the 7v1inistries Case' under Count 1 were found guilty. 
Third, in Article 6(b) of the London Charter the expression 'war crimes' was defined in general terms as 
'violations of the laws or customs of war', followed by some examples, which expressly were declared not to be 
exhaustive; in Law No. 10, the definition (also followed by the same examples, which were not exhaustive) was 
more expansively expressed thus: 'Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting violations of 
the laws or customs of war'. The generic definition of 'war crimes' was therefore wider in Law No. 10. It is not 
suggested that the difference in expression involved any practical distinction in the scope of the respective 
provisions; however, it seems curious that the draftsmen of Law No. 10 saw fit to alter the words in the London 
Charter. It is also difficult to appreciate why the words 'of or in' preceding the words 'occupied territory' in the 
London Charter were changed to 'from' in Law No. 10. It is arguable that the change could have had significance. 
In the writers opinion the word 'from' in the context is more restrictive than 'of or in'. 
Fourth, there are clearly differences in scope in the definitions of 'Crimes against Humanity' in Article 
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6(c) of the London Charter and in paragraph 1(c) of Article II of Law No. 10; in particular, the omission of the 
words 'in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Trihunal . appearing in 
the London Charter potentially enlarged the definition of 'Crimes against Humanity for the purposes of the 
'Subsequent Proceedings'. 
Fifth, Article II (2) of Law No. 10 conferred an extremely wider jurisdiction on the Tribunals than that for which 
the London Charter made provision by the addendum to Article 6 of the Charter relating to 'leaders, organisers, 
instigators and accomplices'. In particular, Article H (2)(f) of law No. 10, which was concerned with Crimes 
against Peace, was drafted in terms which created responsibility in respect of vast numbers of political, civil and 
military personnel. 
Sixth, Article II (5) of Law No. 10 was novel. It deprived an accused person of 'the benefits of any statute of 
limitation in respect of the period from 30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945'. 
The organisation and powers of the Tribunals before which the 'Subsequent Proceedings' were conducted were 
prescribed by Ordinance No. 7, pursuant to which the Tribunals were established. 
It has already been noted that the London Agreement and Charter were made integral parts of Law No. 10. No 
provision was, however, included in that law for the reconciliation of variations between the two enabling 
instruments. I am not aware that this question arose at Nuremberg in the 'Subsequent Proceedings'. If it had done 
so, it would have been the duty of the Tribunal to apply normal principles of statutory construction; that is, the 
four instruments--the London Agreement, the London Charter, Law No. 10 and Ordinance No. 7—would have 
required interpretation as one whole document, however incongruous that may have appeared. However, it does 
not seem thatt in practice any difficulty arose in this respect. 
From the viewpoint of evidence and procedure, Article X of Ordinance No.7 was of singular significance. It 
provided:- 
The determinations of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment in Case No. 1 that 
invasions, aggressive acts, aggressive wars, crimes, atrocities or inhumane acts were planned or 
occurred, shall be binding on the tribunals established hereunder and shall not be questioned except 
insofar as the participation therein or knowledge thereof by any particular person may be concerned. 
Statements of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment in Case No. 1 constitute proof of 
the facts stated, in the absence of substantial new evidence to the contrary. 
That provision, on the vast scale contemplated by its terms as being applicable to determinations and statements 
as to the proof of facts of the International Military Tribunal, is not only unique in the context but is also 
whimsical in the extreme. It sharply distinguished the legal setting for the 'Subsequent Proceedings' from that of 
the International Military Tribunal, the trial before which was itself, in the words of the President, 'unique in the 
history of the jurisprudence of the world' (see Chapter 10, Annexe 2). 
A further matter of distinction is that Ordinance No. 7 authorised opening statements by the defence--a normal 
practice but one which was not available before the International Tribunal. 
Brigadier General Taylor has stated (see note 2): 
In general, Law No. 10 adopted the London agreement as a model, although the language differed in 
numerous important particulars. Each of the four Zone Commanders was authorised to arrest suspected 
war criminals and to establish 'appropriate tribunals for their trial. Elaborate provisions were included 
for the exchange of war crimes suspects among the four occupation zones and for their delivery to other 
countries. 
The delivery of Judgment was completed by the International Military Tribunal on 1 October 1946. Control 
Council Law No.10 was dated 20 December 1945. Ordinance No. 7 became effective on 18 October 1946. In 
the writer's view, a conscious effort was made to enhance the clarity of expression in Law No. 10 compared with 
the London Charter . The result was the production of an instrument, supplemented by Ordinance No. 7, which 
was more concise, incisive and felicitously expressed than the London Charter. 
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The judgment of the International Tribunal was declared res judicata in all material respects. In the 
'Einsatzgruppen Case' (N.M.T., vol. 4, at p. 457) the Tribunal said: 
The legal consequences drawn from the International Military Tribunal adjudication, which is now res 
*ucjii_c_iata may not be altered by the assertion that someone else may also have been at fault [a reference 
to the argument of defence counsel that Control Council Law No. 10 was inapplicable because of the 
fact that Russia, a signatory to the Law, had signed a secret treaty with Germany on 23 August 1939, 
agreeing to a division of Poland]. 
The true nature of the Tribunals for the 'Subsequent Proceedings' was expressed in the judgment in the 'Flick 
Case' in these terms: 
As to the Tribunal, its nature and competence: The Tribunal is not a court of the United States as that 
term is used in the Constitution of the United States. It is not a court martial. It is not a military 
commission. It is an interuational tribunal established by the International Control Council, the high 
legislative branch of the four Allied Powers now controlling Germany The judges were legally 
appointed by the Military Governor and the later act of the President of the United States in respect to 
this was nothing more than a confirmation of the appointments by the Military Governor. The 
Tribunal administers international law. It is not bound by the general statutes of the United States or 
even by those parts of its Constitution which relate to courts of the United States. 
The same Tribunal expounded the following principles as expressing what it termed 'the spirit of the law of 
civilised nations': 
1. There can he no conviction without proof of personal guilt. 
2. Such guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 
3. The presumption of innocence follows each defendant throughout the trial. 
4. The burden of proof is at all times upon the prosecution. 
5. If from credible evidence two reasonable inferences may be drawn, one of guilt and the other 
of innocence, the latter must be taken. 
The authority of the Nuremberg Tribunals for the 'Subsequent Proceedings' was succinctly expressed in the 
judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in the course of appeal 
proceedings in the United States by the accused Flick. It stated (N.M.T., vol. 6, 1227, at p. 1231): 
We think it [the Tribunal in the 'Flick Case'] was, in all essential respects, an international court. Its 
power and jurisdiction arose out of the joint sovereignty of the four victorious Powers. The exercise of 
their supreme authority became vested in the Control Council. .. Concededly, the International 
Military Tribunal, established under the London Agreement, was a court of international character. 
How, then, can it be said that Military Tribunal IV was not of the same character, with its existence 
and jurisdiction rooted in the sovereigllty of the Four Powers, exercised jointly through the supreme 
governing authority of the Control Council. We think, therefore, that the tribunals established under 
its authority were legitimate and appropriate instruments of judicial power for the trial of war 
criminals (see (1945) 39 AJ.I.L., p 525). 
The Court accordingly held that the Tribunal which tried and sentenced Flick was not a tribunal of the United 
States and that a United States court was therefore without power to review the judgment and sentence. 
There can be no doubt that sovereign legislative authority was vested in the four Occupation Powers in the 
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circumstances which existed when Control Council Law No. 10 and Ordinance No. 7 were promulgated. The 
real point at issue, however, is whether or not those instruments gave expression to international law as it 
existed when the acts alleged in the indictment were committed. That issue is discussed in Chapter 18. 
THE TRIALS IN THE 'SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS' 
THe wide scope and enormous documentation involved in the trials which comprised the 'Subsequent 
Proceedings' are described by Brigadier General Taylor in the monograph referred to in note 2. In his words: 'At 
peak strength (July - November 1947), the Nuremberg trials required the services of nearly nine hundred 
American and allied employees and about an equal number of Germans. Some idea of the magnitude of the 
undertaking may be gathered from the fact that in one twelve-month period (1 September 1947 - I September 
1948) the language division [of the Office, Chief of Counsel] translated and stencilled 133,262 pages of material, 
or about 520 pages per day'. 
The description and classification of the 'Subsequent Proceedings' are conveniently set forth in a summary 
arrangement of the cases in the fifteen-volume series 'Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military 
Tribunals', United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1952. It is reproduced as Annexe 3 to this 
Chapter. 
In relation to tho Allied Powers other than the United States of America, Brigadier General Taylor has said (see 
note 2): 
In the Soviet zone of occupation, so far as is known to the writer, little or nothing was ever done to 
carry Law No. 10 into effect. The British, in their zone, preferred to handle war crimes on a military 
basis under the 'Royal Warrant'. In the French zone, at Rastatt (near Baden-Baden), one major trial 
under law No. 10 and several of lesser interest have been held. 
From the necessarily brief summary in this chapter of the twelve trials by tribunals established under Control 
Council Law No. 10 in the American Zone of Occupation, conclusions will be drawn as to the extent to which 
they served to consolidate the judgment of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and affirm it as a 
recognised source of substantive international penal law. 
The 'Medical Case' (Case No. I) 
Twenty three accused were tried in the 'Medical Case'. They mainly were high-ranking officers in the German 
Medical -Service; all except three were physicians. The exceptions were administrative personnel involved in 
medical affairs. 
The indictment contained four Counts: 
Count 1. The Common Design or Conspiracy. 
Counts 2 and 3. War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity. 
Count 4. (referable to ten of the accused). Membership in an organisation declared to be criminal by the 
International Miltary Tribunal. 
The nature of the charges was that 'all of the accused were principals in, accessories to, ordered, abetted, took a 
consenting part in and were connected with plans and enterprises involving medical experiments without the 
subjects' consent ... in the course of which experiments the defendants committed murders, brutalities, cruelties, 
tortures, atrocities and other inhuman acts'. In addition to the medical experiments, some of the defendants were 
charged with criminal acts, involving murder, torture, and ill treatment of non-German nationals. Sixteen of the 
accused were found guilty. 
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The case is important for two reasons. 
First, the Tribunal, in the course of the trial, made the following ruling: 4 
Count I of the indictment in this case charges that the defendants, acting pursuant to a common 
design, unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did conspire and agree together to commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10, Article 2. It is charged that the 
alleged crime was committed between September 1939 and April 1945. 
It is the ruling of this Tribunal that neither the Charter of the International Military Tribunal nor 
Control Council Law No. 10 has defined conspiracy to commit a war crime or crime against 
humanity as a separate substantive crime; therefore, this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to try any 
defendant upon a charge of conspiracy considered as a separate substantive offense. 
Count I of the indictment, in addition to the separate charge of conspiracy, also alleges unlawful 
participation in the formulation and execution of plans to commit war crimes and crimes against 
humanity which actually involved the commission of such crimes. We, therefore, cannot properly 
strike the whole of Count I from the indictment, but insofar as Count I charges the commission of the 
alleged crime of conspiracy as a separate substantive offense, distinct from any war crime or crime 
against humanity, the Tribunal will disregard that charge. 
This ruling must not be construed as limiting the force or effect of Article 2, paragraph 2 of Control 
Council Law No. 10, or as denying to either prosecution or defense the right to offer in evidence 
any facts or circumstances, occurring either before or after September 1939, if such facts or 
circumstances tend to prove or to disprove the commission by any defendant of war crimes or crimes 
against humanity as defined in Control Council Law No. 10. 
The second paragraph of this citation is, in my opinion, the correct juridicial exposition of the problem 
arising from the manner in which Count the principal Nuremberg indictment was framed. The International 
Military Tribunal's judgment in this respect has been discussed in Chapter 8. 5 
Second, the case is a striking illustration of the consequences of the inclusion in the principal Nuremberg 
Charter, and subsequently in the indictment pursuant to it, of the provisions relating to the 'indicted' 
organisations. 
Of the ten accused in the 'Medical Case' of membership in an organisation declared criminal by the judgment of 
the International Military Tribunal, nine were found guilty under other Counts. However, in the case of Helmut 
Poppendick the accused was found guilty only under Count 4, the other charges against him having been 
abandoned by the prosecution and 'not considered further by the Tribunal. 6 In imposing sentence, the 
Tribunal said: 7 
... For your said crimes ... Military Tribunal I sentences you to imprisonment for a term of ten years 
The Tribunal had previously stated: 8 
In weighing the punishment, if any, which should be meted out to the defendant for his guilt by reason 
of the charge contained in Count four of the indictment, this Tribunal will give such consideration to 
the recommendations of the International Military Tribunal as may under the premises seem meet and 
proper. 
in the circumstances, especially the abandonment by the prosecution of the only charges of substance against 
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Poppendick, the question arises whether he was justly treated, even although Control Council Law No. 10 
expressly provided that 'membership in categories of a criminal group or organisation declared criminal by the 
International Military Tribunal is ... recognised as a crime'. The question may the more easily be answered by a 
consideration of his background, as set out in a footnote.9 
Poppendick petitioned the Military Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation for review of the sentence. 
The petition was a particularly moving and compelling document, which emphasised that the accused's only 
'crime' was his membership of the SS and that the sentence, which was the first of its kind imposed in the 
American Zone against an SS member, had established a precedent for all military tribunals. 10 
The petition was denied. In his circumstances, Poppendick did not have any other avenue of appeal. His case can 
only be regarded as illustrative of what, at times, was the harsh character of the administration of justice at 
Nuremberg, more particularly because it was the first case in the 'Subsequent Proceedings'. * 
(* The writer has recently noted a novel work on the Medical Case, entitled 'The First German War Crimes 
Trial', by Judge Walter B. Beals, the presiding judge in the case. It comprises mainly a reproduction of Judge 
Beals 'desk notebook', which he maintained throughout the trial. It is a novel source of previously unpublished 
material: New Edition, 1985, Documentary Publications, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, U.S.A.). 
The 'Mich Case' (Case No. 2) 
Erhard Milch was the only aecused in the 'Milch Case' (Case No. 2, Military Tribunal II, N.M.T. vol. 2). 11 
Mulch had been a Field Marshal in the German Air Force. He was indicted on three Caunts, which in summary 
were: 
Count 1. War crimes involving murder, slave labor, deportation of civilian population for slave labor, cruel and 
inhuman treatment of foreign labourers, and the use of prisoners of war in war operations by force and 
compulsion. 
Count 2. War crimes, involving murder, subjecting involuntary victims to low-pressure and freezing experiments 
resulting in torture and death. 
Count 3. Crimes against humanity, involving murder and the same unlawful acts specified in Counts 1 and 2 
against German nationals and nationals of other countries. 
The Tribunal in its judgment dealt first with Count 2. It held that the guilt of the accused in respect of the 
medical experiments had not been established beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted him. He was convicted on 
Counts 1 and 3. The Tribunal cited lengthy parts of the judgment of the International Military Tribunal in its 
findings against the accused Alhert Speerl 2 and said: 13 
Under the provisions of Article X of Ordinance No. 7, these determinations of fact by the International 
Military Tribunal are binding upon this Tribunal 'in the absence of substantial new evidence to the 
contrary'. Any new evidence which was presented was in no way contradictory of the findings of the 
International Military Tribunal, but, on the contrary, ratified and affirmed them. 
The Tribunal further stated: 14 
Count three of the indictment charges the defendant with crimes against humanity committed against 
'German nationals and nationals of other countries'. Sufficient proof was not adduced as to such 
offenses against German nationals to justify an adjudication of guilt on that ground. As to such crimes 
against nationals of other countries, the evidence shows that a large number ol Hungarian Jews and 
other nationals of Hungary and Romania, which countries were occupied by Germany, but were not 
belligerents, were subjected to the same tortures and deportations as were the nationals of Poland and 
Russia. In Count one of the indictment these acts are charged as war crimes and have heretofore been 
considered by the Tribunal under that Count in this judgment. In the judgment of the International 
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Military Tribunal 	the court stated: 'From the beginning of the war in 1939, war crimes were 
committed on a vast scale which were also crimes against humanity'. This is a finding of law and an 
interpretation of Control Council Law No. 10, with which this Tribunal is in full accord. 
Our conclusion is that the same unlawful acts of violence which constituted war crimes under Count 
one of the indictment also constitute crimes against humanity as alleged in Count three of the 
indictment. Having determined the defendant to be guilty of war crimes under Count 1, it follows, of 
necessity, that he is also guilty of the separate offense of crimes against humanity, as alleged in 
Count three, and this tribunal so determines. 
The 'Mikh Case' is not of substantial significance in the context of this thesis. Nevertheless it raises two 
legal matters which merit brief mention. 
First, the Tribunal acquitted the accused of one of the three Counts. It found him guilty of the first Count—war 
crimes—and also guilty on Count 3--crimes against humanity—on the basis of the same facts. For authority, the 
Tribunal relied on the cited statement of the International Military Tribunal and its own interpretation of Control 
Council Law No. 10. Such a duality of findings of guilt was only made legally tenable by virtue of the express 
terms of the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10. The duality is not, in general, recognised as part 
of Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. 
Second, the 'Much Case' was the first in the 'Subsequent Proceedings' to close. Its judgment could therefore 
be regarded as a precedent. Albert Speer, considerably superior in influence in the German hierarchy to Mulch, 
was indicted under all four Counts before the International Military Tribunal. He was found not guilty on 
Counts 1 and 2, but guilty under Counts 3 and 4 (war crimes and crimes against humanity) and sentenced to 
imprisonment for twenty years. Milch was sentenced to imprisonment for the remainder of his natural life. 
The basis of the disparity in the sentences is questionable. 
The Altstoetter Case' (Case No. 3) 
The third trial in the 'Subsequent Proceedings', officially designated United States v. Josef Altstoetter et al., is 
commonly known as the "Justice Case', because, in the words of the prosecution, the defendants were 'the 
embodiment of what passed for justice in the Third Reich'. 15 
All the accused were connected with the German judicial system as judges, prosecutors or ministerial officers. 16 
In the events which happened sixteen were indicted and fourteen were tried. 17 Four of the accused were found not 
guilty, and ten were held guilty of war crimes, crimes against humanity, or membership of criminal 
organisations, or of two or all three of such charges. 
The following extract from the headnote of a report of, and commentary on, the case in the series selected and 
prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, illustrates the breadth of the legal issues which were 
considered: 18 
In its judgment, the Tribunal dealt, inter alia, with the legal basis of the Tribunal and of the law 
which it applied, the scope of the concept of crimes against humanity, the legal position of countries 
occupied by Germany during the war, the illegality of condemning to death nationals of such 
territories for high treason against Germany, the illegality of proceedings taken under the Nacht und 
Nebel plan, and in general the legal aspects of the part taken in furthering the persecution of jews and 
Poles and other aspects of Nazi policy by various of the accused acting in their official or judicial 
capacities. 
Two aspects of the judgment have been chosen by the author for some elaboration:- first, the course of the 
development of International law and second he concept of conspiracy (cf. Count 1 of the principal Nuremberg 
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indictment). 
In respect of international law, Military Tribunal III stated in its judement: 19 
The defendants claim protection under the principle nullum crimen sine leee, though they withheld from 
others the benefit of that rule during the Hitler regime. Obviously the principle in question constitutes 
no limitation upon the power or right of the Tribunal to punish acts which can properly be held to have 
been violations of international law when committed. By way of illustration, we observe that C.C. Law 
10, article H, paragraph 1(b), War Crimes', has by reference incorporated the rules by which war crimes 
are to be identified. In all such cases it remains only for the Tribunal, after the manner of the common 
law, to determine the content of those rules under the impact of changing conditions. 
Whatever view may be held as to the nature and source of our authority under C.C. Law 10 and under 
common international law, the ex post facto rule, properly understood, constitutes no legal nor moral 
barrier to prosecution in this case. 
Under written constitutions the ex post facto rule condemns statutes which define as criminal, acts 
committed before the law was passed, but the ex post facto rule cannot apply in the international field as 
it does under constitutional mandate in the domestic field. Even in the domestic field the prohibition of 
the rule does not apply to the decisions of common law courts, though the question at issue be novel. 
International law is not the product of statute for the simple reason that there is as yet no world 
authority empowered to enact statutes of universal application. International law is the product of 
multipartite treaties, conventions, judicial decisions and customs which have received international 
acceptance or acquiescence. It would be sheer absurdity to suggest that the ex post facto rule, as known 
to constitutional states, could be applied to a treaty, a custom, or a common law decision of an 
international tribunal, or to the international acquiescence which follows the event. To have attempted 
to apply the ex post facto principle to judicial decisions of common international law would have been 
to strangle that law at birth. 
[However,] as a principle of justice and fair play, the rule in question will be given full effect. As 
applied in the field of international law that principle requires proof before conviction that the accused 
knew or should have known that in matters of international concern he was guilty of participation in a 
nationally organized system of injustice snf persecution shocking to the moral sense of mankind, and 
that he knew or should have known that he would be subject to punishment if caught. Whether it be 
considered codification or substantive legislation, no person who knowingly committed the acts made 
punishable by C.C. Law 10 can assert that he did not know that he would be brought to account for his 
acts. 
Second, the case is noteworthy for the fact that in circumstances that are described below, the Tribunal delivered a 
significant judgment on the issue of conspiracy, which was the essence of the first Count in the indictment. 
Although the extracts to be cited are lengthy, the arguments of counsel must be fully understood as a basis for 
the ultimate consideration of the Tribunal's judgment. 
The Trial in the 'Justice Case' began on 5 March 1947. On 9 July 1947, a joint session of five United States 
Military Tribunals was held in order to hear counsel argue regarding the sufficiency of Counts which charged 
defendants with conspiracy to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity as a separate offence. 2° Such 
Counts had been brought not only against the accused in the 'Justice Case' but also against the defendants -in the 
trial of Karl Brandt and others, the 'Medical Case', and in the trial of Oswald Pohl and others, which were also 
being held before certain of the Military Tribunals ... Counsel for the defendants in these three trials challenged 
the sufficiency of the Counts, while General Taylor, who led the prosecution in these trials, upheld it. (The 
essence of the principal arguments of counsel is contained in Annexe 4 to this chapter).21 
The Tribunals decided in favour of the defence submission, and the Tribunal conducting the 'Justice Case 'ruled  
accordingly, on the grounds that the Tribunals were bound by the provisions of Law No.10 and of the Charter of 
the Military Tribunal, which did not define conspiracy to commit a war crime or a crime against humanity as a 
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separate substantive crime. The Tribunal made an order identical with that of the Tribunal in the Medical Case as 
cited above, and its final Judgment included the following: 
This Tribunal has held that it has no jurisdiction to try any ddefendant for the crime of conspiracy as a 
separate substantive offence but we recognise that there are allegations in Count One of the Indictment 
which constitute charges of direct commission of war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, 
after eliminating the conspiracy charge from Count One, we find that all other alleged criminal acts 
therein set forth and committed after 1st September, 1939, are also charged as crimes in the subsequent 
counts of the indictment. We therefore find it unnecessary to pass formally upon the remaining 
charges in Count One. Our pronouncements of guilt or innocence under Counts Two, Three, and Four 
dispose of all issues which have been submitted to us. 
The 'Pohl Case' (Case No. 4) 
One of the three cases 22 in the 'Subsequent Proceedings' which involved ethnological issues (that is, Nazi racial 
policy) was the trial of Oswald Pohl et al., (the 'Pohl Case .). The principal defendant was Oswald Pohl, a 
Lieutenant-General in the Waffen SS, who was Chief of the Economic and Administrative Department 
(commonly known as the 'WVHA', derived from the German language description of the Department). He 
was indicted with seventeen other officials of the Department. There were four Counts: the common design or 
conspiracy; war crimes; crimes against humanity; and (except in the case of one defendant) membership in 
a criminal organisation. These crimes included murders, brutalities, cruelties, tortures, atrocities, deportations, 
enslavement, forced labor, plunder of property, and other inhumane and unlawful acts'. 23 
The judgment in the Pohl Case is not remarkable for pronouncements on legal issues. No doubt this was 
due, at least in part, to the fact that the Tribunal applied a similar ruling on the conspiracy count (Count 1) to 
that made in the 'Justice Case'; further, the crimes charged involved essentially questions of fact with a mass of 
the most revolting evidence imaginable. 
However, one aspect of the case relating to procedural fairness is noteworthy. It is convenient to 
reproduce the following extract from the 'supplemental' judgment of the Tribunal. 24 
On 3 November 1947 the judgment was read in open Court and sentence imposed upon those defendants 
found guilty. Subsequently, counsel for the convicted defendants filed petitions with the Military 
Governor of the United States Zone of Occupation asking revision of the sentences under Article 
XVII(a) of Ordinance No. 7. In these petitions various reasons were given for revision of the judgment, 
including claims that the proof had not been properly evaluated by the Tribunal, that various exhibits 
had been misinterpreted, that findings of fact were not supported by the evidence, and that there was 
injustice in the disparity of sentences. Two defendants stated that in preparing the judgment, the 
Tribunal had denied the defendants the right to answer prosecution's briefs filed against them. The 
Military Governor did not pass on the contentions of any of the defendants, but instead, at the request of 
the Tribunal, issued General Order No. 52, dated 7 June 1948, ordering it to reconvene on or about 12 
July 1948, 'for the purpose of permitting such reconsideration and revision of its judgment as may be 
appropriate'. The Tribunal accordingly reconvened, and on 14 July 1948 entered an order reading in part 
as follows: 
In conformity with the policy of the Tribunal to afford defense counsel every possible 
opportunity to present full and complete arguments in behalf of the defense, such counsel as 
wish to do so will now be permitted to prepare and submit briefs in reply to the prosecution's 
briefs. If, after fully considering such defense briefs, it should appear to the Tribunal that the 
judgment heretofore entered to any defendant is not then supported by the evidence and that his 
guilt has not then been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, or that the sentence imposed is 
injust, the Tribunal will thereupon vacate, modify, or amend the judgment now entered in 
accordance with the facts and the law as so determined. 
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It will be observed that this order gave opportunity to all defendants to submit any arguments they 
wished, based on the record in the case. This completely removed any possibility of prejudice arising 
from the manner in which defendants claimed the original judgment had been prepared. It gave the 
defendants an unrestricted opportunity to supplement the 909 pages of defence argument already 
submitted with further briefs of any scope desired. In addition, the Tribunal ordered the return of all 
defendants to Nuernberg from the Landsberg prison so that their counsel could have free opportunity 
to consult with them. 
It is the firm opinion of the Tribunal that this fulfilled every requirement of full and complete justice to 
the defendants, and gave them all the protection in their legal rights which could be asked. 
Reconsideration of the evidence after judgment and new findings of fact based thereon are not new 
concepts in Anglo-Saxon Law. Motions for new trial, motions for rehearing, motions to reduce the 
verdict of a jury to conform to the proofs, and motions for judgment non obstante veredicto are 
familiar procedural steps in all courts. That is exactly what is being done in this case. No new or 
additional proof is being offered or received. The entire evidence heretofore received is being 
reexamined, and reanalyzed de novo, with the aid of additional defense arguments now submitted in 
briefs. The fact that a judicial conclusion was reached in the original judgment does not preclude the 
Tribunal from reaching a different judicial conclusion, if, after further deliberation, with or without 
briefs, such conclusion appears just and appropriate. Judicial judgments are not immutable. If the 
original court or an appellate court in the interest of justice sees fit to modify them, the power and 
authority to do so, even on its own motion, is undoubted, with the possible limitation that no penalty 
fixed by the original judgmeht could be increased. Defense counsel have taken the strange position of 
objecting to a supplemental proceeding which could not be prejudicial and could be beneficial to their 
clients. 
The 'supplemental' judgment comprised 85 pages. The cases of all accused were reviewed and detailed reasons 
were given either confirming the original judgment and sentence or, as occurred in four cases, reducing the 
severity of the sentence imposed (in one case reducing a sentence of death to life imprisonment). The Military 
Governor of the U.S. Zone of Occupation subsequently commuted a sentence of death imposed on one of the 
accused to imprisonment for life. 
The 'Flick Case' (Case No. 5) 
The case of United States v. Friedrich Flick et. al.,  was one of three cases wholly concerned with the alleged 
criminal responsibility of prominant German industrialists. The six accused were leading officials in what was 
termed the 'Flick Concern' or its subsidiary companies. They were charged with the commission of war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, principally because of their conduct as officials of the 'Flick Concern'. There were 
five Counts in the indictment, which may be summarily described thus: 
Count 1: Participation in the forcible deportation of many thousands of foreign nationals, concentration camp 
inmates and prisoners of war to forced labor in industrial enterprises; 
Count 2: The seizure of plants and properties in France and the Soviet Union; 
Count 3 (which the Tribunal rejected): Crimes against humanity, by participating in the persecution of Jews 
during the pre-war years  (1936-39) by acquiring Jewish industrial and mining properties under the German 
Government's 'Aryanisation' policy; (emphasis added) 
Count 4: Participation knowingly in persecutions and other atrocities committed by the SS by means of 
substantial financial subventions and association with the so-called Eimmler Circle': 
Count 5 (one of the lesser defendants only): Membership in a criminal orginisation. 
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Flick was found guilty under Counts 1, 2 and 4; two other accused were adjudged guilty on two Counts and one 
Count respectively. The other three defendants were completely acquitted. 
It is only relevant to this thesis to refer briefly to three legal issues which were determined by the Tribunal. 
First, the Tribunal extended the conclusion of the International Military Tribunal that international law 
recoenises the criminal responsibility of individuals as distinct from the actions of sovereign States. After 
referring to the judgment of the I.M.T. at pp. 41-42, including a citation from the judgment of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Ex Parte Quinn (1942) 317 U. S. 1, the Tribunal stated: 25 
But IMT was dealing with officials and agencies of the State, and it is urged that individuals holding 
no public offices and not representing the State, do not, and should not come within the class of 
persons criminally responsible for a breach of international law. It is asserted that international law is 
a matter wholly outside the work, interest, and knowledge of private individuals. The distinction is 
unsound. International law, as such, binds every citizen just as does ordinary municipal law. Acts 
adjudged criminal when done by an officer of the government are criminal also when done by a private 
individual. The guilt differs only in magnitude, not in quality. The offender in either case is charged 
with personal wrong and punishment falls on the offender in propria persona. The application of 
international law to individuals is no novelty. (See The Nuemberg Trial and Aggressive War by 
Sheldon Glueck, ch. V, pp. 60-67, incl., and cases there cited.) There is no justification for a 
limitation of responsibility to public officials. 
Second, in contrast with the positions of those indicted before the Tntemational Military Tribunal, it was held 
that the facts of the Flick Case allowed scope for the recognition of the defence of necessity in respect of some of 
those charged. The Tribunal said: 26 
The evidence with respect to defendants [four were named] in our opinion ... clearly established that 
there was in the instant case 'clear and present danger' within the contemplation of that phrase. We 
have already discussed the Reich mien of terror. The defendants lived within the Reich. The Reich, 
through its hordes of enforcement officials and secret police, was always 'present', ready to 2o into 
instant action and to mete out savage and immediate punishment against anyone doing anything that 
could be construed as obstructing or hindering the carrying out of governmental regulations or decrees. 
However, in the cases of Flick and one of his associates, their 'active steps' deprived them of the 'complete 
defence of necessity'. 27 The use of the word 'complete' in this context was clearly a refemce to the mitigating 
circumstances, which were recongised by the Tribunal and reflected in the light punishment imposed, even in the 
case of Flick. 
Third, Count 3 was an extremely weak charge. It purposed to inculpate Flick and two associates with 'crimes 
against humanity' by virtue of their having been involved in four transactions by which the Flick interests 
acquired industrial property formerly owned or controlled by Jews, by taking advantage of the German 
sAryanisation' program. The Tribunal emphasised that the London Agreement and Charter were concerned with 
'war criminals' and that the International Military Tribunal had declined to exercise jurisdiction in respect of 
crimes against humanity occurring before 1 September 1939. In any event, the Tribunal held that the evidence 
tendered under Count 3 did not constitute 'crimes against humanity'. It stated:28 
Jurists and legal writers have been and are presently groping for an adequate inclusive definition of 
crimes against humanity. Donnedieu de Vabres [member for the French Republic of the International 
Military Tribunal] recently said: The theory of "crimes against humanity" is dangerous: dangerous for 
the States because it offers a pretext to intervention by a State in the internal affairs of weaker 
States'.(a) (Our emphasis). 
(a) The Judgment of Nuremberg and the Principle of Legality of Offenses and Penalties, Donneklieu de 
Vabres, published in Review of Penal Law and of Criminology in Brussels, July 1947, translated by 
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J. Herisson, page 22. 
The 'I.G, Farben Case' (Case No. 6) 
The most involved and, from the viewpoint of evidence, the most voluminous of the industrialist cases, was the 
indictment of twenty directors and four senior officers of the I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., popularly known as the 
'Farben Case' (United States v. Carl Krauch et al., Case No. 6). The case of one accused was severed from the 
indictment at an early stage of the trial because of his ill health and consequent inability to stand trial. 
All of the defendants were charged with planning and waging aggressive war (Count 1), spoliation (Count 2), 
enslavement and mistreatment of prisoners of war, deportees and concentration camp inmates (Count 3), and 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, including war crimes and crimes 
against humanity (Count 5). Three of the accused also were charged with membership of the SS, declared by the 
I.M.T. to be criminal. 
The indictment, with appendices, comprised 70 pages; the English transcript of the Court proceedings °covered 
nearly 16,000 mimeographed pages, excluding separate concurring and dissenting judicial opinions; there were 
more than 6,000 written exhibits. Important though the trial was, it was limited relevance to this thesis. 
Consequently, only some isolated issues will be discussed briefly and references to dissenting judgments will be 
excluded. 
The Farben company was a vast chemicals and synthetics combine which deve]oped processes and factories for 
the manufacture of synthetic gasoline and rubber, each of which was essential for mechanised and aerial warfare. 
All the defendants were acquitted under Counts 1 and 5, which were predicated on the same facts, involved the 
same evidence and were considered by the Tribunal together. The defence of 'necessity' was held valid to a liberal 
degree. Only in respect of Count 2 was the Tribunal unanimous, and some charges under that Count were 
dismissed. 
The Tribunal referred to the judgment of the I.M.T. in these terms: 29 
That well-considered judgment is basic and persuasive as to all matters determined therein. In the 
I.M.T. case, Count two bears a marked similarity to Count one in this case. Count one of that case is 
similar to our Count five. 
One of the most important rulings in the Tribunal's judgment in the 'Farben Case' was in these terms: 3° 
There remains the question as to whether the evidence estblishes that any of the defendants are 
guilty of 'waging a war of aggression' within the meaning of Article II, 1, (a) of Control Council Law 
No. 10. This calls for an interpretation of the quoted clause. Is it an offense under international law for 
a citizen of a state that has launched an aggressive attach on another country to support and aid such war 
efforts of his government, or is liability to be limited to those who are responsible for the formulation 
and execution of the policies that result in the carrying on of such a war. 
It is to be noted in this connection that the express purpose of Control Council Law No. 10, as declared 
in its preamble, was to 'give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943, and the 
London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the charter issued pursuant thereto'. The Moscow Declaration 
gave warning that the 'German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party' who were responsible 
for 'atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions' would be prosecuted for such offenses. 
Nothing was said in that declaration about criminal liability for waging a war of aggression. The 
London Agreement is entitled an agreement 'for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War 
Criminals of the European Axis'. There is nothing in that agreement or in the attached Charter to 
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indicate that the words 'waging a war of aggression' were intended to apply to any and all persons who 
aided, supported, or contributed to the carrying on of an aggressive war; and it may be added that the 
persons indicted and tried before the IMT may fairly be classified as 'major war criminals' insofar as 
their activities were concerned. Consistent with the express purpose of the London Agreement to reach 
the 'major war criminals,' the judgment of the IMT declared that 'mass punishments should be avoided'. 
To depart from the concept that only major war criminals—that is, those persons in the political, 
military, and industrial fields, for example, who were responsible for the formulation and execution of 
policies—may be held liable for waging wars of aggression, would lead far afield. Under such 
circumstances there could be no practical limitation on criminal responsibility that would not include, 
on principle, the private soldier on the battlefield, the farmer who increased his production of foodstuffs 
to sustain the armed forces, or the housewife who conserved fats for the making of munitions. Under 
such a construction the entire manpower of Germany could, at the uncontrolled discretion of the 
indicting authorities, be held to answer for waging wars of aggression. That would, indeed, result in 
the possibility of mass punishments. 
The defendants now before us were neither high public officials in the civil government nor high 
military officers. Their participation was that of followers and not leaders. If we lower the standard of 
participation to include them, it is difficult to find a logical place to draw the line between the guilty 
and the innocent among the great mass of German people. 
To find the defendants guilty of waging aggressive war would require us to move the mark without 
finding a firm place in which to reset it. We leave the mark where we find it, well satisfied that 
individuals who plan and lead a nation into and in an aggressive war should be held guilty of crimes 
against peace, but not those who merely follow the leaders and whose participations, like those of 
Speer, 'were in aid of the war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging 
of war.' (IMT judgment, p.122). 
On the issue of conspiracy, the Farben Tribunal expanded the elaboration of its juridical application, as 
expressed in the I.M.T. judgment, when it stated: 
In order to be participants in a common plan or conspiracy, it is elementary that the accused must 
know of the plan or conspiracy. In this connection we quote from a case cited by both the prosecution 
and defense, Direct Sales Company vs. United States, 319 U.S. 703, 63 S. CL 1265. In discussing 
United States vs. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 61 S. Ct. 204, 85 L. ed. 128, the Supreme Court of the 
United States said: 
That decision comes down merely to this, that one does not become a party to a conspiracy 
by aiding and abetting it, through sales of supplies or otherwise, unless he knows of the 
conspiracy; and the inference of such knowledge cannot be drawn merely from knowledge the 
buyer will use the goods illegally. 
Further along in the opinion it is said with regard to the intent of a seller to promote and cooperate in 
the intended illegal use of goods by a buyer: 
This intent, when given effect by overt act, is the gist of conspiracy. While it is not identical 
with mere knowledge that another purposes unlawful action, it is not unrelated to such 
knowledge. Without the knowledge, the intent cannot exist. (United States vs. Falcone 
supra.) Furthermore, to establish the intent, the evidence of knowledge must be clear, not 
equivocal. (Ibid.) This, because charges of conspiracy are not to be made out by piling 
inference upon inference, thus fashioning what, in that case, was called a dragnet to draw in 
all substantive crimes. 
Count five charges that the acts and conduct of the defendants set forth in count one and all of the 
allegations made in count one are incorporated in count five. Since we have already reached the 
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conclusion that none of the defendants participated in the planning or knowingly participated in the 
preparation and initiation or waging of a war or wars of aggression or invasions of other countries, it 
follows that they are not guilty of the charge of being parties to a common plan or conspiracy to do 
these same things. 
We find that none of the defendants is guilty of the crimes set forth in counts one and five. They are, 
therefore, acquitted under said counts. 
The 'Hostage Case' (Case No. 7) 
The description of the 'Hostage Case' is commonly used to refer to the case of United States v. List et al., 
in which twelve prominent army officers were indicted for war crimes committed during the German 
occupation of Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. The principal accused was Field Marshal Wilhelm List. 
The following summary of the indictment is derived from the source recorded in the notes. 31 
The indictment consisted of four counts. Count one was concerned with crimes against humanity and 
war crimes encompassing the murder of thousands of persons from the civilian population of Greece, 
Yugoslavia, and Albania in connection with hostage and reprisal actions. Seven defendants were found 
guilty of this count and three were acquitted; two of the latter were acquitted of all counts of the 
indictment. In addition, defendant Weichs' trial was suspended because of illness, and defendant 
Boehme committed suicide. 
Count two of the indictment dealt predominantly with the plundering, looting, or wanton destruction 
of private and public property in Norway, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Albania. Defendant Felmy was 
found guilty of this count. 
Count three of the indictment consisted of participation in the initiation, distribution, or execution of 
illegal orders, including directives that enemy troops may be denied quarter or status and rights of 
prisoners of war. Five defendants were found guilty of this count. 
Count four related to the illegal treatment of civilian populations by murder, torture, persecution, 
imprisonment in concentration camps, deportation as slave labor, and similar acts. Three defendants 
were found guilty of this count. 
In view of his intimate knowledge of the case as U.S. Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, Brigadier General 
Taylor's assessment of the judgment by Military Tribunal V is important and is reproduced at length: 32 
The judgment was noteworthy alike for its excellent workmanship and its conservatism. Two of the 
most hotly debated issues in the case were whether 'partisans' or 'guerrillas' are entitled to the rights of 
belligerents and to be treated as prisoners of war when captured, and whether it is ever lawful for an 
occupying power to execute hostages taken from the civilian populations. As to the first question, the 
Tribunal declared - 
Just as the spy may act lawfully for his country and at the same time be a war criminal to the enemy, 
so guerrillas may render great service to their country and, in the event of success, become heroes well, 
still they remain war criminals in the eyes of the enemy and may be treated as such. In no other way can 
an army guard and protect itself from the gadly tactics of such armed resistance. And, on the other hand, 
members of such resistance forces must accept the increased risks involved in this mode of fighting. 
Such forces are technically not lawful belligerents and are not entitled to protection as prisoners of war 
when captured.... 
We think the rule is established that a civilian who aids, abets or participates in the fighting is liable to 
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punishment as a war criminal under the laws of war. Fighting is legitimate only for the combatant 
personnel of a country. It is only this group that is entitled to treatment as prisoners of war and incurs 
no liability beyond detention after capture or surrender. 33 
and determined, on the record before it, that - 
There is convincing evidence in the record that certain band units in both Yugoslavia and Greece 
complied with the requirements of international law entitling them to the status of a lawful belligerent. 
But the greater portion of the partisan bands failed to comply with the rules of war entitling them to be 
accorded the rights of a lawful belligerent. The evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that 
the incidents involved in the present case concern partisan troops having the status of lawful 
belligerents. 34 
Turning to the question of hostages' taken from the civilian population, and subsequently executed in reprisal for 
acts of violence against the occupying army, the court wrote: 
The idea that an innocent person may be killed for the criminal act of another is abhorrent to every 
natural law. We condemn the injustice of any such rule as a barbarous relic of ancient times. But it is 
not our province to write international law as we would have it,—we must apply it as we find it. 
An examination of the available evidence on the subject convinces us that hostages may be taken in 
order to guarantee the peaceful conduct of the populations of occupied territories and, when certain 
conditions exist and the necessary preliminaries have been taken, they may, as a last resort, be shot. The 
taking of hostages is based fundamentally on a theory of collective responsibility. ... The occupant may 
properly insist upon compliance with regulations necessary to the security of the occupying forces and 
for the maintenance of law and order. In the accomplishment of this objective, the occupant may only as 
a last resort, take and execute hostages. 35 
However, this right was hedged about with numerous qualifications: 
... there must be some connection between the population from whom the hostages are taken and the 
crime committed. If the act was committed by isolated persons or bands from distant localities without 
the knowledge or approval of the population or public authorities, and which, therefore, neither the 
authorities nor the population could have prevented, the basis for the taking of hostages, or the shooting 
of hostages already taken, does not exist. 
It is essential to a lawful taking of hostages under customary law that proclamation be made, giving the 
names and addresses of hostages taken, notifying the population that upon the recurrence of stated acts 
of war treason the hostages will be shot. The number of hostages shot must not exceed in severity the 
offenses the shooting is designed to deter. Unless the foregoing requirements are met, the shooting of 
hostages is in contravention Of international law and is a war crime in itself. 36 
And these restrictions the Germans had consistently overlooked: 
The evidence in this case recites a record of killing and destruction seldom exceeded in modern history. 
Thousands of innocent inhabitants lost their lives by means of a firing squad or hangman's noose,--
people who had the same inherent desire to live as do these defendants. ... Mass shootings of the 
innocent population, deportations for slave labor and the indiscriminate destruction of public and private 
property, not only in Yugoslavia and Greece but in many other countries as well, lend credit to the 
assertion that terrorism and intimidation was the accepted solution to any and all opposition to the 
German will. It is clear, also, that this had become a general practice and a major weapon of warfare by 
the German Wehrmacht. 
That the acts charged as crimes in the indictment occurred is amply established by the evidence. In 
fact is evident that they constitute only a portion of the large number of such acts which took place as a 
part of a general plan for subduing the countries of Yugoslavia and Greece. The guilt of the German 
occupation forces is not only proven beyond a reasonable doubt but it casts a pall of shame upon a once 
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highly respected nation and its people. The defendants themselves recognize this situation when they 
decry the policies of Hitler and assert that they continually protested against orders of superiors issued in 
conformity with the plan of terrorism and intimidation. 37 
The plea of 'superior orders', although not a defense, was considered with other circumstances in 
mitigation in the fixing of punishment. No death sentences were imposed, but the Tribunal observed: 
... mitigation of punishment does not in any sense of the word reduce the degree of the crime. It 
is more a matter of grace than of defense. In other words, the punishment assessed is not a proper 
criterion to be considered in evaluating the findings of the court with reference to the degree of 
magnitude of the crime. 38 
Field Marshal List and Lieutenant General Kuntze were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Five other lieutenant generals drew terms of seven to twenty years. General Rendulic also was sentenced 
to twenty years, but was acquitted of the charges relating to the devastation of northern Norway, the 
court finding that under' the conditions, as they appeared to the defendant at the time ... he could 
honestly conclude that urgent military necessity warranted the decision made'. 39 The two defendants 
who had served as chiefs of staff (rather than as commanders), Lieutenant General Foertsch and Brigadier 
General Geitner, were acquitted of all charges. Although both had known of the criminal orders which 
led to the atrocities, and indeed had initialled and distributed some of them, the Tribunal concluded that 
their lack of' command of authority ', and the ' want of direct evidence placing responsibility 'upon 
them, required their acquittal. 4° 
In a magnanimous tribute to the Tribunal, Brigadier General Taylor concluded: 41 
The 'Hostage Case' judgment has been much criticized in the countries formerly occupied by Germany, as 
well as in the Soviet-controlled German press. The sentances were attacked as unduly lenient, but much 
more bitter were the comments on the Tribunal's legal rulings upholding the right of an occupying power, 
under certain circumstances, to shoot hostages and to deny 'partisans' the status of belligerents. 
Particularly to former members of 'underground' or 'resistance' movements these decisions were anathema. 
In Norway, the partial acquittal of Rendulic aroused a furore. 
One can easily understand these protests, but, in the writer's view, they have tended to obscure the 
admirable workmanship of the judgment. Furthermore, these were much-mooted questions, with highly 
political overtones, and it is hard to criticize the court's conservative determination to apply 
international law 'as we find it', not 'as we would have it'. In the long run, this may well promote the 
revision of international law along more enlightened lines, which is far more important than the 
decision with respect to these particular defendants. 
The 'RUSHA Case' (Case No. 8) 
Brigadier General Taylor said of the trial of the indictment in United States v. Ulrich Greifelt et al., Case No. 8, 
usually known as the 'RuSHA Case', that '... the factual subject-matter of the case is perhaps more interesting 
than the legal issues or the judgment, which presents few, if any, remarkable features'. 42 
The title 'RuSHA' is derived from an abbreviation of the German language words for 'Main Race and 
Resettlement Office'. The trial was the second 'SS case', in which fourteen officials of 'RuSHA' and three other 
offices or agencies of the SS 'were charged with criminal conduct allegedly arising out of their functions as 
officials of the four agencies mentioned. It was alleged that the crimes charged to the defendants were connected 
with a systematic program of genocide. Ln its judgment the Tribunal ... declared that these SS 
organisations existed for one primary purpose in effecting the ideology and program of Hitler, which may be 
summed up in one phrase (sic)--The twofold objective of weakening and eventually destroying other 
nations while at the same time strengthening Germany, territorially and biologically, at the expense of 
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conquered natons'. 43 
The Tribunal, in a 79-page judgment, 44 concentrated almost completely on the fact of the case. There was 
only one brief and not significant reference to the I.M.T. Judgment. However, it is noted that at p. 599 vol. 4 of 
the I.M.T. series the following footnote appears: 
Since World War II genocide has become the widely used term to describe the systematic persecution and 
elimination of ethnic or religious groups. After the completion of this trial, the General Assembly of the United 
Nations, by resolution of 9 December 1948, adopted a convention entitled 'Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide'. 
The Tinsatzgruppen Case' (Case No. 9) 
In the words of Brigadier General Taylor: 45 
By far the most interesting of the three SS cases was United States v. Otto Ohlendorf et al., (Case No. 
9), commonly known as the 'Einsatzeruppen' Case. The Einsatzgruppen were special units of the SS 
that accompanied the German army during the invasion and occupation of the Soviet Union, with the 
general mission of ensuring 'political security' in the occupied areas. As conceived and executed by the 
SS, this mission involved the immediate and outright slaughter of all Jews in the occupied areas, as 
well as of certain other specified categories, including Communist party functionaries and Gypsies. It 
was established that approximately one million Jews and others were 'liquidated' in Russia by the 
Einsatzeruppen. The twentyfour defendants were commanders or subordinate officers of these units, 
and their trial was, not unnaturally, widely publicized as the 'biggest murder trial in history'. 46 
The facts were stark, simple but horrifying and the Tribunal declared: 47 
[The facts] are so beyond the experience of normal man and the range of man-made phenomena that 
only the most complete judicial inquiry, and the most exhaustive trial, could verify and confirm them. 
Although the principal accusation is murder and, unhappily, man has been killing man ever since the 
days of Cain, the charge of purposeful homicide in this case reaches such fantastic proportions and 
surpasses such credible limits that believability must be bolstered with assurance a hundred times 
repeated. 
The defendants were not gangsters and thugs as the Tribunal stated: 48 
The defendants are not untutored aborigines incapable of appreciation of the finer values of life and 
living. Each man at the best has had the benefit of considerable schooling. Eight are lawyers, one a 
university professor, another a dental physician, still another an expert on art. One, as an opera singer, 
gave concerts throughout Germany before he began his tour of Russia with the Einsatzkommandos. 
This group of educated and well-bred men does not even lack a former minister, self-unfrocked though 
he was. 
Again, this case need not be pursued in the context of this chapter. The legal issues raised were not novel. It is 
merely noted that the Tribunal in this case held, as it was bound to do, that 'the legal consequences drawn from 
the International Military Tribunal Adjudication, which is now res judicata, may not be altered by the assertion 
that someone else may also have been at fault'. 49 
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The 'Krupp Case' (Case No. 10) 
The third trial of industrialists was pursuant to the indictment United States  v. Alfried Krupp von Bohlen und 
Halbach. The accused was the son of Dr Gustav von Bohlen und Halbach, who was charged under the principal 
Nuremberg indictment, but did not undergo trial because of his mental and physical condition. The majority of 
the prosecution had failed in its efforts to substitute his son as an accused (see Chapter 10). 
The Krupp industrial empire was vast and powerful. Alfried Krupp and eleven other officials of the firm were 
indicted on charges of crimes against peace (Count 1), plunder and spoliation (Count 2), deportation, exploitation 
and abuse of slave labor (Count 3) and participation in a common plan and conspiracy to commit criems against 
peace (Count 4), the latter Count being absed upon the allegations of fact set forth in Counts 1,2 and 3. 
In the course of the trial, the Tribunal upheld a defence submission in respect of Counts 1 and 4. It stated: 5° 
We have come to the conclusion that the competent and relevant evidence in the case fails to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the defendants is guilty of the offenses charged in counts one 
and four ... the defendants are acquitted and adjudged not guilty [on those counts]. 
The judgment in respect of Counts 2 and 3 was infelicitously arranged and presented. Of ten who were charged 
under Count 2, six were convicted and four were acquitted. Under Count 3, by which all the defendants were 
charged, only one was acquitted. 
There was a considerable degree of lack of unanimity among the three judges, involving both substantive charges 
and sentences. Ultimately, the sentence imposed on Krupp—twelve years imprisonment and forfeiture of all his 
property—was the subject of a technical variation relating to his property. 
The only legal issue of real significance which was determined by the Tribunal was the defense of necessity, 
particularly in relation to Count 3. 51 However, the facts which the Tribunal found established were 
overwhelmingly strong and the conclusion of guilt appears from the report of the case in the N.M.T. series to 
have been inevitable. 
The 'Ministries Case' (Case No. 11) 
It was predictabe that, against the political background of all of the Nuremhetg trials, the indictment in United 
States v. Ernst Weizsaecker et. al.,  referred to as the 'Ministries' or Wilhelmstrasse' Case, should have been 'the 
largest, longest and last' of the 'Subsequent Proceedings' at Nurembere. 52 
There were twenty one defendants, of whom eighteen were ministers or high officials in the civil administration 
of the Third Reich. The other accused were two SS generals and a banker. 
The material submitted under the eight-Count indictment was massive. The transcript of the Court proceedings 
occupied nearly 29,000 pages. There were about 8,000 written exhibits. In total, there were 339 witnesses. The 
judgment was 883 pages in length. It is neither practicable nor necessary in the context of this chapter to 
consider the indictment, evidence or judgment even in bare outline. However, attention will be drawn to some of 
the legal issues in the light of the I.M.T. judgment. It is convenient to do so by brief references to the Counts 
seriatim, but introductory observations by the Tribunal should first be noted: 53 
Internnational law is not statutory. It is in part defined by and described in treaties and covenants 
among the powers of the world. Nevertheless, much of it consists of practices, principles and standards 
which have become developed over the years and have found general acceptance among the civilized 
powers of the world. It has grown and expanded as the concepts of international right and wrong have 
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grown. It has never been suggested that it has been codified, or that its boundaries have been 
specifically defined, or that specific sanctions have been prescribed for violations of it. The various 
Hague and Geneva Conventions, the Constitution and the Charter of the I gue of Nations, and the 
Kellogg-Briand treaties have given definitive shape to limited fields of international law. It can be said 
that insofar as certain acts are prohibited or permitted by these treaties or covenants, a codification 
exists and specific rules of conduct prescribed. It does not follow however that they are exclusive, and 
assuredly it cannot be said that they cover or pretend to cover the entire field of international law. 
In determining whether the action of a nation is in accordance with or violates international law, resort 
may be had not only to those treaties and covenants, but to treatises on the subject and to the 
principles which lie beneath and back of these treaties, covenants, and learned treatises; and we need 
not hesitate, after having determined what they are, to apply them to new or different situations. It is 
by this very means that all legal codes, civil or criminal, have developed. 
In consonance with the I.M.T., the Tribunal in the Ministries Case relied on the existence of the 1928 Pact of 
Paris and the writings of authors, such as Professor Quincy Wright, in support of the proposition that 
Germany, by being a signatory of the Pact, had renounced war as an 'instrumentality of government policy'. 54 
Count 1: crimes against peace. The Tribunal concurred in and applied the principles stated by the I.M.T. in its 
judgment. Defences based on alleged coercion or duress were rejected. 
Count 2: common plan or conspiracy. On the motion of the prosecution, three accused were dismissed from 
this Count. In respect of those remaining charged under this Count, the Tribunal merely said: 55 
The Tribunal is of the opinion that no evidence has been offered to substantiate a conviction of the 
defendants in a common plan and conspiracy, and all the defendants charged therein are hereby 
acquitted. 
No reasons were stated for that conclusion. 
Count 3: war crimes, murder, and ill-treatment of belligerents and prisoners of war. The Tribunal did not discuss 
any general legal proposions. Some of those accused were acquitted; others were convicted. 
Count: 4: crimes against humanity involving German nationals before the outbreak of war. After argument, the 
Tribunal dismissed this Count for reasons similar to those given by the I.M.T. in an analogous context. 
Count 5: war crimes and crimes against humanity; atrocities and offences committed against civilian 
populations. Again, the Tribunal did not deal with any legal issues. Its findings of guilty against some of those 
charged under this Count were based on its judgment as to the facts. 
Count 6: war crimes and crimes against humanity, plunder and spoliation. Almost entirely, the Tribunal's 
decisions under this Count were based on its view of the facts and there was little discussion of legal principles. 
Count 7: war crimes and crimes against humanity; slave labor. The Tribunal confined itself to examination and 
analysis of the evidence. 
Count 8: membership in criminal organisations. Of the fourteen accused under this Count, twelve were convicted 
and two acquitted. 
Despite the massive judgment delivered by the Tribunal in the Ministries Case, it did not—and probably could 
not in the circumstances have been expected to—itself illuminate any fundamental legal propositions relevant in 
the context of this chapter. The Tribunal adhered strictly to the principles stated in the judgment of the I.M.T. 
It is appropriate to reproduce the eulogy of Brigadier General Taylor:56 
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Considering the gravity of the offenses for which the defendants were convicted, the sentences are 
perhaps somewhat lenient ... but no doubt the Tribunal was governed in its decision by its evaluation 
of the evidence of actual criminality under the definitions laid down in Control Council law No. 10 
rather than by the depth of the Party hue. Certainly the judgment as a whole was a distinguished and 
monumental piece of work, workmanlike and penetrating throughout. 
The 'High Command Case' (Case No. 12) 
The trial of the Wehrmacht High Command (trial of United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb et al., Case No. 12) 
involved the indictment, among others, of Field Marshal von Leeb, the most senior German field marshal of 
World War II, five generals and five lieutenant generals, including the Judge Advocate General of the 
Wehrmacht, one of whom committed suicide on the opening day of the trial. Thirteen stood trial. 
The accused were charged with having committed, together with other leaders of the Third Reich, crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity, and with having participated in a common plan or conspiracy 
to commit crimes against peace. 
Many of the accused had attended major conferences at which Hitler communicated his invasion plans; 
others were privy to the plans and took part in drafting them. 
The Tribunal before which the 'High Command Case' was tried, adopted and purported to apply the principles laid 
down by the International Military Tribunal with regard to 'the law of the Charter'. 57 However, in a section of 
its judgment (less than seven pages), 58 all defendants were found not guilty under Count 1. In its judgment the 
Tribunal said: 
The crime denounced by the law is the use of war as an instrument of national policy. Those who 
commit the crime are those who participate at the policy making level in planning, preparing, or in 
initiating war. After war is initiated and is being waged, the policy question then involved becomes 
one of extending, continuing or discontinuing the war. The crime at this stage likewise must be 
committed at the policy making level. 
The making of a national policy is essentially political, though it may require, and of necessity does 
require, if war is to be one element of that policy, a consideration of matters military as well as 
matters political. 
It is self-evident that national policies are made by man. When men make a policy that is criminal 
under international they are criminally responsible for so doing. That is the logical and inescapable 
conclusion. 
The acts of commanders and staff officers below the policy level, in planning campaigns, preparing 
means for carrying them out, moving against a country on orders and fighting a war after it has been 
instituted do nat constitute the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of war or the initiation of 
invasion that international law denounces as criminal. 
Accordingly, without any discussion or finding by the Tribunal in relation to the practical functions or the 
activities of any of the individual defendants, they were all acquitted of crimes against peace. Before the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, Keitel, Raeder, Jodl and von Neurath, all of whom were, in 
general, in positions analogous to those occupied by most of the high-ranking officers indicted in the Iligh 
Command  Case', and all of whom were found guilty of crimes against peace and two of whom were sentenced to 
death, did not receive the benefit of the determination by the Tribunal in the 'High Command Case' that 'they 
were not on the policy level'.59 
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Early in its judgment the Tribunal dealt with the conspiracy Count (Count 4). It said: 60 
It is difficult to see, as the facts have developed in this case, how a conspiracy charge can be of the 
slightest aid to the prosecution. If the defendants committed the acts charged in this conspiracy Count, 
they are guilty of crimes charged under Counts one, two and three, and are punishable as principals. 
The conspiracy Count has not resulted in the introduction of any evidence that is not admissible under 
the other Counts, nor does it, as the evidence has developed in this case, impose any criminality not 
attached to a violation under such preceding Counts. 
The Tribunal struck out Count 4 because on the facts 'no separate substantive offense is shown'. However 
the Tribunal added:- 
... we .. express no opinion as to whether in all cases and under all factual developments the charge of 
conspiracy should be disregarded. Such determination should depend upon the proof adduced in each 
case. 
In the 'High Command Case', two accused were acquitted on all Counts; von Leeb was convicted on Count 3; all 
other defendants were found guilty under Counts 2 and 3. 
The 'High  Command Case' was the last of the 'Subsequent Proceedings' to open and the second last to close. 
Thus the American curtain was drawn at Nuremberg with two fundamental questions still subject to a degree of 
juridical dubiety: first, the concept of crimes against peace; second, the whole gamut of the web of criminal 
conspiracy. The curtain was not to be raised again at any high judicial level before an American court until nearly 
25 years later when the United States Supreme Court considered the case of Lieutenant William L Caney (see 
Chapters 12 and 15). 
THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 'SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS' 
Although Brigadier General Taylor has stated that 'except with respect to the status and rights of 'partisans' and 
'guerrillas', the Nuremberg trials do not shed much new light on the laws of war relating to combat',61 some 
fundamental legal issues arose in the proceedings which merit mention by way of summary in the context. 
Hostages and Partisans. The focus of the 'Hostage Case' has heen discussed previously in this chapter and the 
views of Brigadier General Taylor have heen set forth at length. In expressing those views he did not cavil with 
the Tribunal's judgment, extremely sensitive though the issue was. The literature considered by the author does 
not appear to contain authoritive and unbiassed criticism of the judgment. History may well render its verdict by 
approbation of the summation by Brigadier General Taylor cited above.62 
The defence of necessity.  The 'Flick Case', as much as any other of the Nuremberg trials, recognised established 
principles of international law relating to the availability of the defence of necessity in appropriate circumstances. 
Professor Dinstein has pointed out63 that '[the] balancing process had already been stressed in the 1868 St. 
Petersburg Declaration where the laws of war were depicted as "limits within which the necessities of war ought 
to yield to the demands of humanity —.64 
Crimes against peace. As has been shown previously in this chapter, the divergence between the approach of the 
International Military Tribunal and that of the Tribunal in the 'High Command Case' to the concept of crimes 
against peace befogs the elucidation of the principles which, if the occasion arose again, would be adjudged 
appropriate to condemn an alleged war criminal on a charge of having committed a crime against peace. 66 
Conspiracy. The manner in which the International Military Tribunal applied the facts as found to the 
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charge of participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of 'crimes against peace', as 
defined in Article 6(a) of the London Charter, was tempered to a degree by the judgment of the Tribunal in the 
High Command Case'. More important, however, as discussed in Chapter 8, is the legal notion of convicting 
an accused on both a charee of conspiracy to commit 'crimes against peace' and, at the same time, of actually 
committing such crimes. This notion was generally rejected in the 'Subsequent Proceedings'. 
CONCLUSION 
Professor Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, a distinguished German academic and author, has evaluated the 13 
Nuremberg Trials in these terms: 66 
If a situation similar to that following World War II arises and war crimes trials are conducted again, 
authority would undoubtedly be sought primarily in the Nuremberg Judgments. The Nuremberg 
Courts decided of necessity many questions of law which are still debated; for that reason, their 
judgments roused anple criticism from all sides. It would, nevertheless, be unjust and beside the point 
to dismiss them as an expression of political bias or revenge. It is a milestone in the development of 
international law that such grave crimes as were committed in World War H were punished in 13 court 
judments following trials in which the accused enjoyed the full right to a defence. Even though many 
crimes committed on the Allied side remained unatoned for and in some cases unjust sentences were 
pronounced as a result of human short-comings, the example of Nuremberg is a landmark in the law 
when viewed as a whole. One only regrets that it has not been followed. [Was this a reference to the 
case of Lieutenant Caney?] The trials are slowly fading from memory and are thus losing their 
imperative force as precedents.67 
I concur generally with the views of Professor Jescheck expressed in the cited passage, with the exception of the 
first sentence. The reference therein to the 'Nuremberg Judgments' fails to recognise that the judgments were 
reached in accordance with the terms of the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10, each of which was 
binding on the relevant Tribunal. To the extent to which any of the Tribunals expounded legal propositions 
which were merely expressive of, or supportive of, the terms of those instruments, they were °biter and did not 
have imperative force as precedents (emphasis added), as stated by Professor Jescheck, supra. 
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1. Jackson, loc . cit., pp . 4-5. 
2. The writer has derived much of the primary source material used in the compilation of this chapter from 
the monograph by Brigadier General Taylor, who was appointed Chief of Counsel for War Crimes in 
succession to Mr. Justice Jackson on 24 October 1946. The monograph was published by the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace: International Conciliation, Nuremberg Trials, War Crimes and 
International Law, New York, April 1949, No. 450. In order to avoid an excessive number of footnotes, 
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3. Sec Dinstein, op, cit., p. 163 and notes 542 and 543. 
4. The 'Medical Case' (Case No. 1, Military Tribunal I) N.M.T vols . 1-2, pp. 1-352 at p. 122; transcript, 
pp. 10717-10718, 14 July 1947. The reference is to the series 'Trials of War Criminals before the 
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5. I.M.T. Judgment, pp 42-44. 
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Waffen SS. He was also a member of a Nazi Physicians Association . In August 1935 he was appointed 
as a physician in the Main Race and Settlement Office in Berlin and became chief physician of that Office 
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In the fall of 1943 Poppendick was made Chief of the Personal Office of Grawitz, which position he 
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Thierack as President of thc infamous People's Court', was killed in an air raid shortly before the war 
ended (Source: Taylor, loc. cit., pp. 286-287). 
17. Taylor loc.cit. p . 287. 
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means unknown in continental law. [Thus, for instance, Article 265 of the French Code Penal provides 
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arrived at for the purpose of preparing or committing crimes against persons or against property, 
constitutes a crime against the public peace'. This provision, inter alia, was relied upon in the trial of 
Henri Georges Stadelhofer by a French Military Tribunal at Marseilles, 15 April, 1948; in finding him 
guilty of the crime of association de malfaiteurs, among other offences, the Tribunal gave an affirmative 
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crimes against persons or property, without justification under the laws and usages of war.' Other accused 
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law, or even a combination of the two. This is not the genius of international law'. 
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Convention II of 1899 with Respect of the Laws and Customs of War on Land. As Dinstein observed, 
• loc. cit., p. 275: '... military necessity is admissible only within the scope of the following definition 
• enunciated by the United States Military Tribunal, in the Hostages case, in 1948: "Military necessity 
permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any amount and kind of force, to compel the 
complete submission of the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life and money" . . The 
essential point made by Dinstein is that 'the key words in the definition are "subject to the laws of war'''. 
Professor N.C.H. Dunbar, in 'Military Necessity in War Crimes Trials', (1952) 29 B.Y.I.L., pp. 442-452, 
stated his conclusion in these terms: 
The contribution of war crimes tribunals towards clarifying the meaning of military necessity has 
inevitably been determined by the nature of the cases brought before them. Nevertheless, if judicial 
precedent is to exercise an influence upon the development of the law of war, it is useful to extract some 
similarity of reasoning in the judgments that have been discussed. It seems likely that court will be 
disinclined to enlarge the doctrine of military necessity beyond that countenanced by express reservations 
appearing in the Hague and Geneva Conventions. The general principle is that belligerent's must always 
respect and observe customary and convenional rules of warfare. The first Article of each of the four 
Geneva Conventions of 1949 makes this clear. The Hague and Geneva Conventions were framed with due 
regard to the practical demands of military necessity, and the situations in which the rules therein laid 
down may be relaxed are strictly limited. Courts will not easily be persuaded to augment of their own 
accord the agreed exceptions to the general rule. 
65. For a moderate comment on the 'Hi oh Command Case', see Jescheck, L.P.I.L., vol. 4, p. 55 et seq. By 
contrast, Brigadier General Taylor, op... ph, p. 340 relied on the conviction in the 'Ministries Case' of five 
of the accused on charges of 'crimes against peace' for the following comment: The Court's opinion in the 
"Ministries Case" on the aggressive war charge is an eloquent and effective restatement of the basic 
concept, but the factual situations with which it dealt fall well within the ambit of the I.M.T. judgment'. 
However, as indicated in the text, I would disagree with that conclusion on a comparison of the facts. 
66. Jescheck, loc. cit., p. 56. 
67. For a valuable review of the Nuremberg Trials as sources of recent German political and historical 
materials, see the publication by Dr. Robert M.W. Kempner, formerly U.S. Deputy Chief of Counsel, 
Nuremberg, reprinted from the American Political Science Review, vol. XLIV, No. 2, pp. 447-459, June 
1950. 
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ANNEXE 1 TO CHAPTER 13 CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO.10: PUNISHMENT OF 
PERSONS GUILTY OF WAR CRIMES, CRIMES AGAINST PEACE AND AGAINST 
HUMANITY 
In order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement of 
8 August 1945, and the Charter issued pursuant thereto and in order to establish a uniform legal basis in 
Germany for the prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt with by the 
International Military Tribunal, the Control Council enacts as follows: 
Article I 
The Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 "Concerning Responsibility of Hitlerites for Committed 
Atrocities" and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945 "Concerning Prosecution and Punishment of Major 
War Criminals of the European Axis" are made integral parts of this Law. Adherence to the provisions of the 
London Agreement by any of the United Nations, as provided for in Article V of that Agreement, shall not 
entitle such Nation to participate or interfere in the operation of this Law within the Control Council area of 
authority in Germany. 
Article II 
1. Each of the following acts is recognized as a crime: 
(a) Crimes against Peace. Initiation of invasions of other countries and wars of aggression in violation of 
international laws and treaties, including but not limited to planning, preparation, initiation or waging a war of 
aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing. 
(b) War Crimes. Atrocities or offenses against persons or property constituting violations of the laws or customs 
of war, including but not limited to, murder, ill treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose, 
of civilian population from occupied territory, murder or ill treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, 
killing of hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or 
devastation not justified by military necessity. 
(c) Crimes against Humanity. Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination, 
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic 
laws of the country where perpetrated. 
(d) Membership in categories of a criminal group or organization declared criminal by the International Military 
Tribunal. 
2. Any person without regard to nationality or the capacity in which he acted, is deemed to have committed a 
crime as defined in paragraph 1 of this Article, if he was (a) a principal or (b) was an accessory to the 
commission of any such crime or ordered or abetted the same or (c) took a consenting part therein or (d) was 
connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission or (e) was a member of any organization or group 
connected with the commission of any such crime or (f) with reference to paragraph 1 (a), if he held a high 
political, civil or military (including General Staff) position in Germany or in one of its Allies, co-belligerents 
or satellites or held high position in the financial, industrial or economic life of any such country. 
3. Any person found guilty,of any of the Crimes above mentioned may upon conviction be punished as shall be 
determined by the tribunal to be just. Such punishment may consist of one or more of the following: 
(a) Death. 
(b) Imprisonment for life or a term of years, with or without hard labour. 
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(c) 	Fine, and imprisonment with or without hard labour, in lieu thereof. 
(d) Forfeiture of property. 
(e) Restitution of property wrongfully acquired. 
(f) Deprivation of some or all civil rights. 
Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of which is ordered by the Tribunal shall be delivered to 
the Control Council for Germany, which shall decide on its disposal. 
4. (a) The official position of any person, whether as Head of State or as a responsible official in a Government 
Department, does not free him from responsibility for a crime or entitle him to mitigation of punishment. 
(b) The fact that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or of a superior does not free him from 
responsibility for a crime, but may be considered in mitigation. 
5. In any trial or prosecution for a crime herein referred to, the accused shall not be entitled to the benefits of any 
statute of limitation in respect of the period from 30 January 1933 to 1 July 1945, nor shall any immunity, 
pardon or amnesty granted under the Nazi regime be admitted as a bar to trial or punishment. 
Article III 
1. Each occupying authority, within its Zone of occupation, 
(a) shall have the right to cause persons within such Zone suspected of having committed a crime, including 
those charged with crime by one of the United Nations, to be arrested and shall take under control the 
property, real and personal, owned or controlled by the said persons, pending decisions as to its eventual 
disposition. 
(b) shall report to the Legal Directorate the names of all suspected criminals, the reasons for and the places of 
their detention, if they are detained, and the names and location of witnesses. 
(c) shall take appropriate measures to see that witnesses and evidence will be available when required, 
(d) shall have the right to cause all persons so arrested and charged, and not delivered to another authority as 
herein provided, or released, to be brought to trial before an appropriate tribunal Such tribunal may, in 
the case of crimes committed by persons of German citizenship or nationality against other persons of 
German citizenship or nationality, or stateless persons, be a German Court, if authorized by the 
occupying authorities. 
2. 	The tribunal by which persons charged with offenses hereunder shall be tried and the rules and procedure 
thereof shall be determined or designated by each Zone Commander for his respective Zone. Nothing 
herein is intended to, or shall impair or limit the jurisdiction or power of any court or tribunal now or 
hereafter established in any Zone by the Commander thereof, or of the International Military Tribunal 
established by the London Agreement of 8 August 1945. 
3. 	Persons wanted for trial by an International Military Tribunal will not be tried without the consent of the 
Committee of Chief Prosecutors. Each Zone Commander will deliver such persons who are within his 
Zone to that committee upon request and will make witnesses and evidence available to it. 
4. 	Persons known to be wanted for trial in another Zone or outside Germany will not he tried prior to 
decision under Article IV unless the fact of their aapprehension has been reported in accordance with 
Section 1 (b) of this Article, three months have elapsed thereafter, and no request for delivery of the type 
contemplated by Article IV has been received by the Zone Commander concerned. 
5. 	The execution of death sentences may be deferred by not to exceed one month after the sentence has 
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become final when the Zone Commander concerned has reason to believe that the testimony of those 
under sentence would be of value in the investigation and trial of crimes within or without his Zone. 
6. 	Each Zone Commander will cause such effect to be given to the judgments of courts of competent 
jurisdiction, with respect to the property taken under his control pursuant hereto, as he may deem proper 
in the interest of justice. 
Article IV 
1. When any person in a Zone in Germany is alleged to have committed a crime, as defined in Article II, in a 
country other than Germany or in another Zone, the government of that nation or the Commander of the 
latter Zone, as the case may be, may request the Commander of the zone in which the person is located for 
his arrest and delivery for trial to the country or Zone in which the crime was committed. Such request for 
delivery shall be granted by the Commander receiving it unless he believes such person is wanted for trial 
or as a witness by an International Military Tribunal, or in Germany, or in a nation other than the one 
making the request, or the Commander is not satisfied that delivery should be made, in any of which cases 
he shall have the right to forward the said request to the Legal Directorate of the Allied Control Authority. 
A similar procedure shall apply to witnesses, material exhibits and other forms of evidence. 
2. The Legal Directorate shall consider all requests referred to it, and shall determine the same in accordance 
with the following principles, its determination to be communicated to the Zone Commander. 
(a) A person wanted for trial or as a witness by an International Military Tribunal shall not be delivered for 
trial or required to give evidence outside Germany, as the case may be, except upon approval of the 
Committee of Chief Prosecutors acting under the London Agreement of 8 August 1945. 
(b) A person wanted for trial by several authorities (other than an International Military Tribunal) shall be 
disposed of in accordance with the following priorities: 
(1) If wanted for trial in the Zone in which he is, he should not be delivered unless arrangements are made for 
his return after trial elsewhere 
(2) If wanted for trial in a Zone other than that in which he is, he should be delivered to that Zone in 
preference to delivery outside Germany unless arrangements are made for his return to that Zone after 
trial elsewhere. 
(3) If wanted for trial outside Germany by two or more of the United Nations, of one of which he is a citizen, 
that one should have priority; 
(4) If wanted for trial outside Germany by several countries, not all of which are United Nations, United 
Nations should have priority; 
(5) If wanted for trial outside Germany by two or more of the United Natiolls, then, subject to Article IV 2 
(b) (3) above, that which has the most serious charges against him, which are moreover supported by 
evidence, should have priority. 
Article V 
The delivery, under Article IV of this law, of persons for trial shall be made on demands of the Governments or 
Zone Commanders in such a manner that the delivery of criminals to one jurisdiction will not become the means 
of defeating or unnecessarily delaying the carrying out of justice in another place. If within six months the 
delivered person has not been convicted by the Court of the zone or country to which he has been delivered, then 
such person shall be returned upon demand of the Commander of the Zone where the person was located prior to 
delivery. 
Done at Berlin, 20 December 1945. 
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ANNEXE 2 TO CIIAPTER 13 MILITARY GOVERNMENT - GERMANY UNITED STATES 
ZONE ORDINANCE NO. 7 
ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF CERTAIN MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
Article I 
The purpose of this Ordinance is to provide for the establishment of military tribunals which shall have power to 
try and punish persons charged with offenses recognized as crimes in Article H of Control Council Law No. 10, 
including conspiracies to commit any such crimes. Nothing herein shall prejudice the jurisdiction or the powers 
of other courts established or which may be established for the trial of any such offenses. 
Article II 
(a) Pursuant to the powers of the Military Governor for the United States Zone of Occupation within 
Germany and further pursuant to the powers conferred upon the Zone Commander by Control Council 
Law No. 10 and Articles 10 and 11 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal annexed to the 
London Agreement of 8 August 1945 certain tribunals to be known as "Military Tribunals" shall be 
established hereunder. 
(b) Each such tribunal shall consist of three or more members to be designated by the Military Governor. One 
alternate member may be designated to any tribunal if deemed advisable by the Military Governor. Except 
as provided in subsection (c) of this Article, all members and alternatives shall be lawyers who have been 
admitted to practice, for at least five years, in the highest courts of one of the United States or its 
territories or of the District of Columbia, or who have been admitted to pratice in the United States 
Supreme Court. 
(c) The Military Governor may in his discretion enter into an agreement with one or more other zone 
commanders of the member nations of the Allied Control Authority providing for the joint trial of any 
case or cases. In such cases the tribunals shall consist of three or more members as may be provided in the 
agreement. In such cases the tribunals may include properly qualified lawyers designated by the other 
member nations. 
(d) The Military Governor shall designate one of the members of the tribunal to serve as the presiding judge. 
(e) Neither the tribunals nor the members of the tribunals or the alternates may be challenged by the 
prosecution or by the defendants or their counsel. 
(f) In case of illness of any member of a tribunal or his incapacity for some other reason, the alternate, if one 
has been designated, shall take his place as a member in the pending trial. Members may be replaced for 
reasons of health or for other good reasons, except that no replacement of a member may take place, 
during a trial, other than by the alternate. If no alternate has been designated, the trial shall be continued to 
conclusion by the remaining members. 
(g) The presence of three members of the tribunal or of two members when authorized pursuant to subsection 
(f) supra shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. In the case of tribunals designated under (c) above the 
agreement shall determine the requirements for a quorum. 
(h) Decisions and judgments, including convictions and sentences, shall be by majority vote of the members. 
If the votes of the members are equally divided, the presiding member shall declare a mistrial. 
Article III 
(a) 	Charges against persons to be tried in the tribunals established hereunder shall originate in the Office of 
the Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, appointed by the Military Governor pursuant to paragraph 3 of the 
Executive Order Numbered 9679 of the President of the United States dated 16 January 1946. The Chief of 
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Counsel for War Crimes shall determine the persons to he tried by the tribunals and he or his designated 
representative shall file the indictments with the Secretary General of the tribunals (see Article XIV, 
infra) and shall conduct the prosecution. 
(b) The Chief of Counsel for War Crimes, when in his judgment it is advisable, may invite one or more 
United Nations to designate representatives to participate in the prosecution of any case. 
Article IV 
In order to ensure fair trial for the defendants, the following procedure shall be followed: 
(a) A defendant shall be furnished, at a reasonable time before his trial, a copy of the indictment and of all 
documents lodged with the indictment, translated into a language which he understands. The indictment 
shall state the charges plainly, concisely and with sufficient particulars to inform defendant of the offenses 
charged. 
(b) The trial shall be conducted in. or translated into, a language which the defendant understands. 
(c) A defendant shall have the right to be represented by counsel of his own selection, provided such counsel 
shall be a person qualified under existing regulations to conduct cases before the courts of defendant's 
country, or any other person who may be specially authorized by the tribunal. The tribunal shall appoint 
qualified counsel to represent a defendant who is not represented by counsel of his own selection. 
(d) Every defendant shall be entitled to be present at his trial except that a defendant may be proceeded against 
during temporary absences if in the opinion of the tribunal defendant's interests will not thereby be 
impaired, and except further as provided in Article VI (c). The tribunal may also proceed in the absence of 
any defendant who has applied for and has been granted permission to be absent. 
(e) A defendant shall have the right through his counsel to present evidence at the trial in support of his 
defense, and to cross-examine any witness called by the prosecution. 
(f) A defendant may apply in writing to the tribunal for the production of witnesses or of documents. The 
application shall state where the witness or document is thought to be located and shall also state the facts 
to be proved by the witness or the document and the relevancy of such facts to the defense. If the tribunal 
grants the application, the defendant shall be given such aid in obtaining production of evidence as the 
tribunal may order. 
Article V 
The tribunals shall have the power 
(a) to summon witnesses to the trial, to require their attendance and testimony and to put questions to them; 
(b) to interrogate any defendant who takes the stand to testify in his own behalf, or who is called to testify 
regarding another defendant; 
(c) to require the production of documents and other evidentiary material; 
(d) to administer oaths; 
(e) to appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by the tribunals including the taking of 
evidence on commission; 
(f) to adopt rules of procedure not inconsistent with this Ordinance. Such rules shall be adopted, and from 
time to time as necessary, revised by the members of the tribunal or by the committee of presiding judges 
as provided in Article XIII. 
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Article VI 
The tribunals shall 
(a) confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges; 
(b) take strict measures to prevent any action which will cause unreasonable delay, and rule out irrelevant 
issues and statements of any kind whatsoever; 
(c) deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing appropriate punishment, including the exclusion of any 
defendant or his counsel from some or all further proceedings, but without prejudice to the determination 
of the charges. 
Article VII 
The tribunals shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. They shall adopt and apply to the greatest 
possible extent expeditious and nontechnical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which they deem to have 
probative value. Without limiting the foregoing general rules, the following shall be deemed admissible if they 
appear to the tribunal to contain information of probative value relating to the charges: affidavits, depositions, 
interrogations, and other statements, diaries, letters, the records, findings, statements and judgments of the 
military tribunals and the reviewing and confirming authorities of any of the United Nations, and copies of any 
document or other secondary evidence of the contents of any document, if the original is not readily available or 
cannot be produced without delay. The tribunal shall afford the opposing party such opportunity to question 
the authenticity or probative value of such evidence as in the opinion of the tribunal the ends of justice require. 
Article VIII 
The tribunals may require that they be informed of the nature of any evidence before it is offered so that they 
may rule upon the relevance thereof. 
Article IX 
The tribunals shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge but shall take judicial notice thereof. They 
shall also take judicial notice of official governmental documents and reports of any of the United Nations, 
including the acts and documents of the committees set up in the various Allied countries for the investigation of 
war crimes, and the records and findings of military or other tribunals of any of the United Nations. 
Article X 
The determinations of the International Military Tribunal in the judgment in Case No. I that invasions, 
aggressive acts, aggressive wars, crimes, atrocities or inhumane acts were planned or occurred, shall be binding 
on the tribunals established hereunder and shall not be questioned except insofar as the participation therein or 
knowledge thereof by any particular person may be concerned. Statements of the International Military Tribunal 
in the judgment in Case No. I constitute proof of the facts stated, in the absence of substantial new evidence to 
the contrary. 
Article XI 
The proceedings at the trial shall take the following course: 
(a) The tribunal shall inquire of each defendant whether he has received and had an opportunity to read the 
indictment against him and whether he pleads "guilty" or "not guilty". 
(b) The prosecution may make an opening statement. 
(c) The prosecution shall produce its evidence subject to the cross examination of its witnesses. 
(d) The defense may make an opening statement. 
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(e) 	The defense shall produce its evidence subject to the cross examination of its witnesses 
(0 	Such rebutting evidence .as may be held by the tribunal to be material may be produced by either the 
prosecution or the defense. 
The defense shall address the court. 
The prosecution shall address the court. 
Each defendant may make a statement to the tribunal. 
The tribunal shall deliver judgment and pronounce sentence. 
Article XII 
A Central Secretariat to assist the tribunals to be appointed hereunder shall be established as soon as practicable. 
The main office of the Secretariat shall be located in Nuremberg. The Secretariat shall consist of a Secretary 
General and such assistant secretaries, military officers, clerks, interpreters and other personnel as may be 
necessary. 
Article XIII 
The Secretary General shall be appointed by the Military Governor and shall organin and direct the work of the 
Secretariat. He shall be subject to the supervision of the members of the tribunals, except that when at leasl three 
tribunals shall be functioning, the presiding judges of the several tribunals may form the supervisory committee. 
Article XIV 
The Secretariat shall: 
(a) Be responsible for the administrative and supply needs of the Secretariat and of the several tribunals. 
(b) Receive all documents addressed to tribunals. 
(c) Prepare and recommend uniform rules of procedure, not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Ordinance. 
(d) Secure such information for the tribunals as may be needed for the approval or appointment of defense 
counsel. 
(e) Serve as liaison between the prosecution and defense counsel. 
(0 	Arrange for aid to be given defendants and the prosecution in obtaining production of witnesses or 
evidence as authorized by the tribunals. 
(g) Be responsible for the preparation of the records of the proceedings before the tribunals. 
(h) Provide the necessary clerical, reporting and interpretative services to the tribunals and its members, and 
perform such other duties as may be required by any of the tribunals. 
Article XV 
The judgments of the tribunals as to the guilt or the innocence of any defendant shall give the reasons on which 
they are based and shall be final and not subject to review. The sentences imposed may be subject to review as 
provided in Article XVII, infra. 
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Article XVI 
The tribunal shall have the right to impose upon the defendant, upon conviction, such punishment as shall 
be determined by the tribunal to be just which may consist of one or more of the penalties provided in Article II, 
Section 3 of Control Council Law No. 10. 
Article XVII 
(a) Except as provided in (b) infra, the record of each case shall be forwarded to the Military Governor who 
shall have the power to mitigate, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence imposed by the tribunal, but may 
not increase the severity thereof. 
(b) In cases tried before tribunals authorised by Article II (c), the sentence shall be reviewed jointly by the 
zone commanders of the nations involved, who may mitigate, reduce or otherwise alter the sentence by 
majority vote, but may not increase the severity thereof. If only two nations are represented, the sentence 
may be altered only by the consent of both zone commanders. 
Article XVIII 
No sentence of death shall be carried into execution unless and until confirmed in writing by the Military 
Governor. In accordance with Article III, Section 5 of Law No. 10, execution of the death sentence may be 
deferred by not to exceed one month after such confirmation if there is reason to believe that the testimony of the 
convicted person may be of value in the investigation and trial of other crimes. 
Article XIX 
Upon the pronouncement of a death sentence by a tribunal established thereunder and pending confirmation 
thereof, the condemned will be remanded to the prison or place where he was confined and there be segregated 
from the other inmates, or be transferred to a more appropriate place of confinement. 
Article XX 
Upon the confirmation of a sentence of death the Military Governor will issue the necessary orders for carrying 
out the execution. 
Article XXI 
Where sentence of confinement for a term of years has been imposed the condemned shall be confined in the 
manner directed by the tribunal imposing sentence. The place of confinement may be changed from time to time 
by the Military Governor. 
Article XXII 
Any property declared to be forfeited or the restitution of which is ordered by a tribunal shall he delivered 
to the Military Governor, for disposal in accordance with Control Council Law No. 10, Article 11 (3). 
Article XXIII 
Any of the duties and functions of the Military Governor provided for herein may be delegated to the Deputy 
Military Governor. Any of the duties and functions of the Zone Commander provided for herein may be exercised 
by and in the name of the Military Governor and may be delegated to the Deputy Military Governor. 
This Ordinance becomes effective 18 October 1946. 
ANNEXE 3 TO CHAPTER 13 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE NUREMBERG 
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 
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Case 
No. United States of America against Popular name 	Volume No. 
1 Karl Brandt, et al. Medical Case I and II 
2 Erhard Mulch Mulch Case 11 
3 Josef Altstoetter, et al. Justice Case DI 
4 Oswald Pohl, et al. Pohl Case v 
5 Friedrich Flick, et al. Flick Case VI 
6 Carl Krauch, et al. I.G. Farben VII and 
Case VIII 
7 Wilhelm List, et al. Hostage Case XI 
8 Ulrich Greifelt, et al. RuSHA Case IV and V 
9 Otto Ohlendorf, et al. Eins2r7gruppen rv 
Case 
10 Alfried Krupp, et al. Krupp Case IX 
11 Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. Ministries Case XII, XIII, 
and XIV 
12 Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. High Command X and XI 
Case 
Procedure XV 
Case 
Arrangement by subject units for publication* 
No. United States of America against Popular name Volume No. 
Medical 
1 Karl Brandt, et al. Medical Case I and II 
2 Erhard Milch Mitch Case II 
Legal 
3 Josef Altstoetter, et al. Justice Case DI 
Procedure XV 
Ethnological (Nazi Racial Policy) 
9 Otto Ohlmdorf, et al. Einsatzgruppen IV 
Case 
8 Ulrich Greifelt, et al. RuSHA Case IV and V 
4 Oswald Pohl, et al. Pohl Case 
Economic 
5 Friedrich Flick, et al. Flick Case VI 
6 Carl Krauch, et.al . I.G. Farben VII and 
Case VIII 
10 Alfried Krupp, et al. Krupp Case IX 
Military 
7 Wilhelm List, et al. Hostage Case XI 
12 Wilhelm von Leeb, et al. High Command X and XI 
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Case 
Political and Government 
11 	Ernst von Weizsaecker, et al. Ministries 	 XII, XIII 
and XIV 
* Although the subject material in many of the cases overlaps, it was believed that this arrangement of the 
cases would be most helpful to the reader and the most feasible for publication purposes. 
[Source: Trials of War Criminals before the Nuemberg Military Tribunals, United States Government Printing 
Office, Washington, 1952]. 
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ANNEXE 4 TO CIIAPTER 13 PRINCIPAL LEGAL SUBMISSIONS BY COUNSEL IN 
RELATION TO THE CHARGE OF CONSPIRACY 
As stated in the text of this chapter, a joint sitting of five United States Military Tribunals was specially 
convened on 9 July 1947 to hear argument from counsel in relation to the Count of conspiracy. Because of the 
importance of the ruling, the principal submissions of counsel are summarised in this Annexe as follows: 
(i) 	neither the Charter of the International Military Tribunal nor Law No. 10, in dealing with war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, 'speak of common planning as a punishable separate crime, whereas 
both laws have in common that in their respective figure (a), dealing with the crimes against peace, 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of one of the listed crimes 
against the peace, is expressly declared punishable'; 
the International Military Tribunal held that whereas the prosecution [that is, the indictment] in the 
trial of the German major war criminals charged a conspiracy to commit not only aggressive war but 
also war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Charter did not in fact define as a crime any 
conspiracy except the one to commit acts of aggressive war; 
the wording 'was connected with plans or enterprises involving its commission' contained in Article 
II, 2 (d) of Law No. 10 could not be taken to admit charges of conspiracy to commit war crimes and 
crimes against humanity since 'the system of Law No. 10 makes it clear beyond doubt that the facts of 
crimes are exhaustively defined in sub-paragraph 1, whereas in sub-paragraph 2 only the forms of 
complicity in these crimes are defined'; 
(iv) The occupation of Germany was carried out together by the four victorious Powers, who according to 
the Berlin declaration have confirmed again and again that Germany is to be neither annexed nor divided 
up but on the contrary to be maintained as an entity of which the political form is to be determined. 
Consequently, Germany is subject to the united occupation Powers as represented in the Control 
council, but not to the Russian, the English, the French, the American law as such'. The introduction 
of the Anglo-American concept of conspiracy was not therefore admissible; 
(v) the words 'including conspiracy to commit any such crimes', contained in Article 1 of Ordinance No. 
7, must be taken to mean only conspiracy to commit crimes against peace, since Ordinance No. 7 did 
not set out to alter matters of substantive law contained in Law No. 10; 
(vi) the concept of conspiracy is not found in modern continental codes, and is an Anglo-American notion. 
It would therefore be a violation of the maxim nullum crimen sine leoe to apply it to German accused. 
The principal prosecution arguments, as presented by General Taylor, were the following: 
(i) 
	
The classical definition of conspiracy at English common law is that it is a confederation to effect an 
unlawful object, or to effect a lawful object by unlawful means. Within the scope of this definition, 
conspiracy is very little more than an elaboration of the law of attempts, in cases where the 
conspiracy was unsuccessful in attaining its object, or of the law of principals and accessories and 
accomplices, if the conspiracy succeeded in attaining an unlawful object. Within this sphere, the law 
of conspiracy is really just another manifestation of the very familiar problem in all legal systems of 
how closely or in what way an individual must be connected with a crime in order to attribute to him, 
in a judicial sense, guilt. ... However, over the course of years there have occurred, both in English 
common law and in the continental law, a number of efforts to apply the doctrine of conspiracy to acts 
which, if committed by a single person, would not have been indictable or, in a judicial sense, 
unlawful ... it is important to point out, therefore, that none of these questionable and perhaps 
dangerous developments of the law of conspiracy are in any way involved under the London Charter or 
under Law No. 10, or in any of the three cases before these tribunals in which this jurisdictional 
question is raised. Neither one, neither the London Charter nor these indictments, seeks to impose 
criminal liability for conspiring in pursuit of a lawful objective. On the contrary, the conspiracies 
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involved in these cases are conspiracies to conunit acts well established as crimes at international law, 
under the specific language of the London Charter and Law No. 10 and, in most cases, under the penal 
law system of all civilised countries. Moreover, these were crimes which according to the claim of the 
prosecution had in fact been committed. 
(ii) 	All systems of law had 'concepts, such as accessories, accomplices, conspirators, etc.', whose purpose 
was to ensure that all connected with a crime should be punished, and in approaching the question of 
what degree of connection with these crimes must be established in order to attribute guilt to a 
defendant, we must not become enmeshed in the intricacies of the American or English law of principals 
and accessories, or of conspiracy, or indeed in the refinements or peculiar prejudices of any single 
judicial system. International law, with respect to these questions, must be derived and applied from a 
variety of sources and legal systems, including both civil and common law. And the notion of 
conspiracy, if sensibly and fairly confined, is, we submit, a useful body of doctrine to draw upon. 
(iii) 	The law of war crimes is, fundamentally, an attempt to define the circumstances under which a state of 
belligerent hostilities makes lawful acts which would otherwise be clearly unlawful, acts such as 
murder, torture, enslavement, rape, plunder, destruction, devastation, etc. It is well settled, and we think 
this is an important point, that a conspiracy to commit felonies of these types is an indictable offence at 
common law, and regardless of whether any statute expressly so provides. This has been settled in a 
multitude of English and American decisions over a number of years. It was, undoubtedly, for this 
reason that the draftsmen of the London Charter and Control Council Law No. 10 saw no need to 
include an express reference to conspiracy in the definition of war crimes and crimes against humanity, 
any more than they felt it necessary to make express reference to the liability of accessories and 
accomplices or to the law of attempts. All these things adhere to such crimes automatically. 
Why, then, did the draftsmen of the London Charter make specific reference to 'common plan or 
conspiracy' in the definition of crimes against peace? Clearly, we submit, this was done out of 
abundance of caution because of certain differences between the nature of crimes against peace on the one 
hand and war crimes and crimes against humanity on the other hand. ... But the crime of planning and 
waging an aggressive war is, in many respects, peculiarly an international law crime, and particularly 
subject to international jurisdiction. The acts condemned as criminal in the definition of crimes against 
peace are not acts which are declared to be criminal under the internal penal law of most States. 
Furthermore, while war crimes and crimes against humanity can certainly be committed by a single 
individual, it is hard to think of any one man as committing the crime of waging an aggressive war as a 
solo venture. It is peculiarly a crime brought about by the confederation or conspiracy of a number of 
men acting pursuant to well-laid plans. It matures over a long period of time, and many steps are 
involved in its consummation. The interrelations between the confederates or conspirators are likely to 
be extremely complicated and far-flung. For all these reasons, and particularly because planning an 
aggressive war is not, like murder, a standard felony to which the orthodox paraphernalia of doctrine as 
to the liability of accomplices automatically applies, the draftsmen of the London Charter and Law No. 
10 included an express reference to conspiracy in the definition of crimes against. peace. 
(iv) I am sure that it never occurred to the Allied Control Council when it adopted Law No. 10 in December, 
1945, during the proceedings before the International Military Tribunal, that by following the language 
of the London Charter they had excluded from the scope of law No. 10 conspiracies to commit war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. And finally, so far as I am aware, such an idea never occurred to 
any of the defence counsel during the entire course of the international trial. ... The International 
Military Tribunal came to the decision quoted above because of an underlying hostility, particularly on 
the part of the continental members of the court, to the concept of conspiracy as such. The Military 
Tribunal should refuse to follow this ruling, which [seems] to be contrary to the express language of 
Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal which stated that: 'Leaders, organisers, 
instigators, and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or 
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons 
in execution of such plan.' Ordinance No. 7, under which these Tribunals are constituted, does not make 
the decisions of the International Military Tribunal on points of law binding. 
(v) Article II, (2) of Law No. 10 was differently worded from the passage just quoted from the Charter, but 
its purpose is fundamentally the same. ... Indeed, the scope of paragraph 2 of Article H of Control 
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Council Law No. 10 which I have just quoted is, we believe, broader than that of the doctrine of 
conspiracy. 
(vi) In applying international penal law, just as in applying domestic penal law, we must determine the 
substantial degree or quality of participation in crimes upon the basis of which a fair judgment of guilt 
must be rendered. And in making these determinations under international law, it is surely not only 
appropriate but wise to draw upon such well-established bodies of legal doctrine in highly developed 
legal systems as will assist us in arriving at a result which commends itself to our sense of justice. The 
International Military Tribunal did not find that any considerations of general jurisprudence stood in the 
way of applying the doctrine of conspiracy in the case of crimes against peace. 
(vii) Conspiracy to achieve an unlawful objective or to use unlawful means to attain an objective is not, 
properly speaking, a separate subsequent crime at all, any more than being an accessory or an 
accomplice is a crime; it is an adjunct of the crime; 
(viii) It is important, also, to bear in mind that neither the London Charter nor Law No. 10 purports to be a 
complete, or even a nearly complete codification of international penal law ... Particularly in respect to 
the necessary degree of connection with a crime, the provisions of the London Charter and Law No. 10 
are illustrative rather than exhaustive attempts at statutory definition. Neither of them, for example, 
makes mention of attempts, yet it surely was not the intention in either case to eliminate attempts 
from international penal law. 
(ix) Ordinance No. 7 expressly makes conspiracy punishable. 
Source: Nuremberg Military Tribunals series, transcript, passim. 
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CHAPTER 14 
	
THE AUSTRALIAN ROAD TO THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST: COMPARISON BETWEEN 
'NUREMBERG LAW' AND 'TOKYO LAW' 
INTRODUCTION 
It is beyond the scope of this study to consider in detail the deliberations and judgments (including the dissenting 
judgments) of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East ('Tokyo Tribunal). Consequently, the 
discussion in this chapter is confined essentially to the following matters: 
(a) The preliminary official steps taken by Australia to investigate war crimes committed in the widespread 
areas in which the Japanese Armed Forces were involved; 
(b) The establishment and jurisdiction of the Tokyo Tribunal, including a comparison with the jurisdictional 
basis for the Nuremberg Tribunal; 
(c) The relevance of the Tokyo Tribunal in the development of principles of public international law in 
relation to trial and punishment of war criminals; 
(d) The broad approach of successive Australian Governments to the treatment, as a matter of law, of 
Japanese war criminals; and 
(e) A consideration of the criticism of the Tokyo Tribunal 
It is not practicable, or of any direct relevance, to extend the limits of the discussion to the proceedings conducted 
between 1945 and May 1951 before numerous mixed inter-Allied military courts, appointed pursuant to the 
Australian War Crimes Act 1945. Those proceedings did not involve principles of public international law and 
were almost solely confined to allegations of atrocities. 1 For the same reasons, reference is not made to the trials 
in the Pacific theatre conducted by special United States commissions, such as those which tried General 
Yamashita and General Homma in the Philippines. 2 
INITIAL AUSTRALIAN STEPS TOWARDS THE TRIALS OF JAPANESE 
On 23 June 1943 Sir William Webb, then Chief Justice of Queensland, was appointed a Commissioner under the 
National Security (Inquiries) Regulations to inquire into and report whether there had been atrocities or breaches 
of the rules of warfare on the part of the Japanese Armed Forces in or in the neighbourhood of New Guinea or 
Papua, and what evidence was available of any such atrocities or breaches. Sir William Webb submitted his 
report on 21 March 1944. 
On 8 June 1944 a further commission, under the same regulations, was issued to Sir William Webb to inquire 
into and report whether there had been any war crimes on the part of individual members of the Armed Forces of 
the enemy against any persons who were resident in Australia prior to World War II (whether members of the 
forces or not) which in his opinion should be communicated by the Commonwealth Government to the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission, and what evidence was available of any such war crimes. Under that 
commission Sir William Webb heard evidence in Australia and furnished a report. He then visited London for 
discussions with members and senior legal advisers of the British Government and the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission, British judges and lawyers. The discussions involved the question of the relaxation of the 
strict rules of evidence in the case of war crimes trials and no doubt were the genesis of some of the provisions of 
the Australian War Crimes Act 1945. Following the surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945, the 
Commonwealth Government, on 3 September 1945, appointed Sir William Webb, Mr. Justice Mansfield, of the 
Supreme Court of Queensland, and His Honour, Richard Clarence Kirby, a Judge of District Courts of New 
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South Wales, to be a Board of Inquiry, 3 under the same regulations, to inquire into and report on the following 
matters (except insofar as the matters had already been inquired into by Sir William Webb): 
(i) Whether any war crimes had been committed by any subjects of any State with which His 
Majesty had been engaged at war since 2 September 1939 against any persons who were resident 
in Australia prior to the commencement of any such war, whether members of the defence 
forces or not, or against any British subject or against any citizen of an allied nation; 
(ii) If any war crimes had been so committed, whether, in the opinion of the Board, particulars 
thereof should be communicated by the Commonwealth Government to the United Nations 
Commission for the investigation of war crimes; and 
(iii) What evidence was available of such war crimes. 
The instrument of appointment of the Board of Inquiry defined a 'war crime' as including any of thirty five 
categories of acts, the most significant of which was the repetition in identical terms of Article 6(a) of the 
London Charter of 8 August 1945 relating to crimes against peace. The definition included most of the other 
crimes specified in other paragraphs of Article 6 of the London Charter, but was more expansive, to the extent of 
including cannibalism. 
The National Security (Inquiries) Regulations provided that the members of the Board could inform their minds 
in any manner they thought fit and were not bound by the rules of evidence. The Board stated in its report: 4 
... The effect of this is to prevent the Board from being regarded as a judicial body. In any event, as the 
Board takes evidence ex parte and the witnesses are not subjected to cross-examination, the Board 
cannot make a finding against any specific individual. The Board does not try the Japanese; it merely 
finds as an administrative body whether a war crime has been committed, and, if it has, produces the 
evidence ... Actually, then, the Board does not make any finding against any war criminal, whether he 
be a major war criminal or an ordinary war criminal ... The Board is not in a position to say whether 
the evidence it collects should be believed or not by the tribunals that will try the war criminals. It 
merely passes on this evidence with its own conclusions, on the asumption that it is true but without 
finding that it is true. 
Much of the material considered by the Board originated in responses by members of the Australian Armed 
Forces, many of whom had been Prisoners of war, to a printed questionnaire, some 40,000 copies of which 
were distributed. 
In its report, dated 31 January 1946, the Board presented evidence, both general and specific, relating to war 
crimes within its jurisdiction. Just prior to that date, Sir William Webb had been nominated as Australian 
representative on the Tokyo Tribunal and Mr. Justice Mansfield had been appointed Chief Australian Prosecutor 
and Associate Prosecutor with those of the other nations that were to be represented on the international tribunal. 
It is clear that the first two reports by Sir William Webb as a sole Commissioner and the appointment of the 
Board of Inquiry paved the way for the enactment by the Federal Parliament of the War Crimes Act 1945, leading 
to the establishment of the War Crimes Courts which exercised jurisdiction in or near the South Pacific area 
until 1951. More importantly, the three inquiries, and the associated liaison with the United Nations War Crimes 
Commission, including the appointment of Mr. Justice Mansfield as an additional member of that 
Commission, 5 projected Australia into a leading role in relation to the prosecution of war criminals in the Far 
East and, it would appear, led to the appointment of Sir William Webb as President of the Tokyo Tribunal. 
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THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE TOKYO TRIBUNAL 
As in the case of Nuremberg, the preliminary discussions concerning the nature and scope of the Tokyo Tribunal 
were dominated by American attitudes. The concept of conspiracy relating to the planning, preparation, initiation 
or waging of a war of aggression was again fundamental. The maintenance of such a concept was inevitable. As 
Judge Roling, the Netherlands member of the Tokyo Tribunal, wrote in 1982: 6 
The precedent of the Nuremberg trial compelled the Allied powers to prosecute Japanese leaders for the 
crime against peace. Had this charge been omitted, the conclusion might have been that this war had 
not been an aggressive one. Therefore prosecution could only have been for misbehaviour during the 
war, consisting of grave violations of the laws and customs of war. 
However, the framers of the Charter of the Tokyo Tribunal did not seek to pursue the question of the criminal 
guilt of groups or organisations which, under the London Charter of 8 August 1945, was a novel feature of the 
Nuremberg proceedings. 
The development of the Tokyo Charter was not marked by the political disputation which prevailed in the 
discussions among representatives of the Allied Powers in London in June and July 1945 as a prelude to the 
execution of the London Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945. The American authorities — principally the 
Co-ordinating Committee of the Departments of State, War and Navy — had prepared a memorandum which 
expressed the policy of the United States 'in regard to the apprehension and punishment of war criminals in the 
Far East'. That memorandum was communicated to America's allies on 18 October 1945, the same day on which 
the Nuremberg indictment was presented to the International Military Tribunal at Berlin. 7 
It is difficult to appreciate the reason why, among the vast trial documentation and many commentaries by 
writers, some critical and some approbative, relating to the Tokyo Tribunal, an essential analytical distinction 
between the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals has not been emphasised. That distinction concerns the juridical 
character of the respective tribunals. 
The jurisdictional basis for the Nuremberg Tribunal was an executive agreement between the governments of the 
four major Allied Powers, although in the title of the Tribunal it was described as 'Military'. In the case of the 
Tokyo Tribunal, its genesis was a special proclamation issued at Tokyo on 19 January 1946 by General 
MacArthur under the title of 'General of the Army, United States Army Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers'. It is desirable to cite the proclamation verbatim in the text before discussing it: 8 
SPECIAL PROCLAMATION 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 
FOR THE FAR EAST 
WHEREAS, the United Kingdom and the Nations allied therewith in opposing the illegal wars of 
aggression of the Axis Nations, have from time to time made declarations of their intentions that war 
criminals should be brought to justice; 
WHEREAS, the Governments of the Allied Powers at war with Japan on the 26th. July 1945 at Potsdam, 
declared as one of the terms of surrender that stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals including 
those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners; 
WHEREAS, by the Instrument of Surrender of Japan executed at Tokyo Bay, Japan, on the 2nd. 
September 1945, the sienatoties for Japan, by command of and in behalf of the Emporer and the Japanese 
Government accepted the terms set forth in such declaration at Potsdam; 
WHEREAS, by such Instrument of Surrender, the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government 
to rule the state of Japan is made subject to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, who is 
256 
authorised to take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the terms of surrender; 
WHEREAS, the undersigned has been designated by the Allied Powers as Supreme Commander for the 
Allied Powers to carry into effect the general surrender of the Japanese armed forces; 
WHEREAS, the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and Russia at the Moscow Conference, 
26th. December 1945, having considered the effectuation by Japan of the Terms of Surrender, with the 
concurrence of China have agreed that the Supreme Commander shall issue all orders for the 
implementation of the Terms of Surrender; 
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Douglas MacArthur, as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, by virtue of 
the authority so conferred upon me, in order to implement the Term of Surrender which requires the 
meting out of stern justice to war criminals, do order and provide as follows: 
ARTICLE 1. There shall be established an International Military Tribunal for the Far East for the trial of 
those persons charged individually, or as members of organisations, or in both capacities, with offences 
which include crimes against peace. 
ARTICLE 2. The Constitution, jurisdiction and functions of this Tribunal are those set forth in the 
charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, approved by me this day. 
ARTICLE 3. Nothing in this Order shall prejudice the jurisdiction of any other international, national or 
occupation court, commission or other tribunal established or to be established in Japan or in any territory 
of a United Nation with which Japan has been at war, for the trial of war criminals. 
The legal basis for the Special Proclamation was derived from two crucial sources: first, the Berlin (Potsdam) 
Conference, 17 July - 2 August 1945, at which a proclamation by the heads of government of the United States, 
China and Great Britain was approved on 26 July 1945 (often referred to as the Potsdam Declaration, 26 July 
1945);9 second, the instrument, dated 2 September 1945, whereby Japan proclaimed the unconditional surender to 
the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and armed forces 
under Japanese control wherever situated. 10 
The Potsdam Declaration, which was subsequently adhered to by the Soviet Union, was the first public 
announcement of the basic policy which the Allied nations proposed for the trial and punishment of 
Japanese war criminals. It took the form of a 'Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender'. 11 The 
principal relevant provisions were: 
(4) 	The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self- 
willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to 
the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason. 
(6) 	There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and 
misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of 
peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the 
world. 
(8) 	The terms of the Cairo Declaration 12 shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited 
to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. 
(10) We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation but stern 
justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our 
prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of 
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, 
as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established. 
The instrument by which Japan proclaimed its unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers was executed on 2 
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September 1945. It is reproduced as Appendix 1 to this chapter. 13 By the instrument, Japan accepted the 
provisions in the Potsdam Declaration and undertook 'to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in 
good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the supreme commander for 
the Allied Powers ... for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration'. 
The next most definitive step leading to the establishment of the Tokyo Tribunal was the decision at a meeting 
at Moscow on 26 December 1945 of the foreign Ministers of the United States, Great Britain and Russia, with 
the concurrence of China, to establish a Far Eastern Commission. The primary functions of the Commission 
were to formulate policies for the fulfilment by Japan of its obligations under the terms of surrender and to 
review, on the request of any member, any directive issued by the Supreme Commander Allied Powers involving 
policy decisions within the jurisdiction of the Commission. 14 
On 3 April 1946 the Commission issued a policy decision on the 'Apprehension, Trial and Punishment of War 
Criminals in the Far East'. 15 The most significant provision in the policy decision was that each nation 
represented on the Commission had the right to appoint a judge to 'the international courts' (emphasis added). 
The basic pattern for the trials of Japanese war criminals was similar to the European trials of Axis war 
criminals. Major offenders were to be prosecuted by an international agency before an international court. All 
others were to be tried before national courts or commissions. The International Prosecution Section was 
established on 8 December 1945 to investigate and prosecute cases against the major war criminals. Joseph B. 
Keenan, formerly Assistant to the Attorney-General of the United States, had been appointed by President 
Truman on 30 November 1945 as Chief of Counsel for the prosecution of War Crimes Charges against the 
major leaders of Japan. He was appointed head of the International Prosecution Section. Since the directives of 
the Far Eastern Commission required that trials prosecuted by this agency be held before an international 
tribunal, the Supreme Commander issued on 19 January 1946 the special proclamation establishing the 
International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). 16(see supra) 
THE CHARTER OF THE TOKYO TRIBUNAL 
The Charter of the IMTFE, established by the Proclamation of 19 January 1946, was amended and published in 
its amended form on 26 April 1946. It is reproduced in Appendix II to this chapter. 
The London Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945 were the basis adopted for the framing of the Charter of 
the Tokyo Tribunal, but some significant changes were made and require consideration. 
First, in the description of Crimes against Peace, the word 'law' was inserted before the word 'treaties' appearing 
in Article 6 (a) of the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal. As a matter of drafting and construction, the insertion 
of the word 'law' was calculated to widen considerably the concept of Crimes against Peace. A war 'in violation 
of international law' potentially transcends a 'war in violation [only] of international treaties, agreements or 
assurances', because it brings into force all the principles and rules of international law irrespective of any 
consensual action by the country in whose interests the person charged had acted. The distinction is generally 
ignored by writers and commentators. 
Second, the Tokyo Charter included in the jurisdiction of the Tribunal 'Conventional War Crimes: Namely, 
violations of the laws or customs of war'. It did not include the expansive description of 'war crimes' in Article 6 
(b) of the Nuremberg Charter. However, there was no difference in substance between the respective provisions. 
Third, in the definition of Crimes against Humanity, Article 6 (c) of the Tokyo Charter omitted the words 'or 
religious', which were included in the expression 'persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds' in Article 
6 (c) of the Nuremberg Charter. Further, the Tokyo Charter did not include the words 'against any civilian 
population' which were part of such Article 6 (c). 
Fourth, Article 6 of the Tokyo Charter was, as discusstd in Chapter 12, more liberal and in favour of an accused 
person than the combined effect of Articles 7 and 8 of the Nuremberg Charter. 
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Fifth, Article 12 (d) of the Tokyo Charter expressly provided that the Tribunal shall 'determine the mental and 
physical capacity of any accused to proceed to trial'. At Nuremberg, the Tribunal assumed this power, as, for 
example, in the case of Rudolph Hess. 
Sixth, it should be noted that the Tokyo Tribunal had jurisdiction only over persons who were charged with 
offences which included Crimes against Peace. If they were so charged, all of their offences were tried before the 
Tokyo Tribunal, but otherwise they were tried before a different Tribunal. As Horwitz points out, 17 'the 
Nuremberg Tribunal, on the other hand, had no such exclusive provision, although actually all of the defendants 
were indicted for Crimes against Peace' (my emphasis, because in its Judgment the Nuremberg Tribunal did not 
assert that six of the accused remained indicted for Crimes against Peace.) 
Seventh, provisions similar to Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Nuremberg Charter relating to the criminal character 
of groups or organisations were not contained in the Tokyo Charter. The obvious reason was that in Japan there 
was no organised programming in support of aggressive war planning such as existed in Germany. 
Eighth, the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Article 26) provided that its judgment as to the guilt or the 
innocence of any Defendant 'shall be final and not subject to review', although it contemplated the review of 
sentences. That prohibition was not contained in the Tokyo Charter. In fact, in some cases proceedings in error 
were instituted in the United States Supreme Court, but it declined jurisdiction. 
In other respects, the provisions of the two Charters concerning the conduct of the trial, the admissibility of 
evidence and the course of the trial proceedings were substantially similar, although in the writer's view the 
drafting of the Tokyo Charter was more felicitous. 18 
THE TOKYO TRIALS IN BRIEF RETROSPECT 
It is the writer's view that the conception of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East had the basic 
flaw that it was wrongly assumed that a major trial of Japanese political and military leaders would in itself lead 
to world condemnation of the Japanese nation as a whole. That did not happen for many reasons, to which brief 
reference shall be made. 
The proceedings were far too protracted. Despite the unconditional surrender of Japan on 2 September 1945, the 
trials did not begin until 29 April 1946. Final arguments were not concluded until 16 April 1948. The Tribunal 
occupied seven months in preparing its findings. It took more than a week to read the Judgment in open court. 
Despite the provision in Article 9 (a) of the Charter that 'the indictment shall consist of a plain, concise and 
adequate statement of each offense charged', the prolixity of the Tokyo indictment eclipsed that of the Nuremberg 
indictment. It began with a lengthy and inflammatory discourse in general terms, whereby all the accused were 
charged with conspiracy to wage aggressive war. There were fifty five counts, with the charge of conspiracy 
dominant. The facts traversed the internal and foreign policies of Japan during the period from 1 January 1928 to 
2 September 1945. Twenty eight Japanese political and military leaders were joined in the indictment. There were 
eleven judges from separate countries, all of which had been involved in warfare with Japanese Forces. With few 
exceptions, the judges were not of outstanding stature. Discord among the judges was rampant, and there was 
strongly expressed dissent from the opinions of the majority. The principles established at Nuremberg were more 
than two years old before the Tokyo Judgment was concluded, and the new constitution of the Federal Republic 
of Germany (the Basic Law) was within a few months of being confirmed, ratified, signed and promulgated. 
Against this background, the saving grace could only have been furnished by a judgment of outstanding quality, 
which regrettably was not forthcoming. In support of this contention it is necessary to refer to parts of the 
Judgment. After summarising the seven 19 substantial grounds of the defence challenge to the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal, it stated: 2° 
Since the law of the Charter is decisive and binding upon it this Tribunal is formally bound to reject 
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the first four of the above seven contentions advanced for the defence but in view of the great 
importance of the questions of law involved the Tribunal will record its opinion on these questions. 
After this Tribunal had in May 1946 dismissed the defence motions and upheld the validity of its 
Charter and its jurisdiction thereunder, stating that the reason for this decision would be given later, 
the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg delivered its veldicts on the first of October 
1946. 
The Tokyo Tribunal then cited certain passages from the Judgment of the IMT (pp. 38-42 thereof) and stated: 
21 
With the foregoing opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the reasoning by which they are reached 
this Tribunal is in complete accord. They embody complete answers to the first four of the grounds 
urged by the defence as set forth above. In view of the fact that in all material respects the Charters of 
this Tribunal and the Nuremberg Tribunal are identical, this Tribunal prefers to express its unqualified 
adherence to the relevant opinions of the Nuremberg Tribunal rather than by reasoning the matters 
anew in somewhat different language to open the door to controversy by way of conflicting 
interpretations of the two statements of opinions. 
It is proper to cite the following additional extracts from the Judgment of the Tribunal, as they deal, albeit 
briefly, with essential questions of law: 
The fifth ground of the Defence challenge to the Tribunal's jurisdiction is that under the Instrument of 
Surrender and the Declaration of Potsdam the only crimes for which it was contemplated that 
proceedings would be taken, being the only war crimes recognised by international law at the date of 
the Declaration of Potsdam, are Conventional War Crimes as mentioned in Article 5 (b) of the 
Charter. 
Aggressive war was a crime at international law long prior to the date of the Declaration of Potsdam, 
and there is no ground for the limited interpretation of the Charter which the defence seek to give it. 
A special argument was advanced that in any event the Japanese Government, when they agreed to 
accept the terms of the Instrument of Surrender, did not in fact understand that those Japanese who 
were alleged to be responsible for the war would be prosecuted. 
There is no basis in fact for this argument. It has been established to the satisfaction of the Tribunal 
that before the signature of the Instrument of Surrender the point in question had been considered by 
the Japanese Government and the then members of the Government, who advised the acceptance of the 
terms of the Instrument of Surrender, anticipated ttlat those alleged to be responsible for the war would 
be put on trial. 
• • • 
The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal wholly fails. 
THE PLACE OF THE TOKYO TRIBUNAL IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 
As at Nuremberg, the Tokyo Tribunal was designated an 'International Military Tribunal' in Article 1 of the 
Charter. It is argued, however, that the Tokyo Tribunal was far more 'military' in its conception and performance 
than that at Nuremberg. Two of the judges held military rank and wore uniforms at the trial. General MacArthur 
approved the final list of the defendants to be charged. The members of the Tribunal were appointed by the 
Supreme Commander from the names submitted by the relevant nations. The Supreme Commander appointed the 
President. The whole fabric for the establishment of the Tribunal was of a military character in that it was based 
essentially on the Instrument of unconditional surrender, whereby Japan undertook, on behalf of 'the emperor, the 
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Japanese Government and their successors' to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith. 
The Instrument expressly recognised the omnipotent position of General MacArthur, as Supreme Commander 
Allied Powers (SCAP), in the effectuation of those provisions. General MacArthur took the initial steps by 
means of the special proclamation which he issued on 19 January 1946, concurrently with the promulgation of 
the Tokyo Charter. Those steps were the actions of a supreme military commander. 
In my view, there are significant differences in emphasis between the two Charters in relation to the execution of 
the Judgments of the respective Tribunals. In the case of Nuremberg, ultimate authority was vested in the 
Control Council for Germany (Article 29). The Tokyo Charter provided (Article 17): 
... The record of the trial will be transmitted to the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers for his 
action thereon. A sentence will be carried out in accordance with the order of the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers, who may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentence except to increase 
its severity. (emphasis added). 
Nevertheless the character of the Tokyo Tribunal was different to that of a traditional military court or 
commission. By reason of the definition of Crimes against Peace (paragraph (a) of Article 5), its jurisdiction 
extended to determining, where relevant, whether or not a war was 'in violation of international law'. 
It is therefore submitted that the Tokyo Tribunal should be regarded as sui generis, with the consequence that the 
binding or persuasive force of its Judgment should not be exalted in the sphere of international criminal 
law. The Nuremberg Charter was described by the IMT as 'itself a contribution to international law'. 22 The 
same could not be said of the Tokyo Tribunal, which, despite the authority and influence of the Far Eastern 
Commission, was not the product of the same nature and degree of political impetus which led to the London 
Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945. 
Despite the protestations to the contrary of the President of the Tokyo Tribunal, Sir William Webb, the fact is 
that the Tribunal did follow the substantive decisions of the Nuremberg Tribunal to a large degree, as 
illustrated by the extract from its Judgment cited previously in this chapter. 
The question of reliance on Nuremberg precedents arose acutely during the Tokyo trial. On 10 July 1946, 
the President saw fit to deny that the Tribunal had 'followed Nuremberg slavishly' (emphasis added). As 
the extract from the transcript cited in the footnote shows, it had not been suggested that Nuremberg precedents 
had been followed slavishly.23 
In his preface to the monograph of Solis Horwitz, (op. cit.), a member of the prosecution team at Tokyo, to 
which reference has been made in footnotes 16 and 17 to this chapter, Brigadier General Telford Taylor wrote in 
November 1950: 
This valuable descriptive analysis of the Tokyo Trial should command the attention, not only of 
students of the War and of contemporary Japan, but of all international lawyers. For it is as a 
milestone in the development and application of international law that the war crimes trials will find 
their niche in the history of modern times. 
As the scene of the first great international trial, where many basic principles of the ius gentium 
received their first judicial formulation, Nuremberg has become a synonym for war crimes trials and 
has received the lion's share of attention from both journalists and jurists. Unhappily, public 
indifference to the Tokyo Trial has been matched by an apparent lack of interest on the part of the 
sponsoring governments themselves. Up to now, for example, our own government has not 
undertaken to publish even the Tokyo Judgment, to say nothing of the testimony and other 
proceedings before the Tribunal.24 
It is appropriate in the context of this part of this chapter to reproduce in Appendix III the text of the Conclusion 
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in the monograph of Horwitz (op. cit. ), bearing in mind that he was an eyewitness. 
AUSTRALIAN PERCEPTIONS RELATING TO THE TREATMENT OF JAPANESE WAR 
CRIMINALS 
The dearth of contributions to the literature relating to war crimes trials generally, and the Tokyo Tribunal in 
particular, by Australian jurists, academics, practising lawyers and historians is remarkable. 
In my view the most outspoken Australian jurist was, and remains, the late Sir John Barry, a judge of the 
Supreme Court of Victoria from 1947 until his death in 1969. His forthright views on war crimes were 
graphically described by Sir Zelman Cowen in the following terms: 25 
In [1943], in two articles in the Australian Law Journa1,26 he [Sir John Barry] discussed the trial and 
punishment of Axis war criminals and the Moscow Declaration on War Crimes. He strongly 
advocated the taking of steps in advance of the termination of hostilities to establish an effective body 
'which would have power to ensure that those rules of international law which are designed to maintain 
standards of human decency shall be more than mere pious aspirations. Only in that way can those rules 
take on the reality which they now lack because there is no effective sanction for their breach.' He 
argued for the constitution of an international criminal court to try war criminals; despite the difficulties 
in such an undertaking, 'the influence it would have upon the maintenance of civilized standards would 
be so immense that these difficulties must be resolved.' 
• • • 
At a later time he expressed serious doubts about the Nuremberg tribunal and judgment, and he was very 
critical of the proceedings which led to the conviction and execution of the Japanese General Yamashita: 
The ad hoc tribunals which were used for the conduct of the trial of some war criminals drawn 
from the vanquished nations -- he wrote — were fundamentally political and it is this 
circumstance which troubles a great many lawyers, who, while holding the conduct of those 
criminals in deepest abhorrence and recognising that punishment was deserved, were 
nevertheless, in the years of retribution after the war, very uneasy about the proceedings of 
some tribunals and have grown no happier about them now that the passing of the years has 
given opportunity for cogitation and calmer reflection. 
His criticisms were the familiar ones: retrospective laws, violation of the maxim nulla poena and 
dressed up retribution meted out by victor to vanquished. There are, to be sure, many disturbing 
aspects of the war crimes trials and judgments -- though it is not altogether fair to lump the 
Yamashita and the Nuremberg proceedings together — but I cannot think —as Barry's earlier writings 
suggested — that the decision to proceed in this way was altogether ignoble and unwise. The problems 
to which he adverted a decade after the events, were apparent to a clear minded lawyer in 1943, and 
Barry was not one to be caught up in the passions of war. It is true that in 1943 he argued for the 
constitution of an international criminal tribunal but I am sorry that he did not link up his pre and 
post-war writings on these matters, and spell out more fully and precisely what he regarded, on 
reflection, as the appropriate course to pursue. 
AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT POLICIES AND ACTIONS 
Tile Australian Government pursued an active program in relation to warcrimes trials and legislation to 
262 
provide what it perceived as an appropriate basis. 
In September 1945 the Commonwealth Government released a summary of the facts and findings of Sir 
William Webb's initial report, which had been tendered to the Government on 21 March 1944. At that time Dr. 
H.V. Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, issued a statement, simultaneously released in London and Canberra, 
in which he declared: 27 
While this report relates only to part of the whole field of Japanese terrorism and criminality, its contents are 
such as to shock and dismay the feelings of every decent human being. It reveals not only individual and isolated 
acts of barbarity but also practices which are beyond the pale of accepted human conduct which could not have 
become general without the connivance, encouragement and direction of superior officers up to the highest. If 
those responsible for these outrages are allowed to escape punishment it will be the grossest defeat of justice and 
a travesty of principles for which the war has been fought.. 
In its demand that all Japanese war criminals be brought to trial, the Australian Government is actuated by no 
spirit of revenge but by profound feelings of justice and of responsibility to ensure that the next generation of 
Australians is spared the frightful experiences of the kind which Sir William Webb's report reveals. 
I emphasize most of all that the war crimes committed by Japanese forces in the field, while utterly wicked on 
the part of the actual perpetrators, are also part of a system of terrorism in which all Japanese troops and 
commanders participated. It is our duty to see that those who organized the system are punished and that the 
system itself is completely eradicated. Those at the top are, in our view, at least equally guilty with the actual 
perpetrators on the spot. 
Last week the United States Government released for publication reports of atrocities committed by the Japanese 
against American nationals. These reports strengthened the confirmed policy of the Australian Government, based 
on its own judicial findings, that there should be no immunity from trial for war crimes for any Japanese 
whatsoever. Furthermore it is the view of the Australian Government that the general charge of planning and 
waging aggressive warfare which will shortly be preferred against the major German war criminals applies 
equally to those in Japan who are ultimately responsible for the acts detailed in Sir William Webb's report. 
In common with the other United Nations Governments represented on the War Crimes Commission, the 
Australian Government has recently received from the Commission a series of recommendations for the 
apprehension and trial of suspected Japanese, which, if they are carried out, will ensure the punishment of all 
culpable persons in the Japanese administration and armed forces. 
The Australian Government is indicating to the War Crimes Commission not only its entire endorsement of the 
procedures recommended but also its firm view that the process should be put into operation without delay. 
These recommendations, which if properly applied will ensure that no Japanese who deserves punishment shall 
escape, owe much to the work of Lord Wright, who is the representative of Australia on the War Crimes 
Commission as well as Chairman of the Commission. 
The War Crimes Act 1945 
The War Crimes Act was passed by the Commonwealth Parliament in October 1945 with bipartisan support. Its 
provisions were analysed by Mr. B.J. Dunn, barrister, in an article in (1945-46) 19 A.L.J., pp. 359-361. The 
basic purpose of the statute was to provide the legislative authority for the trial of war criminals by Australian 
military courts. Mr. Dunn compared the provisions of the 1945 Act with those of the British Royal Warrant and 
the Order dated 24 September 1945 entitled 'Regulations Governing the Trial of War Criminals' issued by 
General MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific Area. Although he 
noted substantial similarity between all three provisions in relation to the acts or omissions which were defined 
as 'war crimes', Mr. Dunn observed: 28 
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Since all war criminals to be tried are subjects of or adherents to a common enemy it is to be regretted 
that the United Nations did not agree on a uniform definition of the war crimes which may be tried and 
punished. 
(Amendments to the 1945 Act, introduced on 28 October 1987, will be discussed separately in Appendix IV to 
this Chapter). 
Other post -war legislation 
The Commonwealth Government, in common with other governments of the United Nations, had approved the 
Charter of the United Nations which was signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945. Thereafter the Australian 
Parliament enacted legislation much of which emanated from Declarations made by the United Nations 
Organisation. Such statutes included the Genocide Convention Act 1949 and the Geneva Conventions Act 1957. 
The most significant features of Australian Government policies, both before and after the establishment of 
the Tokyo Tribunal, were their consistency and political bipartisanship. For many decades there has been little 
interest in Australia in the Tokyo Tribunal's activities or the fate of those who were tried. The crimes committed 
by Japanese between 1939 and 1945 are fast fading into history, to be replaced by a capitalistic concentration on 
the economic strength of Japan and desultory debate on the future political and strategic relationships between 
Australia and Japan. 
CRITICISM OF THE TOKYO TRIAL 
It is not proposed in this study to consider the wide-ranging literature concerning the Tokyo Tribunal, which, as 
in the case of Nuremberg, evoked at the time marked differences of opinion concerning the law of the Charter and 
the validity of the majority Judgment of the Tribunal. However, in the concluding section of this chapter some 
brief consideration will be given to the proceedings of the International Symposium on the Tokyo War Crimes 
Trial, held in Tokyo in May 1983. The symposium was an international gathering of scholars, critics and writers 
with a special interest in the trial. Among those who presented papers was Dr. B.V.A. Roling, the Dutch judge 
of the Tokyo Tribunal. 
In a review of the proceedings of the symposium, Professor James Crawford, of Sydney University, stated: 29 
On the whole it [the account of the symposium proceedings] reflects badly on the justice and legality 
of the trials. The Nuremberg trials, which have been studied in much greater depth, are generally 
accounted just, whether or not legal. The examination of the procedural fairness of the Tokyo trials is 
advanced here especially by Roling (... who dissented in important respects from its findings) and by 
Pritchard. The examination of their legality, on the other hand, is obscured by an uncritical statement 
of 'the Soviet position' by Lounev, and a constricted analysis of the possible legal underpinnings by 
Ipsen of the Federal Republic of Germany. Among the Japanese participants (many of them 
historians rather than lawyers) there is a wide diversity of views and much interesting debate, although 
the historian, Kojima, for example, appears to ignore the possibility that an understanding of the 
historical background to and processes of Japanese military involvement in Asia and then in the World 
War might nonetheless allow a proper judgment of the conduct of individuals. 
Not all the criticisms from Japanese speakers of the trials are convincing: for example, Tsurumi's 
arguments from the failure of the trial to implant itself on Japanese popular consciousness contain a 
spectacular series of non sequiturs. But the intensity and openness of the debate is impressive: most 
impressive is the concluding session, with its contrast, indeed duality, between the United States 
scholar Millear's insistence on procedural and other defects in the trial, and the Japanese scholar 
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Ienaga's insistence that these defects should not conceal the profounder, and none-the-less valid, 
judgment entailed by the verdicts, if not the sentences. 
The views expressed in his paper by Professor Ipsen, president of Ruhr University at Bochum, West Germany, 
are of interest because of some seeming paradoxes. He stated those views in summary form thus: 3° 
The jurisdiction of the IMT for crimes against peace was not based on international law in force at that 
time. Individual responsibility had not been established for the prohibition against resort to war 
already in existence. Nor were there sanctions in criminal law against a breach of that prohibition. To 
that extent, the charter contained ex post facto legislation and was incompatible with the maxim 
nullum crimen sine lege, which the Tokyo tribunal itself recognised expressly as a 'general principle 
of justice'. 
2. There remain lecral doubts with regard to the jurisdiction of the IMT for war crimes, because for 
such crimes, which unquestionably could be tried and punished, the jurisdiction of courts-martial of 
the detaining and occupying powers was established by the Geneva Convention of 1929 and by 
customary law. It must be admitted, however, that a fair trial before a court-martial would have led to 
similar punishments. 
3. The jurisdiction of the IMT for crimes against humanity ... was based on international law in force 
at that time. Article 43 of the Hague Regulations empowered the occupying power to establish an 
international tribunal, and this tribunal could apply law derived from a recognized source of 
international law, that is to say, the condemnation of murder and other inhumane acts as a general 
principle of law recognized by civilized nations. 
Professor Ipsen stated his conclusions on the influence of the Tokyo trial on the development of international 
law in these terms:31 
In the light of developments and state practice since Nuremberg and Tokyo, we must conclude 
unhappily that the law of both charters has been neither reaffirmed by treaty law nor developed into 
customary law. The main problems still to be resolved are the following: 
I. The problem of national or international jurisdiction has remained controversial among the states of 
the world. 
2. The majority of states is still not prepared to accept individual responsibility for crimes in 
international law. 
3. In order to meet the requirements of the general principle nullurn crixnen sine lege, the provisions 
of international criminal law and international procedural law have to be formulated as precisely and 
definitely as the provisions of national criminal law. In particular, international criminal law must 
provide exact definitions of justifications and exculpations, such as superior orders and other defenses, 
which were controversial at the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. 
4. The provisions of international criminal law must include exact descriptions of penalties, that is, of 
the type of penalty and, in case of imprisonment, the duration of the penalty. 
5. Conflicts between national criminal law and international criminal law must be resolved. 
The basic theme of the paper delivered by Onuma, Associate Professor of International Law, Tokyo University, 
was refreshingly pragmatic. It is true that he criticised the Tokyo trial as unfair because no issue could 
be raised concerning the actions of the Allied Powers, including the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
and the violation by the Soviet Union of the neutrality pact of 13 April 1941 between Japan and Russia. 
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However, Onuma said: 
believe that we should acknowledge frankly that the legal basis for the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials 
cannot be found in international law as it existed at the time. However, seen from a broader 
perspective, that admission is not necessarily damaging to the assessment that the trials were legal and 
legitimate. The problem of crimes against peace is a good example. I pointed out earlier that one of its 
two constituent elements, the concept of the illegality of war, had received general recognition in 
international society and had already been established in international law by the time of the outbreak 
of World War H.... In regard to crimes against humanity, traditional international law simply did not 
foresee that the leaders of a state might use the state apparatus in the systematic slaughter of an 
enormous number of the country's own citizens — but this is precisely what the Nazis did. These acts 
were in fact committed. Traditional international law was deficient in this respect and that deficiency 
had to be corrected.32 
Professor Onuma's views, as cited, will be developed and expanded in the writer's ultimate thesis. 
Japan's pre-war political process, which loomed large in the Tokyo indictment and Judgment, was the theme of 
three of the papers. I concur in the following view expressed by Kojima, historian and critic: 
At the Tokyo trial, Japanese leaders were charged with a 'conspiracy' to launch and wage an aggressive 
war. However, I think it is clear ... that the elements of confusion, of tangled complexity, in Japanese 
policy-making at this time made any unified conspiracy quite impossible. In this sense the situation 
in Japan was very different from that in Nazi Germany, where a single dictator and the group 
surrounding him were in constant control of policy decisions. 
The prosecution at the trial also spoke of a military dictatorship, but in fact the army and the navy 
acted as quite independent entities in advocating policy. The result was a series of ad hoc measures 
designed to treat the symptoms of a steadily deteriorating situation. Precisely because the Japanese 
government was ultimately incapable of the kind of 'conspiracy' that would have enabled it to 
formulate national policies based on a wide perspective, it was forced in its progress thereafter from 
Manchuria into China proper to rely on policies that were narrow, short-sighted and unilateral. When 
we look back on Japan's past, it is this aspect that most invites reflection. 33 
Dr. R.J. Pritchard, 34 in an overview of the historical importance of the Tokyo trial, made the following 
observation which, in my opinion, is a valid commentary on the Tokyo Tribunal: 
Like its Nuremberg counterpart — and every other international war crimes proceedings — the 
Tokyo war trial was a product of the highly-charged emotional atmosphere of its time. It is 
axiomatic that 'international' criminal prosecutions are broadly political as well as juristic 
causes. Few of the defendants at the Tokyo trial could have expected fairness, tact or 
understanding, once they had comprehended the indictment.  (emphasis added)35 
In my view the most lucid and impressive of the papers delivered was that of former Judge Roling, especially 
as it was prepared against the background of his membership of the Tokyo Tribunal as the representative of 
the Netherlands. Dr. Roling (at the time Professor Emeritus, international law, University of Groningen) 
strongly asserted that international law before World War II did not make aggressive war a crime. He said: 
My personal conviction was that the victors had no authority to create new criminal laws and punish 
the vanquished on the basis of those new laws. Moreover, to claim this licence would create a 
hazardous precedent and later provide an opportunity, after a successful war, to eliminate hated 
opponents as war criminals. 36 
Nevertheless, Dr. Roling recognised the reality of the situation at the time of the unconditional surrender of 
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Japan. He stated: 
Political measures were needed to protect the fragile peace against potential leaders who might provide 
a nucleus for groups bent on revenge. There was also a growing aversion to war which was fueled by 
the war crimes and atrocities committed by both sides. The form of a criminal trial might contribute 
to the progressive development of international law in such a way that it would no longer recognize 
the freedom of a state to wage war, but would completely reject it and would regard aggressors as 
criminals and outlaws.37 
Dr. Roling also conceded that since the precedent had been set in the Nuremberg Charter, it was 'hardly possible' 
to avoid prosecuting Japanese leaders for crimes against peace. 38 His conclusion was that at the time of the 
Tokyo trial 'international law was en route to banning war and rendering it a criminal offence. The crime against 
peace was in state nascendi, so to speak.'39 
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NOTES 
1. The establishment of the Australian war crimes courts was trenchantly criticised by Mr. G. Dickinson, a 
Sydney lawyer, who, as a Lieutenant-Colonel in the Royal Australian Armoured Corps, was Advisory 
Officer to the Japanese defence team at Manus Island, New Guinea. Source: Australian Ouarterly, June 
1952, vol. 24, pp. 69-75. Lieutenant-Colonel Dickinson described the jurisdiction conferred by statute on 
the courts as 'a new and irresponsible element in the field of Public International Law following the 
Potsdam Agreement'. He said: 
The length of time spent in listening to cases that never should have been brought to trial and in listening 
to irrelevant evidence amounted in the case of the Australian War Crimes Courts, to some years. 
Perhaps the worst feature of the Australian War Crimes Courts was the highly coloured and exaggerated 
statements published in the Australian Press. The contents of the prosecution's typed opening address, 
radioed to Australia, became front page news before the trial commenced. In some cases no evidence was 
given in court to support the statement.... To my mind the only satisfactory War Crimes Court would be 
one conducted by a neutral. It might be accessible to both victor and vanquished alike, and such a court 
would avoid the character of a 'revenge party'. 
See also Piccieallo, The Japanese on Trial, University of Texas Press, 1979, pp. 121-139, in which the 
author discusses the deficiencies from a juridical viewpoint, mainly procedural, of the Australian war 
crimes trials. 
Statistics of the Australian trials, conducted at eight centres, from Hong Kong to Darwin, are given by 
Piccigallo (op. cit., p. 139) and by Tutorow, op. cit., Introduction, p. 7. 
2. See Lawrence Taylor, A Trial of Generals, Icarus Press, Indiana, 1981, especially Chapters 8 and 9. The 
basis of the verdict of guilty in each of the cases of Yamashita and Homma was that they failed to provide 
effective control of their troops as was required by the circumstances. Neither case should be regarded as 
illuminating any aspect of public international law. 
3. The Board was generally, but not formally, known as the Australian War Crimes Commission: see 
Department of External Affairs, Current Notes on International Affairs, 1945, p. 219. 
4. Australian War Crimes Board of Inquiry, Report, vol. 1, House of Representatives Record 5624 (Part 1), 
presented 10 April 1946, pp. 10-11. 
5. Ibid., pp. 8-9. 
, 	6. 	E.P.I.L., vol. 4, p. 244. 
7. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, Pritchard and Zaide (eds.), 22 vols.,(1981), Garland Publishing Inc., New 
York and London, vol. 1, pp. xiv-xvi and footnotes 73 and 74 to the Historical Introduction (hereinafter 
cited as The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, followed by the number of the relevant volume). 
8. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, vol. 1, first two pages (not numbered) of the section containing 'Pre-Trial 
Documents'. 
9. See Bassiouni, International Crimes: Digest/Index, vol.1, pp. 231-232. 
10. U.S. Congressional Record (daily), vol. 91, No. 156 (Sept. 6, 1945), p. 8488, reproduced in (1945) 39 
A.J.I.L., Supp., pp. 264-265. 
11. U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. xiii, No. 318,29 July, 1945, pp. 137-138. 
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12. The Cairo Declaration was signed on 1 December 1943 by China, the United Kingdom and the United 
States. Although it set forth that the signatories 'are fighting this war to restrain and punish the 
aggression of Japan', the Declaration was directed essentially to territorial issues and did not deal with any 
policy matters relating to Japanese war criminals. (U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 1943, p. 
394). 
	
13. 	Congressional Record (daily), vol. 91, No. 156, 6 September 1945, p. 8488. 
14. 	U.S. Department of State Bulletin, vol. xiii, No. 340, pp. 1027-1032 
15. Activities of the Far Eastern Commission. Report by the Secretary General,  U.S. Department of State 
Publication, 2888, Far Eastern 	Series 24, 1947, p.2. 
16. The summary of the events described in this paragraph has been adopted from the contribution by S. 
Horwitz published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in International Conciliation, 
November 1950, No.465. 
17. 	Horwitz, op. cit., p. 487. 
18. For a more detailed comparison of procedural differences, see Horwitz, op . cit., pp. 486488. 
19. 	See p. 48,436 of the proceedings. The references in this chapter to pages of the proceedings are derived 
from the relevant volumes of The Tokyo War Crimes Trial, edited by Pritchard and Zaide, (on.cit.). The 
seven grounds were: 
(I) 	The Allied Powers acting through the Supreme Commander have no authority to include in the 
Charter of the Tribunal and to designate as justiciable 'Crimes against Peace' (Article 5 (a)); 
(2) Aggressive war is not per se illegal and the Pact of Paris of 1928 renouncing war as an instrument 
of national policy does not enlarge the meaning of war crimes nor constitute war a crime; 
(3) War is the act of a nation for which there is no individual responsibility under international law; 
(4) The provisions of the Charter are 'ex post facto' legislation and therefore illegal; 
(5) The Instrument of Surrender which provides that the Declaration of Potsdam will be given effect 
imposes the condition that Conventional War Crimes as recognised by international law at the date 
of the Declaration ... would be the only Crimes prosecuted; 
(6) Killings in the course of belligerent operations in so far as they constitute violations of the rules 
of war or the laws and customs of war are the normal incidents of war and are not murder, 
(7) Several of the accused being prisoners of war are triable by court martial as provided by the Geneva 
Convention 1929 and not by this tribunal. 
20. Page 48,437 of the proceeding 
21. 	Pages 48,437-48,442 of the proceedings. 
22. 	I.M.T. Judgment, p. 38. 
23. 	Proceedings, 10 July, 1946, pp. 2,225-2.226. 
Mr. William Logan, American Defense Counsel: 'If the Tribunal please, I wish to present a matter ... on 
behalf of all the accused ... This Tribunal has on several occasions based its rulings on precedents 
which have been established at the Nuremberg Trials and I wish to call your attention to a ruling which 
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was made at the Nuremberg Trial with respect to the admission of interrogatories of the accused.' 
The President (Sir William Webb): 'You are wrong in assuming we have been following Nuremberg 
slavishly. I have not read the decisions until the last day or two; we are always pleased to have their 
guidance and I think in some matters we have followed them. I do not remember any matter in which we 
have given a different ruling.' 
Mr. Logan: 'I think it has been mentioned several times as to the rulings that have been made at 
Nuremberg and they have been followed here.' 
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Mr. Logan: 'May I continue, if the Tribunal please? I think you will follow what I have ...' 
President: We are not going to have any general discussion on Nuremberg rulings. If you are going to 
point out a ruling at Nuremberg which we have not followed, you had better wait until the point arises 
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different than given at Nuremberg. We are not slavishly following Nuremberg, which I do not think we 
should do.' 
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annotated, compiled and edited by R. John Pritchard and Sonia Magbanua Zaide; the Project Director was 
Professor D.C. Watt, of the London School of Economics. The series contains a reproduction of the total 
transcript of the official proceedings of the trial. 
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220. 
28. (1945-46) 19 A.L.J., p. 360. See also article by Ian Spain in (1946- 
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APPENDIX I 
SURRENDER OF JAPAN 
UNITED STATES - CHINA - GREAT BRITAIN - SOVIET UNION 
UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER OF JAPAN 
September 1, 1945. 
1. We, acting by command of and in behalf of the Emperor of Japan, the Japanese Government, and the 
Japanese Imperial General Headquarters, hereby accept the provisions in the declaration issued by the heads 
of the Governments of the United States, China, and Great Britain on July 26, 1945, at Potsdam, and 
subsequently adhered to by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which four Powers are hereafter 
referred to as the Allied Powers. 
2. We hereby proclaim the unconditional surrender to the Allied Powers of the Japanese Imperial General 
Headquarters and of all Japanese armed forces and armed forces under Japanese control wherever situated. 
3. We hereby command all Japanese forces, wherever situated, and the Japanese people, to cease hostilities 
forthwith, to preserve and save from damage all ships, aircraft, and military and civil property, and to 
comply with all requirements which may be imposed by the supreme commander for the Allied Powers or 
by agencies of the Japanese Government at his direction. 
4. We hereby command the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters to issue at once orders to the commanders 
of all Japanese forces and all forces under Japanese control, wherever situated, to surrender unconditionally 
themselves and all forces under their control. 
5. We hereby command all civil, military, and naval officials to obey and enforce all proclamations, orders, 
and directives deemed by the supreme commander for the Allied Powers to be proper to effectuate this 
surrender and issued by him or under his authority, and we direct all such officials to remain at their posts 
and to continue to perform their noncombat duties unless specifically relieved by him or under his 
authority. 
6. We hereby undertake for the emperor, the Japanese Government, and their successors to carry out the 
provisions of the Potsdam declaration in good faith, and to issue whatever orders and take whatever action 
may be required by the supreme commander for the Allied Powers or any other designated representative of 
the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that declaration. 
7. We hereby command the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters at once to 
liberate all Allied prisoners of war and civilian internees under Japanese control and to provide for their 
protection, care, maintenance, and immediate transportation to places as directed. 
8. The authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the 
supreme commander for the Allied Powers, who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate 
these terms of surrender. 
Source: See footnote 13 of this Chapter. 
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APPENDIX II 
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY 
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST 
I. 
CONSTITUTION OF TRIBUNAL 
Article 1. Tribunal Established. The International Military Tribunal for the Far East is hereby established for the 
just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals in the Far East. The permanent seat of the 
Tribunal is in Tokyo. 
Article 2. Members. The Tribunal shall consist of not less than six members nor more than eleven members, 
appointed by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers from the names submitted by the Signatories to the 
Instrument of Surrender. India, and the Commonwealth of the Philippines. 
Article 3. Officers and Secretariat. 
(a) President. The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers shall appoint a Member to be President of the 
Tribunal. 
(b) Secretariat. 
(1) The Secretariat of the Tribunal shall be composed of a General Secretary , to be appointed by the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers and such assistant secretaries, clerks, interpreters, and other personnel 
as may be necessary. 
(2) The General Secretary chall organize and direct the work of the Secretariat. 
(3) The Secretariat shall receive all documents addressed to the Tribunal, maintain the records of the Tribunal, 
provide necessary clerical services to the Tribunal and its Members and perform such other duties as may 
be designated by the Tribunal. 
Article 4. Convening and Quorum, Voting and Absence. 
(a) Convening and Quorum. When as many as six members of the the Tribunal are present, they may 
convene the Tribunal in formal session. The presence of a majority of all members shall be necessary to 
constitute a quorum. 
(b) Voting. All decisions and judgments of this Tribunal, including convictions and sentences, shall be by a 
majority vote of those Members of the Tribunal present. In case the votes are evenly divided, the vote of 
the President shall be decisive. 
(c) Absence. If a member at any time is absent and afterwards is able to be present, he shall take part in all 
subsequent proeedings; unless he declares in open court that he is disqualified by reason of insuficientnt 
familiarity with the proceedings which took place in his absence. 
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JURISDICTION AND GENERAL PROVISIONS 
Article 5. Jurisdiction Over Persons and Offenses. The Tribunal shall have the power to try and punish Far 
Eastern war criminals who as individuals or as members of organizations are charged with offenses which include 
Crimes against Peace. 
The following acts, or any of them, are crimes coming within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal for which there 
shall be individual responsibility: 
(a) Crimes against Peace: Namely, the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a declared or undeclared 
war of aggression, or a war in violation of international law, treaties, agreements or assurances, or 
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing; 
(b) Conventional War Crimes: Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war; 
(c) Crimes against Humanity: Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane 
acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political or 
racial grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, 
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, organizers, 
instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy 
to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any person in execution 
of such plan. 
Article 6. Responsibility of Accused. Neither the official position, at any time, of an accused, nor the fact that an 
accused acted pursuant to order of his government or of a superior shall, of itself, be sufficient to free such 
accused from responsibility for any crime with which he is charged, but such circumstances may be considered in 
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so requires. 
Article 7. Rules of Procedure. The Tribunal may draft and amend rules of procedure consistent with the 
fundamental provisions of this Charter. 
Article 8. Counsel. 
(a) Chief of Counsel. The Chief of Counsel designated by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is 
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of charges against war criminals within the jurisdiction 
of this Tribunal, and will render such legal assistance to the Supreme Commander as is appropriate. 
(b) Associate Counsel. Any United Nation with which Japan has been at war may appoint an Associate 
Counsel to assist the Chief of Counsel. 
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FAIR TRIAL FOR ACCUSED 
Article 9. Procedure for Fair Trial. In order to insure fair trial for the accused the following procedure shall be 
followed: 
(a) Indictment. The indictment shall consist of a plain, concise, and adequate statement of each offense 
charged. Each accused shall be furnished, in adequate time for defense, a copy of the indictment including 
any amendment, and of this Charter, in a language understood by the accused. 
(b) Language. The trial and related proceedings shall be conducted in English and in the language of the 
accused. Translations of documents and other papers shall be provided as needed and requested. 
(c) Counsel for Accused. Each accused shall have the right to be represented by counsel of his own selection, 
subject to the disapproval of such counsel at any time by the Tribunal. The accused shall file with the 
General Secretary of the Tribunal the name of his counsel. If an accused is not represented by counsel and 
in open court requests the appointment of counsel, the Tribunal shall designate counsel for him. In the 
absence of such request the Tribunal may appoint counsel for an accused if in its judgment such 
appointment is necessary to provide for a fair trial. 
(d) Evidence for Defense. An accused shall have the right, through himself or through his counsel (but not 
through both), to conduct his defense, including the right to examine any witness, subject to such 
reasonable restrictions as the Tribunal may determine. 
(e) Production of Evidence for the Defense. An accused may apply in writing to the Tribunal for the 
production of witnesses or of documents. The application shall state where the witness or document is 
thought to be located. It shall also state the facts proposed to be proved by the witness or the document 
and the relevancy of such facts to the defense. If the Tribunal grants the application the Tribunal shall be 
given such aid in obtaining production of the evidence as the circumstances require. 
Article 10. Applications and Motions before Trial. All motions, applications, or other requests addressed to the 
Tribunal prior to the commencement of trial shall be made in writing and filed with the General Secretary of the 
Tribunal for action by the Tribunal. 
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I V. 
POWERS OF TRIBUNAL AND CONDUCT OF TRIAL 
Article 11. Powers. The Tribunal shall have the power 
(a) 	To summon witnesses to the trial, to require them to attend and testify, and to question them, 
( b) To interrogate each accused and to permit comment on his refusal to answer any question, 
(c) To require the production of documents and other evidentiary material, 
(d) To require of each witness an oath, affirmation, or such declaration as is customary of the witness, and to 
administer oaths, 
(e) To appoint officers for the carrying out of any task designated by the Tribunal, including the power to 
have evidence taken on commission. 
Article 12. Conduct of Trial. The Tribunal shall 
(a) Confine the trial strictly to an expeditious hearing of the issues raised by the charges, 
(b) Take strict measures to prevent any action which would cause any unreasonable delay and rule out 
irrelevant issues and statements of any kind whatsoever, 
(c) Provide for the maintenance of order at the trial and deal summarily with any contumacy, imposing 
appropriate punishment, including exclusion of any accused or his counsel from some or all further 
proceedings, but without prejudice to the determination of the charges, 
(d) Determine the mental and physical capacity of any accused to proceed to trial. 
Article 13. Evidence. 
(a) Admissibility. The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence. It shall adopt and apply to 
the greatest possible extent expeditious and non-technical procedure, and shall admit any evidence which it 
deems to have probative value. All purported admissions or statements of the accused are admissible. 
(b) Relevance. The Tribunal may require to be informed of the nature of any evidence before it is offered in 
order to rule upon the relevance. 
(c) Specific evidence admissible. In particular, and without limiting in any way the scope of the foregoing 
general rules, the following evidence may be admitted: 
(1) A document, regardless of its security classification and without proof of its issuance or signature, which 
appears to the Tribunal to have been signed or issued by any officer, department, agency or member of the 
armed forces of any government. 
(2) A report which appears to the Tribunal to have been signed or issued by the International Red Cross or a 
member thereof, or by a doctor of medicine or any medical service personnel, or by an investigator or 
intelligence officer, or by any other person who appears to the Tribunal to have personal knowledge of the 
matters contained in the report. 
(3) An affidavit, deposition or other signed statement. 
(4) A diary, letter or other document, including sworn or unsworn statements which appear to the Tribunal to 
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contain information relating to the charge. 
(5) 
	A copy of a document or other secondary evidence of its contents, if the original is not immediately 
available. 
(d) Judicial Notice. The Tribunal shall neither require proof of facts, of common knowledge, nor of the 
authenticity of official government documents and reports of any nation nor of the proceedings, records, 
and findings of military or other agencies of any of the United Nations. 
(e) Records, Exhibits and Documents. The transcript of the proceedings, and exhibits and documents 
submitted to the Tribunal, will be filed with the General Secretary of the Tribunal and will constitute part 
of the Record. 
Article 14. Place of Trial. The first trial will be held at Tokyo and any subsequent trials will be held at such 
places as the Tribunal decides. 
Article 15. Course of Trial Proceedings. The proceedings at the Trial will take the following course: 
The indictment will be read in court unless the reading is waived by all accused. 
The Tribunal will ask each accused whether he pleads "guilty" or "not guilty". 
The prosecution and each accused (by counsel only, if represented) may make a con 
The prosecution and defense may offer evidence and the admissibility of the same 
the Tribunal 
The prosecution and each accused (by counsel only, if represented) may examine 
accused who gives testimony. 
Accused (by counsel only, if represented) may address the Tribunal. 
The prosecution may address the Tribunal. 
The Tribunal will deliver judgment and pronounce sentence. 
cise opening statement. 
shall be determined by 
each witness and each 
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V. 
JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Article 16. Penalty. The Tribunal shall have the power to impose upon an accused, on conviction, death or such 
other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just. 
Article 17. Judgment and Review. The judgment will be announced in open court and will give the reasons on 
which it is based. The record of the trial will be transmitted directly to the Supreme Commander for the Allied 
Powers for his action thereon. A sentence will be carried out in accordance with the order of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers, who may at any time reduce or otherwise alter the sentence except to increase 
its severity. 
By command of General MacArthur: 
Richard J. Marshall 
Major General, General Staff 
Corps, Chief of Staff. 
Official: B.M. Fitch Brigadier General, AGD, Adjutant General. 
Source: Supreme Commander, General Headquarters, APO 500,26 April 1946 General Orders No. 20. 
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APPENDIX HI 
THE CONCLUSION TO THE MONOGRAPH OF S. HORWITZ * 
Since the author's task has been to trace the course and to delineate the issues of the Tokyo trial, he has refrained 
to the best of his ability from evaluation of the trial and the judgment. This does not mean, however, that he is 
without conviction on the fundamental issues or the merits of the trial. As one who participated as a member of 
the prosecution staff from beginning to end and who bears some responsibility for the outcome of the trial, he 
has deep and positive convictions as to its value. It may therefore not be entirely unwarranted for the author to 
state here at the end of this report what he considers the most important contribution of the Tokyo trial. 
The Tokyo judgment was not the product of the first flush of victory. More than three years had elapsed since 
active hostilities in the most devastating war in world history had ended. Already the psychological factors, 
which enable man to go forward even after the most harrowing experience, had begun to operate and to bring a 
measure of forgetting of the death and mutilation and destruction and chaos which had followed in the wake of 
the war. Already the Grand Alliance, which had brought the war to a successful conclusion and had dedicated itself 
to the eradication of war as the accumulation of all evil, had broken apart. New conflicts and new problems had 
arisen, and new alignments had been formed among the victors. 
It was therefore not surprising that in the darkening shadows of current events there were added to the voices of 
those who did not believe in the principles of the trial and who could see no illegality in war regardless of its 
aggressive character, the warnings of those who saw in the principles of Nuremberg and Tokyo a dangerous 
precedent which could be applied to our own leaders regardless of blame or guilt in the event we should lose a 
war. It was not surprising that it should be forgotten that the aggressor knows neither law nor principle and that 
his actions toward a defeated non-aggressor are determined solely by considerations of expediency for the 
promotion of his own aggressive design. Nor was it altogether unexpected that these new voices should fail to 
comprehend that the assumptions of their argument negated the very base of all law and legal systems; and to 
remember that in every system of law there is always the inherent danger that the legal system might be 
perverted by the aggressor for his own aggressive purposes against the very persons whom the law was designed 
to protect - a danger which can be averted only by vigilance to maintain the internal strength of the law and the 
power of the law-abiding. 
Admidst the tensions of the new post-war conflicts the members of the Tribunal might have succumbed to a 
feeling that their task was a futile one. It is of the utmost significance that they did not succumb, but, even under 
the impact of events which mieht foreshadow a conflict more horrible than the one just concluded, they elected to 
reaffirm as an act of faith, their conviction that war was not a necessary concomitant of international life and that 
acknowledged principles of law and justice were fully applicable to nations and their leaders. Whatever may be 
the ultimate decision on the merits of its judgment, perhaps the real significance of the work of the Tokyo 
Tribunal lies in this act of faith. 
* See footnotes 16. 17 and 18 to this Chapter. 
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APPENDIX IV 
AMENDMENTS TO THE AUSTRALIAN WAR CRIMES ACT 1945 
Early in 1986 public allegations were made in Australia that large numbers of persons who had committed 
serious war crimes 'related to the activities of Germany during World War II' had entered Australia illegally after 
the conclusion of the war and that many of them were still resident in Australia, including some who had 
acquired Australian citizenship. 
On 25 June 1986 the Federal Government commissioned Mr. A.C. Menzies, a retired officer of the Attorney-
General's Department, to carry out a review of all material relevant to the allegations. 
Mr. Menzies submitted his report to the Government on 28 November 1986. His Review concluded that it was 
more likely than not that persons who had committed serious war crimes in World War II had entered Australia. 
At the time the Review was tabled in the Senate, a statement was made by Senator the Hon. G.J. Evans by way 
of a summary of its contents. He stated: 
With his Report, Mr. Menzies has provided a list of the more significant instances of allegations that 
particular persons now in Australia have committed serious war crimes. Some 70 people have been 
identified as warranting further inquiry. They originate in a number of countries and the Review has 
stressed that they are only a minute proportion of the enormous number of persons who came to 
Australia from those ares and who have made such a significant contribution to Australia's 
development. Mr. Menzies has recommended that the list should not be divulged, except to whatever 
body is charged with taking further action on the Report. 
A Bill to amend the 1945 Act to make provision for the prosecution of war criminals in Australian courts, under 
Australian law, was introduced in the House of Representatives on 28 October 1987. Although it was ultimately 
passed by the Parliament, its passage was slow and tortuous, and there was a lack of bipartisan support for its 
rationale. The Federal Government has given little indication of its intentions, and at the time of the submission 
of this thesis, it is not practicable to state whether or not any prosecutions are likely to result. Consequently, the 
author has not attempted any analysis of the detailed provisions of the legislation. 
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CHAPTER 15 	THE APPLICATION OF 'NUREMBERG LAW' FROM THE 1940's TO 
THE PRESENT TIME 
INTRODUCTION 
More than forty years have elapsed since the Nuremberg Judgment was delivered. By 1989, forty years will have 
passed following the completion of the deliberations of the Tokyo Tribunal and the 'Subsequent Proceedings' at 
Nuremberg. War crimes trials continue in the Federal Republic of Germany and in the German Democratic 
Republic, although at an ever decreasing level. The spectre of Nuremberg has emerged in Australia (see Chapter 
14). Scholars, historians and other writers 'revisit' Nuremberg from time to time. Occasionally, notorious war 
criminals such as Klaus Barbie and John Demjanjuk, attract international attention. In the background, there 
remain the 'Nuremberg Principles'. It therefore seems apposite to attempt in this chapter an appraisal of the 
continuing validity of the Nuremberg principles from the viewpoint of positive international law, a historian 
may include in any such appraisal a consideration of political attitudes and policies, perceptions of public 
morality and philosophical tenets. However, such matters are not within the scope of this study; the viability of 
'Nuremberg Law' will be examined only in a legal context and by means of references to legal institutional and 
constitutional developments, including practical curial application. 
There can be no doubt that the London Agreement and Charter, and later the I.M.T. Judgment, had a profound 
influence on the emergence of widespread national legislation, as well as on the formulation of national attitudes 
and policies generally, in relation to war crimes and their punishment. This development was manifest in two 
principal respects: (a) specific legislation as a basis for national prosecutions; (b) the detailed provisions of 
Armistice Agreements and Peace Treaties. 
It is proposed in this chapter initially to refer to some of those developments, with examples of the 
application of the Nuremberg principles, and then to deal in more detail with some specific national 
approaches. 
NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TRIALS 
The London Agreement and Charter, executed by the four major Powers, was adhered to, pursuant to Article 5 of 
the Agreement, by nineteen nations.1 Of the adherents, a number enacted legislation which expressly embodied 
Article 6 of the London Charter. However, in some other countries, for example France, Norway, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, Canada and Luxembourg, there was no such specific enactment of Article 6, at least in its 
totality, usually because of national legislative and constitutional constraints. 2 
Australia not only adhered to the London Agreement, but the Commonwealth Parliament also enacted the War 
Crimes Act 1945, to which assent was given on 11 October 1945 (see generally, and for recent legislative 
provisions, Chapter 14). In that statute, 'war crime' was thus defined: 
(a) a violation of the laws and usages of war; or 
(b) any war crime within the meaning of the instrument of appointment of the Board of Inquiry appointed on 
the third day of September [1945] under the National Security (Inquiries) Regulations ... 
It is noteworthy that the Australian statute was given extra-territorial effect, in that it expressly extended to a 'war 
crime' committed in any place whatsoever, whether within or beyond Australia, during 'any war' (defined as 
meaning 'any war in which His 'Majesty has been engaged since the second day of September [19391'). The 
instrument of appointment referred to in the 1945 Act provided that 'war crimes' included an offence defined in 
terms identical with those of Article 6 (a) of the London Charter. 3 The Australian statute was the jurisdictional 
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basis for the mixed inter-allied military courts which functioned for several years (see Chapter 14). 
Thus, by 194.6, the vast majority of the civilised nations of the world, by being a party to the London 
Agreement and Charter, or by adhering to it, or by separate national legislation had accepted as embraced within 
the doctrines of positive international law the letter and the spirit of the instruments which lay at the foundations 
of the principal trial of German major war criminals at Nuremberg. 
Two significant cases, illustrative of national trials which derived their jurisdictional basis, wholly or 
partly, from Nuremberg Law (8 August 1945 - 1 October 1946), will now be considered. 
The trial of Artur Greiser.4 This trial was before the Supreme National Tribunal of Poland, between 21 June and 
7 July 1946. Its jurisdiction and powers had been defined by decrees of 31 August 1944 and 16 February 1945 
(promulgated before the German capitulation). The Tribunal itself established by a decree of 22 January 1946 'for 
the trial of persons who, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration, will be surrendered to the Polish 
prosecuting authorities for crimes committed on Polish territory during enemy occupation'. 5 On 25 September 
1945 the Polish Government had expressed its adherence to the London Agreement. 
The indictment contained many Counts, some of which were underscored by allegations of the involvement of 
the accused in the activities of the N.S.D.A.P. as Governor and Gauleiter of Poznan and 'aggression'; there were 
numerous other charges of the commission of war crimes and 'crimes against humanity'. The indictment recorded 
the principal events in the development of international law in relation to aggressive war. 
The case was concluded and judgment delivered some months before the I.M.T. Judgment was pronounced, but in 
relation to the charge of membership of a criminal organisation the Tribunal based its finding of guilt on a 
combination of the London Agreement and Charter and provisions of the Polish Criminal Code. The Tribunal 
found the accused guilty of all charges except that he did not personally commit any murders or acts of cruelty. 
He was sentenced to death and hanged. 
The complicated state of Polish law at the time tends to obscure the basis for the Tribunal's verdict. 
Subsequently, a number of changes in the law were made and the jurisdiction of the Supreme National Tribunal 
was expanded. 
There is no doubt that the judgment in the case of Greiser was an affirmation of the London Agreement; 
moreover, it anticipated in some respects the Judgment of the I.M.T.: for example, in relation to aggression and 
the defence of superior orders. 
The trial of Takashi Sakai.6 The accused served as a Japanese military commander in China during the 1939-45 
war, and previously during the Sino Japanese hostilities which followed the Mukden incident of 1931. The 
charges against him were described as constituting crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
In addition, some changes, were laid under Chinese municipal law and involved offences against the internal 
security of the State.7 
The judgment of the Tribunal was delivered on 29 August 1946,8 prior to amending legislation of 24 October 
1946.9 At the time of the trial, Article 1 of the Chinese Rules governing the Trial of War Criminals provided for 
the application of a combination of the 'rules of international law' and municipal law. 10 
The accused was found guilty 'of participating in the war of aggression, war crimes and crimes against humanity' 
He was sentenced to death. 
The significance of the case is that the judgment preceded that of the I.M.T. by several weeks, and the Tribunal 
convicted the accused of 'crimes against peace' on the basis that he had, while occupying a command military 
position, participated in operations which formed part of a war of aggression. This view was significantly broader 
than that adopted by the I.M.T. 11 
With the exceptions of the I.M.T., the Tribunals established for 'Subsequent Proceedings' at Nuremberg and the 
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Tokyo Tribunal, the vast majority of the reported war crime prosecutions relate to 'war crimes' in the strict sense 
or, in some cases, 'crimes against humanity'. For example, of the 89 cases reported in the series, comprising 15 
parts, prepared by the United Nations War Crimes Commission, nearly all deal with trials before military 
tribunals, variantly constituted, while a small number relate to prosecutions under national legislation for crimes 
generically classified as 'violations of the laws or customs of war or for the breach of specific provisions of 
national statutes. This situation is understandable because the major German war criminals, charged with, or 
convicted of, crimes against peace were indicted at Nuremberg. 
More illumination is shed on the affirmation of Nuremberg Law by the legislative acts of national parliaments 
rather than by national prosecutions under laws similar to Article 6 (a) of the London Charter. 12 
ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND PEACE TREATIES 
As was pointed out by Professor Brownlie, 13 armistice agreements, with Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and 
Finland provided that those countries would 'co-operate in the apprehension and trial of persons accused of 
war crimes'. The subsequent peace treaties concluded with those and other countries contained more detailed 
provisions. 14 
There is little consideration in texts of the provision in Article II of the Treaty of Peace between the Allied 
Powers and Japan, signed at San Francisco on 8 September 1951, in the following terms: 15 
Japan accepts the judgments of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and of 
other Allied War Crimes Courts both within and outside Japan, and will carry out the 
sentences imposed thereby upon Japanese nationals imprisoned in Japan ... [there followed 
references relating to clemency, reduction of sentences and parole]. 
Professor Brownlie has referred to Article II above without comment. 16 
It is submitted that, as a matter of construction, Article H was intended to refer only to the execution of sentences 
imposed by the Tokyo Tribunal and other courts and not to be tantamount to any endorsement of principles 
propounded in the judgments. 
It is noteworthy that shortly before the Treaty with Japan was signed, East Germany, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the Outer Mongolian Republic almost simultaneously enacted legislation 
described as 'Law on Defense of Peace'. 17 The statements in those laws strongly attacked the policies of the 
major Western Powers, . but are significant in the present context because they referred to crimes against 
humanity, aggression and crimes against peace. Thus seven countries without Western alliances, and obviously 
with a common purpose, recognised, whatever their motives were at the time, that the actions of States could 
amount to crimes against peace and crimes against humanity. However, the genesis of the seven laws was the 
allegation of existing war propaganda and incitement to aggressive war, and as such they are only indirectly 
relevant to Article 6 (a) of the London Charter. 
THE PROSECUTION OF NAZI CRIMES BY GERMAN LEGAL AUTHORITIES IN THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY FROM 1945 ONWARDS 
The first formal step to invest German courts with clear jurisdiction after the surrender of Germany was taken by 
the promulgation on 30 October 1945 18 of Allied Control Council Law No. 4 on the 'Reorganisation of the 
German Judicial System'. Article III provided that the jurisdiction of German courts shall extend to all cases both 
civil and criminal with the following exceptions: ... 
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(b) criminal offences committed by Nazis or any other persons against citizens of Allied nations 
and their property, as well as attempts directed towards the re-establishment of the Nazi 
regime, and the activity of the Nazi organisations. 
Very shortly afterwards, Control Council Law No. 10 of 10 December 1945 became effectivel 9 (see Chapter 13). 
Law No. 10 conferred limited jurisdiction on German courts which 'shall have the right to cause all persons as 
arrested ... to be brought to trial before an appropriate tribunal. Such tribunal may in the case of crimes 
committed by persons of German citizenship or nationality against other persons of German citizenship or 
nationality, or stateless persons, be a German court, if authorised by the occupying authorities'. 
Similar jurisdictional powers were subsequently conferred on German courts in the British, American and French 
Occupation zones. 2° 
Ruckerl 21 has provided a penetrating analysis of the reasons why the German public generally 'adopted a 
reserved and indeed censorious attitude towards the trials conducted not only by the tribunals of the Occupying 
Powers, but also by the German courts and prosecuting authorities in connection with the crimes committed 
during the Nazi regime'. 22 A prime factor which contributed to this attitude was the dubious and unsavoury 
character of the so-called 'denazification process', the result of which is thus described by Rucker1: 23 
When the denazification courts and tribunals completed their activities in the first half of 
the 1950s, they could claim to have passed sentences ranging from fines to terms of several 
years imprisonment on over one and a half million people in the three Western Zones of 
Occupation alone ... Many people held the erroneous view—and apparently still hold it 
today [1979]--that the trials by German courts merely represented a continuation of 
denazification under another name. 
It is not difficult to appreciate the further observation of Rucker1: 24 
By comparison [with crimes under domestic law] secondary importance attached to the acts 
constituting a crime against peace: these were unique until that point of time in that they 
were unknown in the German and foreign penal codes. The only one among the accused to 
be condemned by the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg solely by applying the 
then non-codified legal characteristics of a crime against peace was Rudolph Hess (emphasis 
added). [in fact Hess was convicted under Counts 1 and 2]. 
A consideration of the facts stated by Rucker!, including statistics, 25 leads to the conclusion that few, if any, 
of the trials of German war criminals by German Courts after 1945 up to the present time involved the 
principles of 'Nuremberg Law', but that they were concerned only with crimes cognisable under German domestic 
law. There were many difficulties, including numerous changes in the law relating to limitation of 
proceedings, the specific provisions of the German Penal Code, constraints under the German Basic Law, 
problems in locating witnesses and documents and a prevalent view that the goal of 'coming to terms with the 
past had now been reached'. 26 One possible exception to this conclusion relates to the fact that, according to 
statistics provided to the writer by the German Federal Ministry of Justice, German courts pronounced 730 
sentences from 1950 to 1951 on the basis of Control Council Law No. 10 (see Chapter 13) in legal proceedings 
involving Nazi crimes against German nationals or stateless persons. 27 
More significant than the post-war trials in Germany in relation to the policies of the Republic is the provision 
(Article 26) in the 1949 German Basic Law of the following prohibition of wars of aggression: 
Acts tending to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, 
especially to prepare for aggressive war, shall be unconstitutional. They shall be made a punishable 
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offence. 
By comparison, the Italian Constitution of 1947 was less positive than the German provision. Article II provided 
that 'Italy repudiates war as an instrument of aggression against the liberties against other peoples and as a means 
of settling international difficulties ...'. 
A number of other States have adopted similar Constitutional provisions. 28 
TRIALS BY COURTS IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND IN EAST 
BERLIN 
Brief reference should be made to the attitude of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to war crimes trials. 
The statistics, claimed by the GDR to be accurate in this respect, are contained in an article in a semi-official 
publication in 1985 by Borchert. 29 
Omitting the bias expressed against the Federal Republic of Germany, the article is important because of the 
following statement by Borchert: 30 
The consistent prosecution and punishment of war crimes and of crimes against humanity was and 
continues to be for the German Democratic Republic and for its organs of criminal prosecution and 
judicial bodies always a command of international law and a historic task. The Nuremberg 
Principles have found their legal expression in the legal system of the GDR. Thus in the Criminal 
Code of the GDR of 12 January 1968, sections 85-89 and 91-93, the principles of the IMT Statute 
have been made a constituent part of domestic law. 
It was already on 1 September 1964 that the People's Chamber of the GDR in conformity with the 
international legal position had passed a law to abolish time limits for the prosecution of nazi and 
war crimes. In the GDR Constitution of 6 April 1968, in pursuance of the stipulations of the 
Constitution of 7 October 1949, the Nuremberg Principles, including the principle not to apply 
statutory limitation to this category of crimes, were adopted as principles of the Constitution. 
Article 91 reads as follows: 'The generally accepted norms of international law relating to the 
punishment of crimes against peace and humanity and of war crimes are directly valid law. Crimes 
of this kind do not fall under the statute of limitations'. 
The exclusion of statutory limitations for crimes against peace, humanity and human rights and for 
war crimes is reaffirmed in section 84 of the Criminal Code of the GDR. 
The following statistics are provided in Borchert's article: 31 
On the territory of the German Democratic Republic. altogether 12,873 war criminals and persons 
guilty of crimes against humanity were finally tried from 1945 to 31 December 1984 under 
international law according to the degree of their guilt within the system of mass-scale fascist 
crimes. This was also in line with the instructions of the bloc of all antifascist and democratic 
parties which had adopted a resolution on the puree of Germany from the remnants of fascism 
already on 20 October 1945. From this fact the task emerged for German courts to decide in their 
own competence on such crimes committed by Germans because of nazi convictions which are not 
condemed by the courts of the United Nations' and 'immediately and with the utmost energy, in 
cooperation with the antifascist forces of the German people to initiate all measures which are 
necessary for the prosecution of the nazi crimes'. 
By 1960 already, the courts of the GDR sentenced 12,147 war criminals and persons guilty of 
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crimes against humanity. Among them were not only members of execution squads, but also 
judges and prosecutors of the nazi regime, euthanasia criminals and also top managers in 
corporations who had abused their work to commit most abominable crimes. 32 
THE TRIAL BY ISRAEL COURTS OF ADOLF EICHMANN 
The trial of Adolf Eichmann merits some additional mention in this chapter, apart from the consideration of it in 
the limited context of Chapter 12, if only because of its widespread notoriety. It should not, however, be 
regarded as exemplifying principles of 'Nuremberg Law' or in itself as contributing to the body of international 
law. It was unique. 
As is well known. Eichmann was, between 1942 and 1944, the Chief of the Jewish Affairs Section of the Reich 
Security Head Office, the essential task of which was the supervision of the so-called 'final solution of the 
Jewish question'. He had been the 'architect and chief exponent of the policy which resulted in the deaths of, on a 
general estimate, nearly six million persons. He had escaped to Argentina, but was captured in 1960 and taken to 
Israel for trial. He was indicted on fifteen Counts before the District Court of Jerusalem in 1961 on charges of 
'crimes against the Jewish people', as defined in the Israeli law of August 1950 in these terms: 
killing Jews; causing serious bodily or mental harm to Jews; placing Jews in living conditions 
that are calculated to bring about their physical destruction; devising measures intended to prevent 
births among Jews; forcibly transferring Jewish children to another national or religious group; 
destroying or desecrating Jewish religious or cultural assets or values; inciting to hatred ofJews. 33 
The Israeli law substantially followed Article II of the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
The root basis for the jurisdiction of the Court was the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law (see 
Chapter 12). 
Professor Woetzel, in a postlude to the second impression of The Nurembe_g Trials' in 1962, canvassed at length 
the arguments for the defence and the suggestion that an international trial would have been preferable. With full 
respect, the writer finds it difficult to accept the view expressed in the postlude that '... the legal basis of the 
Eichmann trial can be considered controversial'. 34 In legal writings it has, of course, been a matter of 
disputation.35 
It is true, as inevitably had to happen, that every conceivable defence was argued and, so far as the defence of 
superior orders was concerned, even Kant's 'categorical imperative' was invoked. But the Court dealt in a reasoned 
and unbiassed manner with the defence arguments. As Professor Woetzel has stated,36 the Court's view, in 
General terms, was: 
Our jurisdiction to try this case was based on the Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment) Law, 
a statutory law the provisions of which are unequivocal. The court has to give effect to the law of 
the [Parliament], and we cannot entertain the contention that this law conflicts with international 
law. On the contrary we have reached the conclusion that the law in question conforms to the 
best traditions of the law of nations. 
More specifically, the Israel court relied on the pronouncements of the I.M.T. (see the I.M.T. Judgment at pp. 
60-64 and especially the references to Eichmann at pp. 62 and 64). 
Further, the Court said: 37 
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Israel's 'right to punish' is based, with respect to the offences in question, from the point of view 
of international law, on a dual foundation: the universal character of the crimes in question and 
their specific character as being designed to exterminate the Jewish people ... These crimes which 
afflicted the whole of mankind and shocked the conscience of nations are grave offences against the 
law of nations itself.... 
And again: 
... all that has been said in the Nuremberg principles on the 'crime against humanity' applies a 
fortiori to the 'crime against the Jewish people'. 38 
It is appropriate to cite the final statement of Professor Woetze1: 39 
.... International law grows also through cases in national jurisprudence, as has been shown. Just like the first 
Allied national tribunals which tried war crimes were followed by acceptance of the universal principle of 
jurisdiction to cover war crimes in the Geneva Convention, the Eichmann case adds to the body of evidence 
which could justify in future the application of this principle by national courts in cases involving genocide, if 
confirmed by practice and agreement. Even though it is not an international trial, it may in that sense have 
contributed significantly to the development of international law. It also achieved the purpose of showing the 
world what heinous destruction may be wrought through human prejudice and intolerance. 
The emphasised words in the passage cited above detract from the general viewpoint therein expressed. So far as 
'agreement is concerned, the terms of the Genocide Convention approved by the General Assembly of the United 
Nations at Paris on 9 December 1948 are explicit. Article I provides: 
The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of 
war, is a crime under inter-national law which they undertake to prevent and punish. 
Article III of the Convention provides that the following acts shall be punishable: (a) Genocide, (b) Conspiracy 
to commit genocide; (c) Direct and public incitement to commit genocide; (d) Attempt to commit genocide; (e) 
Complicity in genocide. 
The Convention was signed by twenty States immediately after its approval and entered into force according to 
its terms. Subsequently many other States signed the Convention. 40 
The Genocide Convention Act 1949 provided for the ratification of the Convention by Australia. 
So far as 'practice', as the word is used in the cited extract, is concerned, it does not appear necessary for there to 
be repetitions of acts of genocide before there is unqualified acceptance of the fact that genocide is recognised by 
civilised State's as being contrary to inter national law as a criminal and punishable act, as indeed it was at the 
time of the trial of Eichmann under the statute law of the State of Israel. 
It is proper to regard the case of Eichmann as sui Generis. 41 
THE TRIAL OF FIRST LIEUTENANT CALLEY 
Against the background of the major involvement of America in the prosecution of war criminals at Nuremberg 
extending over nearly four years, from 1945 to 1949, there emerged in the late 1960s the case of First Lieutenant 
William L Calley, a platoon leader in operations in the village of Son My, (more commonly, but inaccurately, 
described as My Lai), South Vietnam, on 16 March 1968. The facts have been sufficiently stated in Chapter 12. 
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The legal proceedings in the Calley Case were pending when Brigadier General Taylor's book Nuremberg and 
Vietnam : an American Tragedy  was published in 1970, and he avoided comment on the question of the criminal 
responsibility of Calley and his associates. Nevertheless, he stated:42 
Whether the killings constituted a war crime is the question first to be examined and, for this purpose, it can be 
take as undisputed that on March 16, 1968, American troops at Son My killed a large number of the village 
residents of both sexes and all ages. According to President Nixon, who presumably was well briefed: 'What 
appears was certainly a massacre, under no circumstances was it justified. We cannot ever condone or use 
atrocities against civilians 	'43 
Military aspects of the massacre are detailed by Brigadier General Taylor, 44 but are not relevant to this section, 
which is concerned with the legal sequel. 
The Caney Case began on 5 September 1969 and ended on 5 April 1976 when the Supreme Court of the United 
States denied a petition for a writ of certiorari directed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. 
During that period of more than six years, there was a multiplicity of trial, review and appeal proceedings, in 
which, in order, Calley initially was convicted and sentenced to imprigonment for life, the sentence was reduced 
to twenty years in prison and later by executive action to ten years, the conviction was set aside by a District 
Judge whose judgment was reversed on further appeal and finally another attempt at review failed before the 
United States Supreme Court, without reasons being assigned.' 6 It is proposed to refer only to the judgment of 
the last appellate court in which reasons were stated - that is, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit ('the Appeal Coure).47 
The Appeal Court stated that all charges could have been laid as war crimes, but were prosecuted under the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice (Field Manual 27-10, paragraph 507b, The Law of Land Warfare (1956)). 
The defence plea of superior orders has been considered in Chapter 12. It was condignly rejected. 48 Defence 
counsel presented thirty-one assignments of error, many of them technical, but all were refused. There was also 
a petition for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence; it was denied. In relation to the sentence of 
twenty years imprisonment the Appeal Court observed: 49 
The approved sentence is not too severe a consequence of his choosing to commit mass murder. 
On analysis, the Calley Case was simply one of multiple murder. Hysterical media coverage, numerous books 
and articles, and a long-sustained publicity campaign concerning the American 'conscience' and 'the immorality of 
an act of Government' cannot elevate the case to any level above that of a crime against the established code of 
military behaviour. 'Nuremberg Law' was irrelevant. 
The only relevant significance of the case is that in the firgt American trial of any notoriety since 1949 at 
Nuremberg, before a national tribunal, a sentence of twenty years imprisonment was considered appropriate in a 
case of mass murder, and was reduced ultimately to one of ten years. It is unnecessary to compare the result of 
the Calley Case with the pronouncements by the prosecutors at Nuremberg, because such a comparison would 
involve principles of morality, not law, and consequently is not within the scope of this study. 
CONCLUSION 
There can be no doubt in the light of the foregoing analyses that the Nuremberg principles became recognised as 
a constituent part of positive international law within a short time after they were promulgated, and that, 
regardless of some politically inspired aberrations (such as the Vietnam War and the Russian invasion of 
Afghanistan), they remain an entrenched segment of international law. The principal unresolved problem is the 
method of their enforcement. 
Professor Brownlie convincingly demonstrated the recognition of the Nuremberg principles in his 
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survey of national court decisions and legislation. 5° In the fifteen-part series of reports prepared by the 
United Nations War Crimes Commission, there is also a detailed summary of relevant references to acceptance 
of 'Nuremberg Law'.51 
Commencing with its resolution on 13 February 1946,52  in which it noted the defmitions of crimes against 
peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity in the London Charter, the United Nations has consistently 
recorded its affirmation of 'Nuremberg Law'. 53 
Professor Brownlie concluded his survey of the acceptance of the principles of the London Agreement and Charter 
as follows: 
It is submitted that the majority of states are now estopped from denying that the substantive 
aspects of the Charter and Judgment of Nuremberg have become part of the positive law. 
Moreover, in spite of doubts expressed by some members of the International law Commission, 
they are accepted as law by the majority of jurists and in authoritative works. 54 
Whatever view may be taken of the jurisdictional validity of the London Agreement and Charter, the writer, for 
the reasons stated in this chapter, argues that there is no room for doubt that within a short time of the delivery 
by the I.M.T. of its Judgment, the vast majority of the civilised nations of the world, by express action, 
legislative or political, chose individually, and at times collectively, to proclaim their own judgment that 
'Nuremberg Law' was a reality as part of the general body of international law. It does not appear that any court 
or tribunal has expressed any doubt about that reality. Four decades have passed and the fundamental fact of the 
continuing existence of the reality stands virtually unchallenged and is irrefutable. 
289 
NOTES 
1. The adhering nations are named in the Judgment of the I.M.T., p. 1. 
2. History of U.N.W.C.C., p. 216 and passim. France ratified the London Agreement and Charter by a decree 
dated 8 October 1945, so that it became formally recognised by French Courts (see the judgment of the 
Cour de Cassation (Chambre Criminelle), cited in Brownlie, op. cit., p. 177, footnote 7). 
3. History of U.N.W.C.C., p. 216. 
4. Law Reports, U.N.W.C.C., XIII, p. 70. 
5. For a detailed exposition of Polish law concerning the trials of war criminals, which is extremely 
complex, see Annex to Law Reports, U.N.W.C.C., VII, pp. 82-97, from which the following is an 
extract: 'Nor does the Polish war crimes legislation contain a definition or reference to 'crimes against 
peace' (except for the case of criminal organizations). This has not, however, been an obstacle preventing 
the Polish Courts from dealing with these types of crimes. In such cases the problem of criminal acts 
coming within the notion of crimes against peace can easily be solved within the framework of Polish 
municipal law'. 
6. Law Reports, U.N.W.C.C., XIV, p. 1. 
7. Ibid. 
8. Brownlie, op. cit., p. 181, footnote 4. 
9. Law Reports, U.N.W.C.C., XIV, p. 3, note 1. 
10. For a detailed account of Chinese law concerning the trials of war criminals, see ibid, Annex, pp. 152- 
160. 
11. See Brownlie, op. cit., p. 182. 
12. Details of such laws are contained in a number of Annexes to volumes of the series Law Reports, 
U.N.W.C.C.; see also Brownlie, op. cit., pp. 175-182. 
13. Brownlie, op. cit., p. 182. 
14. A typical such provision was made by Article 45 (1) of the Treaty between the four major Powers and 
Italy, signed at Paris on 10 February 1947, as follows: '1. Italy shall take all necessary steps to ensure the 
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CI1APTER 16 	POST NUREMBERG: THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION 
INTRODUCTION 
The significance of the legal pronouncements of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals and in the 'Subsequent 
Proceedings' at Nuremberg can, in practical terms, only be gauged in the light of the achievements of the United 
Nations Organisation (U.N.0.) towards entrenching the principles of those judgments as an accepted part of 
international law, so far as member states of the Organisation are concerned. 
This chapter contains a very brief survey of the progress of the U.N.O. towards that goal and an expression of the 
writer's opinion on the nature and extent of the progress. 
INITIAL STEPS OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANISATION 
In a resolution adopted on 11 December 1946, the General Assembly affirmed 'the principles of international law 
recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal' and directed the Committee on the Codification of 
International Law 'to treat as a matter of primary importance plans for the formulation, in the context of a 
general codification of offences against the peace and security of mankind, or of an International Criminal Code, 
of the principles recognised' in the Nuremberg Charter and the Tribunal's Judgment.' 
The Governments which participated in the.cirafting of the Charter of the United Nations were 'strongly opposed 
to conferring on the United Nations legislative power to enact binding rules of international law. As a corollary, 
they also rejected proposals to confer on the General Assembly the power to impose certain general conventions 
on States by some form of majority vote'. 2 
Nevertheless, the strong support for vesting in the General Assembly of the U.N.O. more limited powers 
culminated in the inclusion in inclusion in the Charter of Article 13, which provided that 'the General Assembly 
shall initiate studies and make recommendations for the purpose of: (a) ... encouraging the progessive 
development of international law and its codification'. 
The 'Committee of Seventeen' held thirty meetings between 12 May and 17 June 1947 and adopted a report 
recommending the establishment of an international law commission and stating provisions designed to serve as 
the basis of its statute. 
On 21 November 1947 the General Assembly, by resolution 174, established the International Law Commission 
and approved its statute. It was not, however, until 12 April 1949 that the first annual session of the 
Commission began.4 
The work of the Commission (ILC), is well documented. 5 However, the only significant positive development 
in nearly thirty years was the adoption on 14 December 1974 by the General Assembly of a definition of 
'aggression' in the context of a 'war of aggression'.6 
The road to the adoption of the definition of 'aggression' was long and tortuous. After more than twenty years of 
discussion of what would be an appropriate definition, the Assembly of the U.N.O. on 18 December 1967 
established a Special Committee on the Question of Defining Aggression. 7 The Special Committee met from 11 
March to 12 April 1974. and continued its work following a General Assembly decision on 12 December 1973. 8 
The resolution of the Assembly on 14 December 1974 was based upon the recommendation of its Sixth (Legal) 
Commi ttee.9 
The text of the definition comprised ten preambular paragraphs and eight articles. It is reproduced in Appendix I 
to this chapter and is discussed later. 
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THE LEGAL STATUS OF TIIE U.N.O. GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS 
Before examining the detail of the definition of aggression and U.N.O. developments following its adoption, it is 
convenient to consider the legal status, as a matter of international law, of resolutions of the General Assembly, 
confined to the criminal character of aggressive war. 
It has been asserted that 'the inquiry on the legal status of the resolutions of the U.N. General Assembly will ... 
remain a subject for animated discussion in the years to come.' 1 ° However, on the proper construction of the 
U.N. Charter, there does not appear any basis for controversy concerning the legal status of the General 
Assembly in the context of the peace and security of mankind. 11 The balance of informed opinion is that, in 
general, the effects of resolutions of the General Assembly 'are not of "legal nature" in the usual sense, but rather 
of a moral or political character'. 12 
In the writer's view it is difficult to attribute to the resolution of the General Assembly endorsing, or purportedly 
expanding, 'Nuremberg Law' anything other than a morally and politically persuasive force. But to say that, is 
not to depreciate the significance of consensus, among a preponderance of states, relating to the development of 
principles of international criminal law which could be applied in expanding international criminal jurisprudence 
in a manner analogous to that of the common law (see Chapter 18). 13 
THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION: AN ANALYSIS 
The definition of 'aggression' in the Oxford English Dictionary, vol. I, p. 38 is simply expressed as 'an 
unprovoked attack; the first attack in a quarrel; an assault'. 
Despite the simplicity of the basic concept of aggression, nearly three decades passed before the U.N.O. was able 
to reach any agreement, either unanimously or by consensus, on what acts constituted 'aggression' in 
international relations. This is not surprising for two principal reasons. 
First, for more than 2,000 years sporadic efforts had been made to outlaw international aggression, including the 
exhortation of the Chinese philosopher Mo Ti, some 400 years B.C., that wars between nation, be regarded 
as the greatest of all crimes. 14 'Nevertheless wars remained the accepted national resort, especially in feudal 
Europe. 
Second. despite the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 warfare contined to be the ultimate means of satisfying 
national aspirations. 
The generic definition of 'aggression' in Article 1 of the 1974 definition (see Appendix 1 to this Chapter), 
although it was the product of compromise, is defective in that it omits any reference to a threat of force, such as 
preceded the annexation by Nazi Germany of Austria on 13 March 1938, following a series of threats of 
invasion. Nor does the definition embrace the unconcealed preparations by Nazi Germany to attack 
Czechoslovakia in 1938, combined with the diplomatic treachery which led to the Munich Pact of 29 September 
1938 between the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy, whereby Czechoslovakia was forced to cede the 
Sudetenland to Germany In neither of those cases was there 'use of armed force' as contemplated by Article 1 
(emphasis added). Another weakness of the definition is the omission of any reference to economic coercion, 
political duress or racial reprisals, any one of which may impugn the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of a state. 
Article 2 provided that the first use of armed force in contravention of the U.N.O. Charter constitutes prima facie 
evidence of aggression. It is open to the criticism that it reflects an outmoded view of what is a 'first strike'. In 
the world today, when many nations have a capacity for sophisticated nuclear war, it could be very difficult to 
determine which of two antagonists was guilty of the 'first strike'. However, the Article provides that the 
Security Council is the arbiter of the question whether or not an act of aggression has been committed, but the 
power of veto may make that authority illusory. 
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Article 3 enumerated seven categories of acts which would 'qualify' as an act of aggression. Understandably, 
differing political views and the fears of smaller states that the categorisation proposed would expose them to 
unacceptable risks resulted in some compromises in the drafting of Article 3. Since all seven categories were 
made subject to the provisions of Article 2, it is questionable whether, as a matter of drafting, the inclusion of 
the enumeration in the definition was prudent. It is trite to emphasise that in legal drafting attemps to enlarge 
upon a primary definition by engrafting onto it some non-exhaustive specific examples often result in difficulties 
of interpretation. 
Although, under Article 4, the Security Council was empowered to determine that other acts constitute 
aggression, the absence of an independant body that decision-making process is, in my opinion, the most 
significant weakness of the definition. 
Article 5 is the most important provision in the definition, for the purposes of this study. Its terms were: 
1. 	No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise. may serve 
as a justification for aggression. 
'7. 	A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international 
responsibility. 
3. 	No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as 
lawful. 
Although during the debates which preceded the approval by the Assembly of the definition, Article 5 was 
criticized as expressing truisms, 16 it was important that in 1974 the U.N.O. should reaffirm in an appropriate 
context at least some of the Nuremberg principles. Had it not done so it would be difficult to sustain 'Nuremberg 
Law' as having continuing relevance as part of international law. However, the failure to qualify the words 
'international responsibility' by expressly including in paragraph 2 of Article 5 a reference to individual personal 
responsibility deprived the Article of the reaffirmative force which should have been integral to it. 
Article 6 also has been criticized as 'merely stating the obvious'. 17 I do not share that view. The definition in 
Article 1 bore the stamp of a statutory expression of the meaning of 'aggression'. As such, it was prudent to 
ensure that no quirk of interpretation should affect the scope of the U.N. Charter, 'including its provisions 
concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful'. 
Article 7 was designed to protect the 'right to self-determination, freedom and independence, as derived from the 
Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right ...'. (emphasis added). The analysis by Ferenc,e of this Articles 
is,18 in my respectful view, incomplete, especially as he describes the Article as 'an even clearer embodiment of 
fundamental differences'. 
Again, it was essential that the paramountcy of the Charter should be preserved, and the text of the Article did so. 
A definition of aggression was not the place, nor was the time opportune to attempt to reconcile more general 
differences in political attitudes within the U.N.O. 
Article 8 has merely a drafting technique. It did not merit the following comment by Ferencz:I9 
Article 8 gave further reinforcement to those who hoped to read their own meanings into the 
ambiguous clauses of the consensus definition. It tied everything -- preamble and substantive 
text -- into one interrelated package. 
In the writer's view, the important question was whether or not, by 1974, it was of paramount importance for the 
U.N.O. to demonstrate that its member states could, at least in substance, reach agreement on what acts 
constituted 'a war of aggression'. That expression had been used in Article 6 (a) of the Nuremberg Charter of 8 
August 1945 as the foundation of the alleged crimes against peace (Count 2 of the Nuremberg indictment). 
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Despite some criticisms as stated above, the ultimate definition of a 'war of aggression' in 1974 was not without 
purpose. To some extent it solidified the concept embodied in the London Agreement and Charter; it also set the 
seal of the approval of the member states to acceptance of the proposition that an aggressive war is a crime 
which Rives rise to international responsibility. In both those respects, the definition was a contribution to the 
evolution of international law, even though, as will be discussed later in this chapter, it was not accompanied by 
the emergence of a code of international criminal law and of a body capable of enforcing it, as in municipal 
law.2° 
DRAFT CODE OF OFFENCES AGAINST THE PEACE AND SECURITY OF MANKIND 
The record of the progress within the U.N.O. of the preparation of a Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace 
and Security of Mankind is depressingly revealed in an analytical paper prepared by the Secretary-General, dated 
16 October 1981. 21 The paper was prepared in accordance with resolution 35/49 of the General Assembly on 4 
December 1980. which cursorily surveyed the developments in the consideration by the U.N.O. of a draft code 
and expressed its intention to discuss the matter again at its thirty-sixth session. 
The analytical paper, which set forth the requested views of member states as expressed up to 30 June 1981, 
made it clear that: 
the draft code prepared by the International Law Commission in 1954 was subject to diverse and strong 
criticism; 
For a variety of reasons, many states argued that the time was not opportune to reactivate the 
preparation of a draft code. For example, the representative of the United States expressed the following 
view: Since the International Law Commission was currently considering the draft articles on State 
responsibility 'it would not be wise to resume work on the draft Code, at least until the Commission 
had made considerable progress in the present tasks'. He also recalled that, when the Commission had 
considered article 19 of the draft articles on State responsibility relating to international crimes and 
international delicts, the Special Rapporteur pointed out that it would be inappropriate to deal with that 
question without first having accepted judicial machinery for determining in what cases the article 
should apply.22 
The provisions of the 1974 Definition of Aggression were the subject of criticism by some states. The 
representatives of the Netherlands said the definition 'did not help in elaborating a code of conduct, precisely 
because it was not sufficiently exact to be used in the framework of a code laying down individual 
responsibilities'. 23 The representative of the United States expressed the view that a definition of aggression 
suited to the purposes of the draft code had not yet been formulated. 24 
On 10 December 1981, the Assembly again referred to the International Law Commission the question of 
offences against the peace and security of mankind. The Assembly requested the Commission to resume its work 
with a view to elaborating a draft code which would take into account new developments in international law.26 
Mr. Doudou Thiam was appointed by the Commission to be a Special Rapporteur. He submitted a first report 
on 18 March 1983. 26 
Mr Thiam's report was only introductory and, in his words, was an 'inventory of the problems, in order to evoke 
joint thinking and answers'.27 He said: '... the present report can only be exploratory. Its purpose is to put to 
the Commission as a whole a number of questions, the answers to which will guide the Special Rapporteur.'28 
By resolution 38/138 of 19 December 1983, the General Assembly recommended that, taking into account the 
comments of Governments, whether in writing or expressed orally in debates in the General Assembly, the 
International Law Commission should continue its work on all the topics in its current programme. 
Furthermore, by its resolution 38/132 of 19 December 1983, the Assembly invited the International Law 
Commission to continue its work on the elaboration of the draft Code of Offences against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind in certain specified areas. 
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At the subsequent session of the Commission, 7 May to 27 July 1984, it considered the second report of the 
Special Rapporteur. From the record of that session it is obvious that the Commission had lost direction. It 
concluded that it should begin by drawing up a provisional list of offences for inclusion in a draft code. 
(emphasis added). However, it stated: 'there was a general trend in the Commission in favour of including 
colonialism, apartheid, and possibly serious damage to the human environment and economic aggression in the 
draft code, if appropriate legal formulations could be found.' 
THE VIEWS AND WORKS OF SCHOLARS AND WRITERS 
Outside the confines of the U.N.O., a number of scholars, writers and bodies such as the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission and the London International Assembly, as well as the State Departments of United States, 
considered, before and after the end of World War II, the creation of a United Nations War Crimes Court. 29 
However, there are no tangible signs that the General Assembly of the U.N.O. has been influenced by the 
expression of views outside its own purview. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to consider at length the contributions to the solution of the most difficult 
problems of an international criminal code and court by persons not directly associated with the U.N.O. 
However, brief reference will be made to the writings of a small number of scholars. 
Professor Bassiouni 
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, of DePaul University, published in 1980 a draft criminal code. 3° The code, 
which is substantive in character, combines two alternative approaches to the future direction of international 
criminal law. The first is that jurisdiction in respect of international crimes should be vested in an International 
Criminal Court; the second, which is a recognition of the maxim aut dedere ant iudicare. is that states should 
enter into a binding International Criminal Code Convention prescribing a code of international crimes, the 
proscriptions in which would become part of the national law of the parties to the Convention and be enforceable 
within national criminal justice systems. In a preface to the work, Bassiouni acknowledged that the second view 
is the contemporary prevailing one. Nevertheless the code recognises each view and is therefore divided into 
discrete and separable parts in order to accommodate both approaches. 
Article 1 of the International Criminal Code embodied the text of the 1974 Definition of Aggression, expressed 
verbatim and only with changes in numbering. The author recognised some of the criticisms of the definition,31 
but was himself uncritical. His conclusion was: 
Despite the problems, the definition evidences a political maturity previously lacking. Both the 
Security Council and member states have felt the impact of what may become an accepted 
norm. The definition fills a void which results in the United Nations putting aside work on an 
international criminal code. This crime includes 'crimes against peace' as defined in the London 
Charter of 1945 ... 32 
The fact that Bassiouni chose to present a codification of international criminal law on the alternative bases of a 
supranational criminal code and a resort to a convention, with ultimate enforcement of proscriptions the 
responsibility of national criminal law systems, demonstrates the two major stumbling blocks to progress in 
restraining national aggression first the schism between states with respect to the surrendering, of national 
authority and jurisdiction to an international tribural with punitive powers; second, the failure, after nearly half a 
century, to reach a positive and practical exposition by way of definition of the acts which would lead to 
culpability of both States and individuals (seethe conclusion of this chapter). 33 and 34 
Mr. Benjamin B. Ferencz 
Probably the most prolific writer since World War II on issues relating to the enforcement of international law, 
an international criminal court and the problems involved in a definition of aggression is Benjamin B. Ferencz.35 
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The major works by Ferencz are substantially historical and documentary, but they convey the constant theme 
that humankind should have the capacity to ensure that international co-operation replaces 'the prevailing 
international anarchy'. That theme was crystallised in his afterword in Enforcing International Law : A Way to 
World Peace in these terms: 36 
When it comes to international law enforcement, everything is linked. There can be no social justice 
without reducing the costs of arms; no disarmament without a peaceful method of settling 
irreconcilable disputes among states; no court with binding authority to resolve such disputes until 
states agree to give it the necessary power; no need for an international army if there is no 
international court; no consent to judicial determinations until there are common norms of 
international behavior; no agreement on norms until nations with different values develop mutual 
confidence and a will to compromise in order to enhance the security and well-being of all peoples. 
Progress must be made in all areas if effective international law enforcement is to become a reality. 
The ultimate challenge is whether human intellect will prevail over man's destructive capacity. 
The thesis which Ferencz has consistently propounded marks a departure from the orthodox jurisprudential 
approach of legalistic examination of principles. With his ultimate view, as expressed in the above citation, I 
am bound to concur; however, I would advocate refinements, involving the need for appreciation of practical 
political realities, which are discussed in the conclusion of this chapter. 
Professor Brownlie 
Although Professor Brownlie's well-known monograph published in 1963 antedated the U.N.O. Definition of 
Aggression by more than a decade, there is no reason to suppose that his views changed in the light of the 1974 
resolution of the General Assembly.37 He stated: 
The failure of various bodies to formulate a definition of aggression indicates the difficulty of the 
problem but no more. ... The source of confusion would seem to be that the quest for a definition of 
aggression has become a vast law-making project with many facets.... Discussion of the 'definition of 
aggression' is a valuable aid to more effective regulation of conflict, both armed and in other forms, 
hut agreement on what is really a vast field of problems and not merely a definition can hardly be a 
sine qua non for acceptance of legal norms on the use of force by states.38 
Brief though Professor Brownlie's consideration of a definition of aggression was, it pinpoints the problem 
which has engulfed the General Assembly and the International Law Commission for some forty years. The 
attempt to draft consensually a detailed definition of aggression has failed, and will continue to fail, because 
of the efforts of some states to engraft onto the basic elements of aggression additional elements which create 
disputation on political or ideological grounds: for example, consideration of environmental issues. 
Professor Stone 
Professor Julius Stone's treatise Leoal Controls of International Conflict  was first published in 1954. 39 Thirty 
four years later it is not difficult to describe as prescient his comments on the International I.2w Commission's 
initial consideration of the meaning of 'aggression' in the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and 
Security of Mankind. He stated: 
Both the inclusions and exclusions, vague and inexhaustive as they are, leave the Draft Code open to 
wide diversity of interpretation, and to the evasive and often ingenious resorts in which aggressive 
Powers have shown themselves adept in face of modern attempts to assert legal control over the resort 
to war. The prognosis for a Draft Code of which this formulation is the pivot, would not be favourable 
even if it should ever come into force, though a Tribunal of sufficient calibre and assured impartiality, 
might -- if it were given the time and the chance — develop the required precision and comprehensiveness 
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through a growing jurisprudence.'° 
In my respectful view. Professor Stone's judgment has been completely vindicated by the deliberations of the 
General Assembly and International Law Commission in subsequent decades. Each of those bodies has allowed 
itself to be engulfed, to the point of impotence, in the interstices of definition, so far as 'aggression' is 
concerned. 
Professor Woetzel 
In his work The Nuremberg Trials in International Law, Professor Woetzel discussed uncritically the early 
deliberations of the International Law Commission on the question of aggression. 41 He described the 
initial recommendation of the Commission in the Draft Code as a compromise between three different points of 
view: first, the espousal by the Soviet Union of an exhaustive list specifying each form of aggression ('the 
enumerative school'); second, the French view which favoured a general formula for aggression, on the ground 
that with no definition at all the criticism of nulla poena sine leg,e might be brought up, as at Nuremberg., if a 
new form of aggression occurred ('the general definition school'); third, the 'no defmition school', led by 
Greece, the United Kingdom and the United States, opposed any definition at all (cf. the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Charters), arguing that it could not be all-embracing and that an aggressor might be able to circumvent it by 
committing an aggression in a form not covered in the defmition.42 
It should be stated that the treatment by Professor Woetzel of the problem of what constitutes 'aggression' was 
in the context of a section of a chapter entitled 'Codification of the Nuremberg Principles and 
Conclusions', and was not basic to the principal theme of the section. It should not, therefore, be regarded as 
exhaustive of his views at that time (1962). 
A British political view 
The most forthright public opposition by a senior Minister on behalf of the British Government to the 
establishment of an International Criminal Court in post-World War II years was expressed by Sir Frank 
Soskice, the Attorney-General, in an address to the U.N.O. Legal Committee in Geneva in 1951, in which he 
stated that in the view of the British Government the practical difficulties of setting up an international criminal 
court would be overwhelming.. As reported in the press, he said: 
The court would need the power to bring the accused to trial and to see that its sentences were carried 
out. The accused might be persons with big followings in their own countries. Efforts to brine them 
before a court would inevitably be resisted, and even if they were ever brought to trial the court would 
become a political arena rather than a forum of justice. 
There would also, he added, be great difficulty in carrying out a sentence. If the court were set up and 
could not function effectively it would merely become an object of contempt. The Nuremberg Tribunal 
could not be recorded as precedent. It had been able to function effectively in the unusual circumstances 
of a total victory after a world war, but such circumstances did not exist in peacetime. He hoped that if 
an attempt were made even to draft a tentative statute for the General Assembly these considerations 
would be taken into account 43 
The writer is not aware of any publicly expressed attitude by any British Government which deviates from the 
cited remarks of Sir Frank Soskice. 
Dr. C.A. Pompe 
An essentially pragmatic approach to defining the concept of aggression was discussed by Dr. C.A. Pompe in his 
work published in 1953, but not consistently.' 4 He emphasised the distinction between international law and 
international politics, arguing that the distinction involved practical rather than theoretical questions. He advanced 
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a suggested definition in these terms: 45 
The use or imminent threat of force on the part of a State, whether acting openly or indirectly, which 
leaves the State against which it is directed no other than military means to preserve its territorial 
integrity or political independence, or which disturbs the international status quo in such a way that 
only a military reaction can maintain the status of territories under an international regime or under the 
effective jurisdiction of a State. 
It is difficult to appreciate how such a definition elucidates the intrinsic qualities of the concept of 
aggression. On its face the definition has two defects: first, expressed as it is in general terms it still 
requires that an authoritative body pronounce a judgement on the facts as proved or admitted; second, it does 
not recognize in a practical way the many disparities between the leading nations and the smaller states, 
especially those which have emerged as such since the end of World War II. 
Moreover, such a definition does not appear to the writer to be consistent with the following preceding statement 
of Dr. Pompe: 46 
As long as 'aggression is not defined but only determined in casu, the difference in function between 
criminal and public law makes it necessary that a tribunal determines in every case, independently of 
possible previous decisions by a political organ, whether 'aggression' has been committed. This is, from 
a point of view of international criminal law, the significance of the much discussed question whether 
the definition of aggression is a political or a legal question. Insofar as 'aggression' has not been 
precisely defined it remains a predominantly political concept. When it was brought within the 
compass of criminal law the competent Tribunals had to determine in concreto whether culpable 
aggression had been committed., 
In a reference to the form of the Draft Code at the time of the publication of his work, Dr. Pompe stated: 47 
While the Code has a number of deficiencies, mainly from a systematic point of view, the absence of a 
strict definition of aggression is its main default and overthrows the whole structure of the Code in its 
present wording (emphasis added). 
The writer poses the question: What is meant by a "strict" definition?' It is submitted that the connotation of the 
adjective is not consistent with the approach initially adopted by Dr. Pompe. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although the United Nations Organisation should be judged on its record of achievements, criticism would be 
unfair without recognition of the unprecedented difficulties which it has faced in forty three years. By its 
sponsorship of international treaties, conventions and declarations,48 the U.N.O. has entrenched new concepts of 
human values in a world driven by conflicts between states. It has provided a forum for the public debate of 
issues which are international and transcend the interests of any individual state. It has not deviated from its 
fundamental purpose, as stated in Article 1 of its Charter, of pursuing the the maintenance of peace and security, 
but it has found the attainment of that purpose elucsive. The reasons are not difficult to describe. In the wake of 
World War II, the development of strong and often intansigent political attitudes at international level, has made 
progress towards the fulfilment of the purposes of the U.N.O. slow, tortuous and often disappointing. Further, as 
Benjamin B. Ferencz pointed out in 1981, 'it would be unreasonable to expect 154 sovereign states in vastly 
different stages of economic, social and political development to make an easy or quick transition from the law 
of force to the force of law. 49 
However, with the caveats stated above, the U.N.O. is no nearer today than it was in 1945 to reaching a solution 
of the politico-legal problems which are the aftermath of Nuremberg. Those problems include: 
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A mechanism for the quasi-enactment of binding canons of conduct in international relationships, 
expressed simply and unambiguously; 
The inclusion in such a code of a precise statement of the nature and scope of 'crimes against peace and 
an explicit expression of the concept of 'aggression'; 
The means whereby the proscriptions contained in an international law criminal code can be enforced 
with the same rigour as in national penal law. 
It is the writer's view that the United Nations Organisation, which operates with a restricted Charter, is not the 
appropriate body to initiate or continue discussions with a view to evolving a solution of the problems to which 
reference has been made. The problenls are neither solely political nor solely legal, but each of those elements is 
fundamental and overriding. 
The United Nations Organisation shows no inclination to alter its methodology or procedures; it is using old-
fashioned tools in its attempt to solve problems which are new in their intrinsic character, with nuclear warfare 
an ever-present threat. It is trite but accurate to repeat the observation often made that the Organisation needs 
more resolution and fewer resolutions. Moreover, with the International law Commission the focal organ for 
recommendations to the General Assembly, the political, as distinct from the legal, complications are not likely 
to be resolved by such a body. 
The consequence, it is submitted, is that the tool which has to be used to initiate and carry through the necessary 
discussions is statesmanship. The opportunity exists, in view of moderating Soviet attitudes, for the major 
Powers to create the catalyst for a standing forum outside the U.N.O. to identify the issues which need to be the 
subject of compromise and prepare an international agreement of binding force. Only if such statesmanship 
emerges is it likely that international criminal law will become a means of ensuring the peace and security of 
mankind. 
As long ago as September 1982, the Secretary-General of the U.N.O., Perez de Cuellar, in a periodic report 
on the work of the Organisation, acknowledged the '... underlying deficiencies of our present system'. 
He stated:5° 
... the lesson is clear -- something must be done, and urgently, to strengthen our international 
institutions and to adopt new and imaginative approaches to the prevention and resolution of conflicts. 
Failure to do so will exacerbate precisely that sense of insecurity which, recently, cast its shadow over 
the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Despite present difficulties, 
it is imperative for the United Nations to dispel that sense of insecurity through joint and agreed action 
in the field of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament. 
The Secretary-General expressed the view that -- 
... we now take the Charter far less seriously than did its authors, living as they did in the wake of a 
world tragedy. I . believe therefore that an important first step would be a conscious recommitment by 
Governments to the Charter. 
It seems appropriate to conclude this chapter by quoting the final words of the Secretary-General in his report: 
Member States will, I hope, understand if I end this report on a personal note. Last year I was appointed 
Secretary General of this Organization, which embodies the noblest hopes and aspirations of the peoples 
of the world and whose functions and aims under the Charter are certainly the important ever entrusted 
to an international institution. This year, time after time we have seen the Organization set aside or 
rebuffed, for this reason or for that, in situations in which it should, and could, have played an 
important and constructive role. I think this tendency is dangerous for the world community and 
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dangerous for the future. As one who has to play a highly public role in the Organization, I cannot 
disguise my deep anxiety at present trends, for I am absolutely convinced that the United Nations is 
indispensable in a world fraught with tension and peril. Institutions such as this are not built in a day. 
They require constant constructive work and fidelity to the principles on which they are based. 
We take the United Nations seriously when we desperately need it. I would urge that we also seriously 
consider the practical ways in which it should develop its capacity and be used as an essential institution 
in a stormy and uncertain world. 
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APPENDIX 1. 
DEFINITON OF AGGRESSION 
The General Assembly, 
Basing itself on the fact that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international 
peace and security and to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, 
and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, 
Recalling that the Security Council, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations, shall 
determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security, 
Recalling also the duty of States under the Charter to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in 
order not to endanger international peace, security and justice. 
Bearing in mind  that nothing in this Definition shall be interpreted as in any way affecting the scope of the 
provisions of the Charter with respect to the functions and powers of the organs of the United Nations, 
Considering also  that, since aggression is the most serious and dangerous form of the illegal use of force, being 
fraught, in the conditions created by the existence of all types of weapons of mass destruction, with the possible 
threat of a world conflict and all its catastrophic consequences, aggression should be defined at the present stage, 
Reaffirming the duty of States not to use armed force to deprive peoples of their right to self-determination, 
freedom and independence or to disrupt territorial integrity, 
Reafirraing also that the territory of a State shall not be violated by being the object, even temporarily, of 
military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State in contravention of the Charter and that 
it shall not be the object of acquisition by anothter State resulting from such measures or the threat thereof, 
Reaffirming also the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
Convinced that the adoption of a definition of aggression ought to have the effect of deterring a potential 
aggressor, would simplify the determination of acts of aggression and the implementation of measures to 
suppress them and would also facilitate the protection of the rights and lawful interests of, and the rendering of 
assistance to, the victim, 
Believing that, although the question whether an act of aggression has been committed must be considered in the 
light of all the circumstances of each particular case, it is nevertheless desirable to formulate basic principles as 
guidance for such determination, 
Adopts the following Definition of Aggression: 
Articlel  
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set 
out in this Definition. 
Explantory note: In this Definition the term "State": 
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(a) Is used without prejudice to questions of recognition or to whether a State is a Member of the United 
Nations; 
(b) Includes the concept of a "group of States" where appropriate. 
Article 2 
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence' of an 
act of aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity with the Charter, conclude that a 
determination that an act of aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light of other relevant 
circumstances, including the fact that the acts concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity. 
Article 3  
Any of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, subject to and in accordance with the 
provisions of article 2, qualify as an act of aggression: 
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military 
occupation, however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use of 
force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any 
weapons by a State against the territory of another State; 
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of another State; 
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces, or marine and air fleets of another 
State; 
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of another State with the agreement of 
the receiving State, in contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of 
their presence in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement; 
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the disposal of another State, to be 
used by that other State for perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out 
acts of armed force against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed above, or its 
substantial involvement therein. 
Article 4 
The acts enumerated above are not exhaustive and the Security Council may determine that other acts constitute 
aggression under the provisions of the Charter. 
Article 5 
1. No consideration of whatever nature, whether political, economic, military or otherwise, may serve as a 
justification for aggression. 
2: 	A war of aggression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives rise to international 
responsibility. 
3. 	No territorial acquisition or special advantage resulting from aggression is or shall be recognized as 
lawful. 
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Article 6  
Nothing in this definition shall be construed as in any way enlarging or diminishing the scope of the Charter, 
including its provisions concerning cases in which the use of force is lawful. 
Article 7 
Nothing in this Definition, and in particular article 3, could in any way prejudice the right to self-determination, 
freedom and independence, as derived from the Charter, of peoples forcibly deprived of that right and referred to in 
the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States 
in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly peoples under colonial and racist regimes or 
other forms of alien domination; nor the right of these peoples to struggle to that end and to seek and receive 
support, in accordance with the principles of the Charter and in conformity with the above-mentioned 
Declaration. 
Article 8 
In their interpretation and application the above provisions are interrelated and each provision should be construed 
in the context of the other provisions. 
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CIIAPTER 17 	TIIE CONCURRENCE AND TIIE DISSENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Before World War!! ended, public controversy began concerning the forthcoming trials of German war criminals in accordance 
with the declarations of the Allied and Associated Powers. The controversy continued during and after the trials at Nuremberg 
before the International Military Tribunal and it is still evident at the present time. 
Jurists of international reputation, academic specialists, scholars, historians and many others have found in the 'Nuremberg 
principles a fertile source of disputation as to the legal validity of the whole process. The disparate views cover a wide range 
of the essential aspects of "Nuremberg Law". They are summed up in the Introduction to Tutorow's modern, annotated 
bibliography and souce book (1986) in these terms: 
Much has been written on the justice and injustice of the various war crimes trials. Some critics have defended the 
need for such trials, but would have preferred tribunals consisting of members of neutral and vanquished nations 
as well as victors. Others deny the right of any nation to try soldiers or the industrial and political leaders of a 
defeated nation for the violation of what amounts to ex mg facto or non-existent laws, and they argue further that 
no laws defining war crimes existed until after World War II ... Staunch defenders of Allied trials could point to 
the farcical post-World War I Leipzig trials that resulted from allowing the trial of war criminals by domestic 
courts in Germany. 
This chapter contains brief resumes of the writings of well-known jurists, academics and lawyers, some of whom have 
affirmed, and others of whom have dissented from, the validity of 'Nuremberg Law'. Of necessity, the views of only a very 
small number on each side of the debate could be included in the chapter. It has not been considered appropriate, except in 
isolated cases, to include subsequent comment by those who appeared as individual counsel at Nuremberg, either for the 
prosecution or defence, or by individual members of the Tribunal (as distinct from the judgment of the Tribunal). The choice 
has been governed by both the reputation of the writers selected and by the desirability of referring to as many of the major 
areas of disputation as is practicable. 
In order to avoid repetition of the writer's statement of personal views in Chapter 18, no attempt has been made in this 
chapter to appraise the opinions expressed. 
In a consideration of the opposing views which have been publicly advanced concerning the validity, as a matter of 
international law, of the London agreement and Charter, it should be appreciated that for the most part they reflect the 
opinions of academic lawyers. Of course, many of those were eminent. Nevertheless there is a comparative dearth of material 
published by practising jurists and lawyers. The uneven distribution was necessarily resulted in the citation in this Chapter 
of a preponderance of references to the writings of academic specialists and a concentration on theoretical issues. However, to 
the extent to which the debate concerning 'Nuremberg Law' has involved theoretical issues, examples of both concurrence and 
dissent illustrate the uneven distribution. 
SECTION A - THE CONCURRENCE  
Oppenheim's International Law (7th edn.. ed. Lauterpacht) 
In the following statement of some of the essential views of Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, account has primarily been taken of the 
7th edition of Oppenheim's International Law. vol. IL Disputes. War and Neutrality,1952, as edited and substantially 
rewritten (with at times radical revision compared with the 6th edition (1944)) by Professor Lauterpacht. 2 
In the 7th edition of the cited work, it is stated with reference to the 1928 Pact of Paris: 
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The essence of a criminal act, as distinguished from a contractual or tortious wrong actionable at the instance of 
the injured party, is the fact that it injures, and is punishable by, the community at large. Nor are the seriousness, 
the destructiveness, and the heinousness of the act irrelevant to the question of the determination of its criminal 
character. Judged by these tests, the premeditated violation of the Pact of Paris constitutes an international crime. 
It is no longer a question of aggressive war in general, i.e. a war undertaken in violation of an express 
undertaking. It is a question of a war undertaken in breach of a fundamental treaty which has dethroned war as an 
international prerogative of the soverein State. 3 
It may not be easy to define the exact nature of the binding force, in the sphere of conventional International 
Law, of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal upon the States which signed it without formally 
accepting any obligations inter se, which adhered to it. or which participated in its affirmation by the General 
Assembly [of the United Nations Organisation]. However, International Law is not created by treaty alone. In so 
far as the instruments referral to above give expression to the views of the States concerned as to the applicable 
principles of International Law—applicable generally and not only as against the defeated enemies—they may be 
fairly treated as evidence of International Law and as binding upon them. In comparison the detailed formulation 
of these principles, however useful, must be deemed to be of secondary irnportance. 4 
In particular, Professor Lauterpacht expressly negated the proposition that the conferment of jurisdiction on the Nuremberg 
Tribunal with regard to crimes against the peace constituted an innovation in international law (i.e. the question whether 
recourse to aggressive war is criminal or merely unlawftil)'.4a 
Lord Wright 
Aided in reputation by his judicial eminence and the knowledge and experience gained as Chairman of the United Nations War 
Crimes Commission. Lord Wright was probably the foremost advocate in Britain of the legal validity and propriety of the 
London Agreement and Charter and of the subsequent Nuremberg Trial. 
Lord Wright first publicly expressed his views as a jurist in an article in January 1946, some eight months before the 
Nuremberg Tribunal delivered its judgment. 5 He asserted that the crimes charged in Counts 2, 3 and 4 of the indictment: 
... are not crimes because of the agreement of the four Governments, but that the Governments have scheduled 
them as coming under the jurisdiction of the Tribunal because they are already crimes by existing law. On any 
other assumption the Court would not be a Court of law but a manifestation of power. The principles which are 
declared in the Agreement are not laid down as an arbitrary direction to the Court but are intended to define, and 
do, in my opinion, accurately define what is the existing International Law on those matters. 
In the cited article, Lord Wright developed powerful arguments in support of the acceptance of the concept of crimes against 
peace (Count 2) as being contrary to the law of nations and criminal in essence. He put the argument on two bases: first, 
that the war was planned and totalitarian in character second, that a war of aggression is beyond any justification by reason 
of necessity or self defence and that its initiation is the accumulated evil of the whole. Therefore he concluded that the 
planning, preparation. initiation or waging of war of aggression was a crime against peace. 
Lord Wright recognised that the 'punishment of heads or other members of Governments or national leaders for complicity in 
the planning and initiating of aggressive or unjust war has not yet been enforced by a Court as a matter of International Law'. 
In this respect his primary argument was derived from the 1928 Pact of Paris. Thus: 
The concert of the nations evidenced by the Pact had the sanction of being embodied in a Treaty, the most formal 
testimony to its binding force. As a treaty or agreement it only bound the nations which were party to it. But it 
may be regarded from a different aspect. It is evidence of the acceptance by the civilized nations of the principle 
that war is an illegal thing. This, principle so accepted and evidenced, is entitled to rank as a rule of International 
Law. It may be that before the Pact the principle was simply a rule of morality, a rule of natural as contrasted 
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with positive law. The Pact, which is clear and specific, converts the moral rule into a positive rule comparable to 
the laws and customs of war, and like these laws and customs binding on individuals since the principle that 
individuals may be penally liable for particular breaches of International Law is now generally accepted. 
The thesis expounded in the cited article was consistently and vigorously asserted by Lord Wright at meetings of the United 
Nations War Crimes Commission and in its principal publication. History of U.N.W.C.C. 6 (See the Introductory Chapter, 
the author of which was Lord Wright). 
Mr Henry L. Stimson 
Very few national political leaders engaged in public discussion of 'Nuremberg Law' after the International Military Tribunal 
delivered its judgment and the United Nations Organisation formally endorsed the principles which it propounded. 
An exception was Mr. Henry L. Stimson, who described the trial as 'a landmark in the history of international law'. 7 As a 
former Secretary of War of the United States, Mr. Stimson had emerged as the principal political proponent of the concept of 
a formal trial, by an international tribunal, of major German war criminals. 8 Despite the strong criticism which his views 
attracted, he remained a respected figure in American politics. 9 
In the cited article, published in 1947, Mr. Stimson maintained his approach to the Nuremberg proceedings which he had 
advocated for some years: that is, justification of the London Agreement and Charter of 8 August 1945 and of the Nuremberg 
Judgment on a combination of moral philosophy and legal principles. He said: 1° 
International law is not a body of authoritative codes or statutes; it is the gradual expression, case by case, of the 
moral judgments of the civilized world. As such, it corresponds precisely to the common law of Anglo-American 
tradition. We can understand the law of Nuremberg only if we see it for what it is—a great new case in the book of 
international law, and not a formal enforcement of codified statutes. 
Mr. Stimson made the Pact of Paris of 1928 the cornerstone of his argument. In this respect, after a discussion of 
international developments between 1918 and 1945, he said: 11 
... the second World War brought it home to us that our repugnance to aggressive war was incomplete without a 
judgment of its leaders. What we had called a crime demanded punishment; what our law in balance with the 
universal moral judgment of mankind. The wickedness of aggression must be punished by a trial and judgment. 
This is what has been done at Nuremberg. 
Now this is a new judicial process, but it is not ex post facto law. 
Mr. Stirnson argued that the legal basis of 'Nuremberg Law was by analogy to the development of the common law: 12 
Al] case law grows by new decisions, and where those new decisions match the conscience of the community, 
they are law as truly as the law of murder. They do not become ex post facto law merely because until the first 
decision and punishment comes, a man's only warning that he offends is in the general sense and feeling of his 
fellow men. 
The charge of aggressive war is unsound, therefore, only if the community of nations did not believe in 1939 that 
aggressive war was an offense. Merely to make such a suggestion, however, is to discard it. Aggression is an 
offense, and we all know it; we have known it for a generation. It is an offense so deep and heinous that we 
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cannot endure its repetition. 
The law made effective by the trial at Nuremberg is righteous law long overdue. It is in just such cases as this 
one that the law becomes more nearly what Mr. Justice Holmes called it: the witness and external deposit of our 
moral life.. 
Mr. Stimson's stature was recognised by the International Military Tribunal in its Judgment (pages 39-40), in which it 
referred to his statement in 1932: 'War between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Treaty. This 
means that it has become throughout practically the entire world ... an illegal thing. Hereafter, when nations engage in armed 
conflict, either one or both of them must be termed violators of this general treaty law ... We denounce them as law breakers'. 
Academic views 
In this section. reference is made to the opinions of a number of academic international lawyers, all of whom have written 
extensively on 'Nuremberg Law". 
Professor R.K. Woetzel, writing in 1961 as Professor at New York and Fordham Universities, examined a number of 
criticisms of the assumption of jurisdiction in the London Agreement and Charter. 13 They included the breach of the so-called 
territoriality principle (the loci theory), the now discredited 'Acts of, State' doctrine and the claim that after 8 May 1945 
the status of the Allied Powers in Germany was that of beligerent occupation and their right to prosecute war criminals was 
restricted by Article 43 of the Hague Rules of Land Warfare. Another criticism discussed by Professor Woetzel related to the 
general character and the composition of the Tribunal. Professor Woetzel's conclusions were: 
... it must be concluded that the I.M.T. at Nuremberg was an international military tribunal with a firm basis in 
international law. It had a definite right to take jurisdiction over the German war leaders ... It is evident ... that 
international sanction constitutes the most important condition for the legal character and the legal basis of the 
Nuremberg trial. With it, the I.M.T. can certainly be regarded as an institution sanctioned under international law. 
In a survey of major legal developments in the period 1920 to 1945 relating to illegal war, aggressive war and aggression, 
Professor I. Brownlie placed primary emphasis on the Pact of Paris. He regarded the following recitals in the preamble as of 
'material interest': 14 
(The High Contracting Parties) Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an 
instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing 
between their peoples may be perpetuated: 
Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the 
result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall.hereafter seek to promote its 
national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty. 
Professor Brownlie continued: 15 
This instrument has been ratified or adhered to by sixty three states and is still in force. It contains no provision 
for renunciation or lapse. In order to bring the Pact into force between the countries of Eastern Europe, a Protocol 
with this object was signed at Moscow on 9 February 1929 by the U.S.S.R., Estonia, Latvia, Poland and 
Rumania. The treaty was of almost universal obligation since only four states in international society as it 
existed before the Second World War were not bound by its provision [Bolivia, El Salvador, Uruguay and 
Argentinaj. 
Nor did the treaty remain in isolation. It had considerable effects on state practice. In the years that followed 
numerous treaties were concluded which reaffunted the obligations of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and stated as one of 
their objects the desire to give more precision to those obligations. In the deliberations and public 
pronouncements of statesmen the Pact was treated as a factor in international affairs which was to be taken into 
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account. 
In the light of this defence of the legal significance of the Pact of Paris in establishing a positive tenet of recognised 
international law at the time of Nuremberg, Professor Brownlie categorically concluded: 16 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact provided a legal basis for the charges of crimes against peace contemplated at the 
London Conference on Military Trials and incorporated in the Charters of the International Military Tribunals at 
Nuremberg and Tokyo; and received emphasis in the examination of the law of the Charter undertaken by the 
Tribunal at Nuremberg. 
... [The Pact] at present stands together with the United Nations Charter as one of the two major sources of the 
norm limiting resort to force by states. It is parallel to and a complement of the Charter. 17 
In a monumental treatise on what the author described as the dynamics of disputes and war-law, published in 1954, Professor 
Julius Stone acknowledged that: 'as matters stood prior to vigorous development during and after the Second World War, rules 
of customary international Law (as distinct from particular treaties) did not directly establish or punish the criminality of 
individuals for breaches of the law of war'. 18 He further recognised that: 'the question of criminal sanctions against enemy 
individuals under international law itself emerged fully into controversy during the Second World War ... the openness of the 
Nazi leaders'aggressive intentions raised with new acuteness the question of responsibility for the infliction of the scourge of 
war on most of mankind.' 19 
Professor Stone expressed his view simply and directly in the following passage of the cited work: 
In the final resort, the trials, convictions and punishments under all the counts of the Nuremberg Charter have 
a technically sound legal basis in the powers of the victor States over the defeated German State and its soldiers, 
ministers and nationals, that State having unconditionally surrendered, and as to the count for violations of war-
law stricto sensu, it was also legally well based on the traditional right of each belligerent to try violators, 
regardless of nationality, in its own tribunals. 20 
Having acknowledged that the two principal objections which had been made to the Nuremberg proceedings were that they 
violated the maxim nulla poena sine leae and deprived the accused of the defence of the plea of superior orders, Professor 
Stone forthrightly stated: 
Even if it were assumed that there was a rule of international law which forbade retroactive criminal punishment 
in accordance with the maxim, then the question whether the Nuremberg trials contravened it would still have to 
be answered separately for each count. Therei however, no such rule of international law. Even municipal 
systems of law do not invariably have such a rule of law: the United Kingdom, for example, has no such rule, 
however strong may be the policy observed by its courts in the interpretation of criminal statutes. The question 
of general retroactivity of the Nuremberg counts must be regarded, therefore, as a question of substantial justice 
and policy, and not of law in the strict sense. The injustice involved is that of arbitrary changes in the legal 
consequences of men's acts after the acts occur, and in particular the punishment of acts the guilt of which the 
actor could not have known at the moment of commission. 21 
In Professor Stone's view it was the count of crimes against the peace which was nearest to a violation of the substantial 
policy against retroactivity. In this respect he stated: 
There was clearly no explicit rule of international law, or indeed of municipal law as at 1939, providing 
punishment for statesmen or military leaders who led their nations into aggressive war. Yet in terms of 
substantial policy ... the position is not so clear. For, since rules of treaty law did then exist which made illegal 
the kind of war planned and initiated by the defendants, it can scarcely be said that they were being punished for 
acts the guilt of which they could not have known when they committed them. The argument that there was no 
advance prescription of punishment is scarcely an argument of moral merit, in view of the serious nature of the 
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illegality. Still less can the principle of substantial justice underlying the policy against retroactivity be regarded 
as violated by the counts for war crimes stricto sensu, and for crimes against humanity.22 
In a separate discourse on the maxim milk  poena sine kge, Professor Stone considered the analogy between the development 
of customary rules of international law and the growth of the common law. He said: 
... the development of the criminal and other branches of law by precedent in common law systems necessarily 
involves the holding criminal of acts not clearly such when done. The maxim can scarcely be given legal force 
except by exhaustive authoritative advance statement of the criminal law, and the prohibition of judicial 
'interpretation thereafter. In those regards, international law resembles an uncodified common law system.... The 
Nuremberg trials now add an important judicial contribution to the pre-existing evidence of the growth by custom 
of an international criminal law.- (emphasis added) 
The views of Professor H-H Jescheck, of West Germany, have been included in this section of this chapter because of the 
scholarly and balanced manner in which he has presented them over the decades, against the background of his service in the 
Wehrmacht during World War II. 
Writing in the Encyclopedia of Public International Law in 1982, Professor Jesclleck said: 
The [Nuremberg] Tribunal conceived itself to be a duly constituted international court: in reality it was an 
interAllied occupation court, since Germany had not agreed to the creation of such an international entity. 24 
In respect of the twelve wars of aggression alleged in the indictment to have been waged by the German Reich, Professor 
Jescheck's comment was: 
Although at that time no definition for the international law concept of aggression existed, it must be conceded 
that, in almost all of the above cases, they were wars of aggression under any thinkable concept.25 
Professor Jescheck expressed the view that the resolution of affirmation by the United Nations General Assembly on 11 
December 1945 had the effect of 'mere approval of action taken by the Allied Powers against the former German leadership as 
the just and appropriate (under the circumstances) application of criminal law by the victors against the vanquished: 26 
The conclusion of Professor Jescheck in the cited article was: 
If a situation similar to that following World War II arises and war crimes trials are conducted again, authority 
would undoubtedly be sought primarily in the Nuremberg Judgments. The Nuremberg courts decided of necessity 
many quest:ions of law which are still debated; for that reason, their judgment roused ample criticism from all 
sides. It would, nevertheless, be unjust and beside the point to dismiss them as an expression of political bias or 
revenge. It is a milestone in the development of international law that such grave crimes as occurred in World War 
II were punished in 13 court judgments following trials in which the accused enjoyed the full right to a defence. 
Even though many crimes committed on the Allied side remained unatoned for and in some cases unjust sentences 
were pronounced as a result of human shortcomings, the example of Nuremberg is a landmark in the law when 
viewed as a whole. One only regrets that it has not been followed. The trials are slowly fading from memory and 
are thus losing their imperative force as precedents. 27 
In a lecture delivered before the Edinburgh University Law Faculty Society on 5 February, 1946, during the progress of the 
principal Nuremberg trial, Professor A.L. Goodhart, then Professor ofJurisprudence in the University of Oxford and editor of 
the Law Quarterly Review,28 asserted three essential elements in every legal trial: the judge, the law and the evidence. He 
examined the extent to which it could be said that those essential elements could be found in the International Military 
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Tribunal trial. 
Professor Goodhart rejected the argument that the members of the I.M.T.. because they were representatives of the victorious 
Allied Powers, lacked that impartiality which is an essential in all judicial procedure'. Such an argument, he said, 'ignores 
the fact that it runs counter to the administration of law in every country. He postulated three grounds upon which the 
Tribunal satisfied the essential element of fairness. First, the character of the judges; second, the fact that 'the trials are being 
conducted in the full glare of world publicity'; and third, the requirement in Article 26 of the London Charter that the Tribunal 
state the reasons on which its judgment as to the guilt or innocence of any defendant was based. His conclusion was that the 
first essential of a legal trial was satisfied. 29 
Without examining any of the detailed questions of evidence and procedure which arose al the trial, and basing his argument 
on the provisions of the Charter, including the authority of the Tribunal, under Article 13 of the Charter, to prescribe rules 
for its procedure, Professor Goodhart stated: 
It is clear ... that no question can ever be raised concerning the fairness of the rules of evidence and procedure 
administered the Nuremberg Tribunal. The second essential of a legal trial has therefore been satisfied. 3° 
Professor Goodhart examined two 'major questions' in determining the legal. as distinct from the political, justification for 
the I.M.T.; ' a) To what extent is the law in the Charter ex p facto in character? (b) In so far as it is ap facto can this 
departure from principle be justified?' He rejected Professor Oppenheim's view that international law could be applicable only 
to States and never to individuals: 
The correct conclusion ... is, I believe, that under International Law an individual can be under a legal duty not to 
commit certain international crimes, such as. for example, piracy or violations of the Hague and Geneva 
conventions. The fact that in the past there have been no international courts before which such crimes could be 
prosecuted does not negative the existence of such duties; it merely shows that the then existing machinery was 
defective. The creation of the International Military Tribunal has remedied this defect. 31 
Professor Goodhart acknowledged that it was still necessary to consider whether the crimes charged constituted crimes under 
international law at the time when they were allegedly committed. Basing his conclusion on historical developments 
culminating in the 1928 Pact of Paris, Professor Goodhart said: 
... the Nuremberg trials differ from all previous war trials because hitherto defendants have only been charged with 
crimes either committed by themselves or under their immediate directions. Never before has cold calculated 
brutality played a leading role in military strategy. This does not mean that there has been an innovation in the 
law, for all that has happened is that the law has been applied to novel circumstances. As Lord Jowitt, L.C. has 
said in the Joyce case:32 'It is not an extension of a penal law to apply its principle to circumstances unforeseen 
at the time of its enactment, so long as the case is fairly brought within its language.' There can therefore be no 
question that Count Three is in accord with the established princip]es of International Law. 
It was only in relation to Count 4 ('crimes against humanity') that Professor Goodhart had any reservation. Nevertheless, 
while conceding that Count 4 was, in a sense, ex post facto in character, he argued that to allow the perpetrator of such acts 
to get off scot-free because at the time when they were committed no adequate legal provision for dealing with them had been 
devised, is to turn what is a reasonable principle of justice in fully developed legal systems into an inflexible rule which 
would, in these circumstances, he in direct conflict with the very idea of justice on which it itself is based.' 
The conclusion of Professor Goodhart was that the first three counts were in accord not only with the charter of the 
International Military Tribunal but also with the existing international law, 'while the fourth count, although based on a 
novel international principle, was in accord with the principles found in every civilised system of law.' 
One of the most distinguished American international law scholars at the time of the I.M.T. trials was Professor Quincy 
Wright, of the University of Chicago. He had been, and continued to be, a prolific writer on the problems involved in 
'Nuremberg Law'. He was one of a number of assistants to the American representatives on the Tribunal. 
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As the end of World War II approached, Professor Wright wrote a monograph in which he discussed the legal principles 
relating to the punishment of war criminals. 33 His conclusion was that four systems of law —national law, the law of war, 
the law of peace and 'world law' — could be used to punish war criminals and that each basis of prosecution had some 
advantages and some disadvantages. However, he considered the fourth system, that is 'world law' was to be preferred. By 
'world law' he conveyed the concept of what he also termed 'universal law', which he compared with the older theory of piracy 
jut aentium. In anticipation, to a substantiial deeree, of the method of prosecution for which the London Agreement and 
Charter provided, Professor Wright stated: 
Prosecutions under universal law would have the disadvantage from the juridical point of resting upon a 
controversial legal foundation. Such trials would look towards the future rather than the immediate past but it is 
believed that sufficient legal materials exist to nullify the suggestion that they would rest upon ex ps:t facto law. 
Such trials would be the most satisfactory in reaching all the war criminals, in vindicating the rule of law, in 
deterring future war crimes, in satisfying demands for retribution, and in preventing further danger from the war 
criminals. Such trials would assert that the community of nations, which the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals seek to 
organize, already exists, and would demonstrate by acts louder than words that human rights can be vindicated and 
inhuman offenses can be punished. Without widespread convictions on these matters, sustained by firmer evidence 
than the contracts of governments, the general organization for peace and security is not likely to flourish. 
In a subsequent article, 34 Professor Wright expanded the expression of his views in the light of the judgment of the I.M.T. 
and the opinion of 'champions and critics' of the Nuremberg proceedings. In respose to the criticism that the I .M.T . had no 
jurisdiction in international law and that it applied ex wst facto law, he said : 
Legally belligerent states have habitually assumed jurisdiction to try in their own military commissions captured 
enemy persons accused of war crimes and to try in their own prize courts captured enemy and neutral vessels. All 
states in time of peace have assumed jurisdiction to try captured pirates in their own criminal courts and some 
states have extended the jurisdiction of such courts to other offense against the law of nations committed by 
aliens abroad.... In practice the legal competence of national criminal, military, and prize courts to try aliens for 
certain offenses against the law of nations committed outside the state's territory has not been questioned ... 
Sovereign states, it is true, cannot be subjected to a foreign jurisdiction without their consent, but no such 
principle applies to individuals. The Nuremberg Tribunal did not exercise jurisdiction over Germany but over 
certain German individuals accused of crimes.35 
Professor Wright rejected as irrelevant what he termed the equitable principle of 'clean hands': 
Whether or not statesmen or individuals of the United Nations have been guilty of any of the offenses for which the 
defendants were tried was not a question legally relevant to this trial: nor is it legally relevant to consider whether 
other persons who have not been indicted or who were not within the jurisidction of the Tribunal may have been 
guilty of the same offences. Unreasonable discrimination in initiating prosecution of persons probably liable 
under law would certainly not appear to be just and when the law applied is international law justice seems to call 
for a tribunal with jurisdiction over all persons subject to that law. Such justice, however, has never been realized. 
Courts applying international law have always had a more limited jurisdiction. It has not been considered 
unreasonable for the jurisdiction of national tribunals applying international criminal law to be limited to those 
whose acts were injurious to the state establishing the tribunal. 36 
In a comment on the I.M.T. 's judgment that The making of the Charter was the exercise of the sovereign legislative power 
by the countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered' and The Signatory Powers .. . have done together 
what any one of them might have done singly; for it is not to be doubted that any nation has the right thus to set up special 
courts to administer law', Professor Wright said: 
This statement suggests two distinct grounds of jurisdiction— that enjoyed by the four powers as the government 
of Germany and that enjoyed by any state to administer law. The latter statement is far from complete. 
International law does not permit states to administer criminal law over any defendant for any act. There are limits 
to the criminal jurisdiction of a state, Every state does, however, have authority to set up special courts to try 
any person within its custody who commits war crimes, at least if such offenses threaten its security. It is 
believed that this jurisdiction is broad enough to cover the jurisdiction given by the Charter. If each party to the 
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Charter could exercise such jurisdiction individually, they can agree to set up an international tribunal to exercise 
the jurisdiction jointly . The context of the Court's statement suggests that the Tribunal intended this limitation. 
37 
Professor Wright acknowledged that disagreement continued concerning the scope of the concept of offences against the law of 
nations. However, his view was that an analysis of general principles of international law and of criminal law suggested the 
following definition 'A crime against international law is an act committed with intent to violate a fundamental interest 
protected by international law or with knowledge that the act will probably violate such an interest, and which may not be 
adequately punished by the exercise of the normal criminal jurisdiction of any state'.38 
On the basic issue of the legal competence of the four principal Allied Powers to enact the terms of the Charter of the I.M.T., 
especially paragraph 6(a) of the Charter, Professor Wright expressed the view that 'there can be little doubt that international 
law had designated as crimes the acts so specified in the Charter lone before the acts charged against the defendants were 
committed:39 
It should be noted that in relation to the conspiracy charge, Professor Wright confined his analysis to the interpretation of the 
Tribunal. He did not criticise the inclusion of conspiracy in Count I of the indictment, either generally or, in particular, in 
respect of its juxtaposition to charges of actually committing the crimes contemplated by the alleged conspiracy. 
Professor Wright, who had been personally involved at a high level as an adviser to the American judges at Nuremberg, 
concluded in these terms. The world shattered by two world wars needs to have its confidence in law restored. Such 
confidence can only develop if people believe that formal law embodies justice and that it will be enforced. The Nuremberg 
trial is likely to contribute to both of these ends. The general opinion that aggressive war and mass massacre are crimes has 
been recognized in formal international law and that law has been sanctioned by trial and punishment of many of the guilty. 
Much remains to be done but opinion will be reassured that international law is neither esoteric nor helpless.' 
In one of the most logical and incisive answers to the critics of 'Nuremberg. Law', Professor Wright. in a subsequent article: 41 
debunked the assumptions of positivistic jurists at the time of the Nuremberg trials. He began his criticism of positivistic 
doctrine as applied to the London Charter by the following categorical statement: 
The favourite or unfavourable character of comments upon events related to intemat:ional law often depends less 
upon the nature of the events than upon the theory of international law assumed by the commentator. 
... Positivism tends to assume that the sovereign state is the only subject of international law; that it is under no 
obligation except those which it has accepted by valid agreement or clear acquiescence in a general custom: that 
such obligations are to be narrowly construed under the assumption that consent to qualifications of sovereignty 
cannot be assumed; and that consequently concrete obligations cannot be implied even from formal consent to 
general principles. 42 
Professor Wright continued his trenchant criticism of positivistic doctrine when he said: 
If it is said that the positivistic conceptions of international law express the reality of the present situation, it 
may be answered that the reality of a legal situation is in no small measure the product of the prevailing opinion 
about the nature of law. If general opinion throughout the world presumes that sovereign states are under no 
obligations except those they have explicitly accepted, then international relations will be little affected by a 
sense of legal obligation. It is for this reason that periods of jural positivism have been periods of jural 
pessimism, in which men see little hope of improvement through the law. Unless men believe in justice and 
the possibility of realizing it through law, there is not likely to be much either of justice or of law. 43 
Professor Wright concluded by stating: 
The Nuremberg Tribunal, in characterizing Germany's hostilities as aggression. manfested more than the prejudice 
of the victors. It manifested the overwhelming opinion of the world. In the last analysis, no better criterion can 
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be found for interpreting the justice and the legal effect of acts of state. 
The predominant opinion of the legal community must be the ultimate source of justice, at least if the thesis of 
democracy is accepted. In a world of transition, positivistic theories which hamper the adaptation of international 
law to international justice, as thus evidenced, can only bring law into contempt and promote a lawless struggle 
for survival.44 
Writing in September 1944, Professor Sheldon Glueck, Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology, Harvard University, 45 
adopted a positive and incisive attitude towards the punishment of Axis major war criminals. In many respects he 
foreshadowed the policies adopted in the London Agreement and Charter. His thesis was that 'Punishment of individual 
malefactors remains as the only deterrent and retributive remedy ... it is recourse against individual war criminals upon which 
the United Nations ought largely to rely. 
Professor Glueck argued: 
Because of the widespread murders and lootings of innocent civilians initiated by Germany in supplementing 
traditional warfare with ordinary crime as a politico-military policy, Germany and her satellites have given a new 
meaning to the concept of 'war criminals': and this broader definition should be used in proceedings against Axis 
malefactors. Such a modernized concept of war criminals embraces offenses and crimes cognizable under one or 
more of the following systems of law: international common (unwritten) law, international conventional (written) 
law, the criminal law of the vast majority of the civilized nations of the world. It includes among the implicated, 
not only Heads of States and leading military figures, but also responsible politicians, industrialists, bankers and 
others who have participated in a lawless nation's crirninalistic conspiracies and programs. 46 
Professor Glueck rejected any claim that might be made that the trial of Axis war criminals for crimes committed inside 
Germany and Japan would violate the territorial principle of jurisdiction and therefore be unjust. His arguments were that the 
territoriality of sovereignty depended on the existence of friendly relations between states at peace and that, in any event, 
many states had by legislation expanded the scope of their jurisdiction to include crimes against their nationals wherever 
committed. 47 
He advanced his thesis to the point at which he advocated the trial and punishment of the major war criminals 'under the 
solemn auspices of the entire civilized world'. This proposition involved the establishment of an International Criminal 
Court: 
Adequate law for use by an International Criminal Court now exists; and its enforcement by such a tribunal 
would violate no fundamental tenets of civilized justice. The law for an international tribunal can be drawn from 
the rich reservoirs of common and conventional law of nations and the principles, doctrines and standards of 
criminal law that constitute the common denominator of all civilized penal codes. 
Professor Glueck also argued, in anticipation of provisions in the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, that the defences of 
'acts of State' and 'superior orders' should not be available. 
Despite his strong denunciation of Axis criminality and his powerful arguments that the major war criminals should be 
charged before an International Court, Professor Glueck did not, in 1944. support a criminal charge of 'flagrantly violating 
solemn treaty obligations or conducting a war of aggression.' The view he then expressed was that the 1928 Pact of Paris 
'failed to make violations of its terms an international crime punishable either by national courts or some international 
tribunal'. Professor Glueck concluded, therefore, that 'the legal basis for prosecutions for violations of the Pact of Paris may 
be open to question. though the moral grounds are crystal clear'.48 It is apparent that in 1944 Professor Glueck was of the 
opinion that prosecution of what he termed the 'Axis chief malefactors should be focussed on 'violations of the laws and 
customs of legitimate warfare and of criminal law which they have committed during the course of the contlict.' 49 
Nevertheless. by May 1946 Professor Glueck had changed his opinion relating to aggressive war, which he expressed in a 
new book,5° the foreword of which. dated 1 May1946, was written by Mr. Jackson, then Chief of Counsel for the United 
States In the trials before the 1.M.T. which were then still in progress. The involvement of Professor Glueck in the 
negotiations leading to the London agreement and Charter and in the proceedings at Nuremberg is stated by Mr. Jackson in 
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the foreword.51 
In his 1946 work, Professor Glueck stated: 
The foregoing discussion justifies the conclusion, it is believed, that the waging of an aggressive war is not only 
unlawful but also criminal, and that there is nothing fundamentally 'retrospective' or unjust either in recognising 
this fact or in holding individual members of a Government personally liable for criminal acts committed in the 
name of the State. At the very worst, there is only formal retroactivity. If the Court at Nuremberg will decide it 
has jurisdiction to examine into the alleged exp facto nature of the Count charging individual Nazi leaders with 
the crime of aggressive war (something that may be doubtful in view of the fact that the organic Charter of the 
Court, its constitution, includes the crime in question among. crimes 'coming within the jurisdiction of the 
Tribunal for which there shall be individual responsibility'), it could legitimately be argued that not even formal 
retroactivity is involved. The rule of universal nonliability of members of a Government invested with absolute 
powers, for plotting and executing wholesale violations of both international law and the principles of criminal 
law common to all civilized peoples, is so contrary to reason and justice and so dangerous to the security of 
law-abiding peoples and to the very existence of law itself, that it must be regarded as extremely doubtful whether 
it ever was true law. 
The term 'ex post facto' is not a legal shibboleth; it ought not to be applied blindly and mechanically, but with 
reason and discretion, in the light both of its historic significance and of the realities of the modern situation. 52 
The change in the point of view expressed by Professor Glueck was acknowledged by Mr Francis Biddle, the senior American 
member of the I.M.T. 53 
SECTION B - THE DISSENT 
GERMAN VIEWS OF 'NUREMBERG LAW' 
It is a convenient starting point to examine the views of a number of German professors and lawyers, published collectively 
in 1955, as edited by Benton and Grimm. 54 Although the content of the work reflects in the main the typical arguments 
addressed by German defence counsel to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the approach of Wilboum E. Benton, the co -editor, in the 
Introductory Chapter was non-partisan. He wrote: 
After considering the pre-Nuremberg developments, as well as the Charter and Judgment of Nuremberg, one must 
conclude—so it seems to the author—that two significant innovations resulted from the War Crimes Trials: (1) The 
concept of the illegality of aggressive war was transformed into criminality, in the sense that penal sanctions may 
be applied against those who wage such a war. This was accomplished by assimilating 'crimes against peace with 
the violations of the laws of war in which the immunity of state representatives does not exist because such acts 
are considered criminal under international law. Such an expansion of the notion of the illegality of aggressive 
war indicates again the concurrent development of the concept with the rules of war, both developments 
furtherrestricting the sovereignty of nations in the international field. (2) This transformation, together with the 
new rule recognizing individual responsibility for the crime of war provided the connecting link between Article 
6a of the London Charter and the Kellogg Pact. Hence, the search for juridical techniques by which aggressive war 
may be outlawed and punishment assessed against those who wage such a war, as a part of the past is not 
something that we have left behind us it is ... something that moves along with us.' 
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Basic submission on behalf of all German defence counsel 
In 19 November 1945, before the pleas of the defendants were taken, Dr. Stallmer, counsel For the defendant Goering, filed a 
motion, on behalf of all Counsel for the defendants who were present, which involved a preliminary argument relating to the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal under the indictment. It is contained in Appendix I of this Chapter. Essentially, the argument 
was that the charge of 'crimes against peace' did 'not invoke existing international law' but was 'rather a proceeding pursuant 
to a new penal law, a penal law enacted only after the crime.' 
Reliance was placed on the ex post facto principle and the cognate maxim nullum crimen, nulla poena  in  lege. It was stated 
in the motion: 
... the Defense consider it their duty to point out at this juncture another peculiarity of this Trial which departs 
from the commonly recognized principles of modern jurisprudence. The Judges have been appointed exclusively 
by States which were the one party in this war. This one party to the proceeding is all in one: creator of the 
statute of the Tribunal and of the rules of law, prosecutor and judge. It used to be until now the common legal 
conception that this should not be so... 
The motion sought a direction by the Tribunal, 'in view of the variety and difficulty of these questions of law' that 'an 
opinion be submitted by internationally recognized authorities on international law on the legal elements of this Trial under 
the Charter of the Tribunal'. 
The Tribunal gave its ruling on the motion on 21 November 1945. The President said: 
A motion has been filed with the Tribunal and the Tribunal has given it consideration, and insofar as it may be a 
plea to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it conflicts with Article 3 of the Charter and will not be entertained. 
Insofar as it may contain other arguments which may be open to the defendants, they may be heard at a later 
stasze.55 
'The issues of ex post facto law and the nullum crimen sine le_ge maxim were the subject of extensivee argument later In the 
trial and were referred judgment of the Tribunal. 56 
It is significant from the viewpoint of the defence perception of the indictment, that no mention was made in the motion of 
the fact that a charge of conspiracy was woven into all four Counts of the indictment. 57 
Submission by Dr. Hermann Jahrreiss 
Dr. Hermann Jahrreiss, counsel for the defendant Jodi, made a restrained, but scholarly, statement to the Tribunal towards the 
end of the Nuremberg proceedings. Much of the statement was devoted to a consideration of the legal position of Hitler in 
relation to the people of Germany, in accordance with the 'Fuhrer Principle'. He concluded: 
I have already shown how, in the course of a gradual transformation which laid particular emphasis on legal 
forms, Hitler replaced all the highest authorities of the Weimar period' and combined all the highest competencies 
in his own person. His orders were law. 
The circumstances in a state can be such that the man who is legally the only one competent for the decision on 
war and peace, may have, in practice, no—or not the sole—authority. lf, however, both the sole legal competence 
and the sole authority in actual practice have ever been coincidental in any state, then such was the case in Hitler 
Germany. And if, in any question, Hitler did ever go as far as to accept the advice of a third party, then that was 
certainly not the case in the question of war or peace. He was the arbiter of war and peace between the Reich and 
other nations—he alone. 
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I conclude: Sentences against individuals for breach of the peace between states would be something completely 
new under the aspect of law, something revolutionarily new. It makes no difference whether we view the matter 
from the point of view of the British or the French chief prosecutors. 
Sentences against individuals for breach of the peace between states presuppose other laws than those in force 
when the actions laid before this Tribunal took place. 
The legal question of guilt—and I am here only concerned with that—is thus posed in its full complexity, for not 
one of defendants could have held even one of the two views of legal constitution on which the chief prosecutors 
base base their arguments. 58 
Address by Dr. H. Ehard to German Lawyers 
One of the most impressive expositions of the German legal viewpoint concerning 'Nuremberg Law' was that of Dr. Hans 
Ehard, Minister-President of Bavaria, in an address at a meeting of lawyers in Munich in 1947. 59 
Dr. Ehard not only stated the orthodox objections to the provisions of the London Agreement and Charter, but he went much 
further. Thus: 
Offenses were tried in Nuremberg which the entire German population feels merit the death penalty. These crimes 
would also have found their retribution by applying the penal codes in force in most nations, including Germany. 
It is also the conviction of the German people that the society of nations, if it wishes to survive in the age of the 
most terrible tools ' of destruction. may and must arm and secure itself against such crimes also with the weapons 
of law. In our evaluation of the Nuremberg trial we should not be misled by the unworthy wish for a milder 
judgment of the crime, but only by the desire for an ever-increased perfection of the law and the longing for the 
final and universal victory of law over might. 6° 
Dr. Ehard also went farther than most critics when he said of the 1928 Pact of Paris: 
This contractual renunciation of war as a tool of national politics implies, of course, that such a war is contrary 
to international law and that any nation which in spite thereof wages such a war commits a breach of contract. To 
this extent one must agree with the judgment. On the other hand, I do not find in the statements of the indictment 
and of the judgment any convincing proof for the further conclusion that after the treaty such a war was not only 
unlawful, but that those who plan such a war and wage it thereby commit a crime. In the treaty itself war is not 
designated as a crime and the renunciation is not reinforced by a sanction. It must be regretted that the treaty is a 
lex irnperfecta to this extent, but in my opinion this cannot be disputed. It certainly is not satisfactory from a 
moral point of view if, subsequent to the treaty, monstrous deeds such as the waging of a war of aggression may 
be considered unlawful but not as a punishable offence. But such imperfections are not infrequent in the 
development of law and they are not always avoidable. 61 
In the context of his address, it seems suprising that Dr. Ehard said: 
The Powers could have solemnly declared in the London Agreement that they consider the norms established in the 
Charter as generally binding for the community of nations. They have not done so. 62 [The author will argue that in 
fact this proposition was clearly implicit in the London Agreement and Charter] . 
Of the remaining contributions collected in the work of Benton and Grimm. none is outstanding. Some German counsel who 
appeared for defendants at Nuremberg repeated submissions which they had made to the Tribunal, but without advancing any 
new arguments concerning its jurisdiction.63 
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VIEWS OF JURISTS AND SCIIOLARS 
Among the vast number of jurists, scholars, lawyers and historians who have made contributions to the literature on 
'Nuremberg Law', one of the most prominent and prolific writers was Professor George Schwarzenberger, Professor of 
International Law in the University of London and Director of the London Institute of World Affairs. The views of Professor 
Schwarzenberger were crystallised in his two-volume work published in 1968.64 
On analysis, the views of Professor Schwarzenberger reflect a degree of ambivalence, in that his approach was not merely 
theoretical but also pragmatic. Professor Schwarzenberger was of the opinion that the Tribunal's case for the criminal 
character of aggressive war under International morality, before the Nuremberg Charter, stands and falls with the criminal 
character of breaches of the Kellogg Pact.'65 Schwarzenger's Interpretation of the Kellogg Pact followed orthodox lines: 
While it is self-understood that a breach of the Kellogg Pact is a breach of a treaty, and any breach of treaty 
constitutes an international tort, the further legal consequence attached to acts of aggression, that is, that they are 
crimes akin to war crimes in the strict sense, does not necessarily follow from the illegality of a breach of treaty. 
Whether this is so, or not, depends on the intention of those who have established such a consensual quasi-order. 
Actually, the Treaty itself strongly suggests the opposite conclusion ... it is expressly provided that a party to it 
which should employ war thereafter as an instrument of national policy 'should be denied the benefits furnished 
by this Treaty.' If so obvious a consequence of a breach of the Pact is stated in so many words, it is unlikely that 
one of such moment as the transformation of a breach of treaty into a war crime would have been merely implied 
if the parties had desired to make breaches of the Treaty a criminal offence. 
The Nuremberg Tribunal was too easily prepared to read into the Pact such a change in attitude. 66 
That reasoning led Schwarzenberger to conclude that the law which the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals applied in respect of 
aggressive war was that laid down in their Charters, and as such ex post facto law. 
However, Schwarzenbereer's pragmatic rationalisation was apparent in his concluding observation on the point: 
To deal fairly with the accused before the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, it would have sufficed, and would 
probably have been preferable. to state that men who had broken international laws as indiscriminately as the 
totalitarian aggressors had become international outlaws. Thus, whatever law was applied to them, this was done, 
not because they were entitled to its protection, but because the victors considered that they owed it to themselves 
as civilised nations to apply to the accused the law laid down in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters.° 
In relation to crimes against humanity, Schwarzenberger expressed a similar view which embodied both theoretical and 
pragmatic elements. He rejected any argument that the provisions in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters were declaratory of 
international customary law, but qualified his criticism by stating: 
All the four Powers intended to do was, under the heading of crimes against humanity, to deal retrospectively 
with particularly ugly facets of the relapse of two formerly civilised nations into a state of barbarism. 68 
On the concept of conspiracy, Schwaaenberger said: 
While it is possible to justify the policies behind the conspiracy clauses, these clauses were as much innovations 
in 1945 international law as those relating to crimes against peace and humanity. 69 
Schwarzenberger was restrained in his treatment of the provisions of the London Charter concerning criminal organisations. 
Two citations illustrate his fundamental opinions: 
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To assess fairly Articles 9 and 10 of the Nuremberg Charter, it is necessary to bear in mind the mass character of 
the crimes committed by those associated with the Nazi system and the apocalyptic depths to which its leaders 
and followers had sunk. 
In the face of bestiality organised on so colossal a scale, the care taken by the Nuremberg Tribunal in trying to 
make sure that, over and above the safeguards laid down in the Nuremberg Charter, those most guilty should be 
separated from the less guilty members of these criminal organisations was a remarkable achievement. 70 
Schwarzenberger reached the crux of his thesis when he wrote: 
Crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, conspiracies to commit any type of war crime, and the 
declaration of organisations to be criminal were innovations introduced into international law by the Charters of 
Nuremberg and Tokyo. 
The manner in which the two international Tribunals attempted to dispose of this defence is indicative of their 
uneasiness on this point In order to see the issue in a proper perspective, it is necessary to keep in mind the root 
and meaning of war crimes jurisdiction. Its root is reprisal and its meaning is authority, on this basis, and, 
therefore, by international law, to exercise an extraordinary form of State jurisdiction. To describe war crimes as if 
they were based on rules of a substantive international criminal law merely leads to confusion. 
The real problem is whether the victors were entitled to extend -as they did their policies of reprisal. and, for this 
purpose, ignore the tenet of legal policy [emphasis added in original] that it is advisable to avoid retrospective 
legislation.71 
It is apparent from the cited passages (including the observations in footnote 71) that Professor Schwarzenberger should be 
treated in a category of his own. He conceded, as a matter of strict legal analysis, that many of the arguments which had been 
advanced against the validity of 'Nuremberg Law', insofar as established international customary law was concerned, were 
technically correct, but he refused to deny the right of the victorious Powers to deal with the Nazi fiends in the manner in 
which they did. 
The principal purpose of the work published in 1951 by Viscount Maugham, formerly Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, was, 
as he stated in the Preface, 'to establish the principle, contrary to the view recently accepted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations, that in any future war followed by trials and punishment of war criminals the only persons who can justly or 
fairly be tried and convicted are those who are proved to have been guilty of the violation of "the laws and usages of war". 72 
Viscount Maugham also stated that 'the gravest mistake in the Charter was in making participation in an aggressive war or a 
war in breach of treaties a terrible crime .. . In doing so it lumped together in the same general condemnation those deemed 
to be the real author or authors of the war ... with the hordes of Germans of all sorts and kinds ... 73In fact, the London 
Agreement and Charter stated that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was referable to the major war criminals of the European 
Axis. 74 
Viscount Maugham's criticism of 'Nuremberg Law' was most trenchant in respect of the prescription in the London Charter 
of 'crimes against peace : 
... if punishment of statesmen, soldiers, sailors and airmen is to be rested on the allegation that they have 
participated in aggressive war, there must certainly be an independent and unprejudiced Tribunal to decide the 
intricate questions of a political nature which will arise. 75 
Viscount Maugham stigmatised as 'flagrantly unjust the provisions of Article 7 (heads of state) and Article 8 (the defence of 
superior orders).76 
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The views of Viscount Maugham may be judged against the opinions he expressed concerning 'the exercise of ... sovereign 
legislative power by the countries to which the German Reich had unconditionally sun -endered; and the undoubted right of 
those countries to legislate for the occupied territories had been recognised by the civilised world'.77 Viscount . Maueham 
then stated: 
So far there is, I think, no doubt from the point of view of law, whatever may be said against the Charter from 
the standpoint of justice or policy. But the judgment continued The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power 
on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the Tribunal ... it is the expression of international law 
existing at the time of its creation; and to that extent is itself a contribution to international law'. This sentence 
in my respectful opinion was erroneous. The Charter, as we have seen, was not intended or designed to express 
international law. Nor could four nations or four judges from those nations create a rule of international law 
which had never previously been published to the world or aueed to by the concert of Nations. 78 
Viscount Maueham acknowledged: 
Complete sovereignty does not pass except in the case of debellation, but temporary legislative power does pass 
to the occupying powers. It comes to an end with the occupation. 79 
As a sequence to his discussion of the Pact of Paris. Viscount Maugham stated: 
The alleged code of crimes contained in Article 6, sub-clause (a) could not have existed before the Paris Pact of 
1928, since, as above stated, before that treaty all wars were regarded as permissible. There have been since 1928 
plenty of legal reports, publications and meetings concerned with international law. There is no trace of a new 
rule of that law bringing into force as a provision of that law so vital a sanction as is now under consideration. 
As regards the actual trial at Nuremberg it is sufficient to say that no one has ever explained how, except as an 
Act of State, a military court could be set up in a foreign country, consisting of foreign Judges, appointed to try 
foreigners in their own land for committing crimes under a new system of law. This does not resemble a rule of 
international law as hitherto accepted by the nations. 8° 
One of the most consistent and vocal critics of the British war crimes trials policy and the actual conduct of the trials in 
accordance with 'Nuremberg Law', was Lord Hankey, a prominent British statesman and a member of the British Cabinet 
during World War II. He expressed his views in a number of speeches in the House of Lords. In 1950 he published a 
monograph, Politics Trials and Errors,81 in which he critically examined the policies and practice relating to the Nuremberg 
principal trial essentially from a political viewpoint. However, he did state his opinion on some of the legal issues which 
was consonant with that of Viscount Maugham, to whose work (m gjL  sutra) he contributed a postscript. 
His strongest criticism was directed at the provisions of the London Charter relating to crimes against peace, and the 
impracticability of defining a 'war of aggression'. in the light of history. He wrote: 
... for centuries past and in recent times, certainly during the war, technical aggressions have been committed by 
most of the prinicipal allied European Powers. The Western Powers did not hesitate to ally themselves with an 
Eastern Power whose aggressions had been flagrant, recent and on a large scale. In spite of that the German 
political and military Leaders were singled out to be put on trial for their own aggressions and were not even 
allowed to make the point in their defence that their enemies had been doing the same thing right up to the date of 
the trial 'as evidence of a general practice accepted by Law' (Art. 38, 1 (b) of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice). Moreoever, they were tried on a crime created by an ex mat facto law drafted by the Victors for this 
particular Trial of the Vanquished. Yet, the Germans, and we ourselves, and all posterity are expected to accept 
that as a fair tria1. 82 
The focus of much of Lord Hankey's criticism was the fact that the Allied Powers had insisted on the unconditional surrender 
of the German Reich (see Chapter 18). He asserted that English History appears to record no case of a demand for 
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'unconditional surrender' before 1943, and that fifteen major wars since the end of the sixteenth century, on examination, 
supported this assertion. He cited part of a speech delivered to the House of Commons by the British Prime Minister, Mr. 
Churchill: 
Unconditional Surrender means that the victors have a free hand. It does not mean that they are entitled to behave 
in a barbarous manner, nor that they wish to blot out Germany from among the nations of Europe. If we are 
bound, we are bound by our own consciences to civilization. We are not to be bound as the result of a bargain 
struck. That is the meaning of 'Unconditional Surrender'. 83 
Lord Henkey's view was that the Allied Powers had not analysed with any precision what they meant by 'unconditional 
surrender' and that fact vitiated the establishment of a Tribunal composed of representatives of the vivictors to try only the 
vanquished. 
For many years after the end of the war, Lord Hankey was a vigorous advocate of the abandonment of any further war crimes 
trials. Quoting from a speech he had made in the House of Lords, he said: 84 
... I cannot see that we gained anything by the Nuremberg trials, and I shall seek to show ... that we have gained 
nothing from the Tokyo trials.... The most urgent thing is to bring all these trials to an end, and if other nations 
will not agree, to decline any further British co-operation. We must not be too mealy-mouthed about it. It is four 
years after the war. 
One of the most succinct published contemporary criticisms of 'Nuremberg Law was that of J.H. Morgan, K.C., Professor 
Emeritus of Constitutional Law in the University of London, formerly British Deputy Adjutant-General and Vice-Chairman 
of the British Government War Crimes' Committee of 1918-1919 (commonly known as the 'Birkenhead Committee'), as 
well as being the Chairman of that Committee's Sub-Committee on Law. His work, The Great Assize is referred to supra 
in Chapter 11 in a limited context.85 
Professor Morgan did not question the correctness in law of Count 3 of the Nuremberg indictment. He acknowledged that 
offences against the laws and customs of war, whether or not the law was 'aggressive, had for long been established as an 
integral part of international law and that the categories thereof had been expressly prescribed in the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907. He therefore regarded Count 3 as 'unimpeachable'. 86 
Count 4 (crimes against humanity), with its wide focus on 'inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before 
or during the war, or prosecutions on political, racial. or religious grounds, in execution of or in connection with any 
Crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whetheror not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated' (Article 6(c) of the Charter), was described by Professor Morgan as 'a new offence, previously unknown to 
International Law': 
I know of no authority in law at all for the rubric 'crimes against humanity, and it is significant that the 
Nuremberg Court made no attempt to find one. 87 
Proressor Morgan also was critical of the drafting of Count 4, particularly the pleading in which reference was made 
to 'violations of ... the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilised nations'. 
He argued: 
I do not quite know how the violation of 'a principle' can be called a crime.... Still less do I know what 
general principles can be 'derived' from the criminal law of all 'civilised' nations.88,89 
With regard to Count 2 of the indictment (paragraph 6(a) of the Charter), Professor Morgan's view was that the defendants 
were charged with something which hitherto had defied all definition in International Law and which ... had never been made 
a "crime" in International Law at all.' His conclusion was: 
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Aggressive war will never be a crime in law until the legislature of this country, to say nothing of other 
countries, enacts a statute giving effect to the pious words of the Pact of Paris. No legislature, not even 
the American Congress, has ever done this nor is it likely to do 
Professor Morgan was particularly trenchant in his criticism of the conspiracy Count, principally because '... for the first 
time in history, military court, deriving its jurisdiction from the fact of war, was invested with jurisdiction by the Charter to 
try the accused for alleged offences committed in time of peace extending back to six years before the outbreak of war' 
(emphasis added in the original).91 
The concluding overall view of Professor Morgan was: 
... it appears to me that the Counts of Conspiracy, of 'Aggresive War', and of Crimes against Humanity had 
better never have been framed at all. They were, indeed, as gratuitous as they were unprecedented, for in the case 
of all but two of the defendants who were convicted those defendants were also convicted on what I have called the 
one invulnerable Count of 'War Crimes'. As regards that particular Count, not only the law but the evidence was 
unimpeachable and indeed overwhelming. 
A critical approach, similar in substance to that of Professor Morgan, was taken by Professor G.A. Finch, Editor-in-Chief of 
the American Journal of International Law, and a frequent contributor to that Journal. 
In an analysis of the London Charter, Professor Finch defended the manner in which the International Military Tribunal was 
constituted. His comment on Counts 3 and 4 of the Indictment was brief but incisive: 
No substantial objection lies to the trial of [crimes in violation of the laws and customs of war], to the judgment, 
or to the execution of the sentences. The laws and customs of war, including those of military occupation, are 
well established in international law. They are enacted in national legislation. codified in military manuals, 
incorporated in binding international conventions, and affirmed by the immemorial practice of states, thus 
becoming a part of the common law of war. It is accepted international law, conventional as well as customary, 
that a belligerent has authority to try and punish individuals for crimes which constitute violations of the laws 
and customs of war, as well as the laws of humanity, when such persons fall within his power. (emphasis added) 
We therefore conclude that no question of ex post facto legislation or punishment was involved in the proceedings 
at Nuremberg on Count 3 of the indictment, and they were legally adapted to the vindication of accepted principles 
of international law.93 
Professor Finch supported the strict legality of Count 4 (crimes against humanity) and argued that in cases in which crimes 
against humanity were not justiciable, for whatever reason, as war crimes, the governments of the Allied Powers 
nevertheless had jurisdiction to punish those who had committed crimes against humanity. This right arose from the fact that 
the Allied Powers held sovereignty over the State of Germany in their position as a condominium of occupying Powers. 
At this stage in his analysis, Professor Finch moved to a different view concerning the London Charter. He criticised the 
inclusion of provisions relating to crimes against humanity committed before the war, on the basis that 'there is no rule of 
international law, customary or conventional, by which such acts committed before the commencement of hostilities can be 
punished by the subsequent military occupants.94 
The conclusion of Professor Finch was: 
Had the indictment ended here, the trials and judgment would rest upon solid legal principles and practice. 
Conviction upon additional charges of doubtful legal validity added nothing to the satisfaction of retributive 
justice already meted out on Counts 3 and 4. Its contribution to the strengthening of international law is limited 
to an unprecedented decision by a military tribunal of the victors, trying captured enemies which it is hoped will 
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institute a new custom establishing the juridical principle that aggressive war-making is illegal and criminal. 95 
In a criticism of Counts 1 and 2 jointly, Professor Finch said: 
We are not urging the untenable proposition that all criminals of a class must be punished, or none at all; nor do 
we overlook the lack of jurisdiction by the Nuremberg Tribunal under its Charter to try and punish anybody but 
enemy nationals. Our criticisms are directed to the retroactive effect of the dictum of the Tribunal that certain acts 
not treated as criminal by the prosecuting governments at the time they took place were subsequently transformed 
into crimes or conspiracies against peace for which ex post facto punishment is now legally justifiable. 96 
The principal basis for the cited criticism was that both the terms of the Pact of Paris and the history of the official attitude 
of the United States Government towards its interpretation made it 'impossible to accept the thesis of the Tribunal that a war 
in violation of the Pact was illegal on 1 September 1939.' 97 
It follows from the expressed views of Professor Finch that he considered that the terms of the London Charter, and therefore 
the Counts in the indictment, should have been limited to war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
The writer has included Judge Bert V.A. Roling among those who publicly dissented from the validity of the jurisdictional 
basis for the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters primarily because of his dissenting judgment in the I.M.T.F.E. proceedings and 
also because of the balanced and rational views he expressed some twenty five years later. 98 
Critical though it was from a broad juridical viewpoint, Judge Roling's assessment in 1973 was realistic. In a discussion of 
what he termed the 'introduction of the concept of the crime against humanity, formulated in view of German behaviour 
toward German Jews', he .stated: 
Persecution of a group of people, on the basis of race or religion, in occupied territory would already have been 
covered by the concept of the conventional war crimes [but not those committed before a state of war existed]. 
Consequently, in most cases the indictment for crimes against humanity amounted only to a charge of qualified 
war crimes, committed on a large scale, on the ground of a specific policy. German atrocities against German 
Jews compelled the Allies to prosecute for a specific internal policy [emphasis added]. This amounted to a new 
concept of the place of the national state, of the individual within his national state, and of the role of humanity 
as a guardian of a minimum standard of state decency. The Genocide Convention, 1948, has consolidated this new 
concept, and has recognized its validity in peace and in war.99 
In relation to crimes against peace, Judge Roling approved the observation of Max Radin: 
It is impossible to determine, with certainty whether public opinion at the present time supports the doctrine of 
individual guilt for crimes against peace. The impossibility is due to the fact that the three types of crimes 
[excluding conspiracy] are inevitably fused in the public mind by being combined in a single trial. To regret any 
one of the three creates the impression of defending men whose vicious actions seem to place their guilt beyond 
the reach of any sort of clemency. 100 
The realism of Judge Roling's appraisal in 1973 is clear from the following extract: 
The political reasons for having a trial in which Germans would be tried for the crime against peace are very clear. 
The U.S. Government had acted on the assumption that launching any attack on the peace was an international 
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crime, and it wanted to prove by charter and judgment that launching a war of aggression constituted a criminal 
violation of the law of nations. It is beyond doubt that before World War II there had been no question of 
individual criminal responsibility for a violation of the Kellogg-Briand pact. Neither this treaty nor the 
resolutions of the League of Nations or the abortive treaties in which it was stated that aggressive war was an 
international crime had the effect of creating international criminal law. 
It is at this moment a practically undisputed thesis that before World War II positive international law did not 
recognize, the crime of aggressive war for which individuals could be punished. No wonder that the U.N. War 
Crimes Commission did not consider aggressive war an international crime. 101 
CONCLUSION 
The examples, derived from the massive literature on the subject, which have been given in this Chapter, illustrate the very 
wide and fundamental differences of opinion among both contemporary and more modern writers on 'Nuremberg Law'. The 
disparity is probably most starkly revealed by a comparison between the Judgment of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the 
'Dissentient Judgment' of Judge Pal, the representative of India on the Tokyo Tribunal. 
In its Judgment, the Nuremberg Tribunal stated: 
The Charter is not an arbitrary exercise of power on the part of the victorious nations, but in the view of the 
Tribunal, as will be shown, it is the expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; and to 
that extent is itself a contribution to international law. 
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy necessarily 
involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who plan and wage such a 
war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so doing. 
To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an international crime; it is the supreme international crime 
differing only from other war crimes in that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole. 102 
The dissenting judgment of Judge Pal was contained in 1,049 pages. He discussed the opinions of a number of prominent 
jurists, and stated 
After giving my anxious and careful consideration to the reasons given by the prosecution as also to the opinions 
of the various authorities I have arrived at the conclusion: 
1. That no category of war became criminal or illegal in international life; 
2. That the individuals comprising the government and functioning as agents of that government incur no 
criminal responsibility in international law for the acts alleged; 
3. That the international community has not yet reached a stage which would make it expedient to include 
judicial process for condemning and punishing either states or individuals. 
On the basis of his reasoning, Judge Pal was of the view that all the defendants should be found guilty of all charges in the 
indictment. 
In the words of Judge Boling, 'it is indeed a real contrast: the supreme international crime, in the opinion of Nuremberg and 
the majority Tokyo judgment—no crime at all according to the dissenting opinion ofJudge Pal.'103 
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APPENDIX I MOTION ADOPTED BY ALL DEFENCE COUNSEL 
Two frightful world wars and the violent collisions by which peace among the States was violated during the period between 
these enormous and world embracing conflicts caused the tortured peoples to realize that a true order among the States is not 
possible as long as such State. by virtue of its sovereignty, has the right to wage war at any time and for any purpose. 
During the last decades public opinion in the world 'challenged with ever increasing emphasis the thesis that the decision of 
waging war is beyond good and evil. A distinction is being made between just and unjust wars and it is asked that the 
Community of States call to account the State which wages an unjust war and deny it, should it be victorious, the fruits of 
its outrage. More than that, it is demanded that not only should the guilty State be condemned and its liability be established, 
but that furthermore those men who are responsible for unleashing the unjust war be tried and sentenced by an International 
Tribunal. In that respect one goes now-a-days further than even the strictest jurists since the early Middle Ages. This thought 
is at the basis of the first three counts of the Indictment which have been put forward in this Trial, to wit, the Indictment for 
Crimes against Peace. Humanity insists that this idea should in the future be more than a demand, that it should be valid 
international law. 
However, today it is not as yet valid international law. Neither in the statute of the league of Nations, world organization 
against war, nor in the Kellog-Briand Pact, nor in any other of the treaties which were concluded after 1918 in that first 
upsurge of attempts to ban aggressive warfare, has this idea been realized. But above all the practice of the Legue of Nations 
has, up to the very recent past, been quite unambiguous in that regard. On several occasions the League had to decide upon 
the lawfulness or unlawfulness of action by force of one member against another member, but it always condemned such 
action by force merely as a violation of international law by the State, and never thought of bringing up for trial the 
statesmen, generals, and industrialists of the state which recurred to force. And when the new organization for world peace was 
set up last summer in San Francisco, no new legal maxim was created under which an international tribunal would inflict 
punishment upon those who unleashed an unjust war. The present Trial can, therefore, as far as Crimes against Peace shall be 
avenged, not invoke existing international law, it is rather a proceeding pursuant to a new penal law, a penal law enacted only 
after the crime. This is repugnant to a principle of jurisprudence sacred to the civilized world, the partial violation of which 
by Hitler's Germany has been vehemently discountenanced outside and inside the Reich. This principle is to the effect that 
only he can be punished who offended against a law in existence at the time of the commission of the act and imposing a 
penalty. This maxim is one of the great fundamental principles of the political systems of the Signatories of the Charter of 
this Tribunal themselves, to wit, of England since the Middle Ages, of the United States since their creation, of France since 
its great revolution, and the Soviet Union. And recently when the Control Council for Germany enacted a law to assure the 
return to a just administration of penal law in Germany, it decreed in the first place the restoration of the maxim, "No 
punishment without a penal law in force at the time of the commission of the act." This maxim is precisely not a rule of 
expediency but it derives from the recognition of the fact that any defendant must needs consider himself unjustly treated if he 
is punished under an ex post facto law. 
The Defense of all defendants would be neglectful of their duty if they acquiesced silently in a deviation from existing 
international law and in disregard of a commonly recognized principle of modern penal jurisprudence and if they suppressed 
doubts which are openly expressed today outside Germany, all the more so as it is the unanimous conviction of the Defense 
that this Trial could serve in a high degree the progress of world order even if, nay in the very instance where it did not depart 
from existing international law. Wherever the Indictment charges acts which were not punishable at the time the Tribunal 
would have to confine itself to a thorough examination and findings as to what acts were committed, for which purposes the 
Defense would cooperate to the best of their ability as true assistants of the Court. Under the impact of these findings, of the 
Tribunal the States of the international legal community would then create a new law under which those who in the future 
would be guilty of starting an unjust war would be threatened with punishment by an international Tribunal. 
The Defensese are also of the opinion that other principles of a penal chatter contained in the Charter are in contradiction with 
the maxim, "Nulla Poena Sine Leg,e". 
Finally, the Defense consider it their duty to point out at this juncture another peculiarity of this Trial which departs from the 
commonly recognized principles of modern jurisprudence. The Judges have been appointed exclusively by States which were 
the one party in this war. This one party to the proceeding is all in one creator of the statute of the Tribunal and of the rules 
of law, prosecutor and judge. It used to be until now the common legal conception that this should not be so; just as the 
United States of America. as the champion for the institution of international arbitration and jurisdiction, always demanded 
that neutrals, or neutrals and representatives of all parties, should be called to the Bench. This principle has been realized in an 
exemplary manner in the case of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague. 
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In view of the variety and difficulty of these questions of law the Defense hereby pray: 
That the Tribunal direct that an opinion be submitted by internationally recognized authorities on international law on the 
legal elements of this Trial under the Charter of the Tribunal. 
On behalf of the attorneys for all defendants who are present. 
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CHAPTER 18 
	
CONCLUSIONS ON TILE NUREMBERG PROCESS 
INTRODUCTION 
It is noteworthy that in the judgments delivered in the thirteen separate trials at Nuremberg, the judges placed 
little, if any, emphasis on the divergent views which were the product of contrasting philosophies in a formal 
jurisprudential sense.' The prime reason for this refusal to canvass jurisprudential concepts in the field of 
international criminal law was, no doubt. that the judges uniformly determined that the law of the Nuremberg and 
Tokyo Charters was 'decisive and binding' upon them. 
The evaluation of the Nuremberg process by international law scholars has been substantially based upon their 
adherence to a specific legal philosophy I agree with the observation of Professor Quincy Wright that 'the 
favourable or unfavourable character of comments upon events related to international law often depends less 
upon the nature of the events than upon the theory of international law assumed by the commentator'. 2 The 
disparity in academic views is illustrated by the statistical analysis of Professor Bosch. 3 
A subsidiary paradox was injected into the academic debate in 1950 by the claim of Professor Schwarzenberger 
that "International Law has not yet evolved a branch of criminal law of its own."4 
Irrespective of the controversy concerning the existence of an international criminal law and the difficulty of 
'establishing its content in a given case', it is the view of Professor Jesheck that: 
... a state and its citizens do not exist in and for themselves, but instead are organised in manifold ways 
into an international community of nations. Accordingly, the domestic criminal law of states is not 
concerned exclusively with internal events, but rather often produces effects reaching beyond its own 
national borders and the citizens of its own state. That the international community of nations itself 
could possess its own criminal power, from which an international law in turn could be developed, is 
also an idea one cannot dispute.5 
It is instructive to recall the words of Professor Glueck, several months before the unconditional surrender of 
Germany, concerning the complexity of the issues which required speedy resolution: 
With victory in sight, not the least perplexing question that will present itself to the United Nations 
is: What shall be done with the Nazi-Fascist war criminals? 
The problems involved in answering this question are enormously complex. A rational and civilized 
approach to the issues presented must entail consideration of puzzling tangles of international 
and municipal law; of military and non-military law; of public policy on both national and 
international planes; of criminology and penology; of social psychology and social ethics.6 
Lord Wright was particularly scathing in the following extract from his Introductory Chapter to the History 
of the United Nations War Crimes Commission: 
One of the troubles of arriving at a definition of international law rules is that writers in their study, 
often removed from the realities of life, have expressed so many diverse views, which cannot be 
reconciled at all; hut international law does not depend upon the irresponsible views of theoretical 
writers. It is to be found rather in international declarations, conventions, treaties, and practices of the 
nations, to say nothing of the moral consensus of human beings in the world, and the decisions of 
competent courts.7 
In any consideration of the validity of 'Nuremberg 1.2w', it is essential to draw a distinction between just and 
unjust wars. This theme will.be  examined later in this Chapter. It is a theme which has often been ignored by 
the critics of the Nuremberg process, because the recognition of the distinction reveals a fundamental flaw in the 
application of positivistic tenets to the solution of what was truly a legal, political and moral dilemma of 
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unexampled complexity and dimension in world history. 
No useful purpose would be served by concluding the essential thesis of this study by merely adopting any of 
the divergent views which have been expressed concerning the legal validity of 'Nuremberg Law'. The content 
of some of the previous Chapters, as well as the citations above in this Chapter, demonstrate the impossibility 
of any reconciliation between those views. The author is not prepared to embrace any of the opposed opinions 
without qualifications. 
For these reasons, it is emphasised that, as explained in Chapter 1, the thesis is written from the perspective of a 
trial lawyer, briefed to advise on the general validity of the London Agreement and Charter, the indictment and 
the Judgment of the International Military Tribunal. In doing so, we shall examine the major issues which the 
principal trial at Nuremberg raised for the ultimate judgment of a world which had been stricken by the most 
grievous and savage war in the history of mankind. 
The focus of this Chapter will therefore he on whether or not twelve men, who were among the principal 
architects of the Nazi blitzkrieg, should have been sentenced to death and seven others sentenced to 
imprisonment for long terms. 
In this discussion the author assumes only the role of a trial lawyer, without any inhibitions emanating from 
theoretical predilections. It was a case of guilty or not guilty, secundum allegata et probata. 
THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
In the context of this study, an examination of the sources of international law is confined to a preliminary 
consideration of sources as expounded by jurists, international lawyers and scholars. The purpose is to reach a 
conclusion on the capacity of international law validly to be expanded in a manner analogous to common law 
doctrine and practice. 
A classical exposition of the sources of international law, both general and particular, was the subject of a 
monograph by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, republished in 1970.8 
Lauterpacht examined the basis and objective sources of international law: 
The basis—the primary cause—of international law is the fact of the existence of an international society 
composed of human beings organized as sovereign States. Its more immediate cause (or, as it is 
occasionally referred to, its objective source) is the interdependence, in its manifold manifestations, 
of these sovereign States; the need to safeguard their interests and their independent existence by 
means of binding rules of law; and the necessity to protect the individual human being who is the 
ultimate unit of all law ... The necessity of acting upon these causes by way of legal regulation is the 
objective source of international law in the sense that disregard of them must, in the long run, 
entail the disruption of the foundations of civilized life as well as the impairment of the 
reality of the law already established in the pursuance of those needs and interests.9 
Lauterpacht argued that there are two principal agencies by which international law is expressed and 
made binding: first, individual sovereign States which create conventional international law by treaty or 
the aggregation of States which by uniform conduct furnish authoritative evidence of customary international 
law; second, the development of principles and rules of law 'which are due not to an ascertained direct 
expression of the will of States, but to the "reason of the thing"—which in this context means the existence 
of the international community—formulated in general principles of law.' 
In the view of Professor Lauterpacht, the second of those sources is 'a expression of how of nature which 
nurtured the growth of international law and which assisted powerfully in its development.' 10 
He further argued: 
... though the limited degree of usefulness of the distinction between the basis, the cause, the sources 
and the evidence of sources of international law is ... apparent, it is not devoid of value. The notion of 
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the source of law on the analogy of the source of a stream as the first external manifestation of an 
already existing, though inarticulate, body of law is particularly appropriate in the sphere of 
international law. It brings to mind the fact that the will of sovereign States, which is often regarded as 
the exclusive source of international law, is but the expression of an underlying objective reality. 11 
So far as is relevant to 'Nuremberg Law', the essential postulate of Lauterpacht was thus expressed: 
So far as the sources of international law are concerned the view which seems to be most in accordance 
with the practice of States and with the attitude of tribunals is that we must consider the objective 
reality of the international community as the primary source of international law; that sovereign 
States are the principal organs declaring, with constitutive effect, the rules of international law 
as a consequence and expression of that reality by means of custom and treaty; and that, in the 
absence of international law thus created and revealed, the rules and principles derived from the fact 
of the existence of the international community and formulated with the assistance of general 
principles of law--of the modern law of nature--must be regarded as one of the primary sources of 
international law. 
While Lauterpacht recognised the hierarchy of sources of international law prescribed by Article 38 of the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice,I2 he went further in the cited paper when he endorsed the law of 
the London Agreement and Charter in these words: 
Cases may occur—and the conduct of National-Socialist Germany during the Second World War 
confirmed that possibility—where the degree of transgression against the laws of humanity, which in any 
case are part of international law, is such as to call, as a compelling dictate of justice, for punishment, 
if necessary with retrospective effect, of crimes and atrocities.I3 
However, in the cited extract Lauterpacht did not, in the writer's opinion, take his argument as far as was 
necessary by adding as a requisite element for the validity of 'Nuremberg Law' the lawful authority of the Allied 
Powers, to which Germany had unconditionally surrendered, to legislate on the basis of their joint sovereignty 
over the former German Reich. That requisite element is discussed later in this Chapter. 
A number of German scholars have in recent years enunciated concepts of the sources of international law 
which supplement, and in some cases depart from, traditional attitudes. Such concepts do not necessarily arise 
from 'Nuremberg Law' but appear to be consistent with its validity. 
In an article essentially confined to customary law as one of the primary sources of international law, 
Professor Rudolph Bernhardt, under whose direction the Encyclopaedia of Public International Law has been 
published, discussed the novel question of 'instant' customary law. He wrote: 
The question has been raised ... whether 'instant' customary law is possible; in other words, whether 
'customary' law can be created spontaneously. This poses not only logical and semantic 
difficulties ('customary' law without 'custom?). It also raises other important theoretical and 
practical problems. According to traditional concepts of customary law the possibility of 'instant law' 
must be denied. But one can imagine exceptional cases and situations in which such instant law is 
useful or even necessary. If, for instance, the community of States unequivocally and without 
any dissent considers certain acts, which have not been known before, to be illegal, the 
opinio juris might suffice even if no practice could evolve.14 
It • is a moot point whether or not the concept adverted to by Professor Bernhardt will obtain any significant 
recognition, but it bears in practice a similarity to 'Nuremberg Law' is prescribed in the London Agreement 
and Charter. 
Professor Jochen Abr. Frowein developed a wide interpretation of jus co.ens as a source of international 
law. 15 He expressed the view that the description of an 'international crime' in Article 19 of the 
International Law Commission draft on State responsibility 'clearly refers to the most important rules of jus 
cogens', including 'a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, such as that prohibiting aggression.'  (emphasis added). Although Professor 
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Frowein did not mention 'Nuremberg Law' expressly, it seems implicit in his evaluation of the doctrine of jj 
cogens: 
The notion of jus cogens became essential for the understanding of international law at a time when it 
was again realized that the individual and arbitrary agreement of States could not be the highest value in 
the international community, and that the goal of preserving peace and protecting peoples and 
individuals presupposed the recognition of some basic values. 16 
Attention has already been directed to the dissenting opinion of Viscount Maugham in respect of the validity of 
'Nuremberg Law' (Chapter 17). It is now necessary to examine the views he expressed in Chapter 6 of his cited 
work, entitled 'A Note on the Nature of International Law'. 
Viscount Maugham asserted five propositions on which he based his disapproving judgment on the 
London Agreement and Charter: 
'... it is generally recognized that except as the result of consent no new rule of international law can be 
imposed so as to have any binding force on a State merely by the will of other civilized 
States'. 
It is absurd to contend that a single act by (say) four States creates a custom, and therefore a law. The 
Law of Nations no doubt grows from time to time to meet a change in circumstances, and custom must 
have a beginning; but that fact does not lead to the conclusion that a suggested new rule, however 
desirable it may seem to be, can become a part of international law unless the consent of the nations 
as a whole has been obtained.' 
He adopted in the context of 'Nuremberg Law' the statement of Sir Frederick Pollock that 'the final 
test of validity must in the case of international law, no less than in that of any other customary 
law, he found in general consent evidenced by conduct' (Cambridge Modern History, vol. II, p. 715). 
The Judges at the Tribunal at Nuremberg could not lay down a rule for the world, even if a duty to do 
so had been conferred upon it by the Moscow Agreement'. [The Tribunal did not pronounce a 'rule for 
the world'. It applied, in the trial of twenty two alleged war criminals, the law prescribed in the London 
Agreement and Charter]. 
'A rule punishing the authors of an aggressive war could only be enforced by the victors after and during 
the occupation' [it is submitted that this is precisely what the London Agreement and Charter achieved]. 
With all respect, we are constrained to reject the cited views of Viscount Maugham as irrelevant to a 
consideration of the validity of 'Nuremberg Law'. Expressive as they are of generalised opinions of root sources 
of international law, they ignore the two fundamental matters from which 'Nuremberg Law' derived its rational 
and lawful force: first, there is no rule that international law is incapable in a jurisprudential sense of 
development and application, after the fashion of the common law, in order to do justice in unique 
circumstances; 18 second, following the unconditional surrender of Germany and its complete collapse as a 
State, the Allied Powers possessed supreme legislative authority and exercised it.I9 
THE LEGAL STATUS OF GERMANY AFTER ITS UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER ON 
8 MAY 1945 
Two basic instruments determined the legal status of Germany after the Reich disintegrated by the 
beginning of May 1945. The first was the instrument whereby all German forces unconditionally 
surrendered to the Allied Powers at Rheims on 8 May. The document stated: 
1. We. the undersigned, acting by authority of the German High Command, hereby surrender 
unconditionally to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and simultaneously to the 
Soviet High Command, all forces on land, sea, and in the air who are at this date under German 
341 
control. 
2. The German High Command will at once issue orders to all German military, naval, and air 
authorities and to all forces under German control to cease active operations at 2301 hours (11.01 P.M.] 
Central European Time on 8 May and to remain in the positions occupied at the time. No ship, vessel 
or aircraft is to be scuttled, or any damage done to their hull, machinery or equipment. 
3. The German High Command will at once issue to the appropriate commanders and ensure the 
carrying out of any further orders issued by the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and 
by the Soviet High Command. 
4. This Act of Military Surrender is without prejudice to, and will be superseded by, any general 
instrument of surrender imposed by, or on behalf of, the United Nations and applicable to Germany and 
the German Armed Forces as a whole. 
5. In the event of the German High Command or any of the forces under their control failing to act in 
accordance with this Act of Surrender the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and the 
Soviet High Command will take such punitive or other action as they deem appropriate. 20 
The most legally significant term of the surrender instrument was paragraph 4, which anticipated the declaration, 
on 5 June 1945, of the instrument expressed to be 'regarding the defeat of Germany and the assumption of 
supreme authority with respect to Germany and supplementary statements' (commonly referred to as 'the Berlin 
Declaration of 5 June 1945'). A correct appreciation of the terms and legal effect of the Declaration is essential 
to a conclusion regarding the nature and scope of the authority which it legally conferred on the Allied and 
Associated Powers in the succeeding years. It is reproduced in Appendix 1. 21 The terms of the Declaration 
included the following preambular paragraph: 
In virtue of the supreme authority and powers thus assumed by the four Governments, the Allied 
Representatives announce the following requirements arising from the complete defeat and unconditional 
surrender of Germany with which Germany must comply. 
The most significant provision was Article 11(a), whereby 'the principal Nazi leaders as specified by the Allied 
Representatives, and all persons from time to time named or designated by rank, office or employment by the 
Allied Representatives as being suspected of having committed, ordered or abetted war crimes or analogous 
offences, will be apprehended and surrendered to the Allied Representatives'. There was no definition or 
specification of what acts or omissions constituted 'war crimes or analogous offences'. 22 
For the purposes of occupation, the Declaration provided for the division of Germany, within its frontiers as 
they existed on 31 December 1937, into four zones, each under a Commander-in-Chief designated by the 
responsible Power. The Declaration contained a detailed statement on control machinery in Germany It 
expressly acknowledged that the 'assumption of authority did not effect the annexation of Germany'. The 
Declaration concluded: 'The governments of the four Powers hereby announce that it is their intention to consult 
with the Governments of other United Nations in connection with the exercise of this authority.' 
An important practical element in the circumstances relevant to the scope of the 'supreme authority' of the Allied 
Powers in accordance with the Berlin Declaration was the collapse, in all practical terms, of the German 
Government. Grand Admiral Donitz had been appointed by Hitler in a 'political testament' his successor. Donitz 
assumed the leadership of the German yolk on the evening of 1 May 1945, as Head of State and commander in 
Chief of the armed forces. 23 His last speech to the German people was on 8 May, when he announced the 
unconditional surrender. shortly afterwards, Reichsfuhrer SS Heinrich Himmler committed suicide. Donitz was 
obviously embattled. On 23 May, Donitz, Jodl and another high-ranking officer, pursuant to an order of the 
Allied Control Commission, met Allied officers. They were told: 
[General Rooks, U.S. Chief of the Commission]: I am in receipt of instructions from Supreme 
Headquarters, European Theatre of Operations, from the Supreme Commander, General Eisenhower, 
to call you before me this morning to tell you that he has decided, in concert with the Soviet High 
Command, that today the acting German Government and the German High Command, with the 
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several of its members, shall be taken into custody as prisoners of war. Thereby the acting 
German government is dissolved ...24 
There were thus four elements which co-existed on the date of the execution of the London Agreement and 
Charter on 8 August 1945. 
(a) The fact that the German Reich had surrendered unconditionally to the Allied Powers. In argument 
relating to the criminality of groups or organisations, Mr. Justice Jackson submitted to the Tribunal: 
The unconditional surrender of Germany created for the victors novel and difficult problems of law and 
administration. Being the first such surrender of an entire and modernly organised society, precedents 
and past experiences are of little help in guiding our policy toward the vanquished. The responsibility 
implicit in demanding and accepting capitulation of a whole people certainly must include a duty to 
discriminate justly and intelligently between the opposing elements of that population, which bore 
dissimilar relations to the policies and conduct which led to the catastrophe. 
The primary objective of requiring that the surrender of Germany be unconditional was to clear the way 
for a reconstruction of German society on such a basis that it will not again threaten the peace of 
Europe and of the world. 
This Charter is the plan adopted by our respective governments and our duty here is to make it work. 25 
(b) The fact that the acting German government, irrespective of its dubious legality even under German 
national law, had been dissolved, with the consequence that there was no government in Germany other than 
the Allied Control Council. 26 
(c) The Berlin Declaration of 5 June 1945, by Article 11, expressly contemplated the trial of Nazi war 
criminals, without any express reliance on the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943 or any other 
Allied pronouncement. 
(d) It is notorious that the German Reich was substantially in a state of physical ruin, which was 
accompanied by deprivation, hunger, social dislocation and the resentment and anger of most of the 
German people in the wake of the collapse of the National Socialist policies which they had espoused. 
It is obvious that the solution to the problems created by those four elements could only have been 
determined by political decisions. 
What were the alternatives?27 In retrospect, it appears that there were four: 
First, 'political execution', that is the execution, as a result of a political decision, of an arbitrarily determined 
number of German political, military and industrial leaders, immediately following apprehension and 
identification. This course was advocated by Churchill and many others. Had it been adopted, there can be no 
doubt that it would have been condemned within a short time and by future generations as just as reprehensible as 
some of the policies of the Nazi regime. Above all, it would have been characterised as a 'lottery in death' to the 
shame of the Allied Powers. 
Second, the course advocated by Great Britain, in particular by Lord Simon, that a 'document of Arraignment' be 
served on Hitler and his associates, who would be given the opportunity of disputing the truth of its contents 
before an inter-allied judicial tribunal, with power reserved to the Allies to determine punishment if the 
Arraignment was not disproved. The writer finds it difficult to identify any saving grace whatsoever in the 
adoption of this course, which combined all of the most unacceptable jurisprudential concepts and lacked any 
redeeming feature (see Chapter 6). 
Third, the Nuremberg trial could have been confined solely to war crimes stricto sensu, with very little 
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difference in the ultimate result. It is idle to suggest that such a course would have satisfied public opinion, 
at least in Great Britain, America and other Allied countries. It would have been a tame finale to the declarations 
of retribution by the Allied Powers. It would have demonstrated intrinsic impotence in the jurisprudence of 
international law. In practical terms, it would have invited mass reprisals against a host of German 
individuals, and it would seem that, of those indicted at Nuremberg, Hess, Streicher28 and von Schirach would 
have gone free. Most important of all reasons, for the future, against omitting crimes against peace from 
the London Charter was that such crimes would have been seen to be ignored after the most disastrous war in 
world history and the concept would have vanished into oblivion so far as the jurisprudence of international law 
was concerned. 
Fourth, the only lawful, just and proper course was the execution of the London agreement and Charter by the 
four Allied Powers in the exercise of what the Tribunal termed 'the sovereign legislative power by the 
countries to which the German Reich unconditionally surrendered and the undoubted right of these countries to 
legislate for the occupied territories has been recognised by the civilised world'. 
In the circumstances which have been outlined supra, the author's submission, at the heart of this study, is that 
the London Agreement and Charter were a valid legislative prescription for the Nuremberg trial of major German 
war criminals. Unfortunately a proper perspective of those instruments has been obscured by the writings of 
some academic and other international lawyers and, most importantly, by the judgment of the International 
Military Tribunal when it went beyond its Charter and attempted to defend the proposition that the Charter was 
an 'expression of international law existing at the time of its creation.' 29 
The tribunal itself created the forensic structure for the cited obiter pronouncement and the subsequent 
development of it in its judgment, when it stated, on the second day of the trial: 
A motion [see Chapter 17, Appendix I] has been filed with the tribunal and the Tribunal has given it 
consideration, and insofar as it may be a plea to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, it conflicts with Article 
3 of the Charter and will not be entertained. Insofar as it may contain other arguments [ex post facto 
legislation and the maxim nullum crimen sine lege]  which may be open to the defendants, they may be 
heard at a later stage. 30 
The Tribunal did in fact subsequently hear extensive argument from counsel relevant to the two legal issues cited 
above, and stated: 
The Charter makes the planning or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties a 
crime; and it is therefore not strictly necessary to consider whether and to what extent aggressive war was a crime 
before the execution of the London Agreement. But in view of the great importance of the questions of law 
involved, the Tribunal has heard full argument from the Prosecution and the Defence, and will express its view 
on the matter. 31 
It was not at the insistence of the prosecution that the Tribunal made its obiter pronouncements. Thus, in his 
closing address, Mr. Justice Jackson said: 
At this stage of the proceedings. I shall rest upon the law of these crimes as laid down in the Charter. 
The defendants, who except for the Charter would have no right to be heard at all, now ask that the legal 
basis for this trial be nullified. This Tribunal, of course, is given no power to set aside, or to modify 
the Agreement between the four Powers, to which eighteen [sic] other nations have adhered. The terms 
of the Charter are conclusive upon every to these proceedings. 32 (emphasis added) 
A convenient starting point for consideration of the validity in law of the London Agreement and Charter is the 
following proposition advanced by Professor Julius Stone: 
In the final resort, the trials, convictions and punishments under all the counts of the Nuremberg 
Charter have a technically sound legal basis in the powers of the victor States over the defeated German 
State and its soldiers, ministers and nationals, that State having unconditionally surrendered, and as to 
the count for violations of war-law strict° sensu, it was also legally well based on the traditional 
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right of each belligerent to try violators, regardless of nationality, in its own tribunals.33 
That fundamental thesis of Professor Stone expressly excluded any merit in defence arguments based on ex post 
facto law or the principle of nullum crimen sine lege. He asserted that there was no rule of international law 
which sustained either argument.34 There is an impressive bibliography which supports the view of 
Professor Stone, to some of which reference should be made. 35 
In the writer's view, Professor Kelsen convincingly demonstrated the legal right of the Allied Powers to enter 
into the London Aereement and Charter 
This [the assumption by the Allied Powers of supreme authority] means that the German territory, 
together with the population residing on it, has been placed under the sovereignty of the four Powers. 
It means further that the legal status of Germany is not that of 'belligerent occupation in 
accordance with the Articles 42 to 56 of the Regulations annexed to the Hague Convention respecting. 
the Laws and Customs of War on Land of 1907. After Germany's unconditional surrender and 
especially after the abolition of the last German Government. the Government of Grand Admiral 
Doenitz, the status of belligerent occupation has become impossible. This status presupposes that 
a state of war still exists in the relationship between the occupant state and the state whose 
territory is under belligerent occupation. This condition implies the continued existence of the state 
whose territory is occupied and, consequently, the continued existence of its government recognised as 
the legitimate bearer of the sovereignty of the occupied state. 36 
Professor Kelsen rejected as untenable the doctrine--and did no logically and correctly, it is submitted--that before 
the Allied Powers could legally be regarded as having sovereign authority in Germany its annexation was a 
prerequisite. a situation which those Powers had expressly disclaimed in the Declaration of Berlin. His reasoning 
led to the conclusion that the nature of the sovereignty exercised by the Allied Powers was that of condominium,  
which embraced unrestricted legislative, judicial and executive powers. The unrestricted legislative power of the 
occupants is practically the only possibility of creating an adequate legal basis for the prosecution of German war 
criminals, which neither international law nor the existing municipal laws of Germany or of any of the United 
Nations provides.' 
The cited view with respect to the unlimited scope of the legislative authority of the Allied Powers, as reflected 
in the London Agreement and Charter, is consonant with the policy implemented by the Allies immediately after 
they entered Germany in September 1944. By a series of Proclamations, Laws and Ordinances, the Supreme 
Commander, General Eisenhower, established Military Government Courts and suspended the functioning of all 
German Courts within the occupied territories. The first Proclamation announced the vesting of supreme 
legislative, judicial and executive authority within the occupied territories in General Eisenhower as Supreme 
Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Forces and as Military eovernor, the purpose of the Proclamation was 
thus expressed: 
The Allied Forces serving under my command have now entered Germany. We come as conquerors 
but not as oppressors. In the area of Germany occupied by the forces under my command we shall 
obliterate Nazism and German Militarism. We shall overthrow the Nazi rule, dissolve the Nazi 
Party and abolish the cruel, oppressive, and discriminatory laws and institutions which the Party has 
created. We shall eradicate that German Militarism which has so often disrupted the peace of the world. 
Military and Party Leaders. the Gestapo, and others suspected of crimes and atrocities will be tried and, 
if guilty, punished as they deserve. 
... Military Government Courts will be established for the punishment of offenders. 37 
Although Professor Quincy Wright expressed his ultimate view that 'the derivation of the Tribunal's jurisdiction 
from the sovereignty of Germany ... appears to be well grounded', his exposition of the relevant law is not, in 
the author's opinion, as incisive as that of Professor Kelsen. this criticism applies particularly to the discussion. 
of the question of annexation, which appears to be somewhat confused. Nevertheless, the following statement of 
Professor Wright is considered to be correct: 
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In principle it would appear that if a State or States are in a position to annex a territory they 
have the right to declare the lesser policy of exercising sovereignty temporarily for specified 
purposes with the intention of eventually transferring the sovereignty to someone else [or, it 
should be added, relinquishing the sovereignty]. This appears to be the proper construction of the 
Declaration of Berlin38 
It was, of course, necessary for the Allied Powers to await the establishment of a democratic system of 
government in Germany and the emergence of a stable social order, before it was prudent to relinquish their 
sovereignty. The first step in those processes did not occur until the promulgation of the new constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany (the Basic Law) on 23 May 1949. It was not until 5 May 1955 that the Paris 
Protocol on the Termination of the Occupation Regime in the Federal Republic of Germany came into force, 
thus terminating the occupation of the Western zones of occupation in Germany. The termination had 
been reached in stages. In the Eastern (Soviet) zone the occupation was also progressively concluded. Thus, for 
a decade, the occupation of the former Reich was sustained, at least in part (ignoring the complex situation 
in the 'special Berlin area'), and this fact does not give credence to the many theories advanced by German 
writers with respect to the precise legal character of the total Allied occupation which began on 8 May 1945.39 
In the writer's view it is not realistic to suppose that the reconstruction in all respects of Germany could 
have been accomplished in the circumstances which existed unless full legislative authority had been assumed 
by the Allied Powers as a concomitant of sovereignty. Once the Allied Powers established, according to the 
unprecendented circumstances, a regime based on their supreme legislative power—and it is submitted they did so 
by the four-Power Declaration of Berlin following closely on the unconditional surrender of Germany—they were 
entitled to exercise their sovereignty without constraints other than any which were dictated by rules or principles 
of justice soundly based in international custom and approved almost universally by civilised countries. 
In the discussion earlier in this Chapter of the sources of international law, reference has been made to some of 
the views expressed by Sir Hersch Lauterpacht. On the consequences of the unconditional surrender of Germany 
and the provisions of the Declaration of Berlin, Lauterpacht wrote: 
The method of putting an end to hostilities by way of 'unconditional surrender' instead of the 
customary armistice agreements was adopted at the end of the Second World War largely in order 
to make it possible for the Allies to avoid the conclusion of agreements with the Governments 
responsible for the initiation and the lawless conduct of the war of aggression and so assist 
indirectly in the perpetuation of regimes the complete abolition of which had been proclaimed 
to be among the principal purposes of the War. 
... It would thus appear that while an ordinary armistice— even if dictated by the victor—is still in the 
nature of an agreement signed by both sides and laying down exhaustively the rights and 
obligations arising thereunder, this is not the case with regard to an instrument of 
unconditional surrender. In the latter there is no legal limit set to the victor's freedom of action—save 
the implied obligation not to resume hostilities if all his conditions and orders are complied 
with. These orders may include the total suppression of the Government of the defeated State, as was 
in fact the case in relation to Germany 40 
One of the difficulties in appreciating the dissenting views of many writers on 'Nuremberg Law' is their 
failure to recognise that political reality and power politics are dominant features of international life. Such 
considerations were crucial in determining American policy in the months before the unconditional surrender 
of Germany. In a memorandum dated 29 December 1944 (see Chapter 6) from Assistant Attorney-General 
Wechsler to Attorney-General Biddle (later the senior American member of the Nuremberg Tribunal) it was 
stated: 
The problem, moreover, is not a legal problem in any genuine sense since under international law the 
victors may determine the terms of peace. 42 
The Allies acted precisely in the manner suggested in that memorandum. they insisted on the unconditional 
surrender of Germany; they entered into the Declaration of Berlin; and they exercised plenary legislative 
authority. The trial at Nuremberg was no more than the application of the product of that authority to the facts 
as pleaded, which were substantially unchallenged. In the absence of an international legislature and an 
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international judicial organ, it is not possible to visualise any other acceptable process than that which was put 
into effect at Nuremberg. 
A number of writers on 'Nuremberg Law' have argued that the Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 operated to 
restrict the nature of the legislative authority of the Allied Powers as occupants of Germany and to require that at 
least some of the recognised rules of international law in respect of belligerent occupation were applicable. 43 
Professor Schwarzenberger rejected this view, although not expressly on the basis of Germany's unconditional 
surrender and the provisions of the Declaration of Berlin. He stated: 
The experiences of the Second World War made abundantly clear the inadequacy of Section III of the 
Hague Regulations of 1907 when applied to mid-twentieth-century warfare. Allied occupation 
authorities in Africa, Asia and Europe found little guidance in these Regulations on how to feed, 
clothe and house the populations abandoned by their former masters. Moreover, as was put on 
record in the Judgments of the International Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo, the outrages 
committed in the occupied territories by the aggressors were such as to necessitate a more 
articulate and elaborate reformulation of the minimum standards of civilisation. If civilised nations 
could relapse so quickly into barbarism, very much less could be taken for granted henceforth than had 
been assumed by the draftsmen of the Regulations of 1899 and 1907.44 
However, the opinion is advanced that it is necessary to project Professor Schwarzenberger's cited view much 
further. Such a process involves the assertion that the correct rationale of the London Agreement and Charter 
was the lawful capacity of the Allied Powers, in view of their sovereign positions, to prescribe legal rules which 
reflected the expectations of civilised countries, in the light of all the circumstances, in a manner analogous to 
the development of the common law. 
it should be acknowledged that Professor Schwarzenberger qualified his earlier statement when he wrote: 
The government of a belligerent may wish to avoid debe latio, but be unable to secure an armistice. It 
may, however, be in a position to secure its offer of unconditional surrender. Unless the victor accepts 
reservations made in the offer of `unconditional surrender', the defeated party consents thereby in advance 
to any departures from, for instance, the law of belligerent occupation, which the Occupying Power may 
deem necessary. In such a case, the only limitations of the victor's discretion which are probably 
implied, under international customary law, in accepting surrender on such terms are those imposed by 
the standard of civilisation, for it would be difficult to imagine that even a victorious Power would wish 
to reserve its freedom to act in a barbarous manner.45 
The theme of the justice of questioning the adequacy of the Hague Regulations to regulate the rights 
of occupants of the territory of a state which had embarked on a planned campaign of aggressive warfare was 
one of the keynotes in an article by Professor Korovin shortly after the end of World War II. He wrote: 
The new legal aspect of war as a means of self-defense developing into international action against 
aggression places on a new plane all the problems of war and its so-called laws and customs. For 
example, can persons be considered guerrillas as defined by the Fourth Hague Convention, if, even 
though they meet the formal requirements of the Convention, they act voluntarily on the side of the 
aggressor or are accomplices in his crimes? 
Further, can we demand observance of the Hague rules of military occupation (respect for the 
sovereignty of the local government and so on) in the event of the occupation of the territory of an 
aggressor state by troops of peace-loving nations? Or can we permit the thought that in such a case the 
occupation army would provide armed protection for those same reactionary social forms and political 
institutions which led the country on the path of international crime? 
And, conversely, can we confine a sacred people's war against an aggressor and enslaver, a heroic 
struggle of millions of people for their country's independence, for its national culture, for its right to 
exist, can we confine this war within the strict bounds of the Hague rules, which were calculated for 
wars of a different type and for a totally different international situation?445 
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Writing in January 1944, Professor Lauterpacht foresaw the inadequacy of the Hague Conventions rules in his 
review of the work of E.H. Feilchenfeld on the economic law of belligerent occupation.47 Professor Lauterpacht 
directed attention to the manner in which that branch of international law 'has been ruthlessly disregarded by the 
Power [that is, Germany] which in the first stage of the World War has been the principal occupant of enemy 
territory'. He added; 
How far has this wholesale violation of the existing law been due to the weaknesses of the rules codified 
in the Hague Conventions? How far has that disregard of the law been due to the failure of the 
signatories of those Conventions to adapt them to the changed conditions of modern and total war in a 
period of increased State control over economic life? The existing law is probably in many respects in 
need of revision and clarification. 
... There is nothing in the comprehensiveness of total war which compelled Germany to abandon one of 
the basic principles of the law of belligerent occupation, namely, that the occupant does not acquire 
sovereignty over the territory, and that its annexation pendente hello and the subjection of its 
inhabitants to the allegiance of the occupant is utterly unlawful. Yet this has been the practice of the 
German Government on a wide scale. In pursuance of that practice, the German Supreme Court, in a 
decision given in September 1941, held that the Polish State had ceased to exist and that Polish 
nationals in territories not annexed by Germany or Russia had become Stateless persons.48 
In this author's view, it is ironical in the extreme that German writers such as Dr. Laun (see footnote 43) 
should assert the applicability of the Hague Rules to the Allied occupation of Germany after the wholesale 
disregard by the Third Reich of those Rules in its waging of a Blitzkriec, of aggression. 
During the currency of the trial at Nuremberg, Professor Schwarzenberger's review of the work of Dr E. Fraenkel 
on the Rhineland occupation, 1918-1923, was published. 49 Professor Schwarzenberger compared the 
circumstances in the Rhineland with those in Germany after 8 May 1945. He wrote: 
Today, the position in Germany is entirely different. In the first place—and this applies to all other 
countries which have unconditionally surrendered—the unconditional surrender of Germany means a 
renunciation of the protection which, otherwise, the defeated enemy might derive from the customary 
and conventional rules applicable in time of war. Secondly, there is no more a German Government. 
The defeat of Germany ended with debellatio, and the occupying States jointly exercise sovereignty 
within the borders of what once was Germany It has thus become impossible to speak of any leoal 
limitations restricting the untrammelled discretion of the Powers in occupation of Germany. Yet if 
these States claim to represent world civilization, they will have to limit themselves in obedience to 
standards inherent in the idea of civilization, and, in particular, of Western civilization.50 
Professor Schwarzenberger asserted that one of the most significant standards of Western life was the rule of law, 
and that, as used in the book he was reviewing, the rule of law meant that 'bearers of public power respect 
definite rules of jurisdiction and procedure in their governmental and administrative activities--that they recognise 
those formal principles that are indispensable for the protection of the individual from arbitrary interference with 
his personal integrity'. 
At this stage it is convenient to examine some of the dissenting views with regard to the fundamental 
proposition that the London Agreement and Charter were the product of the' sovereign legislative power' of the 
four nations in whose names the instruments were executed . In the author's view, such dissent has in the main 
been created on false premises and confused perceptions. Some examples will be given. 
Dr C.A. Pompe, in what the author considers is a confusing exposition, appears to have been more concerned in 
attacking the Tribunal's expressions in its judgment rather than in asserting the legal invalidity of the Agreement 
and Charter.51 It is necessary to reproduce an extract from Dr Pompe's work verbatim, in order to illustrate the 
writer's statement: 
If there existed on the part of the occupying countries 'sovereign legislative power' over Germany, this 
was not in consequence of the unconditional surrender of the Reich, but of the assumption of 'supreme 
authority' by the Four Allies, embodied in the Declaration of Berlin, June 5, 1945. Whatever may be 
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the outworn doctrine of debellatio (to which the Tribunal seems to adhere), it is certainly a postulate of 
common sense that there can be no government without the consent of the governing [emphasis added 
in the original]. Before the Declaration mentioned, no authority of the Allies existed in Germany, only 
de facto power. The authority assumed was, however, exclusively exercised in the name of their 
respective governments by the Supreme Commanders of the Four Nations, and, since the Potsdam 
am-eement, for the whole of Germany jointly by these Commanders as Members of the Allied Control 
Council. It was not exercised by the representatives of the Four Power of the London Conference. This 
difference of functions is demonstrated beyond all doubt by the later enactment of Law No.10 by the 
Allied Control Council indeed as an exercise of legislative power over Germany 'in order to give effect 
to the terms of the ... London Agreement' ... 'to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for the 
prosecution of war criminals'. The London Agreement was a proper international legal instrument 
concluded in accordance with United Nations Declarations - not restricted to the leading Powers--and 'in 
the interest of all the United Nations'.52 
It is difficult to appreciate the distinction made by Dr. Pompe between the London Aereement and Charter, 
construed together, and Control Council Law No. 10. If the latter instrument was 'indeed an exercise of 
legislative power over Germany', as Dr. Pompe asserted, the question arises why the London Charter was 
'different'. Moreover, the London Conference (of June and July 1945) did not exercise authority. The discussions 
at the Conference were preliminary to the execution of the Agreement and Charter. Further, Dr. Pompe did not 
mention in the cited passage the fact that there was no national government in existence in Germany 
The cited passage also appears to be inconsistent with the statement by Dr. Pompe in his Introduction: 
Though before Nuremberg no rule existed making aggressive war a crime for which individuals could be 
punished, there was nothing unlawful or unjust in the punishment of the Nazi leaders who launched the 
Second World War. Resort to aggressive war had been forbidden and condemned in a basic and 
unequivocal rule of international law. And the Nuremberg Tribunal established beyond any doubt that 
aggressive war had been resorted to not as a sudden national reaction on international events, but after 
years of careful and deliberate planning and preparation. The Tribunal, recognizing this grave violation 
of the fundamental rule of international law as having all the essentials of criminality, was justified in 
punishing its authors in the name of the offended world community ... 53 
Reference has been made in Chapter 17 to the views of Viscount Maugham and Lord Hankey. They are of 
limited relevance in the present context, but should be stated. 
As appears from the text of Chapter 17, Lord Hankey's criticism of the Nuremberg trial process, and of the 
continuation of war crimes trials, was based on three principal arguments. 
First, apparently invoking the et tu quoque concept, Lord Hankey argued that the principal Allied European 
Powers had 'for centuries ....committed technical aggressions': the question naturally arises as to whether Lord 
Hankey really considered that the aggressive acts of the leaders of the Third Reich, as pleaded in the indictment, 
were 'technical' aggressions. 
Second, Lord Hankey was critical of the Allied demand that Germany should surrender unconditionally. His 
argument, to which the author has referred in Chapter 17, appears specious and biased. 
Third, Lord Hankey asserted that the defendants at Nuremberg were tried 'on a crime' created by ex post facto 
legislation. This argument is considered later in this Chapter. 
The writer's opinion is that Lord Hankey's,unrestrained criticism of the Nuremberg process, which reached its 
peak in his condemnation of Mr Churchil1,54 should be attributed to political motives rather than to legal 
considerations. 
It is only necessary to add to the discussion of the views of Viscount Maug.ham in Chapter 17 a brief reference to 
the Preface he wrote to Brigadier-General Morgan's book, The Great Assize. 55 In his extreme criticism of the 
Nuremberg process in that Preface, Viscount Maueham did not analyse the facts relating to the legal status of 
Germany at the date of the execution of the London Agreement and Charter, but, like Lord Hankey, his criticism 
was essentially directed against the Tribunal: 
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... his [Brigadier-General Morgan's] criticisms of the dicta ... in the Judgment, so far as it seeks by 
°biter dicta to justify its decisions on existing rules of International Law are of great weight. For my 
part, I think his criticisms are unanswerable; and I much regret that the Tribunal, being a military 
tribunal appointed for a special purpose, thought fit to travel outside its jurisdiction.56 
As the writer will argue, Viscount Maugham's criticism of 'Nuremberg Law' is fallacious, as it doe snot 
distinguish between two discrete issues: first, the legal integrity of the provisions of the London Agreement and 
Charter, second, the extent to which the Tribunal considered matters upon which it was not necessary for it to 
embark. 
The views of Professor G.A. Finch, Editor-in-Chief of the American Journal of International Law, have been 
discussed in Chapter 17 in a limited context. Although he considered that only Count 3 (war crimes) and Count 4 
(crimes against humanity) had a sound legal basis, Professor Finch did not question the general sovereign 
legislative authority of the Allied Powers. Thus: 
With the unconditional surrender of Germany, its government went out of existence as a sovereign state 
and its sovereignty is now held in trust by the condominium of the occupying Powers ... The 
International Military Tribunal was established after consultation with the Allied Control Council 
which exercises supreme authority in Gerinany.57 
Not all authors, including German authors, adopt a definitive interpretation of the legal rules which constrain the 
administrative authority of an occupying Power, or of a number of co-belligerent Powers, in occupation of 
former enemy territory. J.M. Mossner traced the transition in this respect from the classical period of 
international law, in which no restrictive rules existed at all, to the development at the beginning of the 19th 
century that a distinction must be drawn between the situation before and after debellatio. Military occupation 
before debellatio was ... deemed to be only a provisional administration of the territory'. As Mossner states: 
This rule gradually found acceptance in the practice of States and was finally incorporated into the Hague 
Regulations of Land Warfare (Articles 42 and 56). After debellatio, however, when the animus 
revertendi of the former sovereign was extinguished, the invading State was permitted to annex the 
territory.58 
After referring to Articles 43, 45, 46, 49 and 56 of the Hague Rules, Mossner stated: 'These rules are very 
general and do not take into consideration specific situations.'59 
In order to complete our brief survey of the action taken by the Allied Powers pursuant to their assumption of 
supreme authority with respect to Germany, it is necessary to refer to the agreements reached at Potsdam. near 
Berlin, when Stalin, Truman and Churchill (succeeded from 18 July 1945 by Attlee) met for the last major war 
conference between 17 July and 2 August 1945. The agreements are contained in two documents: A report on 
the Conference published immediately and a Protocol of the Proceedings of the Conference published in 1947 by 
the British and United States Governments. France, although a member of the Control Council, was not 
represented at the Conference. The discussions at the Conference ranged over many issues, including 'the 
establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, the political and economic principles to govern the treatment 
of Germany in the initial control period, reparations, the disposal of the German Navy and Merchant Marine, the 
City of Koenigsberg and the adjacent area, war criminals, the western frontier of Poland, and the orderly transfer 
of German populations.'60 
Professor Frowein has summarised the political principles embodied in the Agreements as follows: 
Complete disarmament, demilitarization, and elimination of the National Socialist Party and its 
institutions on the one hand and reconstruction of German political life on a democratic basis on the 
other. No central German government was to.be  established 'for the time being', but 'certain essential 
central German administrative departments' were to act under the direction of the Control Council .61 
Although the Potsdam Agreements were not initially treated as international treaties in a formal legal sense, as 
Frowein has demonstrated,62 nevertheless subsequent developments established that the parties regarded them as 
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binding international legal agreements.63 
The disinte2ration of the four-Power alliance within three years of the Potsdam Agreements has meant that there 
has never been a peace settlement with Germany, although there has been adherence to the territorial sovereignty 
agreements which were reached at Potsdam. However, there is lingering uncertainty, even nearly 45 years after 
the unconditional surrender of Germany, concerning the existing status of sovereignty within the Federal 
Republic of Germany The issue created considerable public concern in the Republic following the air-show 
tragedy at the United States base at Ramstein in September 1988. An indication of Germany's position is given 
in an article by Karl Feldmeyer in the Frankfurter Zeitung, 5 September 1988, which is reproduced in Appendix 
II in an English version. 
In the writer's view the nature and permissible extent of the authority of the occupying powers when the London 
Agreement and Charter were executed may he more clearly discerned in the provisions adopted at Potsdam than in 
those relating to the trial of twenty four alleged German war criminals. The Potsdam Agreements are facts. They 
bind the States by which they were concluded, and France as well, to the extent to which that country consented 
to them.64 
Conclusion 
As has been indicated in this Chapter (supra, passim), the writer's view is that the London Agreement and 
Charter, which alone prescribed the law in accordance with which the Nuremberg indictment was tried, were a 
valid exercise of legislative authority vested in the four Allied Powers by virtue of their sovereignty over 
Germany in the circumstances which have been discussed. It is true that in order to give that exercise of 
legislative authority the imprimatur of justice and fairness as practised by civilised countries, the legislative 
provisions should not have exceeded in severity as against the accused the standards of conduct in war which had 
gained, or were capable, once formulated, of receiving the approbation of a highly preponderant proportion of 
those countries. These qualifications were fulfilled. 
If the Nuremberg Tribunal had rested its judgment on its assertion, which was correct beyond argument, that the 
law of the Charter was 'decisive and binding' on it, as Mr Justice Jackson (see this Chapter, footnote 32) urged it 
to do and as Sir Hartley Shawcross also argued,65 much of the disputation concerning the Nuremberg trial would 
have been avoided. 
In recognising the legally binding character of the Charter, the Tribunal did not attempt to find the facts and 
propound the legal consequences of the facts, relating to the legal status of Germany at the time the London 
Agreement and Charter were executed. If it had done so, it may well have avoided the °biter pronouncements 
concerning the existing state of international law with regard to Crimes against Peace, and thereby withheld from 
some writers the opportunity to criticise it for having gone outside its jurisdiction. In that respect, the writer is 
bound to concur with Viscount Maugham's criticism (see this Chapter, supra). The situation is the more 
difficult to understand because the Tribunal was clearly of the view that, as it stated, the London Agreement and 
Charter were the expression of the sovereign legislative authority of the four Allied Powers. 
The writer is unable to avoid the conclusion that, for reasons either of compromise or in order to answer critics, 
the Tribunal felt it necessary to support the validity of such authority by an obiter examination of existing 
international law and was thereby led to the view it expressed that the Pact of Paris was in itself a basis for the 
definition of 'Crimes against Peace' in paragraph 6(a) of the Charter.66 It is later argued that the Pact of Paris 
was merely one factor in stamping as just and fair the prescriptive provisions of the Charter. The obiter 
reasoning of the Tribunal, which was marked by extremely sparse citation of authority,67 was not convincing, in 
the writer's respectful view, and weakened the juridical force of the judgment. Further, although the Tribunal 
referred to the capacity of international law to expand in a manner analogous to the development of the common 
law, it did not emphasise that jurisprudential reality, but, rather, obscured it by its concentration on the effect of 
the Pact of Paris.68 The writer expresses the same view regarding the insistence of Lord Wright, in passages 
cited supra, that the provisions of the Charter concerning 'Crimes against Peace' were merely a recognition of 
existing international law. 
When the Tribunal, on the second day of the trial, as stated supra gave its ruling on the preliminary defence 
motion (Chapter 17, Appendix I), it virtually invited defence counsel to raise the issues which they later argued 
unsuccessfully. Thereby the Tribunal depreciated its judgment that the Charter was decisive and binding on it. 
351 
In the next section of this Chapter the writer considers the analogy, so far as international law is concerned, of 
the development of the common law. 
THE ANALOGY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON LAW 
... the crime against the peace undoubtedly rests directly upon international law ... It is 
immaterial whether the Charter and the Judgment of Nuremberg created new international law 
or whether existing international law has only been clarified. At any rate, the direct effect of 
international law on the individual implies a welcome weakening of the sovereignty of the 
individual states. Only by the removal of this . sovereignty can a collective order be created 
which guarantees to all states and men security and peace. 
(Dr. Karl-Heinz Liiders, Regierungs-Direktor in the Ministry of the Interior of the German 
Federal Republic in Bonn, 'The Nuremberg Judgment', Nurembera: German Views of the War 
Trials, edited by Benton and Grimm, Southern Methodist University Press, Dallas, 1955, pp. 
131-132). 
It is of interest and significance that Dr. Liiders, who held a senior administrative legal office in the German 
Government in 1955, should have strongly defended the validity of the Nuremberg process and at the same time 
recognised the 'development of a complex of common law in international law'. He stated: 
Independent of general international law, we Germans cannot raise any objections against these 
proceedings--from the legal standpoint— because with the unconditional surrender we have agreed to all 
measures of the Allies which are compatible with the commandments of humanity and that part of the 
principles of international law which is indispensable as a moral minimum.69 
In order to evaluate the capacity, within the body of international law, for the application of rules and principles 
in a manner analogous to the development of the common law, it is necessary to consider the views of writers of 
acknowledged soundness, as well as judicial authority. 
In one of a series of lectures delivered to the Law Schools of several American universities in 1903, Sir 
Frederick Pollock referred to 'the other great cosmopolitan offshoot of the Law of Nature, namely international 
law' and rejected the views of what he termed the so-called analytical school' for 'not allowing the law of nations 
to be truly law at all'. He stated: 
It is said that a system of rules cannot be law when it lacks the sanction of a tribunal and of regular 
decisions; and the view that international law depends merely on convention (which Lord Stowell 
declared to be fit only for Barbary pirates) may be found not only in text books, but in reported 
judgments given in cases of great importance. I do not admit the validity of the argument, if the fact 
were as alleged; but the supposed fact is in truth subject to large exceptions. Not only international 
questions of allegiance and territorial jurisdiction, of the existence and consequences of war between 
foreign powers (whether officially recognized as sovereign states or not), of blockade and its incidents, 
and the like, may be and frequently have been the subjects of decision in municipal courts; but a 
material part of the law of war, namely the law of prize. has been administered, and still may be, by 
courts of admiralty, and expressly as an international and not as a local law. Prize courts administer the 
law of nations and have never purported to administer anything else. "The seat of judicial authority is 
locally here, in the belligerent country, according to the known law and practice of nations, but the law 
itself has no locality." This is only a sample of Lord Stowell's utterances.70 
Sir Frederick Pollock asserted that it was beyond doubt that Lord Stowell conceived himself to be administering 
a law that was jul aentium in the fullest sense, a rule not of local but of universal obligation. He added: 
The same view has been consistently held and applied in the Supreme Court of the United States; I 
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should rather think, indeed, that American jurists regard it as elementary. Thus although it is true that 
for some parts of the law of nations there is at present no tribunal, or none with coercive jurisdiction, it 
is equally true that a considerable part of it is actually within the sphere of positive jurisprudence.71 
An authority frequently cited is that of the United States supreme Court in New Jersey v. Delaware 291 U.S. 
p.361. Although the issue involved a civil matter—the situation of the true boundary between the two States in 
the absence of any treaty or convention and no conduct or other act of dominion by either State to give the 
boundary a practical location—the opinion of the Court, delivered by Mr Justice Cardozo, stated the following 
general principles: 
The capacity of the law to develop and apply a formula consonant with justice and with the political and 
social needs of the international legal system is not lessened by the fact that at the creation of the 
boundary the formula of the Thalweo had only a germinal existence. The gap is not so great that 
adjudication may not fill it. ... International law, the law that governs between States, has at times, like 
the common law within States, a twilight existence during which it is hardly distinguishable from 
morality or justice, till at length the imprimatur of a court attests its jural quality. The gradual 
consolidation of opinions and habits has been doing its quiet work.' (Vinogradoff, Custom and Right, p. 
21).72 
In academic literature there has been a surprising reluctance on the part of authors to recognise the potentiality of 
international law to develop and apply expanded concepts in the same way as the common law has done for 
centuries. However, Professor Woetzel, writing in 1960, stated: 
It has been shown that international law advances from case to case much like the common law. Some 
authors have maintained, therefore, that regardless of whether there exist precedents or codified 
provisions in international law to conclude that a certain crime is an international delict an international 
court can interpret international law and add to it through its decisions. Thus, it can define a certain act 
as an international crime or indicate its criminal character in international law.73 
Nevertheless, the cited view of Professor Woetzel ignores the fact that, so far as 'Nuremberg Law' was 
concerned, the resort to growth on lines analogous to those which have marked the evolution of the common 
law was manifested by the London Agreement and Charter and not, except by obiter pronouncements, in the 
Tribunal's judgment. 
Another notable exception was Professor Glueck, who, in a discussion of 'Crimes against Peace' expressly used 
the words 'modern international common law': 
Every recognition of custom as evidence of law must have a beginning some time; and there has never 
been a more justifiable stage in the history of international law than the present, to recognize that by 
the common consent of civilised nations as expressed in numerous solemn agreements and public 
pronouncements the instituting or waging of an aggressive war is an international crime.74 
One of the most recent and authoritative judicial descriptions of the manner in which, and the purposes for 
which, the common law has evolved in English law is that of the House of Lords in Shaw  v. Director of Public 
Prosecutions (1962) A.C. p. 220. The appellant was convicted at the Central Criminal Court on three counts 
which alleged the following offences: (1) conspiracy to corrupt public morals; (2) living on the earnings of 
prostitution; and (3) publishing an obscene publication. He appealed against conviction to the Court of Criminal 
Appeal on all three counts. His appeal was dismissed, but that court certified that points of law of general public 
importance were involved in the decision on the first and second counts and gave him leave to appeal on them to 
the House of Lords. It refused so to certify in respect of the third count. By a majority appeal. 
Viscount Simonds said, at p. 267: 
The fallacy in the argument that was addressed to us lay in the attempt to exclude from the scope of 
general words acts well calculated to corrupt public morals just because they had not been committed or 
had not been brought to the notice of the court before. It is not thus that the common law has developed 
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... In the sphere of criminal law I entertain no doubt that there remains in the courts of law a residual 
power to enforce the supreme and fundamental purpose of the law, to conserve not only the safety and 
order but also the moral welfare or the State and that it is their duty to guard it against attacks which 
may be the more insidious because they are novel and unprepared for. ... But gaps remain and will 
always remain since no one can foresee every way in which the wickedness of man may disrupt the order 
of society. 
Lord Tucker adopted a similar approach to Count 1 of the indictment. He cited the following extract from the 
judgment of Parke J. in Mirehouse v. Rennell (1833 1 Cl. & F. 527, at p.546): 
The case, therefore, is in some sense new, as many others are which continually occur; but we have no 
right to consider it, because it is new, as one for which the law has not provided at all; and because it 
has not yet been decided, to decide it for ourselves, according to our own judgment of what is just and 
expedient. Our common law system consists in the applying to new combinations of circumstances 
those rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents ... It appears to me to be 
of great importance to keep this principle of decision steadily in view, not merely for the determination 
of the particular case, but for the interests of law as a science. 
Lord Wright, as noted supra, vigorously argued that the London Agreement and Charter were declaratory of 
existing international law. In his Foreword to History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission 
(1948), he invoked what he termed 'the growth of the common law of war'. However, in the Introductory Chapter 
to that work, Lord Wright expressed the following views (p. 8): 
International law is a product of natural law, that is, it has grown from the workings of the moral 
impulses and needs of mankind by a sort of instinctive growth, as well as by edicts or decrees or 
authoritative pronouncements. In this it resembles all customary law. Indeed it is in itself a body of 
customary law. Its dictates take shape and definition particularly when they are acted upon and are 
recogised by the common consensus of mankind and are administered and enforced by competent courts. 
... But international law is not the law of any single nation. Any nation may act upon it and adopt it 
and in that sense it may be said to be the law of that nation, but it is still international law, which is 
the law of the community of nations. 
A degree of ambivalence in the presentation by Lord Wright of his fundamental proposition appears in 
the following extract from the same Introductory Chapter (p. 19): 
Even if I were wrong in my view that the positive law announcing the crime and defining the 
criminality was in existence  at all times material, at least the criminality of wholesale murder and the 
like was apparent and all that was lacking was some precise enunciation of positive law and 
punishment; that defect could, in my opinion, be made good by subsequent declaration and clarification 
of the particular breach of law and the punishment. If it were necessary, I could go further and say that 
the definition of a clear and atrocious moral offence as being also an offence of positive law can be 
lawfully made by the competent court or legislature. This indeed is the normal method of developing 
international law which extends its boundaries on the principle of analogy just as the common law has 
done. (emphasis added). 
The difficulty that the writer finds with Lord Wright's expositions is that they appear to involve two confusions: 
first, the assertion that all the counts for which the London Charter provided were valid under existing 
international law, but, in the alternative, recourse could be had to the development of international law on 
principles analogous to the evolution of the common law; second, if the true basis of 'Nuremberg Law' was its 
conformity with common law growth, either the competent court or a legislature could be the vehicle for 
defining certain crimes as crimes of positive law. The latter argument does not pay regard to the fact that the 
Charter defined all the four counts in the indictment, not the Tribunal, except to the extent to which it gave 
approval to such definition by °biter pronouncements. • The author's respectful view is that the alternative 
bases advanced by Lord Wright contributed to the criticisms of `Nuremberg Law'. 
It seems that Lord Wright reverted to his original tenet when he wrote in the Foreword to volume 15 of the Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals  (pp- viii-ix): 
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Al I want to emphasise at the moment is that the law of war is a definite body of jurisprudence, 
giving a 'standard certain', to quote the words of Scott and Lancing in the Minority Report 
annexed to the Report of the Commission on Responsibilities issued at the end of World War I. 
One of the most incisive expositions of the argument that international law is capable of development in the 
mould of the common law was contained in the opening address of Mr. Justice Jackson at Nuremberg: 
It is true of course, that we have no judicial precedent for the Charter. But international law is more 
than a scholarly collection of abstract and immutable principles. It is an outgrowth of treaties and 
agreements between nations and of accepted customs. Yet every custom has its origin in some single 
act, and every agreement has to be initiated by the action of some state. Unless we are prepared to 
abandon every principle of growth for international law, we cannot deny that our own day has the right 
to institute customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a newer and 
strengthened international law. International law is not capable of development by the normal processes 
of legislation ... international law grows, as did the common law, through decisions reached from time 
to time in adopting settled principles to new situations. The fact is that when the law evolves by the 
case method, as did the common law and as international law must do if it is to advance at all, it 
advances at the expense of those who wrongly guessed the law and learned too late their error.75 
I consider the only criticism which can be made of the cited passage is that those who were tried and convicted at 
Nuremberg did not incorrectly 'guess the law' but simply ignored it, in both its existing and, by legislative 
prescription, potential forms. 
Brigadier General Taylor echoed the approach of Mr. Justice Jackson: 
International law ... must grow as did the common law in the days of its rude origins, before there were 
statutes, judicial opinions and legal definitions ... International jurisprudence must, therefore, by its 
very nature lie closer to the historical than the analytical school, and international law is generally 
customary rather than positive.76 
A number of the Tribunals in the 'Subsequent Proceedings' at Nuremberg considered the analogy of the 
development of the common law in relation to 'Crimes against Peace'. However, since Article X of Military 
Government Ordinance No.7 (see Annexe 2 to Chapter 13) provided that determinations of the International 
Military Tribunal relating, inter alia, to aggressive wars should be binding on those Tribunals, their 
pronouncements lacked the juridical authority of the I.M.T. Nevertheless, some of the opinions expressed by 
the American Tribunals support the fundamental argument relating to the common law analogy, for example, in 
the Ministries Case (see Case No.11, Chapter 13), the Tribunal stated: 'We think it may be said the basic law ... 
[the London Charter, supplemented by Control Council Law No.10] simply declared, developed and implemented 
international common law.'  (emphasis added). Again, in the same case, it was stated: 
... international common law grows out of the common reactions and the composite thinking with 
respect to recurring situations by the various states composing the family of nations ... 
While it is undoubtedly true that international common law in case of conflict with state law takes 
precedence over it and while it is equally true that absolute unanimity among all the states in the family 
of nations is not required to bring an international common law into being, it is scarcely a tenable 
proposition that international common law will run counter to the consensus within any considerable 
number of nations.77 
In its exposition of the 'Law of the Charter', the International Military Tribunal did not develop the doctrine of 
international common law in the sense in which it has been discussed in this study. Whilst recognising the 
decisive and binding force of the Charter, it preferred to support the validity of the legislative instrument under 
which it was created essentially by invoking the Pact of Paris and the 'international history which preceded it'. 
The Tribunal, without referring to any analogy with the common law, merely stated: 
The law of war is to be found not only in treaties, but in the customs and practices of states which 
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gradually obtained universal recognition, and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and 
practised by military courts. This law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a 
changing world. Indeed, in many cases treaties do no more than express and define for more accurate 
reference the principles of law already existing.78 
Conclusion on the validity of 'Nuremberg Law' 
An analysis of the literature, to some of which reference has been made in its section, indicates that there were, 
and that there remain, three principal divergent opinions in respect of the legal soundness of the London 
Agreement and Charter. The writer will argue that a fourth distinct view is the correct one, and that, although its 
expression can at times be discerned to a limited extent, it has not been advanced in the simple, uncomplicated 
manner which it merits. These opposed attitudes will now be examined. 
First, there are those who assert that the Agreement and Charter were legally valid instruments because they were 
an application of existing international law, an argument which the writer rejects. The practical importance of 
that argument is that, if it were correct, it validates in itself the definition of 'Crimes against Peace' in paragraph 
6(a) of the Charter, without the need for any further justification. 
The etymology of the verb 'to exist' shows its early use as an auxiliary 'to be' and, in Middle English, as 
denoting 'reality'. Its more modern denotation is simply 'being; the fact or state of existing' (Shorter Oxford 
English Dictionary, vol. 1, p. 702). 
A legal rule, for the purposes of international law, especially one which may attract penal consequences, can only 
'exist' in one of two ways: (a) by a statement of the rule in a form which makes it clear that it is accepted as 
binding either universally or by the vast majority of the community of civilised nations (for example, in a treaty, 
convention or agreement); or (h) that it is otherwise part of customary international law by virtue of it being 
recognised or practised in the course of inter-relationships between consenting civilised countries. 
It is submitted that the 'existence' of 'Crimes against Peace', as defined in the Charter, was not established in 
August 1945 because neither of the two stated criteria was applicable. The two strongest protagonists for the 
opinion that the Charter was the expression of international law 'existing' at the time of its creation were the 
Tribunal itself and Lord Wright. Neither was prepared to concede that there was a clear alternative and single 
basis on which the validity of the Agreement and Charter should be based, although Lord Wright, in the passage 
cited supra in this Chapter, gave qualified approval to what he termed 'the principle of analogy after the practice 
of the common law. The Tribunal based its reasoning principally on the Pact of Paris, which is considered, as a 
separate matter, later in this Chapter. 
Second. defence counsel at Nuremberg and a number of authors have claimed that the legal fallacy in 'Nuremberg 
Law' was that it was in conflict with two maxims or principles which are fundamental to a sound jurisprudence: 
the exp facto principle and the maxim 'nullum crimen nulla poena  in  leae'. The writer views these two 
concepts as cognate and will later treat them together. 
The short answer to the arguments based on them is that, if it is accepted that the London Agreement and Charter 
were intrinsically legally valid in the circumstances which existed in Germany between 8 May and 8 August 
1945, as we argue was the position, then neither concept was relevant or capable in a legal sense of affecting the 
untrammelled sovereign legislative authority of the Allied Powers. 
The writer's argument may be appreciated more clearly if it were assumed that the Nuremberg trial had taken 
place before a jury, in the manner recognised by Anglo-American criminal jurisprudence. In such a case, the 
Tribunal would have been bound to direct the jury that if it was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that all the 
elements of a particular count had been established, then, applying the law as directed by the Tribunal, the jury 
should convict an accused. Further, in view of the fact that the Tribunal was of the opinion that the provisions of 
the Charter were binding and decisive, like the terms of a national criminal code, it would have been obliged to 
direct the jury that it should ignore extraneous arguments or issues. On that analOgy, the two cognate concepts 
were extraneous and irrelevant and should not have entered into the Tribunal's consideration. In stating in its 
judgment that 'in view of the great importance of the questions of law involved, the Tribunal has heard full 
argument from the Prosecution and the Defence, and will express its view on the matter79, the Tribunal not 
only went beyond its jurisdiction but also misdirected itself. When a court, sitting without a jury, hears a 
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criminal charge, it is bound to direct itself, on both the facts and the law, in accordance with appropriate legal 
principles, and the absence of a jury doe snot in any way relieve it of this obligation (cf. the Irish courts 
established for the trial of persons involved in terrorist activities, which are comprised of judges who sit without 
a jury, as in the case of those charged with the murder of Lord Mountbatten). 
A third viewpoint, to which reference has been made supra in this Chapter, is that of Dr. Liiders, who argued that 
it was immaterial whether or not the London Agreement and Charter prescribed new international law, as distinct 
from clarifying existing international law. The difficulty in accepting that argument is that it does not explain 
what Dr. Liiders meant by 'clarification'; nor does it import, either expressly or by implication, the notion of 
analogy with the development of the common law. Further, in the cited passage Dr. Liiders did not draw any 
distinction between the Charter and the Judgment of the Tribunal. 
The view advanced in this study is that the London Agreement and Charter, executed by representatives of the 
governments of the four Allied Powers which were in occupation of the whole of Germany, constituted a valid 
enactment within their legislative authority as joint sovereigns of the territory of the Third Reich. As was stated 
in the fourth preambular paragraph, the Agreement was concluded by the four governments 'acting in the interests 
of all the United Nations and 12y their representatives duly authorised thereto'. (emphasis added). The Agreement 
did not specify which countries comprised the 'United Nations', but there can be no doubt that they included the 
four signatories and at least nineteen other countries, the governments of which expressed their adherence to the 
Agreement (Article 5). Certainly there has not been any challenge to the factual position that the vast majority of 
the civilised countries of the world were party to, or privy to, the Agreement. 
There is impressive support in the literature for the proposition that international law is a living jurisprudential 
entity designed to enhance the peaceful and orderly relationships between nations, just as municipal laws exist to 
regulate, in the public interest, the societies of individual countries. International law has developed slowly, 
partly because there is no international legislature and, in criminal matters, no international judicial body to 
enforce it. Nevertheless it is idle to deny the jurisprudential capacity of international law to expand its 
proscriptions in order to deal justly and fairly with new situations, whether or not they could or should have been 
foreseen. It is that capacity which is the rationale of the common law. Without it, especially in modern world 
society, the body of law which scholars such as Grotius espoused would be sterile and destined to decay. 
Fortunately, that possibility was foreclosed by the London Agreement and Charter, followed by the judgment of 
the Tribunal and the unanimous affirmation by the General Assembly of the United Nations Organisation on 11 
December 1946 of 'the principles of international law recognised by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and 
the judgment of the Tribunal'. In a report delivered before the General Assembly on 24 October 1946, the 
Secretary-General stated: 
In the interest of peace, and in order to protect mankind against future wars, it will be of decisive 
significance to have the principles which were implied in the Nuremberg trials, and according to which 
the German war criminals were sentenced, made a permanent part of the body of international law as 
quickly as possible. 
From now on the instigators of new wars must know that there exist both law and punishment for their 
crimes. Here we have a high inspiration to go forward and begin the task of working toward a revitalised 
system of international law.80 
It is a matter of regret that many critical writers on 'Nuremberg Law' have perceived the trial in terms of theory 
and, at times, philosophy. The answer to their arguments is in the words of Brigadier General Taylor: 
'International jurisprudence must, ... by its very nature, lie closer to the historical than the analytical school, and 
international law is generally customary rather than positive. This viewpoint is in tune both with that of the 
libertarian, utilitarian and often free-thinking Founding Fathers and that of Roman Catholic theological 
jurisprudence. The theory and practice of the international law of war abundantly manifest its customary 
basis.'81 
The same theme was expressed by Professor Glueck: 
So is it with modern international common law, in prohibiting aggressive war on pain of punishment. 
Every recognition of custom as evidence of law must have a beginning some time; and there has never 
been a more justifiable stage in the history of international law than the present, to recognize that my 
the common consent of civilized nations as expressed in numerous solemn agreements and public 
pronouncements the instituting or waging of an aggressive war is an international crime.82 
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From the turn of the nineteenth century until 1939 there were considerable advances in the written expression of 
binding rules relating to warfare. The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 initiated those advances, which were 
extended by the Geneva Conventions of 1929. Germany ratified (with reservations) the 1907 Convention and the 
1929 Conventions. Professor Glueck has stated: 
The Hague and Geneva Conventions, to be sure, took for granted the legality of war; but, from motives 
both of humanitarianism and mutual prudence, they went so far in the direction of limiting the methods 
of opening hostilities (Hague Convention (III), 1907) and conducting war, as to be signposts on the 
road toward a growing conviction that aggressive war must somehow be abolished.83 
Article 227 of the. Treaty of Versailles provided for the public arraignment of Kaiser Wilhelm II 'for a supreme 
offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties' before a special tribunal composed of five 
judges, one appointed by each of the Allied and Associated Powers (the United States of America, Great Britain, 
France, Italy and Japan). Although the Article did not refer expressly to 'crimes against peace' or 'aggressive war', 
it certainly contained the germ of the proscription of aggressive war and asserted the justiciability of charges 
against those accused of such offences before an inter-Allied tribunal. 
The Nuremberg Tribunal recognised the international history which preceded the Pact of Paris.84 It is 
significant that the draft of a treaty of mutual assistance prepared under the auspices of the League of Nations in 
1923 provided that 'aggressive war is an international crime' and that the parties would 'undertake that no one of 
them will be guilty of its commission'. Germany was, of course, not a member of the League of Nations. The 
draft was submitted to twenty-nine States, about half of which approved the text. In the case of the other 
nations, their reluctance stemmed principally from their views concerning the difficulties in agreeing upon a 
definition of what constituted 'aggresive war', just as the United Nations Organisation was unable to agree upon 
an appropriate definition until 1974. The failure to achieve the adoption of the draft should not therefore be seen 
as a negation of the principle that aggressive war was an international crime, but rather as a manifestation of the 
problems which it was perceived could arise in its practical application. Moreover, the United States of America 
could not adhere to the draft because it was not a member of the League. 
The discussion in its judgement by the Nuremberg Tribunal of the significance of what is commonly 
known as the 1924 Geneva Protocol is convincing: 
The preamble to the League of Nations Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes ..., 
after 'recognising the solidarity of the members of the international community' declared that 'a war of 
aggression constitutes a violation of this solidarity and is an international crime'. It went on to declare 
that the contracting parties were 'desirous of facilitating the complete application of the system provided 
in the Covenant of the League of Nations for pacific settlement of disputes between the states and of 
ensuring the repression of international crimes'. The Protocol was recommended to the members of the 
League of Nations by a unanimous resolution in the Assembly of the forty eight members of the 
League. These members included Italy and Japan, but Germany was not then a member of the League. 
Although the Protocol was never ratified, it was signed by the leading statesmen of the world, 
representing the vast majority of the civilised states and peoples, and may be regarded as strong evidence 
of the intention to brand aggressive war as all international crime.85 
The next significant development was the unanimous adoption of a declaration relating to aggressive war by the 
Assembly of the League of Nations on 24 September 1927, including representatives of Germany, Italy and 
Japan. The preamble stated: 
The Assembly; Recognising the solidarity which unites the community of nations; Being inspired by a 
firm desire for the maintenance of general peace; Being convinced that a war of aggression can never 
serve as a means of settling international disputes, and is in consequence an international crime ... 
As Glueck has said, the preamble to the Declaration shows 'how strong was the conviction that the time had 
arrived, in the affairs of states and their peoples, to call a spade a spade'. 86 
Shortly before the signing of the Pact of Paris, twenty one American Republics, meeting at the Sixth (Havana) 
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Pan-American Conference, unanimously resolved on 18 February 1928 that 'war of aggression constitutes an 
international crime against the human species'. It could not be doubted that the intention of the resolution was to 
designate aggressive war as criminal within the jurisprudence of international law. 
There followed the signing on 27 August 1928 of the Pact of Paris which, because it involves questions of legal 
construction and was relied upon so strongly by the prosecution and, in turn, by the Nuremberg Tribunal, will be 
considered separately later in this Chapter. 
There does not appear in the literature any significant denial of the lawful authority of the Allied Powers to put 
into effect legislative provisions for the general government of the territory over which they exercised undisputed 
sovereignty. To the extent to which that sovereign authority is disputed, attention should be drawn to the 
'denazification' policies which the Allies pursued for several years through the authorities, the Spruchkammer and 
the Spruchgericht. the policies were stated in legislation. The basic purpose was 'liberation from national 
socialism and militarism'. Ruckerl has thus described the administrative procedure: 
This legislation stipulated that the political and social record of every adult German citizen should be 
examined in order to establish whether, and, if so, to what extent he had engaged in Nazi activities, to 
begin with, the operation was carried out with the help of a lengthy questionnaire (comprising no fewer 
than 131 questions in the American Zone of Occupation, for example). The idea was that it would 
enable a preliminary decision to be taken on the extent of individual guilt. If certain precondiitons-
named in the law—were fulfilled, the denazification courts and tribunals classified 'those concerned' into 
one of the following categories: exonerated, follower only, lesser offender, offender and major offender. 
Apart from the group of exonerated persons, classification in one of the above-named groups incurred 
appropriate penalties. These ranged from the imposition of a fine to a committal order for confinement 
in a labour camp for a maximum period of ten years. The fact that a person had belonged to a Nazi 
organisation in some function or other provided sufficient prima facie evidence to incriminate him. The 
onus of proving that appearances were deceptive rested on his shoulders.87 
The comprehensive character of the denazification policies is illustrated by the fact that when the courts and 
tribunals ceased activities in the first half of the 1950s, they had imposed penalties of fines or imprisonment for 
several years on more than one and a half million persons in the three Western Zones of Occupation.88 
It is difficult to distinguish logically, except as a matter of degree, between the London Charter and the 
denazification laws because in each case the legislation was essentially punitive and without any 'existing' 
positive precedent. 
The author's thesis involves the proposition that there was no rule of international law which prevented the 
enactment of legislation which expressed in written form the criminal character of the planning, initiation and 
waging of a war of aggression. The criminality of such conduct had been attested by the actions, utterances and 
declarations on the part of the very large majority of civilised countries over a period of some decades. All that 
was needed was a formal prescription of what was a consensual affirmation by the Community of Nations, 
combined with the establishment of an appropriate judicial organ to exercise jurisdiction. As has already been 
stated, the only restrictions on the content of the legislation were those which civilised countries recognised as 
necessary to ensure a just and fair trial for those accused. It is a submitted that the London Agreement and 
Charter recognised those restrictions. Finally it cannot be overlooked that twenty three nations were signatories 
or adherents to the London Charter, that the Tribunal, albeit obiter, confirmed its legality and that the United 
Nations Organisation unanimously affirmed the 'principles of international law recognised by the Charter.' 
The Charter was the outgrowth of international common law, in no way different in principle or purpose from 
the evolvement of the common law of Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. What had been mascent prior to 8 August 
1945 attained fulfilment on that day. 
THE CHARACTER AND COMPOSITION OF THE NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL 
There has been some limited criticism, essentially technical or semantic, concerning the nature and 
composition of the International Military Tribunal. It is submitted that the general nature of the Tribunal 
was correctly described by Mr. Justice Jackson in his closing address: 
359 
In interpreting the Charter ... we should not overlook the unique and emergent character of this body as 
an International Military Tribunal. It is no part of the constitutional mechanism of internal justice of 
any of the signatory nations. Germany has unconditionally surrendered, but no peace treaty has been 
signed or agreed upon. The Allies are still technically in a state of war with Germany, although the 
enemy's political and military institutions have collapsed. As a military tribunal, this tribunal is a 
continuation of the war effort of the Allied nations. As an International Tribunal, it is not bound by the 
procedural and substantive refinements of our respective judicial or constitutional systems, nor will its 
rulings introduce precedents into any country's internal system of civil justice. As an International 
Military Tribunal, it rises above the provincial and transient and seeks guidance not only from 
international law but also from the basic principles of jurisprudence which are assumptions of 
civilization and which long have found embodiment in the codes of all nations.89 
Although it has been suggested that the expression 'inter-Allied' would have been a more appropriate 
description of the Tribunal, there is no basis for criticising the use of the adjective 'international', which 
simply means 'existing, constituted, or carried on between different nations'.90 Although an orthodox 
international tribunal is established as a result of the agreement of the parties involved, the debellatio of Germany 
made it impossible for the Tribunal to the international so far as the former Reich was concerned. There is no 
evidence that the Allied Powers ever contemplated a tribunal which was 'international' in a universal sense. They 
had in mind a restricted juridicial body, similar to that for which the Treaty of Versailles following the First 
World War made provision. Moreover, as asserted in the Moscow Declaration of 30 October 1943, the policy of 
the Allied Powers was that major war criminals, whose crimes had no particular geographical location, would be 
punished pursuant to the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies. There was no rule of international law 
which prevented the four Allies from combining to take joint action in the same way as any one of them could 
have acted individually. The Nuremberg Tribunal acknowledged in its judgment the validity of such joint 
action.91 Further, the Allied Powers delegated to the Control Council for Germany the power at any time to 
reduce or otherwise alter the sentences (Article 29 of the Charter). Schwarzenberger summarised his views as 
follows: 
... the international character of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals was formal rather than substantive. 
They were international because they rested on a consensual international basis. Yet, in substance, they 
were joint tribunals of the Powers that created these ad hoc institutions.92 
There can be no doubt that the Tribunal was 'military' in its essential character. The authority for its 
establishment was the product of the unconditional surrender of Germany and its debellatio, each of which facts 
was fundamentally 'military'. As experts in military law have assertec1,93 there was no rule or practice' which 
prevented non-military persons being appointed members of the Tribunal. It seems that the senior Russian judge 
Nilcitchenko was specially qualified: his title was 'Major-General Jurisprudence'. One advantage of designating the 
Tribunal as a military organ, bound by the prescriptions in the Charter and the rules of evidence and procedure for 
which it made provision, was that particular municipal law and practice were not relevant to its deliberations, 
except, when necessary, for the purposes of comparative analogy. Further, as the Tribunal stated in its 
judgment, 'It is not to be doubted that any nation has the right to set up special courts to administer law'.94 
The trial at Nuremberg was before a 'Tribunal'. It was not designated a 'court'. As a Tribunal, it bore two 
features: it was ad hoc and judicial in a broad sense. Schwarzenberger wrote: 
To assess the judicial standards attained at Nuremberg and Tokyo, it would be unfair to compare the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo proceedings with those of peacetime courts in the most advanced national 
communities. It is more appropriate to judge them against the background of the minimum standards 
expected to be observed by civilised belligerents under the laws of war. 
Judged by these standards, the Charters of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals were considerably more 
protective of the interests of the accused than the minimum requirements of international law required.95 
Some writers, very few of them lawyers, have referred in a derogatory manner to the Nuremberg trial as a 
manifestation of 'victors' justice', 96 and it has been suggested that the Tribunal should have been constituted 
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with some 'neutral' judges. This criticism ignores the fact that because the areas in which Germany waged its 
aggressive wars were vast and widespread it would have been difficult to select a responsible and civilised country 
which could have provided a judge with appropriate qualifications. Moreover, if one or more German judges had 
been included, the major Allied Powers would, no doubt, have feared a repition of the farcical example of bias 
demonstrated during the Leipzig trials following the First World War: In the author's view, the trial at Tokyo 
was depreciated by the fact that the Tribunal compised eleven judges from different countries, some of whom 
lacked the judicial stature of those who sat at Nuremberg. The claim of 'victors justice' is without substance. 
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF THE PACT OF PARIS 
The Kellogg -Briand Pact ('the Pact of Paris'), signed on 27 August 1928 by a large number of nations, including 
Germany, Italy and Japan, and later by other countries, was binding on sixty three States at the outbreak of war 
in 1939. At the Nuremberg trial, the Pact dominated the consideration of Count 2 of the indictment. It is 
proposed in this section to discuss the proper legal construction of the Pact and assess the extent to which the 
judgment of the Tribunal was in accordance with accepted legal principles of interpretation. 
Count 2 of the indictment charged all the defendants with participation in the planning, preparation, initiation 
and waging of wars of aggression, which were also wars in violation of international treaties, agreements and 
assurances, pursuant to paragraph 6(a) of the Charter. Particulars of the charge were contained in Appendix C to 
the indictment. Paragraph XIII of the Appendix alleged that: 
Germany did, in violation of the Pact of Paris, on or about the date specified in Column 1, with a 
military force, attack the sovereigns specified in Column 2, respectively, and resort to war against such 
sovereigns, in violation of its solemn declaration, condemning recourse to war for the solution of 
international controversies, its solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy in its 
relations with such sovereigns, and its solemn covenant that settlement or solution of all disputes or 
conflicts of whatever nature or origin arising between it and such sovereigns should never be sought 
except by pacific means. 
The sovereigns of ten countries were specified. 
Of the twenty six allegations of violations of treaties, agreements and assurances caused by the defendants in the 
course of planning, preparing and initiating the wars, the Tribunal in its judgment placed most emphasis on the 
Pact of Paris. Its conclusion amounted to the proposition that breach of the Pact of Paris in itself established, in 
appropriate cases depending on the facts, the guilt of twelve of the defendants under Count 2. It is this conclusion 
which the author disputes. 
In its judgment the Tribunal cited from the preamble of the Pact: 
Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind; persuaded that the time has 
come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end 
that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their peoples should be perpetuated ... all 
changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means ... thus uniting 
civilised nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of their national 
policy. 
The first two Articles of the Pact were then set out: 
Article 1: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that 
they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies and renounce it as an 
instrument of national policy in their relations to one another. 
Article 11: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or 
conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall 
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never be sought except by pacific means. 
The most significant pronouncements of the Tribunal were: 
In the opinion of the Tribunal, the solemn renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy 
necessarily involves the proposition that such a war is illegal in international law; and that those who 
plan and wage such a war, with its inevitable and terrible consequences, are committing a crime in so 
doing. War for the solution of international controversies undertaken as an instrument of national policy 
certainly includes a war of aggression, and such a war is therefore outlawed by the Pact. 
• • • 
In interpreting the words of the Pact, it must be remembered that international law is not the product of 
an international legislature, and that such international agreements as the Pact of Paris have to deal with 
general principles of law and not with administrative matters of procedure. The law of war is to he found 
not only in treaties but in the customs and practices of states which gradually obtained universal 
recognition, and from the general principles of justice applied by jurists and practised by military courts. 
This law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a changing world. In many cases 
treaties do no more than express and define for more accurate reference the principles of law already 
existing.97 
Finally, after a survey of what it termed 'the international history which preceded the Pact', the Tribunal stated: 
All these expressions of opinion, and others that could be cited, so solemnly made, reinforce the 
construction which the Tribunal placed upon the Pact of Paris, that resort to a war of aggression is not 
merely illegal, but is criminal.98 
The judgment of the Tribunal was in accord with the very strong submissions of Sir Hartley Shawcross, Chief 
Prosecutor for the United Kingdom, in his opening address. He argued that by the time Germany had 
accomplished its design of aggressive war against the civilised world, 'aggressive was had become, in virtue of 
the Pact of Paris and the other treaties and declarations ... illegal and a crime beyond all uncertainty and doubt. 
And it is on that proposition, and fundamentally on that universal treaty, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, that Count 
Two of this indictment is principally based.'99 
The address of Sir Hartley Shawcross was lengthy and impassioned. It was not until near its end that he used the 
words 'crime' or 'criminal' in relation to the Pact. He emphasised the express provision in the preamble that no 
State guilty of a violation of its terms might invoke its benefits, but thereby, it is submitted, exposed the 
weakness of the interpretation for which he areued. The address did not contain any compelling legal argument 
based on the actual construction of the document, but rather invective, of which the following is an example: 
Will it seriously be said by these defendants that such a war is only an offence, only an illegality, only 
a matter of condemnation perhaps sounding in damages, but not a crime justiciable by any Tribunal. No 
law worthy of the name can allow itself to be reduced to an absurdity in that way, and certainly the great 
powers responsible for this Charter were not prepared to admit it. 10° 
There was a mixed reception of the pronouncements of the Tribunal and the reasoning expressed in its judgment 
in relation to the Pact of Paris. A small proportion of writers gave the judgment full support; 101 some accepted 
it with qualificationsP2 others were ambivalent; 103 and a large proportion rejected it. 1°4 Selected examples are 
cited in footnotes 101-104, merely as being representative of the principal categories of the divergent views. 
The legal effect of the Pact of Paris has been one of the most controversial issues in any assessment of the 
validity of 'Nuremberg Law'. The author's views do not fit exactly into any of the four categories to which 
reference has been made above, probably because the approach we have adopted is purely that of a trial lawyer 
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rather than that of writers who have used an academic or theoretical basis for the expression of their views. 
The legal effect of the Pact of Paris has been one of the most controversial issues in any assessment of the 
validity of 'Nuremberg Law'. The author's views do not fit exactly into any of the four categories to which 
reference has been made above, probably because the approach we have adopted is purely that of a trial lawyer 
rather than that of writers who have used an academic or theoretical basis for the expression of their views. 
It is first necessary to draw a clear distinction between the pronouncements of the Tribunal and the reasoning 
which led to the framing of paragraph 6(a) of the Charter. The extracts from the judgment of the Tribunal cited 
supra were part of an exegesis which the Tribunal acknowledged was not 'strictly necessary' in view of the terms 
of the Charter. As such, its conclusions as to whether, and to what extent, aggressive war was a crime before the 
London Agreement were obiter dicta. By contrast, as we have argued, the provisions of the Charter were a 
legitimate expression of international common law. 
The task which the Tribunal assumed was to determine the legal effect of the Pact by the application of accepted 
principles of statutory construction. The over-riding obligation was to ascertain the intentions of the signatories 
as deduced from the plain and natural meaning of the words used, to construe the instrument as a whole, to 
consider the travaux preparatoires and to take into account the surrounding circumstances as an indication of the 
'mischief which the Pact was designed to remedy. 
It is a convenient starting point in reaching a correct interpretative judgment to consider a number of features of 
the Pact which were of a negative character, bearing in mind that the Tribunal concluded that the Pact established 
that aggressive war was a justiciable crime on the basis of lex lata. 
First, the Pact did not embrace aggressive war in any universal sense. There were at least six categories of war 
which were excluded from its operation, either expressly or by necessary implication. 
Second, the only express sanction for violation of the Pact was contained in the preamble, which provided that 
'any signatory power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied 
the benefits furnished by this treaty'. Even that sanction had virtually no coercive force because an aggressor 
nation could hardly have expected that once it had embarked on an aggressive war, at least some other nations 
which were parties to the Pact would have refrained from retaliatory hostilities. In fact, this was the position by 
virtue of the declaration by Great Britain of war on Germany on 3 September 1939. But the strongest argument, 
in the context of the construction of the instrument, is that if the signatories had intended to enter into a treaty 
whereby the planning and waging of aggressive war was declared to be an international crime, it would have been 
a simple drafting matter to have ensured that the Pact made express provision accordingly. That is the clear 
principle applicable in the construction of municipal penal statutes. In the author's view it is decisive. 
Third, the phraseology of the Pact was not that which would normally be used in an instrument intended to 
proscribe conduct as criminal, and make such conduct justiciable before a non-existing tribunal or court, with 
power to sentence persons to death. On analysis, the language used in the preamble reveals four pious 
assertions, which were essentially moralistic and humanitarian in charter. There followed three Articles, the third 
of which was merely administrative. The first two Articles were declaratory expressions of the intention of the 
parties to condemn recourse to 'war' (of which there was no definition) and to seek the resolution of disputes only 
by pacific means. Nevertheless, in three sentences the Tribunal concluded that the renunciation of war as an 
instrument of national policy 'necessarily involved' that such a war is criminal. 106 It is submitted that the 
conclusion is not supported by any convincing reasoning. 
Fourth, since the intention of the signatories was the essential question, it is noteworthy that the Pact did not 
contain any provisions for its enforcement as an international treaty prescribing a crime for which individuals 
could be punished. The Covenant of the League of Nations lacked any enforcement mechanism. The defect should 
not, in the writer's view, simply be dismissed as a matter of procedure. capable of being established in some 
manner in the event of violation of the Pact. 
The Tribunal was faced with the argument that 'the Pact does not expressly enact that [aggressive] wars are 
crimes or set up courts to try those who make such wars'. It attempted to meet that argument by its statement 
that 'to that extent the same is true with regard to the laws of war contained in the Hague Convention. The 
Hague Convention of 1907 prohibited resort to certain methods of waging war'. The Tribunal acknowledged that 
'for many years past ... military tribunals have tried and punished individuals guilty of violating the rules of land 
warfare laid down by this Convention. But this reasoning does not impress as being, convincing, because it does 
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not address the fundamental question of the intention of the parties. 
The tribunal purported to support its conclusion by citing a statement made by Mr. Stimson, Secretary of State 
of the United States, in 1932 that 'war between nations was renounced by the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand 
Treaty. This means that it has become throuehout the entire world ... an illegal thing. Hereafter, when nations 
engage in armed conflict, either one or both of them must be termed violators of this general treaty law ... we 
denounce them as lawbreakers'. 107 
As Viscount Maugham observed, that statement does not support the Tribunal's judgment because it clearly 
referred only to the nations which violated the Pact and not to individuals. More importantly, the Tribunal 
omitted any reference to the following statement by Mr. Stimson in the same speech: 
The Kellogg-Briand Pact provides for no sanctions of force. It does not require any signatory to 
intervene with measures of force in case the Pact is violated. Instead it rests upon the sanction of public 
opinion, which can be made one of the most potent sanctions of the world. Any other course, through 
the possibility of entangling the sienatories in international politics, would have confused the broad, 
simple aim of the treaty and prevented the development of that public opinion upon which it most 
surely relies. Public opinion is the sanction which lies behind all international intercourse in time of 
peace. Its efficacy depends upon the will of the people of the world to make it effective. If they desire to 
make it effective, it will be irresistible. 108 
Viscount Maueham cited from a book, published in 1948, of which Mr. Stimson was a joint author, 1 °9 in 
which it was stated: 
The Treaty contained no provision for enforcement, and one of its authors, Frank B. Kellogg, had 
specially stated that no enforcement was incumbent on the signatories. It was a pact of self-denial, and 
its weaknesses were soon to become apparent, but in the spring of 1929 it was young and undamaged 
and it fairly represented both the profoundly peaceful attitude of the Americans and their gross ignorance 
of what must be done to keep the peace unbroken. 
The author argues that it was unnecessary for the Tribunal to attempt to derive from the Pact of Paris the legal 
consequences which it attributed to the Pact. The treaty certainly was capable of taking its place in the historical 
evolution of the principle that aggressive war was a crime under international law for which individuals could 
bear personal liability. But it was not incumbent on the Tribunal to go beyond that point. It appears that the 
Tribunal was not prepared to recognise in positive and unambiguous terms, consonant with the provisions of the 
Charter, that international law had the capacity in 1945 to assert its intrinsic common law jurisprudence. The 
Tribunal did, however, state that 'this law is not static, but by continual adaptation follows the needs of a 
changing world'. 1 I° However, such adaptation had its place in the provisions of the Charter; the Pact of Paris 
was only one element in the evolutionary process. 
Professor Bassiouni's view was graphically expressed: 
To posit that 'Aggression' is an international crime in the absence of a specific conventional penal 
proscription requires stitching together the many international instruments, of varied legal significance 
and enforceability, over a period of 85 years along with the sporadic occasions evidencing the practices 
of states in prosecuting and punishing the perpetrators of such an offence or attempting to do so. Thus, 
it is the sum total of a historical baggage of doctrine, conventions, and other instruments and practices, 
which cumulatively evidences the world community's position that 'Aggression' is an international 
crime. 111 
'NULLUM CRIMEN SINE LEGE' and 'EX POST FACTO' 
Two jurisprudential principles, which are cognate and therefore will be discussed together, dominated the trial at 
Nuremberg: nullum crimen sine lege and ex post facto legislation. Once it is accepted that the London Charter 
was a valid exercise of legislative authority by the Allied Powers, the significance of the principles is not 
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relevant, and, in any event, is now academic. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider to what extent, if any, the 
principles affected the prescription of the law of the Charter. 
The Tribunal dealt briefly with the principles in its judgment: 
It was urged on behalf of the defendants that a fundamental principle of all law -- international and 
domestic — is that there can be no punishment of crime without a pre-existing law. 'NuIlum crimen 
sine leoe, nulla poena sine lege.' It was submitted that ex post facto punishment is abhorrent to the law 
of all civilised nations, that no sovereign power had made aggressive war a crime at the time the alleged 
criminal acts were committed, that no statute had defined aggressive war, that no penalty had been fixed 
for its commission, and no court had been created to try and punish offenders. 
In the first place, it is to be observed that the maxim nullum crimen sine lege is not a limitation of 
sovereignty, but is in general a principle of justice. To assert that it is unjust have attacked 
neighbouring states without warning is obviously untrue, for in such circumstances the attacker must 
know that he is doing wrong, and so far from it being unjust to punish him, it would be unjust if his 
wrong were allowed to go unpunished. Occupying the positions they did in the government of 
Germany, the defendants, or at least some of them must have known of the treaties signed by Germany, 
outlawing recourse to war for the settlement of international disputes; they must have known that they 
were acting in defiance of all international law when in complete deliberation they carried out their 
designs of invasion and aggression. On this view of the case alone, it would appear that the maxim has 
no application to the present facts. 112 
In Anglo-Saxon systems of law, the ex post facto principle finds expression in two ways. First, legislatures are 
extremely reluctant to enact laws which infringe the principle, but, at least in Australia, are prepared to do so in 
exceptional cases if convinced that it is fundamentally just and is necessary in the public interest. Second, in 
construing statutes, courts respect the principle unless the contrary intention of Parliament is manifestly 
apparent. The Tribunal was plainly correct in its view that the maxim was a 'principle of justice', rather than an 
entrenched and binding rule from which there should be no departure. 113 
German defence counsel were orthodox in their assertions of the applicability of the principle, but they did not 
advance any compelling reasons. They simply extracted the principle from municipal jurisprudence (other than 
that of Germany; see infra) and argued that it applied to the Nuremberg indictment, regardless of the facts. It was 
unconvincing advocacy. 114 
In the writer's view, Professor Brownlie adopted a common-sense position when he wrote: 
The question whether the provisions in the Nuremberg Charter for punishment of crimes against peace infringed 
the principle nulla poena sine lege is now academic, except in so far as it is possible to argue that the value of 
the trial as a precedent would be impaired by any retroactivity. Post-war controversy produced these standpoints 
inter alia: (1) the law; (2) that it was a principle of justice and was not infringed provided the illegality of 
aggressive war was known to the accused: (3) the retroactivity was procedural and not substantive; (4) there was 
no retroactivity ... The view of the present writer is that the principle is one of justice and not one of positive 
law even in the sphere of municipal law, since in a municipal law system it is only an effective limitation of 
power if presented as a constitutional guarantee ... As a principle of justice it was not disregarded at Nuremberg 
as the illegality of aggressive war was established in the law by 1939 and as the particular acts punished were so 
obviously illegal it could not be objected that the precise content of aggressive war was not yet determined by the 
law. Those punished for crimes against peace were ignorant neither of the legal nor the moral prohibitation of 
aggressive war.' 15 
Professor N.C.H. Dunbar has drawn attention to the ironical situation that those who most strongly 
argued the relevance of the maxim of ex post facto legislation at Nuremberg were forced to ignore their own 
municipal law as it existed in 1939 and even afterwards, because the principle of nullum crimen sine leee 
was discarded by Article 2 of the 'Law to Change the Penal Code' promulgated by the Reich Minister of Justice 
on 28 June 1935. That Article provided: 
Whoever commits an act which the law declares as punishable or which deserves punishment according 
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to the fundamental idea of penal law and the sound concept of the people, shall be punished. If no 
specific law can be directly applied to this act, then it shall be punished according to the law whose 
underlying principle can most readily be applied to the act. 116 
Moreover, as Professor Dunbar observed: 
Nor was Germany the only country boasting a highly developed legal system to reject the ex post facto 
doctrine. Thus, Article 2 of the Russian Penal Code of 1926 rendered criminally liable 'all citizens of 
the R.S.F.S.R. who have committed socially dangerous acts ...'. And Article 13 of the Italian penal 
project of 1921 followed this line by declaring criminal 'acts which are committed solely for political 
motives or in a collective interest." 17 
A significant majority of authoritative writers on international law have accepted the judgment of the Nuremberg 
Tribunal, although not always for the same reasons and at times with a degree of dubiety. 118 
It would have been an exercise in quixotism if the Tribunal had disregarded the provisions of the London Charter 
as distinct from judicially interpreting them. Those who framed the Charter deliberately excluded any scope for 
the ex post facto principle. At the London Conference in July 1945, Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe, chairman of the 
Conference, said: 
There is one fundamental point that I want to see whether we are agreed on. I think we are. I want to 
make clear in this document what are the things for which the Tribunal can punish the defendants. I 
don't want it to be left to the Tribunal to interpret what are the principles of international law that it 
should apply. I should like to know whether there is general agreement on that, clearly stated -- for 
what things the Tribunal can punish the defendants. It should not be left to the Tribunal to say what is 
or is not a violation or international law. 119 
Thus the exclusion of the ex post facto maxim was embodied in the Charter. It is submitted that this was proper 
in the circumstances. There was no rule of international law in 1945 which made the application of the maxim 
obligatory. 120 Those convicted at Nuremberg, whether as principals or accomplices, had set themselves above 
any law long before the outbreak of the Second World War. As Hitler said: 
I shall shrink from nothing. No so-called international law, no agreements will prevent me from making use of 
any advantage that offers. The next war will be unbelievably bloody and grim.121 
That prediction was accurate. It is ludicrous to argue that those convicted at Nuremberg were unaware of what 
they had done or of the premeditated character of the acts of barbarity pleaded in the indictment, the truth of which 
was hardly disputed. Their mens rea was patent. They were not in the position of persons whom the maxim 
nulla poena sine lee was designed to protected: that is, they were not individuals who believed their actions 
were legally proper and, when the war ended, discovered that international law proscribed those actions. 122 It is 
trite, but true, to repeat that 'murder is murder'. Critics of 'Nuremberg Law' on the basis of ex post facto  
legislation should examine the transcript in the 'Einsatzgruppen Case' in the 'Subsequent Proceedings' and 
consider whether any principle of justice could in conscience be invoked to allow acts of such barbarity to pass 
unpunished. 
THE ACTS OF STATE DOCTRINE: 	INDIVIDUALS AS THE SUBJECT OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The scope of the acts of state doctrine in international law was, before the London Agreement and Charter of 8 
August 1945, subject to considerable controversy among writers. Conceptually, the doctrine was that an 
individual is not responsible for acts done as an agent of his state because accountability devolves upon 'the 
collectivity of individuals' — that is, the State. 123 
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Although the doctrine, in its classical form, had affinity with the principle of respondeat superior, it found 
expression in diverse circumstances. Many writers, including Professor Kelsen, viewed the doctrine as 'a 
necessary limitation of the right of states to take proceedings against foreign nations'. 124 A feature of the 
doctrine was that it was not regarded as of universal application, but was subject to exceptions, even though the 
exceptions were at times controversial. Thus Kelsen recognised that: 
A clear exception is established by the rules regarding espionage and war treason. General international 
law authorises the State against which acts of espionage or war treason have been committed to punish 
the perpetrators as criminals, even if the acts concerned have been committed at the command or with 
the authorization of the enemy government. In contradistinction to other war crimes, the State in whose 
interest espionage or war treason is committed is not obliged to prevent or to punish acts of this nature. 
The State which employs spies or makes use of war treason in its own interest does not violate 
international law and is not responsible for these acts.I 25 
Other writers extended that exception to war crimes on the basis that the doctrine did not apply to acts in time of 
war. 126 
The most significant area of conflict of views concerning the doctrine was whether or not the relevant acts were 
violations of international law, Several prominent writers expressed conflicting opinions on this 
question. 127 
However, in the writer's view, individual responsibility for the criminal acts pleaded in the indictment could not 
be contested at Nuremberg, quite apart from the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of the London Charter. An 
important practical consideration was that of the twelve accused who were sentenced to death, eleven were 
convicted of both war crimes (Count 3) and crimes against humanity (Count 4); the other defendant (Streicher), 
who was not charged under Count 3, was found guilty under Count 4. In the individual reasons for judgment 
relating to Streicher, the Tribunal stated: 
Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination at the time when Jews in the East were being killed 
under the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes persecution on political and racial grounds in 
connection with war crimes, as defined by the Charter, and constitutes a crime against humanity. 128 
One of the most assertive pronouncements of the Tribunal was the part of its judgment concerning individual 
responsibility which, in the view of the writer, was legally sound and mandatory from the viewpoints of justice 
and morality. The Tribunal stated: 
It was submitted that international law is concerned with the action of sovereign States, and provides no 
punishment for individuals; and further, that where the act in question is an act of state, those who carry 
it out are not personally responsible, but are protected by the doctrine of the sovereignty of the State. In 
the opinion of the Tribunal, both these submissions must be rejected. That international law imposed 
duties and liabilities upon individuals as well as upon States has long been recognised ... Crimes 
against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing 
individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced. 129 
The Tribunal expressed the opinion that the provisions of Article 228 of the Treaty of Versailles 'illustrate 
and enforce this view of international responsibility'. The catchcry at the end of the First World War of 'Hang 
the Kaiser' was certainly an expression of world sentiment that an individual could be, and in appropriate 
circumstances should be, held criminally accountable for conduct which violated all concepts of humanity. Yet 
the Kaiser's conduct fell far short of the inhumanity practised so sadistically by the Nazis. 
After citing Article 7 of the Charter, the Tribunal added: 
... the very essence of the Charter is that individuals have international duties which transcend the national 
obligations of obedience imposed by the the individual State. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain 
immunity while acting in pursuance of the authority of the State if the State in authorising action moves outside 
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its competence under international law.I 3° 
In essence, the judgment of the Tribunal applied the fundamental rule of criminal jurisprudence that mens rea, or 
consciousness of guilt, is an essential ingredient of individual criminal responsibility. The rule was given scant 
consideration in the arguments of defence counsel at Nuremberg. the facts pleaded in the indictment and 
established by evidence, often by means of captured German documents, were virtually uncontested. It is beyond 
argument that none of those convicted at Nuremberg could have been unaware of the criminal character of their 
conduct by any jurisprudential test. They simply did not believe, at least initially, that they could fail to be 
victorious in the war and were oblivious of any legal constraints. 
The United States case of Ex Parte Ouirin 
The only judicial authority cited by the Tribunal in relation to the liability of individuals for crimes against the 
law of nations was the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Ex Parte Ouirin, (1942) 317 U.S. 
1. Eight trained German saboteurs were the petitioners. In the middle of 1942 they travelled in two German 
submarines from a port in Occupied France to the United States. They had been instructed by an officer of the 
German High Command to destroy war industries and war facilities in the United States, for which they or their 
relatives in Germany were to receive payments from the German Government. Shortly after their arrival in the 
United States they were apprehended by officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The United States 
President issued an Order whereby a Military Commission was appointed to try the petitioners for offences 
against the law of war and the United States Articles of War. No issue was raised as to the culpability of the 
eight individuals on the basis of the acts of State doctrine. The sole question for decision was whether or not the 
detention of the petitioners for trial by a Military Commission was in conformity with the laws and 
Constitution of the United States. Nevertheless, two pronouncements of the Court, albeit essentially obiter, 
were relevant to the issue of the individual responsibility of enemy saboteurs. 
First, in a passage, part of which was cited by the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Court states: 
From the very beginning of its history this Court has recognized and applied the law of war as including that part 
of the law of nations which prescribes, for the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as 
well as of enemy individuals. By the Articles of War, and especially Article 15, Congress has explicitly 
provided, so far as it may constitutionally do so, that military tribunals shall have jurisdiction to try offenders or 
offenses against the law of war in appropriate cases. Congress, in addition to making rules for the government 
of our Armed Forces, has thus exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against the law of nations by 
sanctioning, within constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for 
offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, 
are cognizable by such tribunals. And the President, as Commander in Chief, by his Proclamation in time of 
war has invoked that law. By his Order creating the present Commission he has undertaken to exercise the 
authority conferred upon him by Congress, and also such authority as the Constitution itself gives the 
Commander in Chief, to direct the performance of those functions which may constitutionally be performed by 
the military arm of the nation in time of war. 
Second, the Court added: 
By a long course of practical administrative construction by its military authorities, our Government has ... 
recognized that those who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into our own, discarding 
their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the 
status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission. This precept of the law of war has 
been so recognized in practice both here and abroad, and has so generally been accepted as valid by authorities on 
international law that we think it must be regarded as a rule or principle of the law of war recognized by this 
Government by its enactment of the Fifteenth Article of War. 
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The importance of the decision in Ex Parte Ouirin is that it was not argued that the saboteurs were immune from 
personal criminal liability. Further, the Court treated the case in all respects as one in which the saboteurs 
allegedly had violated international law and that their actions were justiciable in accordance with the law of the 
United States by the application of 'part of the law of nations'. The decision was simply that the Military 
Commission appointed by the President had jurisdiction to try the charges. The judgment of the Court was 
delivered by Chief Justice Stone, and was based on a lone line of decisions of the Supreme Court. 
Conclusion 
In the writer's view it is beyond doubt that, irrespective of the scope of the legislative authority of the Allied 
Powers following the unconditional surrender of Germany, the prescription in Articles 6 and 7 of the Nuremberg 
Charter of the responsibility of individuals was merely an application of established international law. Many 
respected writers have advanced this view. Thus, Professor Dinstein wrote in 1985: 
The individual human being is manifestly the object of every legal system on this planet, and 
consequently also of international law. The ordinary subject of international law is the international 
corporate entity: first and foremost (though not exclusively) the State. Yet, the corporate entity is not a 
tangible res that exists in reality, but an abstract notion, moulded through legal manipulation by and 
within the ambit of a superior legal system. When the veil is pierced, one can see that behind the legal 
personality of the State (or any other international corporate entity) there are natural persons: flesh-and-
blood human beings. In the final analysis, Westlake was undubitably right when he stated: The duties 
and rights of States are only the duties and rights of the men who compose them'. 131 That is to say, in 
actuality, the international rights and duties of States devolve on human beings, albeit indirectly and 
collectively. In other words, the individual human beiing is not merely the object of international law, 
but indirectly also its subject, notwithstanding the fact that, ostensibly, the subject is the international 
corporate entity.I 32 
Professor Glueck expressed his view clearly and firmly: 
It is perfectly abvious that the application of a universal principle of non-responsibility of a State's 
agents could easily render the entire body of international law a dead letter. For any group of criminally 
minded persons comprising the temporary Government that has seized power in a State could readily 
arrange to declare all of its violations of the law of nations -- either in initiating an illegal war or in 
conducting it contrary to the laws and customs of recognizedly legitimate warfare — to be 'acts of State'. 
Thus all its treaty obligations and international law generally could be rendered nugatory; and thus the 
last law-abiding member of the Family of Nations could always have a weapon with which to 
emasculate the very law of nations itself. The result would be that the most lawless and unscrupulous 
leaders and agents of a State could never be brought to account.I 33 
Mr. Justice Jackson put the issue in simple terms when he said in his opening address: 
The idea that a state, any more than a corporation, commits crimes, is a fiction. Crimes always are 
committed only by persons. While it is quite proper to employ the fiction of responsibility of a state 
or corporation for the purpose of imposing a collective liability, it is quite intolerable to let such a 
legalism become the basis of personal immunity. 134 
TV QUOQUE 
In the course of the trial at Nuremberg and in some subsequent criticism, attempts were made to invoke the 
argument of tu quoque against some of the Allied Powers as a result of their actions during the Second World 
War. It was asserted that war crimes and violations of international law were committed on both sides and that 
German armed forces were entitled to retaliate. Thus Dr. Exner, counsel for Jodi, submitted to the Tribunal: 
Retaliation justifies an action which under normal circumstances would be illegal. That is to say, retaliation 
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then has this significance when the individual action is the answer to a violation of international law committed 
by the other side. ._ it is entirely important in the judgment of a crime — to consider the motive. If one does 
not know the motive of the action one cannot judge the action itself. And the bitterness which was started, 
purely psychologically, by the manner in which the war was conducted on one side and on the other, was the 
motive for actions which normally cannot be justified. 135 
The cited submission by counsel, although no examples were given, was based on the doctrine of reprisals in 
international law, and was directed at the admissibility of evidence sought to be tendered. It does not appear from 
the transcript that the Tribunal made any specific ruling on the submission, at that stage, although it is, of 
course, clear from the subsequent ruling (infra) and the judgment that it did not recognise the tu quoque argument. 
After the war, some writers based their criticism of the Nuremberg judgment on the fact that it was Allied policy 
to attack civilian populations: for example, the destruction of Dresden, the fire-bombing of Hamburg and Tokyo 
and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Professor Falk, a persistent critic of 'Nuremberg Law', 
wrote: 
Standards of negative reciprocity were relied upon, namely, that the leaders of the defeated states brought before 
the bar of international justice were not charged with any actions — such as submarine attacks without prior 
warning or the a bombardment by air of enemy cities — that were also the common practice of the victorious 
side. Such forbearance at Nuremberg can be interpreted to mean that anything the victor does is beyond 
condemnation as criminal and that the defendant might succeed with a tu quogue argument. So interpreted, 
Nuremberg is deeply flawed if understood as moral education. 136 
The tu quoque argument was specious. It is not a defence in criminal proceedines,137 and, in any event, it was 
not relevant at Nuremberg. 
As the Tribunal ruled: 
The question is, how can you justify in a trial of the major war criminals of Germany, evidence against 
Great Britain, or against the United States of 'America or against the U.S.S.R. or against France. If you 
are going to try the actions of all those four signatory powers, apart from other considerations, there 
would be no end to the trial at all, and their conduct has no relevance to the guilt of the major war 
criminals of Germany, unless it can be justified by reference to the doctrine of reprisal, and this cannot 
be justified in this way.I 38 
The Tribunal applied the same reasoning in rejecting evidence relating to aerial attacks on alleged non-military 
targets. 139 
Professor Quincy Wright expanded the argument against the availability of the tu quoque doctrine at Nuremberg 
when he wrote: 
... the equitable principle of 'clean hands' is not recognized as a defence in criminal trials. Whether or 
not statesmen or individuals of the United Nations have been guilty of any of the offenses for which the 
defendants were tried was not a question legally relevant to this trial, nor is it legally relevant to 
consider whether other persons who have not been indicted or who were not within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal may have been guilty of the same offenses. Unreasonable discrimination in initiating 
prosecution of persons probably liable under law applied is international law justice seems to call for a 
tribunal with jurisdiction over all persons subject to that law. Such justice, however, has never been 
realized. Courts applying international law have always had a more limited jurisdiction. It has not been 
considered unreasonable for the jurisdiction of national tribunals applying international criminal law to 
be limited to those whose acts were injurious to the state establishing the tribunal. 14° 
FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE INDICTMENT 
The analysis of the Nuremberg indictment in Chapter 8 was designed to demonstrate some fundamental 
conclusions: first, it was based upon the substantive and procedural provisions of the London Agreement and 
Charter, and the duty of the Tribunal was to apply those provisions without being bound by the jurisprudence of 
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any particular national legal system; second, there was no legal justification for the inclusion of Count I in the 
indictment - the alleged common plan or conspiracy to commit the crimes alleged in the other three Counts -; 
third, Count 4 (Crimes against Humanity) unnecessarily enlarged the indictment and could have been embraced 
within Count (War Crimes). 
In this section, further critical consideration will be given to the terms of the indictment. 
The alleged conspiracy ( Count I) 
The "Statement of the Offence" under Count I was a clear allegation of involvement of all of the accused in a 
common plan or conspiracy to commit all the categories of crimes charged in Counts 2, 3 and 4. The only 
qualification on this all-embracing allegation arose from the particulars in the statement of the individual 
responsibility of the defendants (Appendix A of the indictment). 
The case of the accused FRITZSCHE, who was found not guilty "under the indictment" illustrates the confusion 
which resulted from the conspiracy pleading. 
The particulars in the case of FRITZSCHE alleged that he used the positions he occupied and his personal 
influence: 
to disseminate and exploit the principal doctrines of the Nazi conspirators set forth in Count One of the 
Indictment, and to advocate, encourage and incite the commission of the War Crimes set forth in Count 
Three of the Indictment and the Crimes against Humanity set forth in Count Four of the Indictment 
including, particularly, anti-Jewish measures and the ruthless exploitation of occupied territories. 
The Tribunal began its statement of the reasons for its judgment in relation to Fritzsche with the words ' 
Fritzsche is indicted on Counts One, Three and Four'. After a summary of the official positions held by 
Fritzsche, importantly under the heading of 'Crimes against Peace', the Tribunal stated: 
Never did he achieve sufficient stature to attend the planning conferences which led to aggressive war, indeed 
according to his own uncontradicted he never even had a conversation with Hitler. Nor is there any showing that 
he was informed of the decisions taken at these conferences. His activities cannot be said to be those which fall 
within the definition of the common plan to wage aggressive war as already set forth in this Judgment. 
Under the heading of 'War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity', the Tribunal concluded: 
It appears that Fritzsche sometimes made strong statements of a propagandist nature in his broadcasts. 
But the Tribunal is not prepared to hold that they were intended to incite the German people to commit 
atrocities on conquered peoples, and he cannot be held to have been a participant in the crimes charged. 
His aim was rather to arouse popular sentiment in support of Hitler and the German war effort .... the 
Tribunal finds that Fritzsche is not guilty under this indictment. 
The cited extracts from the Tribunal's judgment, and the structure of the statement of its reasons, establish 
beyond any doubt that analytically it construed Count I as a separate substantive charge, cumulative, if 
established by the evidence, upon each of the three following Counts. For the reasons states in Chapter 8, that 
construction was contrary to the accepted scope of the concept of criminal conspiracy in civilised jurisdictions. 
However, it is questionable whether the Tribunal was correct in stating that Fritzsche was indicted on Counts 1,3 
and 4 . In the writer 's view, he was charged only under Count I, in accordance with the particulars of his alleged 
individual responsibility. The words '... he cannot be held to have been a participant in the crimes charged' 
[emphasis added] are referable, as a matter of construction, to the word 'participated' in the second line of Count I. 
For the purpose of the inclusion of the conspiracy count in the indictment and the pleading of conspiracy within 
Counts 3 and 4 was obviously to ensure that the scope of admissible evidence would be as broad as possible. In 
practical terms, the allegation of conspiracy encompassed the conduct and activities of all the alleged major war 
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criminals over a very long period and linked them together. It is the writer's view that the conspiracy count was 
not necessary and that the course of justice could have been pursued, in accordance with the Moscow Declaration 
of 30 October 1943, just as effectively if it had been omitted. 
Crimes against peace 
Count 2 of the indictment charged all the defendants with crimes against peace, the jurisdictional validity of 
which has been argued by the writer in the section of this Chapter relating to the legal status of Germany after its 
unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945. 
Count 2 was simply expressed. It was not complicated by any allegation of conspiracy. The charge was confined 
to actual participation. In the planning, preparation, initiation and waging of wars of aggression, which, it was 
alleged, were also wars in violation of international treaties, asireements and assurances. Thus it was a clear 
application of Article 6 (a) of the London Charter. Once the validity of that provision in the Charter is accepted, 
as the writer argues it should be, the pleading in Count was unobjectionable. 
It should be borne in mind that although the terms of Count were brief, they involved the twelve wars of 
aggression which it was alleged Germany had initiated between 1 September 1939 and 11 December 1941. This 
fact is an additional argument for the view that the pleading of a conspiracy was unnecessary. 
War crimes 
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organised national policy'. In a reference to the law of 28 June 1935, Professor Campbell, (1946) 62 
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analogy. ... whether the Nazis interpreted the principle of analogy in a wide or a narrow sense the 
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torture and execution without trial; the ordinary criminal law, like every other branch of the law, must 
be made flexible and pliable so that it could be shaped at any moment to whatever ends of policy the 
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117. Dunbar, loc.cit., p.178. 
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moment of commission': Stone, op. cit., Discourse 20, pp. 368-371, in which that writer stated: '... 
The maxim is not as such a rule, much less an overriding rule, of legal systems generally': 
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wished to consider the argument of ex post facto law on its merits, it might have been expected to tackle 
the issue from the point of view of comparative law [sed quaere]. It would probably have found that 
while liberal and individualistic systems of municipal law view retroactive penal laws with disfavour, 
even they have not always been able to dispense altogether with this device'. This writer regards the 
following arguments of Professor Schwarzenbereer as curious: 'It is not necessary to dwell unduly on the 
relapse of the Nuremberg Tribunal into law-making by reference to natural law; for, in view of the clear 
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violators, to impel judges to recognize it as an existing part of the law of the land, and to hold its 
violators guilty of a crime. 
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international law as a progressive system, the rules and principles of which are to be determined at any 
moment by examining all its sources (general principles of law, international custom, and the teachings 
of the most highly qualified publicists no less than international conventions and judicial decisions) 
there can be little doubt that international law had designated as crimes the acts so specified in the 
Charter long before the acts charged against the defendants were committed. 
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a grave injustice and injury upon innocent persons who have acted in good faith, in reliance on the law 
as it existed when they acted, and whose acts, although later declared to be criminal, when done were not 
unlawful or immoral, by no stretch of the imagination could any reasonable person look upon the 
381 
depraved conduct of the Nazis as innocent. It is certain that they did not rely on any possible immunity 
existing under international law as then in force or generally accepted'. 
123. Woetzel, op.cit., p.68. 
124. Ibid., p.69. 
125. Kelsen, op.cit., p.99. 
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132. Dinstein, 'International Criminal Law', (1985) 20 Israel Law Review, pp.206-242 at p.1. 
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135. Nuremberg Trial, I.M.T., vol. VIII, pp.182-183. and see ibid., vol, IX, pp.322-326 and p.673 et.seq. 
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